The development of British counterinsurgency policies and doctrine, 1945-52. by Jones, Timothy Llewellyn
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 











The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any 
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 








The development of British counterinsurgency policies and doctrine, 1945-52.
Jones, Timothy Llewellyn
Download date: 06. Nov. 2017
The development of British counterinsurgency policies and
doctrine, 1945-52.
Timothy Liewellyn Jones.
Submitted for the degree of PH.D.






The thesis explores the period of seminal change in
British counterinsurgency [COIN] policies and doctrine,
1945-52. The first chapter outlines the nature of insurgency
and COIN to indicate the requirements of successful COIN. The
next focuses on British involvement in Internal-Security tasks
from 1900-45, as this experience was a key factor in the
shaping of postwar COIN. The subsequent three chapters identify
the institutions that advanced COIN thought and policies, and
analyses how the line taken by each agency was advanced after
the War. The influences playing on them included individual
progressive thought that displaced accepted convention and
overcame institutional conservatism. And, although not hitherto
fully appreciated, wartime experience of unconventional warfare
and unorthodox forces, and concurrent postwar COIN campaigns,
were also crucial influences. These inspired political and,
more particularly, civic action policies, designed to gain
popular support, notably in Greece and Malaya by 1948/9.
Further, while the transformation of military policy took
longer to effect, significant progress was achieved in
Palestine and Greece by 1947, and especially in Malaya by 1950.
The British political-institutional system worked against the
rapid transfer of lessons from one COIN arena to another, but
individuals sought inspiration from the recent past, and by
1948 all agencies employed 'expert' COIN advisors, which
became a principle for later COIN campaigns. Moreover, by 1950
a new body of COIN policies and doctrine was formed, and
refined by 1952, notably in the military sphere. Traditional
policies were not wholly discarded, but a new 'Hearts-and-
Minds' doctrine was formulated, and this was a major advance on
the previous British COIN line. A short conclusion summarises
the determinants that helped and hindered the development of
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Freedom of Israel, Stern Gang; Palestine insurgents
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Mol Ministry of Information
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Chapter 1: The Nature of Counterinsurgency.
Counterinsurgency was gradually recognised in the postwar
years as a distinctive type of conflict. The United Kingdom
was continuously embroiled with it from 1945 until 1960, and a
comprehensive and coherent set of COIN policies and principles
was created during this period. Britain's first postwar
exposure to insurgency occurred in 1945 in Palestine and
Greece, and the British security forces, (the police and the
military), undertook COIN tasks. The state of British COIN
policies and doctrine at that time will be assessed, as the
starting point for analysing the process of COIN development,
and of the factors involved in this, during the crucial years
of change leading up to 1952. To do this requires a reference
framework that establishes the meaning of the concepts and
terms which are used in this study henceforth.
The term 'policy' is used to describe 'a flow of purposive
action' that a nation-state has taken, intends to take, and is
taking, in a particular field, in order to achieve an
objective. National policies are formulated upon the basis of
various domestic and international political interests which
are defined by high level State authorities. They are derived
from disparate policy options that are recommended by
bureaucrats and policy executors, who provide governments with
a steady stream of information and advice. Individual
government officials who suggest policy alternatives are
influenced by social, cultural and historical factors, as well
as by an array of innate psychological determinants, such as
their own preconceptions, perceptions and analytical methods.
As members of a State bureaucratic organisation, they can also
be affected by the prevailing institutional mode of thought on
a particular subject, or its 'line'. This 'may [serve to] limit
policy-maker's options by obscuring possible interpretations
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of events, and blocking consideration of possible policies.'
Policy options are implemented by high level decision-makers,
by low level staff who are delegated the responsibility, or
simultaneously by various individuals. A nation-state's actual
policy is often the synthesis of various options and it may be
founded on a 'doctrine'. This is one or more principles
advocated by a policy-making body for use in a given field.1
State authorities require an understanding of insurgency
if they are to counteract it successfully. Equally, the
historian needs to know the meaning of 'insurgency' and
'counterinsurgency' in order to determine whether contemporary
British counterinsurgents' perceptions of insurgency were
correct, or if insurgency was confused with other more familiar
types of Internal-Security [i.s.] threat. If British COIN
forces did not have a conception of insurgency, they may well
have responded to it inappropriately.
'Insurgency' is a particular form of 'intrastate
conflict', a term which is used to describe any campaign
by actors other than the State authorities who attempt to fulfil their
goals through the use of violence, with or without assistance
from external sources, (and in preference to the term 'low
intensity conflict' which 	 does not encompass all such
struggles). Historically, 'insurgency' was confused by scholars
1. Further discussion on the formulation and use of policy
options, J.C. Garnett, quoted in J. Baylis (ed.) British
Defence Policy in a Changing World (London, 1977) Intro.,
P.12: for other definitions of 'policy', Chapter 1,
assim; The New Concise Collins Dictionary (London, 1985),
'a plan of action adopted or pursued.' Institutional
constraints on individual thought are elaborated on in, D.
Shafer Deadly Paradigms (Leicester, 1988) P.34,46-7.
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and governments with other types of intrastate conflict, and
often COIN lessons were 'remembered only as aphorisms.'2
Indeed, many different criteria have been used to define
'insurgency', and 'the variety of classificatory schemes now in
use not only increases misunderstanding but is a positive
barrier to the development of knowledge.' 3 Difficulties arise
in the formulation of any theoretical construct dealing with
societal conflict, because atypical cases will reduce its
applicability, and accumulated errors, generalisations and
innate connotations about types of conflict and the terminology
used to describe them pose problems. However, a universal
classification of intrastate conflict is not intended in this
work, and broad classes and their sub/types are delineated only
so as to provide a foundation for understanding insurgency and
other forms of conflict that were encountered by British I.S.
2. On the nature of societal violence, C. Johnson
Revolutionary Change (London, 1966) P.8. On its intensity,
gauged by its scope, duration and the number of deaths it
causes, R. Tanter/M. Midlarsky 'A Theory of Revolution',
in S.C. Sarkesian (ed.) Revolutionary Guerilla Warfare
(Chicago, 1975) P.50-4. Interstate 'limited' or 'total'
wars range from medium to high intensity violence. Intra-
state conflict is usually of low intensity violence,
although it can increase. On various aspects of violence
movements, J.A. Miller, 'Political terrorism and
insurgency', in Y. Alexander/S.M. Finger (eds.) Terrorism:
inter-disciplinary perspectives (New York, 1977) P. 67. On
their effects, L.W. Pye, 'The roots of insurgency and the
commencement of rebellions', in H. Eckstein (ed.) Internal
War (New York, 1964) P.162; J. McCuen The Art of Counter-
Revolutionary Warfare (Harrisburg, Penn., 1966) P.213.
3.	 Eckstein (ed.), in Internal War Intro., P.18.
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agencies between 1945 and 1952. This demarcation is 'based on
various elements' such as the intensity of violence, the
characteristics of the participants, their objectives, and the
instruments of policy that they employ.
Intrastate conflicts can be classed as non/revolutionary,
which gives the State a basic indicator of the type of threat
that it faces, if not its potency, and an idea about the
orientation of its response. Revolutionaries seek to alter a
nation-state's system of political authority, ideological
foundations or basic social structure, in what is termed
'rebellion'. Non-revolutionary actors engage in 'civil
dissension', the most common types of which are 'turmoil',
'sedition', and 'social banditry'. 'Turmoil' involves localised
and short-lived 'relatively spontaneous, unstructured
violence with predominantly popular participation', such as is
manifested in strikes, riots and demonstrations. 4 'Sedition' is
more 'structured' low intensity violence, for instance,
terrorism,	 which is organised by a movement aiming to
destabilise a country until its demands are met by the
government. 5
 'Social banditry' is distinct from criminal
banditry, or 'brigandage', because it is a 'phenomenon of
social protest', and consists of 'unstructured' violence,
exemplified by sporadic irregular attacks. It is usually
pursued for many years in a specific geographical region.6
4. On the characteristics of 'turmoil', T.R. Gurr Why Men
Rebel (New Jersey, 1971) P.11,34.
5. On 'sedition', ibid; Concise Collins defines it as 'an
offence that tends to undermine the authority of a State.'
6. For further details on 'social banditry', E.J. Hobsbawm
Primitive Rebels (London, 1959) P.84-5.
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Some of the various types of 'rebellion' include 'mass
uprising', 'conspiracy', and 'revolt'. A 'mass uprising' may be
spontaneous or organised, and it comprises 'unstructured',
short-lived violence initiated by the inhabitants of towns, as
was demonstrated by the 'Great Revolutions' of history, such as
that of 1789. A 'conspiracy' is 'highly organised, relatively
small scale violence' instigated by a political elite with
little if any popular involvement, and is illustrated by
violent coups. 8 'Revolt' is characterised by low to medium
intensity violence, ranging from riots to conventional warfare,
planned and organised by a political movement that strives for
mass participation over a protracted period. One of its sub-
types, 'civil war', is of an 'essentially military nature', its
focus being on conventional war as two 'sides face off in
geographically distinct areas with rival armies as two warring
governments.' 9 It often evolves from an 'insurgency', which
incorporates the policy instruments of political subversion,
terrorism, and rural and/or urban guerilla warfare, the last of
7. Other terms used to describe conflicts, such as
'resistance' and 'insurrection', are not adopted in this
study, to avoid confusion about various types of conflict.
On 'mass uprising' see, P. Calvert Revolution (London,
1970) P.122.
8. On various types of coup, Gurr Why Men P.334.
9. On the features of civil war, M. Edwards, 'Civil war; a
taxonomy and typology', in R. Higham (ed.) Civil Wars of
the Twentieth Century (Lexington, Mass., 1972) P.20;
Miller in Alexander/Finger P.68.
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which is not commensurate with insurgency.'0
Guerilla war involves semi-independent mobile military
units in the ambush of mobile opposition armed forces, raids
on their installations, and the sabotage of their
infrastructure, using hit-and-run tactics. It can be prosecuted
by nation-state regular armies as an adjunct to conventional
mobile and positional warfare, or by irregular forces.
Irregulars can undertake conventional warfare too, but they
more commonly prosecute guerilla warfare, and indeed, are often
incorrectly viewed as being synonymous with it. Before the
twentieth century, many colonial irregulars practiced
conventional and guerilla modes of war, but, with the emerging
firepower advantages offered by rapid-load weapons after the
1870s, more irregulars switched to the latter form of fighting.
Yet, many retained a propensity to revert to set-piece battles
or to take up static defensive positions as it suited them, and
hence they lay themselves open to imperial firepower. Such
irregulars were of a common 'traditional' variety, but in a few
cases the colonial renegades refined their guerilla tactics
and, especially after 1900, engaged in 'modern guerilla war'.
They became much better trained and organised, attacks were
based on intelligence and a planned advance and dispersal, and
they abandoned pitched battles with regular soldiers. These
'modern guerillas' were therefore 'tactically different' from
10. Some mistaken terminology concerning guerilla war and
insurgency is found, for instance, in, R. Taber War of the
Flea (London, 1970) P.17,21.
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other traditional irregulars.11
Guerilla warfare and terrorism are collectively termed
'unconventional warfare', and this element of violence is
central to insurgency. Terrorists may be distinguished from
guerillas, (though an individual can be both), because although
terrorists might employ hit-and-run tactics, they adopt methods
other than guerilla-style ambush and raid, such as remote
bombing and sniping, which are commonly directed against
unarmed targets. Moreover, terrorism has distinguishing
characteristics that differ from those of other policy
instruments. The murder of a particular person is the objective
of assassination. But political terrorism involves the threat
or use of extreme violence against the individual in a campaign
of intended sustained attack, aimed at unbalancing a society,
and mobilising popular opinion in reaction to it or to a
repressive State response, which in turn pressurises the
11. Also on irregulars, see Chapter 2, and B. Singh/K. Mei The
theory and practice of modern guerilla warfare (London,
1971) P.3,6-7. On various styles of guerilla tactics, A.R.
Molnar Human factors considerations of undergrounds in
insurgencies (Washington, 1966) P.213,218,220.
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government into making political concessions. 12 Political
terrorism is inherently an agent of psychological warfare, (or
'psywar' as it is commonly known), which is any activity that
is specifically designed to psychologically influence the
players in a power-political struggle. Both military force and
political subversion can be used to this end, the latter
instrument consisting of all non-military operations directed
against the State by those pursuing intrastate conflict. The
main vehicle of political subversion is the key psywar tool,
propaganda, which is defined as 'information, ideas, doctrines,
or special appeals disseminated to influence the opinion
attitude or behaviour of any specified group in order to
benefit the sponsor.' Political propaganda is used by a
movement to mobilise the population into active or passive
12. For further distinctions between terrorists and guerillas
see, B.E. O'Neill Armed Struggle in Palestine (Boulder,
Cob., 1978) P.14; W.v. O'Brien 'Counterterror, Law and
Morality', in, L.B. Thompson (ed.) Low-Intensity Conflict
(Lexington, 1989) P.188-9. For various definitions of
terrorism, P. Wilkinson Political terrorism (London, 1974)
P.12,16-17,19,36; J.B. Wolf Fear of Fear (New York, 1981)
P.73; T.P. Thornton, 'Terror as a weapon of political
agitation' in Eckstein P.77-90; M.C. Hutchinson 'The
concept of revolutionary terrorism' Journal of Conflict
Resolution 16, Sept. 1972, P.385-8; D.J. Hanle Terrorism;
the newest face of warfare (New York, 1989) P.111,114-
5,137,140. On the chances of terrorist success, R. Moss
Urban Guerillas (London, 1972) P.26-40.
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support for it.'3
Sir Robert Thompson proposed that 'the best'
concise definition of insurgency was, 'a form of warfare which
enables a ruthless minority to gain control by force, over the
people of a country, and thereby to seize power by violent and
unconstitutional means.' 14
 This is an appropriate description,
but one that circumscribes the essential features of insurgency
and does not offer a precise conception of it. Insurgency is
instigated by an active minority, but it also entails 'the
support or acquiescence of a substantial part of the
populace.' 15
 Therefore, insurgency is defined as a form of
conflict that embroils a substantial portion of a nation-
state's population in a protracted struggle over the national
ideological, social or political system, featuring a military
campaign, ineluctably including one of guerilla warfare, in
conjunction with political terrorism, and political subversion
13. On the characteristics of political subversion, F. Kitson
Low Intensity Operations (London, 1971) P.2. On psywar and
the nature of propaganda, M.A.J. Tugwell Revolutionary
Propaganda and possible countermeasures PHD, 1979, P.8,16-
20,23-4,326, and quoting J. Ellul Propaganda (New York,
1965) P.62-79; L. Fraser Propaganda (London, 1957) P.1.
14. R. Thompson Revolutionary war in world strategy, 1945-70
(London, 1970) P.16,41.
15. J. Paget Counterinsurgency Campaigning (London, 1967)
P.14; a view expressed by Mao in On Guerilla Warfare,
noted in McCuen P.61.
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incorporating propaganda.16
A knowledge of the working of insurgency is crucial to
understand COIN tasks. It does not occur on the basis of
objective preconditions, but appears in societies subjected to
psychological and political disorientation. A revolutionary
consciousness wells up among certain elements of the populace,
and an active minority tries to heighten this by manipulating
popular feelings of actual or aspirational deprivation in
regard to their living conditions. It is possible that socio-
economic or political reforms could conciliate an aggrieved
opposition, but if a government acceded to the full demands of
a revolutionary organisation this would involve self-defeating
change. While a degree of reform may remove some points of
contention, 'after a certain point, such policies could no
longer alter the situation.' 17 The inception of insurgency
depends upon the interaction of numerous factors, including the
options that are open to citizens to pursue political
objectives peacefully, societal views on the validity of
political violence, the degree of breakdown of concensus on
State legitimacy and authority, and the capacity for violence
on both sides. The progress of an insurgency may be stifled if
its leaders and activists are arrested and the insurgent
16. For other compatible definitions of insurgency see, J.
Baylis 'Revolutionary warfare', in J. Baylis et. al.
(eds.) Contemporary Strategy (London, 1975) P.134; P.
Paret/J. Shy Guerillas in the 1960's (London, 1962) P.37.
Insurgency is termed 'revolutionary war' by some authors.
17. On popular feelings and the commencement of insurgency,
Gurr Why Men P.338-9; and in 'Psychological factors in
civil violence' World Politics 20, Jan. 1968, P.47,52. On
the effect of reforms, Pye in Eckstein P.176.
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organisation is eradicated, but this is a difficult task to
accomplish quickly. State intelligence services might warn of
revolutionary agitation but they often fail to detect the
beginning of an insurgency because of its evolutionary
nature. 18
Insurgency progresses in stages that can be inter-related
or disjointed, 19 and its form is determined by many factors.
These include the character of the opponents, such as their
political will and resources, and the effectiveness of their
respective armed forces and organisations in mobilising popular
support, as well as innate societal characteristics, national
geography, and the attitude of other nation-states.
Nonetheless, although it is essential to adapt COIN policies to
the peculiar features of each insurgency, these can be focussed
18. For the preconditions of insurgency see, H. Eckstein 'On
the etiology of internal wars', P.10, J.C. Davies 'Toward
a theory of revolution', P.68, I.K./R.L. Feierabend/B.A.
Nesvold, 'Social change and political violence', P.107-9,
in I.K. /R.L. Feierabend/T.R. Gurr (eds.) Anger, Violence
and Politics (New Jersey, 1972); Gurr World Politics 1968,
P.47,52; W. Laqueur Guerilla (London, 1977) P.379;
Thompson World P.4; M. Elliot-Bateman (ed.) 'The
conditions for People's War', in Revolt to Revolution
(Manchester, 1974) P.289-302; W. Kornhauser 'Rebellion and
political development' in, Eckstein P.142-154.
19. For a discussion of different patterns of insurgency, 0.
Heilbrunn, 'When counterinsurgents cannot win', Journal of
the Royal United Services Institute {JRUSI] 114, Mar.
1969, P.55: he notes that guerilla warfare preceded
subversion in Algeria, 1956-62. Terrorism also
predominated over guerilla war in Palestine, 1945-7.
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on some of its inviolable aspects. Following a careful
assessment of the capabilities, interests and objectives of
both sides, and identification of the basic reasons for pro-
insurgent support, the State must stabilise its position by
restoring security and concurrently implement socio-political
programmes that are acceptable to much of the population. 2° A
regime may be poorly equipped for COIN, or encounter
irresistible insurgent pressures, but it can act purposively.
Insurgency is fostered and directed by a political or
politico-military organisation. The campaign is based on its
efforts to build up a revolutionary consciousness among the
masses, and hence attain widespread participation in the
insurgency, or at least the people's general passivity. This is
essential because 'the exercise of political power depends on
the tacit or explicit agreement of the population, or at worst,
on its submissiveness.' 21 Military action against State
authorities cannot guarantee a rebel victory, and in addition,
political and psychological operations are undertaken to obtain
the population's compliance and thus afford the advancement of
20. On the need for COIN analysis, S. Metz 'Counterinsurgent
campaign planning' Parameters 19, Sept. 1989. P.63; R.
Darling 'A new conceptual scheme for analysing COIN'
Military Review 54, June 1974, P.55-6,58-66.
21. On the relationship between political power and population




 The insurgents must not only destroy the
machinery of the State but also its popular legitimacy, by
impugning its monopoly of force and eroding its capacity to
uphold the Law and protect citizens and their property.
Insurgency nurtures societal polarisation by increasing the
number of its own active supporters and coercing some
individuals into passive support, while yet others resist it.
If the insurgents secure a substantial degree of deference from
the people, whether it takes the form of active or passive
support, the insurgent organisation and forces can be expanded,
and their activities may be sufficient to reverse national
power-political relationships.
The emphasis placed on each insurgency instrument is
conditioned largely by the level of popular acceptance which
the insurgents command. Hence, if a large proportion of the
populace extend their active support to the insurgents,
political subversion and terrorism may be the main instruments
they employ. But if a COIN effort is strong , the insurgents
will concentrate on small or large scale guerilla warfare to
undermine the State's position. Psywar is conducted throughout
the counter/insurgency contest to influence popular attitudes,
and insurgent political subversion includes propaganda that
declares the morality of their cause and decries the government
as immoral, corrupt and dysfunctional. A parallel insurgent
administration might also be constructed, centred on insurgent-
controlled 'liberated' areas. It assumes de facto political
22. Mao Tse Tung noted in On Guerilla Warfare (New York, 1961)
P.43, that solely military action against the State cannot
achieve victory: 'Without a political goal, guerilla war
must fail.' Insurgency is 'organised and maintained by the
masses [without whose] .. participation and cooperation,
its .. development is not possible.'
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authority and boosts insurgent claims to legitimacy. Political
terrorism is also exercised, and includes attacks on government
personnel and supporters, which has damaging psychological and
political effects if it is not mastered by the security forces.
It can dernoralise the regime's supporters, wring compliance
from some individuals who resisted subversion, and achieve
'passive support' for the insurgents from the 'politically
inert .. [who] support .. that side .. which provides .. the
greatest personal security.' 23
 Further, it increases pro-
insurgent support by meting out 'justice' on despised
officials. If terrorism is distended and wielded unselectively
against the people, in order to coerce them into supporting the
insurgency, it could have detrimental consequences for the
anti-State forces. But if a government fails to stem terrorism,
its own credibility is eroded, and wavering sections of the
population may be encouraged to lean towards the insurgent
side.
The accumulation of popular support provides insurgents
with various tactical and strategic advantages. Citizens can
provide supplies, recruits, shelter, and political and
operational intelligence upon which future actions are planned.
Potentially this offers armed units improved tactical
surprise, initiative and mobility. Guerilla warfare is
conducted to erode counterinsurgent resistance and to exert
control over targeted regions, and if it is not defeated it can
result in the expansion of 'liberated areas', the disruption of
the economy, and the loss of security force resources. Under
such unrelenting pressure a government may give in, but if it
persists with its COIN campaign, the insurgents may need to
supplement guerilla forces with conventional units to
23. On individual attitudes to personal security, C.W. Thayer
Guerilla (New York, 1963) P.43.
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achieve their goal.21
Insurgency therefore has several innate attributes, and a
'significant feature of much post-1945 COIN theory was the
considerable space given to understanding the nature of an
insurgency as a preliminary to its eradication.' 25 Hence,
counterinsurgency is defined as, a protracted campaign
involving a combination of psychological, political and
military action against an insurgent organisation and military
forces, and their political, psychological and military
operations, undertaken to preserve the socio-political
structure and ideological system of the State in a form its
authorities desire. 'There is no sure formula to determine the
best approach .. to take', 26 because of unique elements in each
instance, but 'general principles have emerged, which are of
24. Mao said that insurgency developed in three stages: 1. the
creation of an insurgent organisation, and the use of
political subversion and terrorism to discredit the State
and gain popular support. 2. the methodical development of
liberated zones by this action, and by guerilla warfare.
3. having built popular support, a'regular'army is then
created for mobile and positional war and the State forces
are defeated, granting the installment of a revolutionary
administration: Trotsky envisaged a similar development,
but in five phases, see, McCuen P.61.
25. I. Beckett/J. Pirnlott (eds.) in Armed Forces and Modern
Counterinsurgency (London, 1985), Intro., P.5.
26. On the lack of constants in COIN, J. Cross Conflict in the
Shadows (London, 1964) P.103.
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near universal applicability in dealing with an insurgency.'27
The manipulation of popular attitudes is central to the
consolidation of national political authority and legitimacy in
any nation-state. Therefore, for COIN short of genocide, most
academic authorities agree on the need for the State to
maintain the confidence of the non-deviant section of the
population whilst attempting to realign the rest to its side.
General Thompson's 'Five Principles' exemplify the 'Hearts-and-
Minds' COIN line that emphasises the building of pro-government
popular support, in order for it to have the foundations
required for a successful campaign. Some American scholars
turned their attention to the control of those physical
capabilities required by insurgents to pursue their aims,
through the adoption of stringent population-resource control
policies. And 'Hearts-and-Minds' exponents accept that some use
of these methods is necessary. But advocates of the 'Cost-
Benefit' COIN line assert that the key to success is not to be
found in raising levels of government popular support, but in
preventing the insurgents from converting their own active or
passive support into political-military assets. However, the
Hearts-and-Minds line, adapted to circumstances, offers a
generally applicable COIN doctrine.
Thompson's first principle is that the government must
communicate its aim to the people, which is to maintain a free,
independent and politically and economically viable nation-
state. The second is that COIN necessarily abides by legal and
civilised standards, with 'justice' being seen to be done even
if the Law and judicial processes have to be adapted, thereby
underlining government legitimacy. Thirdly, COIN demands an
27. On principles, Beckett/Pimlott P.7. Conversely, see A.W.
Scott et. al. Insurgency (Chapell Hill, Ca., 1970) P.113.
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overall plan that delegates priorities and resources, to avoid
omissions and any duplication of effort. It ought to be
implemented by a central command authority, embodied in a
Director of Operations, and by an efficient State machine which
also continues to carry out normal government functions.28
Fourth, the main focus of COIN is on the fight against
political subversion, especially propaganda, and on bolstering
support for the regime through its own reforms and propaganda.
It has also to eradicate the source of subversion by severing
the insurgent organisation's links with the people and
preventing its domination of areas targeted for 'liberation'.29
Finally, the government requires military success, by securing
strategic bases, often in towns where the masses can be more
easily controlled, and then instigating a methodical offensive
against opposition forces that denies them the 'space' in
which to launch attacks and exert their own influence. Constant
military pressure is exerted and population groups most
vulnerable to intimidation and terrorism are relocated to
secure areas. Therefore, stamping out unconventional war is the
counterinsurgent military objective, but it is also
inextricably linked with the countersubversion effort, and all
COIN operations share common psychological goals with regard to
shaping popular attitudes.3°
28. On the importance of a unified effort see also McCuen
P.71-86; Kitson Low P.51.
29. On counterorganisation tasks, ibid; Paret/Shy P.39-43.
30. For his COIN principles, R. Thompson Defeating Communist
Insurgency (London, 1965) P.62-70,83-4,112,116-9,144; and
also 'Regular armies and insurgency', in R. Haycock (ed.)
Regular armies and insurgency (London, 1979) P.10-3.
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It is necessary to refine these principles, because
although the counterinsurgent's aim is unequivocal, cultural
incommensurability means that some facets of Thompson's first
maxim will not always be relevant. An authoritarian power
engaged in COIN may seek to sustain its political structure and
ideological system, but not to establish a 'free' society.
Indeed, it is unwise for such a regime to enlighten its people
about its COIN campaign if they are quiescent under State
coercion and censorship, because admitting that there is a
threat could spark revolutionary agitation. A further
reservation is that an industrially weak power will be unable
to render a nation-state 'economically viable.' The second
principle of legal COIN action is correct, because societies
conceive that legality must be upheld, even if 'democracy' is
not lauded universally as a pillar of political legitimacy.
However, the fact that COIN action is 'legal' cannot in itself
bestow legitimacy on a discredited government. An overall plan
is also vital for COIN, and psywar in Hearts-and-Minds COIN
doctrine focuses on a 'positive approach', offering people
incentives to support the authorities, while simultaneously
countering the effects that insurgent activities have on the
populace. Positive psywar incorporates COIN 'political action',
including government political reforms, 'civic action' policies
consisting of programmes for social, economic and cultural
advancement, and counter/propaganda, in addition to military-
security operations. Propaganda publicises the government's
achievements, and political and civic action schemes are
designed to eliminate social cleavages and popular
dissatisfaction by achieving those political and socio-economic
changes desired by the population. Indeed, government deeds are
the 'acid test .. people employ' in deciding whether to support
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the State or the insurgents. 3' Other proponents of the positive
psywar approach assign priority to defeating irregulars,
arguing that military successes will raise popular confidence
in the regime. The government must destroy the insurgent forces
in any case, and victories may signal that 'militarily, the
[insurgents] cannot and will not succeed.' But such military
achievements are, by themselves, unlikely to convince citizens
under the pressure of insurgent propaganda and terrorism to
actively support COIN, and hence other COIN policies are
required in conjunction with this. 32 There are differences of
emphasis among exponents of the Hearts-and-Minds line, and
adaptability and flexibility is another essential COIN
principle.
In the 1960s, researchers at the American think-tank, the
Research And Development Corporation [RAND], shifted the focus
of COIN to the 'negative psywar approach', featuring repressive
measures including coercive population-resource control and
military-security policies designed to defeat the insurgent
military and uproot its organisation, and to pressure the
population. Supporters of a 'Cost-Benefit' line argued that in
nation-states where there was significant pro-insurgent
support, the people may disregard an administration's
31. On the requirements of State action, Pye in Eckstein
P.168; GK. Tanham/D.J. Duncanson 'Some dilemmas of
counterinsurgency' in Sarkesian P.561-3; Tugwell PHD,
P. 327-8 , 330.
32. Regarding the difference of emphasis on non-military
action, Paret/Shy P.59. Cf. Galula P.74-92, who underlines
military success for the building of popular support;
Taber P.23. Also, 0. Heilbrunn 'COIN targets- a question
of priorities' Army Quarterly 93, Jan. 1967, P.202-5.
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political-psychological efforts aimed at gaining their support,
because 'reforms' such as local elections and cooperatives
would be regarded as an attempt by the establishment to expand
its control over local affairs and to introduce measures like
conscription and new taxes. Strategists at RAND concentrated on
the physical control of the masses and the resources with which
they could furnish insurgents, because in doing so, the State
could make the insurgents' tasks more difficult and perilous,
and thus slow the progress of the insurgency. These analysts
asserted that rather than seeking the people's active support,
the government would merely require popular acquiescence, and
that this could be achieved by providing strong disincentives
for supporting insurgency. This entailed the State pressuring
inhabitants with threats and punishments, the widespread use of
force, and coercive physical control measures such as prolonged
curfew. RAND stated that once a population was pacified under
the weight of government measures, the security forces could
then destroy insurgent forces. However, Cost-Benefit COIN
action cannot guarantee government success, and popular support
is necessary to prevail in counter/insurgency. 33
 Unless one
camp can generate sufficient popular 'support', it is unlikely
that it will be able to bring enough pressure to bear on the
other side to win. The counterinsurgents must estimate the
levels of influence that their opponents could conceivably
command, and swiftly respond with appropriate Hearts-and-Minds
33. For the Cost-Benefit line, N. Leites/C. Wolf Rebellion and
Authority (Chicago, 1970) P.11,21,42-4,72-81,136,141;
Scott et. al., P.61,96-9. Also on its features, Shafer
P.113-132. On the role of popular attitudes, C. Johnson
'Civilian loyalties and guerilla conflict' World Politics
14, July 1962, P.648. For a sound outline of general COIN
requirements see, B.E. O'Neill Insurgency and terrorism
(Washington, 1990) passim.
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policies, including a politically sensitive application of
measures with potentially negative effects on popular
attitudes, such as population-resource controls.
In addition to COIN political action, counterterrorism34
is needed to prevent the intimidation of the people by
insurgent terrorism, and the creation of an impression of State
impotence as a consequence of it. Counterterrorism involves
offensive military-security policies, including counter-
organisation arrests, and, to reassure people psychologically,
defensive physical security measures, possibly including the
relocation of the most vulnerable people into protected
'resettlement' areas. This measure is also valuable for
population-resource control and counterorganisation, because it
can cut insurgent links with the masses, and in turn weaken the
capabilities of irregular forces.
Military operations are necessary in COIN, but whereas
conventional war is readily understood by State agencies, the
prerequisites of counterguerilla warfare are often
misunderstood. Although time-limited, set-planned, large scale!
unit offensive military operations can defeat unsophisticated
guerillas unversed in 'modern guerilla war', especially in
easily traversible terrain, modern guerillas active in
demanding environments have confounded them. These major
offensives can be of considerable value in unsettling
guerillas, breaking up uncommonly large guerilla forces and
endangering their bases. But the crux of counterguerilla war is
to gain contact with and defeat small guerilla bands. Large
operations rarely do this effectively, even with the assistance
34. 'Counterterrorism' is all action taken to oppose
terrorism, and includes the ambush of terrorists by
security forces, which is termed 'paraterrorism'.
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of control 'corsans' -permanent artificial physical barriers-
such as wire fences, minefields, sensors and guard posts,
because they impede guerilla movement but cannot prevent it.
These operations do not offer a short-cut to counterguerilla
success, which depends on strategic intelligence about the
insurgents, their resources and support, and tactical
intelligence on their actions and intentions. Intelligence is
gathered from technical and human sources and it is a lengthy
process, involving collection, collation, analysis, conversion
of 'background' into 'contact' information, and dissemination.
Counterguerilla offensive operations require prolonged
saturation area patrolling by small units of semi-independent
infantry, undertaking ambushes, raids and harassment from
strategic bases, not only on a speculative basis, but also on
intelligence. Platoons and sections rather than companies or
larger units operate in this 'paraguerilla' fashion, aiming to
restrict guerilla movement and resources, and engage and defeat
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them, as a vital component of the overall COIN effort.35
The process of the development of British COIN policies
and doctrine can now be analysed on the basis of this frame of
reference. This first demands the identification of the British
COIN agencies concerned, their perception of the tasks
confronting them in each instance of insurgency, and the
factors which conditioned their conduct in COIN after 1945.
Each institution involved had devised a 'line' on Internal
Security affairs by then, and this was potentially a crucial
influence on their actions.
35. Also on paraguerilla requirements, 0. Heilbrunn 'Counter-
insurgency Intelligence' Marine Corps Gazette 167, Sept.
1966, P.50; A.L. Fisher 'To beat the guerillas at their
own game' Military Review 43, Dec. 1963, P.82-4; C.N.
Barclay 'The Western Soldier versus the Communist
insurgent' Military Review 49, Feb. 1969, P.91-2; C.
Maechling 'COIN', in M.T. Clare/P. Kornbluh (eds.) Low
Intensity Warfare (New York, 1988) P.40; J. Weller Fire
and Movement (New York, 1967) P.57; V.K. Anand Insurgency
and counterinsurgency (New Delhi, 1981) P.208-12,218-20;
D.A. Charters The British Army and the Jewish insurgency
in Palestine, 1945-47 (London, 1989) P.171; T. Mockaitis
British counterinsurgency, 1919-60 (London, 1990) P.176,
notes that operations involving more than one company 'can
be considered "large scale".' Sub-company operations are
'small unit'.
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Chapter 2: The Heritage- British Internal-Security policy
and doctrine from the turn of the century to 1945.
British authorities involved in Internal Security1
included the Cabinet, various departments of State, and the
security forces. The I.S. line of each agency affected their
stance on COIN, and embraced a combination of political,
psychological and military policies. At any one time, the 1.S.
line of a particular government institution could differ to
that of others, and depending on the nature of that body, its
line could either be fairly rigid, or more open to modification
by new experiences or ideas. Its ability both to 'learn
lessons' and to retain them within a central memory revolved,
firstly, around the cognitive capabilities of individuals
working in it and the perceived worth of new ideas vis-a-vis
the existing line; and secondly, on the characteristics of its
organisational and training systems. If 'lessons' were
generally accepted by officialdom, they had to be assimilated
into the institution's I.S. line and generally disseminated
within it, ready for future reference. This process could take
a considerable time to complete, because of obstacles to change
such as the pervasive influence of existing thinking and
individual or collective conservatism.
Historically, British security forces carrying out I.S.
duties confronted many types of intrastate conflicts, but
insurgency was not encountered until 1919 to 1921 in Ireland,
and later in Palestine between 1937 and 1939. The British
practiced COIN in these territories, as did various regimes in
China, Africa and South America in the 1920s-40s, and other
conflicts of the period exhibited features that were common to
1.	 'IS' was an acronym commonly used after 1918 to describe
government duties in intrastate conflicts.
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insurgency, thereby offering experience of potential worth to
Britons framing COIN after the Second World War.
Technological developments by the end of the nineteenth
century, especially the breach-loading rifle and machine-gun,
and later, air power, led some irregulars to alter their mode
of operation. Unlike most adversaries of the Victorian era,
'modern guerillas' were characterised by the use of refined
tactics, weapons and organisation, and their leaders were not
inclined to favour set-piece battles. Such guerillas were often
also the military arm of an ideologically motivated body, and
by the interwar years there was 'a qualitative change in the
nature of the colonial opposition.' 2 Prior to this, the Army
habitually relied on large scale/unit operations to defeat
irregulars swiftly, although small units were sometimes
deployed in mountains and other treacherous types of terrain.
It sought unequivocal victories through the application of its
man- and fire-power advantages, and in the face of numerous
kinds of E.S. threat, military force became a cure-all for
imperial maladies, except in the white colonies after 1902 and
in India after 1919. Indeed, the Army's successful use of force
meant that familiarity bred contempt for any effort by soldiers
or scholars to analyse the conditions of its useability. This
attitude reflected the ethos of much of politically educated
English society, which 'for historical reasons connected with
political development .. always found it exceedingly difficult
to appreciate social, economic and emotional realities
2. On irregulars, also, K. Jeffery, 'Colonial War 1900-39',
in C. Mclnnes/G. Sheffield (eds.) Warfare in the Twentieth
Century (London, 1988) P.25,43; Singh/Mei P.3,6-7.
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underlying the surface unreasonableness of communal strife.'3
Popular-based violence movements were not perceived as a
manifestation of widespread aspirations or discontent, but as
an innate facet of native cultures. The exercise of force was
considered necessary to preserve the Empire, and the Army
became the tool of this implicit political ideology. Imperial
domination rested upon its supposedly unquestionable
organisational, technical and tactical superiority over
indigenous opposition, yet by the 1890s some military writers
were studying the problems arising in imperial intrastate
conflicts.
Major-General Sir Charles Caliwell's Small Wars became
semi-official War Office doctrine by 1906, and it proved to be
influential on British soldiers' thinking about I.S. matters
in the following decades. It synthesised the ideas of many
commanders on how to fight irregulars, including 	 counter-
guerilla warfare, as well as Callwell's own thoughts on the
3. On the English character, J. Marlowe The Seat of Pilate
(London, 1959) P.134. And views on violence, Pye in
Eckstein P.159-60,172; P. Darby 'East of Suez reassessed',
in Baylis British P.63. On the Army and irregulars,
Chapter 1; B. Farwell Queen Victoria's little wars
(London, 1973) passim. Further discussion of the Army's
role, J. Lider The military thought of a medium power
(Stockholm, 1983) P.275.
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subject. 4 He addressed the crucial issue of how best to respond
to all manner of I.S. threats, including 'the suppression of
insurrections', and accepted that guerilla war was 'the most
unfavourable form' with which the Army had to deal. The General
recognised that arduous terrain, the provision of resources by
native inhabitants, and the innate mobility of guerillas, could
make them a formidable enemy. Callwell advocated the Army's
Cost-Benefit line, but also supported its one customary
positive psywar policy, consisting of 'flag-showing' patrols
designed to demonstrate the Army's power and hence to raise
'popular confidence' in the State. These visited villages and
fought any irregulars encountered, and Callwell argued that
having been psychologically fortified by such displays the
natives would provide the army with information. But in cases
where this was not obtained, he recommended stern negative
psywar collective punishments of the population to extract
intelligence from them, although 'without antagonising' the
majority. Indeed, he proposed the wielding of military force in
order to predominate 'morally' over opponents, and the British
Army's military strategy was simply to 'crush' adversaries by
large scale/unit military-security operations and tough
population-resource control schemes. In view of finite army
resources and a widespread contemporary belief in the
4. Maj.-Gen. Sir C. Callwell Small Wars: it was published in
1896; by the WO Intelligence Dept. in 1899; and by HMSO
for the WO, in revised form, in 1906 and 1909. See also,
British Library Catalogue (-1975) Vol. 99 (London, 1976)
P.2040. The terminology was regularly used in WO works of
the period, for example, 'War Establishments-Small Wars',
Nov. 1920, W033/970A. It influenced officers of later
generations, as in Maj.-Gen. H. Rowan-Robinson Jungle
Warfare (London, 1944) P.13. On Caliwell's synthesis of
current military ideas, Beckett/Pimlott P.5.
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vulnerability of regular soldiers to guerilla attack, the
strategic goal was a quick victory, by impressing on both the
population and the opposition the futility of resisting the
army. It set out to accomplish this by a simultaneous
clearance of areas disturbed by irregulars; but if this proved
ineffective, the army would adopt a gradual area by area
clearance, or 'sectorisation', using area-deployed forces.
However, the	 long-term 'holding' of cleared areas was not
contemplated by the British military establishment because
swift victories against colonial opponents ought to obviate any
need for this. Success was to be achieved by forcing irregulars
to battle, and against tactically weak foes this could be
achieved if the army acted with 'vigour and decision
harassing the enemy and giving him no rest', through the
widespread and persistent use of large columns and large scale
offensives based on any available intelligence, or on
speculation; and short duration small unit operations where
the topography demanded them. Several companies formed 'mobile
columns' designed to have a psychological effect on the
population, to gather intelligence, and to fight and deter
irregulars. Columns moved openly, 'trailing the coat' to entice
irregulars to battle, often with 'bait' convoys nearby. Less
sizable 'flying columns' of a company or two also searched out
armed opposition if 'hot' information of their whereabouts was
received, meeting with some success. 5 But Mockaitis' statement
5. For his ideas, Callwell (1899) P.12,19,34,40,69,73,77,89,
99,102,116,127. Also on 'flag-showing', N.L. Dodd 'COIN
and I.S. operations' Defence 10, May 1979, P.318.
Collective punishments are legal penalties imposed on
uncooperative inhabitants, such as fines, crop destruction
and property seizure. They are distinct from extra-
judicial reprisals in retaliation for irregular attacks or
non-cooperation, and often include torture and murder.
-37-
that large scale/unit operations were a necessary 'prelude to
small unit operations', in order to gain intelligence for
them, 6
 is somewhat simplistic.
The British Army's large scale/unit tactical policies
accorded with the established Principles of War, and the
eagerness of commanders to test and practice their units in
battle. There were several large scale variants: 'drives'
involved a number of columns, each of at least a company, and
often more, moving over a target area towards a natural or
artificial 'block', such as a mountain or swamp, or a line of
artillery, designed to oblige the opponent to fight. Another
envelopment technique, called 'shepherding' or 'encirclement',
involved units moving in a tightening cordon. 'Sweeps' employed
them across a broad front over an area, (and 'sweeping' back
and forth was termed an 'eggbeater sweep' after the 195Os).
These large scale methods and the use of large columns were the
staple of British Army E.S. experience, and their utility and
familiarity enshrined them, along with the less widespread
practice of short duration small unit patrolling from picquets
in the mountains, as the Army's time-honoured counterguerilla
military approach. However, against small bands of modern
guerillas operating in testing geographical conditions, without
precise tactical intelligence, exceptionally good planning,
surprise execution and overwhelming numerical superiority,
large scale/unit operations were all but obsolete.
6. T.R. Mockaitis British counterinsurgency 1919-60 (M/s,
1989) P.356.
7. For more on counterguerilla policies, see R.L. Clutterbuck
'Military Prize Essay' Army Quarterly 81, Oct. 1960,
P.164-6; A. Campbell Guerillas (London, 1967) P.35.
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Callwell emphasised the problems posed by difficult
terrain and the guerilla's habit of dispersal. He favoured
small unit operations in the jungle and mountains, which
required infantry tactics and organisation different to those
of most 'small wars', and he proposed deploying Gurkhas who
'shed their text-book tactics' to engage guerillas 'in their
own coin.' Further, he affirmed that counterguerilla ambush had
'hardly received the attention it deserves.' However, he
confined his proposals to the realm of 'Mountain Warfare', and
they did not supplant large scale/unit policies in that
environment. Cal].well 'cause[d] no .. volte face in British
military thinking', 8 and the British Army made errors in
countering the modern guerilla war waged by the Boers from the
summer of 1900 to the spring of 1902.
The Army tried to 'learn lessons' from the South African
War, and Caliwell revised his Small Wars in 1906. It was
approved by the War Office, and restated the value of
population-resource control policies, including farmstead
destruction for food denial, 'corsan' wire and 'blockhouse'
guard posts, and population relocation into what were termed
'concentration camps', following the 'model' of operations in
Burma, (1886-92), and Rhodesia, (1892-5). In fact, these tough
methods were the vital factor in bringing the War to an end.
However, the 'Official History' of the War and British military
experts presumed that the army's drives, sweeps and flying
columns were the key to success, as they inflicted defeats on
large Boer forces and produced surrenders. Callwell and other
authorities did not evaluate the effects of counterguerilla
tactics vis-a-vis other measures used against the rebels, and
8. On his ideas, Callwell (1899) P.106,215,248,264,302. His
influence, R. Asprey War in the Shadows (London, 1975)
P.225.
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although many Boer irregular small units still existed in 1902,
this was not regarded as a military failure. Contemporary
'strategists regarded the attenuated struggle as a consequence
of the initial failure of generalship', and did not question
the worth of tactical policies applied against modern
guerillas. Townshend states that the lack of strategic
direction and inadequacy of population-resource control
measures applied in Ireland after 1919 indicates 'how rapidly
and completely the memory of the Boer War was effaced.' But
although some potential 'lessons' were not learned, the British
adhered to a 'well-established policy' of using local levies to
bolster the security forces, 9 and the apparent success of large
scale/unit military operations in South Africa and other
territories ensured that they were faithfully adhered to by the
Army. Indeed, familiar policies were the essence of its I.S.
line before the Irish struggle began after the Great War.1°
9. See Caliwell (1906), P.68,114,145-6,252; and Jeffery in
Mclnnes/Sheffield P.34. On both the use of controls, and
tactical military policies in South Africa see, Maj.-Gen.
E.K.G. Sixsmith 'Kitchener and the guerillas in the Boer
War' Army Q'ly 104, July 1974, passim; T. Packenham The
Boer War (London, 1979) P.268-70,274-283; Mockaitis m/s,
P.339-41; A. Campbell P.40. For Army views on the South
African War, and action taken after 1902, C.J. Townshend
'Martial Law' The Historical Journal 25, spring 1982,
P.183; H. Bales 'Military aspects of the War', in P.
Warwick (ed.) The South African War (London, 1979) P.101;
J. Pimlott 'The British experience', in I. Beckett (ed.)
The roots of counterinsurgency (London, 1988) P.22.
10. See, for instance, Capt. T.H.C. Frankland 'Notes on
guerilla war' United Services Magazine 33, 1912, P.126.
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The Army returned to 'Imperial-policing' in 1919, a role
that 'was assumed rather than stated.' The types of I.S.
conflict that it soon faced were 'primarily a case of the Army
simply assisting the Civil Power in traditional colonial
policing', 11
 and long-established policies were practiced
against rebels and dissenters in the North-West Frontier and
the Middle East. But, at a time when the Army sought to revert
to its familiar role after the ravages of the First World War,
the Irish insurgency began, and it required a response
transcending all previous British I.S. action. It was an
'organised, sustained and largely clandestine struggle',
involving psywar, terrorism, and 'consciously modern guerilla
11. The Army assumed Imperial-policing to be its main task, in
S. Bidwell/D. Graham Firepower (London, 1982) P.150; see
especially the Staff College text, Maj. D.H. Cole/Maj.
E.C. Priestley An outline of British military history,
1660-1936 (London, 1936), Chapter 25 on I.S. is titled
'Back to Normal'. The Army readily took up this role, but
in the UK the use of force was limited to being
'sufficient .. NOT coercion', and there was some distaste
for 'duties in aid' tasks among soldiers: Lt.-Col. H. De
Watteville 'The Employment of troops under Emergency
regulations' Army Q'ly 12, July 1926, P.283. On duties in
aid, and the use of force, Duties in Aid of the Civil
Power 1919, KCLL; 1923, W032/3456; 1937, especially P.3,
19: and 1938, MODL. Also on the nature of post-1918 I.S.
tasks, Beckett/Pimlott P.4.
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methods', and was 'a break with rebellions of the past.' 12 To
defeat it required the fusion of police and military skills,
political acumen, and an understanding of insurgent psychology,
into a multifaceted COIN campaign. However, Great Britain had
defeated revolutionaries before, by using its security forces
or devising a political settlement, (as opposed to 'political
action' which is an element of COIN). Despite recent political
concessions such as the suspended Irish Home Rule Act of 1914
and the 1917 Hontagu-Chelmsford reforms for India, the Empire
remained intact. There was no reason for the British
authorities to question the validity of their hitherto
successful I.S. policies, and although Colonel T. E. Lawrence's
published treatise	 of the early 1920s recounting his
experience of modern guerillas indicated their reliance on
popular support and intelligence- which could have given the
Army some valuable if limited insights for COIN purposes- his
'distracting public image obscured his ideas' from the military
hierarchy, and he was considered 'unsound .. and for their
12. On the character of the IRA insurgency, E. Ahmad
'Revolutionary War and COIN' in D.S. Sullivan/M.J. Sattler
(eds.) Revolutionary War-Western responses	 (New York,
1971) P.12; C.J. Townshend 'The IRA and the development of
guerilla warfare, 1916-21' English Historical Review 94,
Apr. 1979, P.318.
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purposes irrelevant.' 13 Additionally, despite Britain's recent
experience with propaganda during the War, its 'black' aspects
led to a 'postwar reaction against the idea of propaganda',14
and it was not viewed as a military concern. This instrument
was encountered before 1919, as were terrorism and guerilla
war, but no high level studies of them had been initiated
before the Great War, and in any case, the use made of them in
Ireland was original. Following the Armistice, the Army was not
disposed to adapt its existing I.S. line at short notice, but
events in Ireland and India immediately conspired to undermine
it, and to expose its weaknesses.
Following the Amritsar Massacre of April 1919, the Hunt
Commission recommended that the Army must apply 'minimum force'
in urban areas, and during the 1920s there was a 'broadening of
the principle of minimum force to cover .. [many types of]
disturbances .. [as is] evident in the War Office literature.'
In rural areas the Army's maxim of 'all necessary force'
continued for some years, and large punitive columns, 'corsan'
blockhouses and 'scorched-earth' crop-burning of the kind
employed in South Africa were implemented in response to
tactically weak irregulars active in the Mesopotamia mandate
from 1920 to 1924. But the massacre at 'Amritsar led to
13. T.E. Lawrence's works on irregulars included Revolt in the
Desert (London, 1927); 'The evolution of a revolt' Army
Q'ly 1, Oct. 1920. For high level army views of him and
irregulars, J. Shy/T.W. Collier 'Revolutionary War' in, P.
Paret (ed.) Makers of Modern Strategy (Oxford, 1986)
P.831; J.B. Bell The myth of the guerilla (New York, 1971)
P.13-5; Brig. R.W. McLeod Special Forces in the British
Army, Paper, c.1963, McLeod Papers, LHC.
14. On British distaste for propaganda, Tugwell PHD, P.39.
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repercussions in the Army and to doubts .. as to what a soldier
could do' while discharging his I.S. duties. 15 In the interwar
period the Cabinet insisted that the Civil Power oversaw I.S.
operations, to prevent any politically damaging excessive use
of force. It sanctioned Emergency legislation and statutory
martial law rather than a resort to actual Martial Law, and any
zealousness on the part of security forces engaged in 1.5.
tasks was further dampened by the growing influence of a modern
press corps. It criticised repressive State policies and
security force reprisals in South Africa, and subsequently, in
Ireland. British public opinion shifted against such methods,
and the Army increasingly found itself operating in an arena
demanding both greater political awareness and cooperation with
civil and police personnel, which had been hitherto neglected
by the British authorities in favour of a relatively non-
circumspect application of force. The Army wanted to administer
unrestrained repression in Ireland, but the level of force
officially allowed within the British Isles was circumscribed
by the Cabinet,' 6 and so the Army was obliged to devise COIN
from 1919 to 1921 without recourse to some of the firmer, more
15. On WO pamphlets, Mockaitis mIs, P.56. On the effects of
Amritsar, R. Higham Armed Forces in peacetime- the British
example (London, 1962) P.50; W. Slim Unofficial History
(London, 1970) P.71-81. On Iraq, P. Sluglett Britain in
Iraq, 1914-32 (London, 1976) P.41; A. Clayton The British
Empire as a superpower, 1919-39 (London, 1986) P.120-
4,129.
16. On the Army's actions, Higharn Armed P.52; on Martial Law,
Record of the Rebellion in Ireland, 1920-1 Vol.1, (Wo,
1922) P.23,27-8, in Lt.-Gen. Sir H. Jeudwine Papers, 72/
82/2, IWM. On the influence of the media, Jeffrey in
Mclnnes/Sheffield P.35.
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politically sensitive control policies that it had executed
before 1914. Mockaitis asserts that the Army believed that 'it
was fighting a war, not quelling disturbances' in Ireland.'7
More accurately, it equated insurgency with Irish rebellions of
the past and felt that this one could be similarly resolved by
a variety of 'normal' I.S. measures. Indeed, it floundered at
first, being both strategically and tactically moribund in
formulating effective policies. A brief outline of the COIN in
Ireland is necessary because of debate about its influence on
the subsequent development of British COIN. Beckett states that
'Ireland provided lessons that should have been noted', but
Jeffery states that 'scarcely any [COIN] lessons .. were drawn
from Ireland'. However, the Army HQ collated some for the War
Office and, as Mockaitis argues, it 'contributed to the
eventual development of British counterinsurgency', with Irish
experience being drawn upon after 1932 during the Burma revolt.
Moreover, in 1939, among 'a lot of officers .. memories of the
Troubles still lingered,' and Sir C.M. Gubbins and J.C.F.
Holland applied their knowledge of COIN in Ireland to form the
SOE, which in turn inspired COIN developments after 1945.18
17. Mockaitis m/s, P.45-6. On Army views, and for details of
COIN during 1919-21, see C.J. Townshend The campaign in
Ireland, 1919-21 (London, 1975) passim, especially P.116-
7; 'Irish insurgency, 1918-21', in Haycock P.32-3,40.
18. I. Beckett 'The tradition', in J. Pimlott (ed.) Guerilla
Warfare (London, 1985) P.4. Mockaitis m/s, P.31. K.
Jeffery 'Intelligence & COIN operations- some reflections
on the British experience', Intelligence and National
Security 2, Jan. 1987, P.121; also T. Bowden The Breakdown
of Public Security (London, 1977) P.243. Officers' views
in 1939, E. Morris Churchill's Private Armies (London,
1986) P.102. On Burma, P.59-61. On SOE, P.73-5; Chapter 6.
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In 1922, following the procedure adopted by the War Office
after the South African and Russo-Japanese Wars, a 'Record' of
the Irish campaign was produced for future doctrinal reference.
Charters notes that it was classified 'Most Secret', thereby
restricting its availability, and that there was 'no reason
for the Army to suppose that the Irish experience was anything
but unique.' But it was actually 'Secret' and was accessible to
Command and staff officers, and Townshend argues that 'it was
practically inevitable that Britain would face a succession of
similar challenges.' The War Office General Staff stated that
operations were 'carried out under unusual conditions of great
difficulty, [and a Record] will be of value to any military
commander who may in future be faced with a similar problem.'
The General Headquarters [GHQ] in Dublin suggested that the
Record should be distributed for guidance 'in the event of
similar situations arising in any part of the Empire', because
Irish 'conditions .. [were] entirely unlike any preconceived
ideas of military operations.' It emphasised the 'political
aspects and action [because] .. political and military
activities were so closely interwoven', and noted that the
opposition consisted of an alternative regime and military
forces that acted differently from 'ordinary guerilla war',
having been trained for terrorism and ambush. However, the
Record proposed fifteen counteractive 'principles .. common to
all forms of rebellion', 19 and also general policies and
organisational arrangements.
The War Office's Record reiterated much of the Army's
19. WO Record, Vol.1/Il, (Mar./May 1922), stamped 'Secret' and
'Officer use'. See especially, I:Foreword, P.1,3; II: P.1,
in Jeudwine, IWM. Charters Jewish insurgency P.134.
Townshend Historical Journal 1982, P.188. For details see,
Record, I: P.33,4,34,14,55; II: P.13,33.
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previous I.S. line, but also sought to improve on this in
various aspects, especially regarding extra-military-security
policies. It	 reaffirmed the worth of the negative psywar
approach, notably collective punishments, (although not
security force reprisals), despite their adverse effect on
relations with the people, and hence on intelligence provision
by them. But the Record also stated that counterpropaganda
'might have modified [popular] .. views about Sinn Feiri', and
stressed that the conflict was 'a political problem, and no
military operations could [end it]'. The report called for a
clearly enunciated government policy when COIN was embarked on,
as well as a Publicity Department to produce information and
counter propaganda. In organisational terms, it repeated the
accepted Army view that Martial Law could ensure unified
command of the security forces and a centralised intelligence
system. Background information was known to be vital, and the
army was urged 'to piece together scraps of information with a
view to forecasting the enemies probable .. moves', and then to
intercept irregulars. This 'principle' was underlined because
the Army as a whole was criticised for a European-War frame of
mind in regard to intelligence work, which was generally seen
by soldiers as 'secret service and nothing else.' The Record
concluded that the Irish episode 'proved that in guerilla war
the foundation of military intelligence is the battalion and
detachment system and that the best information is obtained by
front line troops.' It also stated that the police should be
relied on to procure information from the people, but advised
General Staff Intelligence [GSI] officers to build up local
contacts. If these sources failed to produce sufficient
intelligence, it recommended flag-showing patrolling to raise
'popular confidence.' Moreover, the document analysed the
performance of military-security policies and suggested the
innovative COIN concept of counterterrorist population self-
protection as a means to increase intelligence provision. This
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was not implemented in Ireland, but 'loyalists and moderate[sJ
organise[d] into civil guards' 2° were supposed to overcome
the dilemma posed between the need to concentrate military
force and to safeguard against terrorism.
In response to pleas made by some officers during 'the
Troubles' that the Army ought to intensify the pressure it
exerted on the IRA rather than to adopt a 'compromise between
conciliation and coercion', the Record argued that a more
repressive course could not have resolved the situation. Its
recommended counterguerilla strategy was 'constant activity'
and gradual clearance from urban to rural areas by area-
deployed forces. This entailed various familiar military-
security and population-resource control policies, such as mass
counterorganisation arrests and movement checks, and the South
African experience was drawn on with the employment of
auxiliary forces, sweeps, and flying columns by 1921. But the
termination of the Irish insurgency was not achieved because
these tactical policies were those best suited to countering
the IRA; rather, it sprang from the fact that the Republicans
formed large unit forces that were more vulnerable to army
offensives in 1921, and because information provision by the
people increased as it tired of IRA terrorism. Indeed, South
Africa-style blockhouses and drives were rejected by the
British authorities as likely to antagonise the inhabitants,
and the Record was an attempt on the part of the Army
establishment to officially adjust its I.S. line in 1922. The
Record recommended some fresh policies and rejected other
20. Record, on psywar, II: P.29,35-6; I: P.12,30,34-6,46,55-6.
Political action, I: P.53. Organisation, I: P.29,35-6,55-
6; II: P.20,22,35. Intelligence, II: P.13,29,30,33.
Population protection, I: P.34,55-6; II: P.4,6,12,18,24.
Also see, Townshend Campaign P.50-5,90-2,125-7.
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existing ones, and also pressed for 'peacetime .. [training of
the security forces] to deal with this form of warfare',
especially of intelligence officers. Barclay asserts that after
1922 there was in fact 'a more serious consideration of I.S.
duties throughout the Empire .. [leading] to the training of
all troops in these duties.'21
After the 1926 British General Strike, the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff [CIGS] insisted that I.S. lessons must
be learned by the Army, and War Office doctrine for 'Duties in
Aid of the Civil Power' was updated regularly, clarifying the
army's role in responding to low-level civil unrest. 22 But
preparations for intrastate conflicts in the imperial context
were not regarded as an urgent priority by high level military
21. Record: Army views on force, II: P.34. On counterguerilla
strategy, I: P.26,54-6; II: P.21,26,28. And policies, I:
P.2,13,34,43-4,46. Counterorganisation, I: P.6,7,8,15,23-
4. IRA and the people, I: P.37,39,47. Peacetime training,
II: P.22,33. On its implementation, Brig. C.N. Barclay
'British Forces and I.S.- past experience and future' in,
Brassey's Annual, 1973 (London, 1973) P.88; 'Historical
background, general policy and tasks of the army' in,
Brassey's Annual 1950 (London, 1950) P.138; Bidwell/Graham
P.150. Cf. ff.28. On the South African example, T. Bowden
'Ireland: the impact of terror' in, M. Elliot-Bateman
(ed.) Revolt to Revolution (Manchester, 1974) P.237; calls
for repression in 1920-1, Townshend Campaign P.190.
22. All /ref's in JO33/. WO doctrine for I.S. action in the
UK, in Instructions on Duties in Aid of the Civil Power
1923, MODL; Jan. 1928, /1159; Emergency arrangements Aug.
1929, /1202; Mar. 1930, /1216; I.S. Instructions (1933)




authorities, and in any event, the War Office had 'little time
to reflect on the Service's situation.' Moreover, it was
characterised by a 'tradition of administrative incompetence
[and] deep-seated conservatism', and this conspired to leave
the Army 'with an often chronic shortage of intelligence from
the War Office on its theatres of operations and the native
forces ranged against it.' Despite the emphasis placed on
intelligence in the Service Department's recent Record of the
Irish campaign, 'the status of military intelligence' declined
in the 1920s, indicating an abandonment of its own doctrine.
However, the unusually high incidence of postwar irregular
activity on the North-West Frontier of India, from the 1910s
onwards, ensured that the Army was often involved in I.S.
military operations in the Province, and fierce engagements
like those common before the War, between 1919 and 1922,
encouraged the Indian Army Headquarters to produce a specific
I.S. doctrine for the region in 1925.
The 'Manual of operations on the North-West Frontier of
India' was based on experience gained in fighting the Pathan
tribesmen, and the doctrine was approved by the War Office. The
Manual stated that considerable modification of the Principles
of War was required to fight irregulars, and suggested a
prolonged occupation of areas susceptible to guerilla
disturbances. It recommended various offensive military
policies, giving priority to large mobile columns consisting of
several companies, including infantry, artillery, sappers and
ancillary units, although it also proposed the employment of
smaller 'flying columns' to pursue 'gangs'. The Indian Army's
guide proposed armour support for mobile columns where it was
considered appropriate, and aircraft were said to be of the
'greatest value in tactical cooperation'; but air fire-support
or supply missions were not mentioned. The Manual noted that
the posting of platoon picquets was one of the most common
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activities of the army in the mountains, and it urged the
training of sub-units in ambushing from picquets, which gave
British soldiers some experience in small unit movement. But
the doctrine asserted that the 'enveloping attack often gives
the best hope for success' by deploying companies or platoons
in depth, often in battalion strength, on 'parallel or
converging routes', to achieve encirclement. These large scale!
unit operations were designed not only to defeat the enemy
quickly, but also to break their morale by negative psywar
means. The booklet also encouraged the use of mobile columns
for punitive missions against the population, such as crop-
burning and village destruction. Officers were urged to 'study
the history of past campaigns on the Frontier', and in practice
familiar I.S. policies proved adequate for retaining control in
the Province because of the predominantly traditional type of
irregular opposition encountered there. The Army was attempting
to learn from its previous experience on the Frontier, and the
Manual recommended the collective training of the security
forces in order to improve inter-force cooperation, the use of
instructional films, and learning through 'on-the-job' practice
in the hills. 23 However, despite the Service Department's
backing for the new Frontier doctrine, it relied on other
bodies to take the lead in any general refinement of the Army's
I.S. line, and it evidently did not feel that the direct
application of Irish 'lessons' to Army basic I.S. training was
warranted.
23. On the character of the War Office, W. Snyder The Politics
of British Defence Policy (London, 1963) P.130,133; B.
Bond British Military Policy between the two World Wars
(Oxford, 1980) P.38. Also on its failure to prepare the
Army, C.A. Andrew Secret Service (London, 1985) P.7,340.
'Manual of operations on the North-West Frontier of
India', Army HQ, Calcutta/'HMSO!WO, 1925, passim, IOLR.
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Nockaitis contends that as scores of thousands of British
troops served in Ireland, COIN lessons were unofficially
accumulated within the regiments and disseminated in and
between them. Such a casual diffusion of I.S. information
cannot be readily analysed, and the purported 'lessons' applied
in subsequent campaigns may not have reflected the War Office
Record of 1922 or even been viable for COIN purposes. But the
Army was a customarily non-doctrinaire institution, having a
General Staff structure and regimental system that had not been
designed with the centralised accumulation of I.S. knowledge
and the advancement of I.S. military thought as primary
considerations. The British Army relied on an informal transfer
of I.S. wisdom between officers sharing a similar social
standing. Company majors commanding 'in the field' mixed
socially with their seniors and engaged in a 'two-way flow of
information', resulting in some I.S. 'lessons .. being absorbed
and transmitted.' In addition, the Cardwell regimental system
allowed at least one of a regiment's two battalions to serve in
the Empire at any given time, offering it opportunities to
acquire first-hand I.S. experience. Indeed, many officers
believed that a lack of doctrine was advantageous, because it
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allowed 'on-the-job' training, 24
 wherein officers new to an
I.S. theatre could hone their military skills and share the
'character-building' hardships that were endured by their
peers. This method of learning gave rise to a body of 'general
knowledge' within the Army which soldiers regularly drew on
during their active service in the Empire. It captured the
essence of the institutional I.S. 'line', and various factors
could help or hinder its formal and informal shaping.
The Army's I.S. line could have been amended as a result
of various factors, such as experience gained from colonial
campaigning, or independent critical thought. But the British
Army was intrinsically conservative and distrusted 'serious
intellectual effort.' Any initiatives on the part of its
officers to study I.S. problems or practices were not
officially encouraged, and military thought on the subject was
24. On the transferral of lessons in the Army, Mockaitis m/s,
P.410-3,417; Shafer P.36. On the nature of the Army and
I.S. doctrine, Bond P.44,52-3; Beckett in Pimlott P.116.
The Cardwell system remained unchanged up to 1939, H.
Stanhope The Soldiers (London, 1974) P.13. On the use and
value of 'on-the-job' training, A.G. Jones, 'Training and
doctrine in the British Army since 1945', in NI. Howard
(ed.) The theory and practice of War (London, 1965) P.313;
C.C. French The Frontier Scouts (London, 1985) P.134;
Higham Armed P.81-2; B.D. Powers Strategy without a
sliderule (London, 1976) P.172. This was also endorsed in
the 1925 Frontier Manual, L/MfI/17/13/13, IOLR.
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characterised by inertia. 25 The acceptance of new ideas was
patchy, as some formations were willing refine I.S. procedures
in the light of operations undertaken during their colonial
tours of duty, while others simply adhered to 'proven'
policies. If I.S. 'lessons' were to be generally learnt within
the Army, the prevailing climate had to change, and the army
colleges and journals were a potential source of inspiration
for fresh military thinking.
During the interwar years, the Sandhurst and Woolwich army
academies tutored from 400 to 700 and 250 pupils per term
respectively, and the Staff College at Camberley had sixty
officers in attendance. These men could have disseminated the
I.S. instruction that they received at these institutes to
their units, and although 'relatively little is known about
what took place' there, college 'Notes' are a basic indicator
of the state of the Army's I.S. line at an official level. By
1920, Sandhurst held courses on Indian Frontier Warfare based
on War Office guidelines, and 'wood and village fighting
techniques.' Woolwich also offered tuition in these subjects,
and at least by 1930, an examination of I.S. tasks in the
Army's usual 'training grounds' in Africa, India, and
Palestine. But while this gave soldiers a foundation for
25. On Army conservatism, J.C.M. Baynes The soldier in modern
society (London, 1972) P.28; D. Tulloch Wingate in peace
and war (London, 1972) P.147; M.R.D. Foot SOE in France
(London, 1966) P.390. On its anti-intellectualism, Andrew
P.341; Bidwell/Graham P.154-5; Bond P.56-71; Shy/Collier
in Paret P.830. On inertia in military thought in the
interwar period, Jeffery in Mclnnes/Sheffield P.31; G.
Harries-Jenkins 'The British Armed Forces', in W.
Janowitz/S.N. Wesbrook (eds.) The political education of
soldiers (London, 1983) P.92.
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combatting irregulars, these theatres of operations rarely
generated many of the problems posed by insurgency. Indeed,
college syllabuses contained no guidance on the crucial issue
of how to identify particular types of intrastate conflict that
might be encountered by the Army. The Staff College dealt with
I.S. problems, and Mockaitis notes that in 1923 it organised
discussions and lectures on military aspects of COIN in
Ireland. But this was not subject to regular enquiry and
Camberley concentrated on studying conventional warfare. This
was also a preoccupation of the Imperial Defence College,
founded in 1927 as a forum where officers from across the
Empire could review sundry military matters. It gave no I.S.
lecture until 1934- the year that the War office published its
new I.S. doctrine- and when the military colleges tackled the
subject, they confined their attention to tactical methods,
which were easier for officers to grasp than the complex
political and psychological policies demanded in COIN.
Propaganda was 'still new enough to be practically unknown to
many' officers, and a 'military education [did] .. not
guarantee .. [a] knowledge [of it]'. Unorthodox military
thought, including that of Lawrence, was disparaged by the
colleges during the 1920s-30s, and the subject of fighting in
the jungle was not even raised because it was regarded by most
officers as impossible to wage war in and was anyway 'not
-55-
proper soldiering.' 26 The focus of I.S. studies in the Army
institutes was on familiar colonial irregulars rather than
atypical insurgents, and the War Office did not contemplate
altering the Army's I.S. line or consider it necessary to
supplement these somewhat incomplete official I.S.
preparations. Nevertheless, another potential source of change
outside official circles were the widely-read army journals.27
26. On the military academies, Shy/Collier in Paret, P.870; M.
Elliot-Bateman 'The conditions for people's war' in, (ed.)
Revolt to Revolution P.282; and their instruction, RMC
Sandhurst Syllabus of the course of instruction (London,
1920) P.11; RMA Woolwich ibid (London, 1930) P.8,21; Brig.
J. Smyth Sandhurst (London, 1961) P.185; A. Shepperd
Sandhurst (London, 1980) P.113; H. Thomas The story of
Sandhurst (London, 1961) P.182; R. Higham The Military
intellectuals in Great Britain, 1918-39 (New Jersey, 1966)
P.25; and on jungle warfare, Armed P.81-2; T. Pocock
Fighting General (London, 1973) P.54. On the interwar
study of propaganda, Capt. A.L. Pemberton 'Propaganda'
Journal of the United Services Institute of India [JUSII]
255, Apr. 1929, P.139. On Camberley, Mockaitis m/s, P.418;
A. Orgill, letter, 21 Mar. 1990; Charters Jewish
Insurgency P.144; C.N. Barclay '50 years of conflict' in
Brassey's 1964 (London, 1964) P.15; Maj. A.J.C. Vickers
'Concerning fighting on the North-East Frontier of India'
JUSII 264, July 1931, P.371. On unorthodox military
thought, C. Barnett Britain and her Army, 1507-1970
(London, 1970) P.410— 2; Bond P.68. On the IDC, T.I. Gray
(ed.) in The Imperial Defence College and the Royal
College of Defence Studies (London, 1977) P.4.
27. Regarding the status of the army journals, Bond P.35-6;
Higharn Intellectuals P.35.
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In an Army Quarterly article of 1922, a British officer
argued that the Army must learn from its COIN campaign in
Ireland. He questioned the value of reprisals, and supported
the employment of columns acting on intelligence supplied by
the people, although he also endorsed drives and
encirclement. 28 Such 'lessons' were not readily available for
use by the Army when it crushed the Moplah rebellion of 1920 to
1921 in the Malabar region of India, but a 1923 journal article
criticised large scale offensives which had failed both there
and in Ireland. Success against the Moplah irregulars stemmed
from set-piece battles, control methods based on South African
lines, and some unusual tactics 'of great interest to the
student of war' that 'had to be thought out' by officers 'on
the spot.' These included smaller mobile 'flying' columns,
which were deployed in South Africa in 1901 and 1902, and
during the counter"rebellion in Burma after 1886. Moreover,
in 1921, area-deployed forces patrolled from their bases and
set ambushes for the Moplah guerillas, while the police offered
counterterrorist protection and held cleared areas in an
inventive 'Clear-and-Hold' military-security strategy. This was
a considerable advance on the Army's past I.S. practice, and
another military writer remarked in 1926 on the 'useful
lessons' that the defeat of the Malabar rising offered;
although he did not perceive that familiar tactical military
28. Brevet-Maj. T.A. Lowe 'Some reflections of a junior
commander upon the campaign in Ireland, 1920 and 1921'
Army Q'ly 5, Oct. 1922, P.50-7.
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policies might have become outdated. 29 In 1926, just after the
Indian Army produced its Frontier Manual, the reform-minded
Major B. Dening proposed that the Army should publish a
universal 'clear doctrine' on counterguerilla war. He
recognised that the Army was encountering ever more armed
revolutionary and nationalist opponents, and that the 'most
effective remedy [to rebellion is to remove] the main causes of
grievance upon which [it] .. lies for sustenance', therefore
backing political action as well as propaganda to raise pro-
British support. He documented some of the mistakes committed
by the Army in South Africa and Ireland, and pressed for the
unified command of the security forces, a Clear-and-Hold
strategy, and tactical adaptation to the terrain. However, such
progressive ideas were tempered by his support for age-old
military-security policies which he considered 'sound .. in all
cases.' 3° Thus, during the 1920s, there was some advocacy for
the revision of the Army's existing I.S. line, and also the
creation of a basic doctrine, yet its traditional 'general
knowledge' was widely believed within the ranks to be valid for
all I.S. missions. Indeed, its continued application and
success against rebellion and dissension in various other
colonial territories attested to its apparent worth.
29. Lt.-Col. A.C.B. MacKinnon 'The Moplah Rebellion, 1921-2'
Army Q'ly 7, Oct. 1923, P.260,268,270,277; Capt. W.
Carpendale 'The Moplah rebellion, 1920-1' JUSII 242, Jan.
1926,P.76,82,85-7,89. Also for details of the rebellion,
R.L. Hardgrave 'The Mappilla rebellion, 1921', (1922),
used as Intro, to R.H. Hitchcock Peasant revolt in Malabar
(New Delhi, 1983) P.16,18,20-i.
30. Maj. B.C. Dening 'Modern problems of guerilla warfare'
Army Q'ly 13, Oct. 1926, P.347-8,350-3.
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The RAF became more involved in I.S. affairs in the
twenties, carrying out punitive bombing and flag-showing
operations, and tactical lessons were accumulated at staff
level, although no formal doctrine was written. 31 Its use of
force at a low financial cost threatened to reduce the Army's
role in 'Imperial-policing'. But by the 1930s, the domestic
political imperative to regulate the level of force employed
against native opposition and to apply it in a 'fair' and
'sporting' manner, allowed the Army to retain its preeminence
in these duties. In 1930, troops assisted the colonial police
in putting down disturbances in districts of Burma and Bengal.
But despite the presence of some veterans of the Malibar
episode, neither formal instruction nor informal routes of
enlightenment adequately prepared the security forces for I.S.
action. Mockaitis states that there had been a 'transfer of
experience by individuals' within the regiments, 32 but
'lessons' were not widely assimilated into the Army's 'general
knowledge' and its I.S. line had not been reshaped by then.
Between 1930 and 1936, Burma was subjected to a mixture of
sedition, sectarian violence, and brigandage, as well as a
revolt that incorporated sporadic guerilla warfare, pitched
battles, and concerted campaigns of political propaganda and
terrorism. In 1930 and 1931, counterguerilla drives by the army
and paramilitary police failed to eradicate all Burmese
irregulars, which included 'modern guerilla' bands, and
Mockaitis argues that the persistent use of drives was not 'too
doctrinaire .. [because] there may have been sound reasons for
31. On the RAF, D. Omissi The RAF and Air Policing, 1919-39
PHD, 1989, P.22-3,41,64,66,70,97,103,156,206-7,212; Air
power and colonial control (Manchester, 1990) passim.
32. Mockaitis m/s, P.364.
-59-
[them] .. [D]ispersion [of manpower] .. may have outstretched
[the army, and] .. small patrols also required precise
intelligence.' But although this reasoning may have been sound
at first, the fact remains that the army adhered to major
offensives and mass arrests for a considerable length of time
because it sought to have a psychological impact on the
population and to win a quick military victory. When it failed
to achieve this by the autumn of 1931, the State authorities
changed their tack and a single commander of all the security
forces in the 'disturbed areas' was appointed, and charged with
implementing an overall plan devised by a civil-military-police
committee, the first British tripartite I.S. structure of its
kind. Area-deployed counterterrorist patrols protected
endangered communities in 1932, and intelligence obtained from
them increased thereafter. By then, locally raised levies
performed counterguerilla small unit patrols of a short
duration, ranging from a few hours to days, and thousands of
people were being relocated into 'camps' near their villages in
a novel resettlement scheme designed for population-resource
control. This was also furthered by widespread population
registration and issuing of identification-cards. In addition,
Sir John Anderson was appointed as the new Governor in 1932. He
had been involved in COIN in Ireland, and hence rejected
repression and instead developed some basic Hearts-and-Minds
policies. Government propaganda, amnesty offers and social
welfare schemes heralded a shift to the positive psywar
approach, and winning popular support became the
administration's first priority in 1933. By learning from past
COIN experience after the failure of old I.S. policies in Burma
the British formulated new extra-military action, as well as
improved counterguerilla tactical policies and original
organisational arrangements. Yet, most of the army's energies
were spent on fighting tactically weak Burmese irregulars,
whose 'repeated frontal assaults' and 'pitched battles with few
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firearms' were easily repelled. The conspicuous recurrence of
this familiar aspect of rebellion, and its defeat, apparently
tainted the Army's assessment of the reasons for the eventual
success of the Burmese authorities. Despite an abundance of new
policies which were evolved during the revolt, it emphasised
the elements of continuity in both the opposition and the
response to them, and did not consider that a major reappraisal
of its I.S. line was necessary. Mockaitis states that this
episode gave the British authorities 'valuable experience in
combatting well organised guerillas', 33 but to be truly
'valuable', newly acquired I.S. knowledge had to displace
outmoded elements of traditional wisdom. Details of some new
I.S. measures devised during the Burma campaign were recorded
in a military journal in 1932, but the War Office apparently
made no attempt to circulate any 'lessons' throughout the Army.
The Army Quarterly's prestigious 'Prize Essay' of 1933, by
Captain D. Wimberley, criticised the organisational structure
of the British Army which prevented any centralised, systematic
collation of I.S. 'lessons', and dissemination of them within
it. He wanted general training based on lessons derived from
COIN in Ireland, and expeditions in the North-West Frontier,
not least because 'exactly the same mistakes made in [Ireland
in] 1920 were made again [on the Sub-Continent] in 1930.' He
pointed out that encirclement could not cope with some of the
33. Mockaitis m/s, on tactical policies, and on the value of
the experience, P.364. On the nature of the conflict, and
details of British action, 'The Burmese Rebellion' JUSII
267, Apr. 1932, P.148,152,156-8; D.J. Clark The colonial
police and anti-terrorism D.Phil., 1978, P.12,26,33-5,57,
68-70,80-4,86,89,92-3,121-4,131-2,135-8; M. Adas Prophets
of rebellion (Chapel Hill, 1979) P.38,40,170; U.M. Maung
From Sangha to Laity (New Delhi, 1980) P.83-8,91-5.
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Army's more astute armed opponents, and recommended that higher
authorities 'detail some infantry brigade to explore thoroughly
the action of a column operating on the North-West
Frontier', so that lessons could be deduced and I.S. policies
adapted. However, the Essay typified the interwar Army's
military-centric view of I.S. tasks by focussing on tactical
policies and paying scant attention to extra-military action.
Moreover, although Wimberley referred to the COIN in Ireland,
it was the Frontier that he and his contemporaries regarded as
the archetypal I.S. training arena. 34 Indeed, it was the
theatre where most British regiments gained their 'Imperial-
policing' experience. With military officialdom slow to alter
the Army's I.S. line formally, if I.S. lessons were being
informally transferred within the regiments, the North-West
Frontier was potentially the most important arena in which new
wisdom was being shaped.
The Army was regularly active on the Frontier against
traditional irregulars, embarking on punitive excursions and
large scale offensives, as well as daily picquetting and
convoying. Following directives from London, by 1933 'troops
were ordered to make war peacefully, keeping down casualties',
and the ancient maxim of 'all necessary force' was limited to
RAF punitive bombing of the most warlike tribes in the remotest
34. Capt. D. Wimberley 'Military Prize Essay 1933' Army Q'ly
26, Apr. 1933, P.209,212. On encirclement drawbacks, Maj.
T. Htaik 'Encirclement methods in anti-guerilla warfare'
Military Review 41, June 1962, P.92-4; Jeffery,
Intelligence 1987, P.131. On the nature and dangers of the
Frontier, French P.143; Mockaitis m/s, P.206; P. Mason A
matter of honour (Middlesex, 1976) P.454; Pocock P.43; L.
James P.31.
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quasi-colonial regions. 35 However, endemic brigandage in these
mountain areas, coupled with the infrequency of attention from
Fleet Street reporters, afforded an opportunity to apply a
greater degree of force than in other territories where
political repercussions would prevent this. Military force
rather than effective social policy was the instrument applied
to control the tribesmen, and irregulars often obliged the army
by meeting it in battle. The army used drives, sweeps and large
mobile columns, as well as small unit picquetting and short
duration patrols in 'the heights'. But it relied heavily on
enemy weaknesses to retain its domination in this, its
professed I.S. 'training ground', where 'no one seemed really
sure what [they were] .. supposed to do.' This state of affairs
prevailed throughout the years of peace, precisely because the
army did maintain its superiority, as the defeat of the
Peshawar 'Red Shirts' in 1930 exemplifies. This poorly
organised rebellion featured propaganda, short-lived terrorism,
and clashes involving up to 5000 irregulars, in which the army
prevailed. 36 Traditional tactical policies, like those
35. On Frontier operations, A. Swinson North-West Frontier
(London, 1969) P.377; Brig. R.H. Dewing The Army
(Edinburgh, 1938) P.65; McLeod Special Forces in, Papers,
LHC; Maj.-Gen. J.G. Elliot The Frontier, 1839-1947
(London, 1968) P.112-8,276-9; C. Miller Khyber (London,
1977) P.353-4,358.
36. On the British administration's policies in the Frontier,
Lt.-Col. C.E. Bruce Waziristan, 1936-7 (Aldershot, 1938)
P.vii,6,12,29-30,34-7,72; French P.147,159,167; Swinson
P.364-9; J. Haswell British Military Intelligence (London,
1973) P.163; Maj.-Gen. Sir C. Gwynn Imperial Policing
(London, 1936) P.298. On the lack of media interest, L.
James Imperial Rearguard (London, 1988) P.16.
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contained in the Frontier 'Manual of Operations' were judged to
have been validated by campaign successes in the 1910s-30s. And
with 'intellectual military life .. almost non-existent' in the
Province, the only potential source for the transfer of any new
lessons there lay in informal regimental contacts. However,
soldiers were seldom subjected to fighting conditions that
would lead them to question fundamentally the validity of Army
I.S. policies. In addition, the Indian Army maintained virtual
autonomy from the War Office, and while that Department wanted
to institute some changes in military practices in India, such
as the centralisation of intelligence work, it rarely
interloped into the Indian Army's jurisdiction, least of all in
its 'speciality' of 'Imperial-policing'. 37 Therefore, the
Frontier did not act as a fount for new ideas, and when the War
Office finally answered critics like Wimberley and General
Archibald Wavell by producing an 1.S. doctrine, it proposed
little that was new.
The War Office's 'Notes on Imperial Policing, 1934' was
designed for universal use by soldiers undertaking I.S.
missions, and was distributed to the higher ranks of the Army.
The Notes 'undoubtedly reflect[edj a widespread military
attitude', and reiterated 'duties in aid' doctrine for dealing
with riots. Further, the manual classified two other forms of
conflict, which were general unrest, and organised guerilla war
37. On the WO and the Frontier, French P.134; Bond P.106,323.
The WO's interest in the Frontier is reflected in reports
such as, DM0 'Review of the North-West Frontier', 1933,
W0106/5444; 'Summary of terrorist action to May 1933',
W0106/5445. On the use of the Frontier 'Manual', Lt.-Col.
O.D. Bennett 'Some regrettable incidents' JUSII 271, Apr.
1933, P.194. On intellectual life, 'Further thoughts on
Frontier myths' ibid 323, Apr. 1946, P.227.
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and terrorism. To handle the latter form of disorder, it
recommended the Army's familiar 'subjection' line, entailing
its normal clearance strategy and I.S. policies, including
large scale offensives based on available intelligence,
(especially drives), counterorganisation arrests, and movement
controls. It reaffirmed 'flag-showing', but the negative psywar
approach was favoured for the purpose of information-gathering
and to impress on the population the advantages of resisting
rebel intimidation and refusing them assistance. The Notes
advocated tactical adaptation in the light of the particular
terrain and opposition, and suggested the formation of smaller
columns if guerilla resistance was protracted. Further, it
urged counterterrorist protection of loyalists in 'defended
posts' to encourage intelligence provision, echoing the measure
adopted during the South African War and the recommendations of
the War Office's Irish Record. However, its Notes additionally
supported relatively uncommon 'corsan' blockhouses and wire-
barrier control measures like those used in South Africa, 38 The
War Office's study of history led it to reinforce the Army's
Cost-Benefit I.S. line rather than to reject repressive
policies. But, its doctrine proposed a few useful innovations,
and furthermore, the Field Service Regulations of 1935
emphasised the advantages of air support and light equipment
for smaller columns operating in difficult terrain, which was
also derived from previous I.S. experience. 39 Therefore, the
Service Department was not ignorant of the potentially valuable
38. On Wavell and the WO, J. Connell Wavell, scholar and
soldier (London, 1964) P.166. Notes on Imperial Policing,
1934 WO, Jan. 1934, P.5-14,17-8,21-2,28-33,36,39-41, RMAS.
On its reflection of wider British military views, Jeffery
Intelligence 1987, P.122.
39. Field Service Regulations, II (1935), P.176-9, MODL.
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insights that could be gained from analysing past I.S.
entanglements, yet it failed to capitalise fully on the
experience of insurgency and revolt gained in Ireland and
Burma, as few appropriate COIN lessons were attained.
In 1936, Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn's Imperial
Policing was published, and became a 'basic text' at Camberley
and a quasi-official War Office doctrine. It was reprinted
several times and after years when I.S. was 'half-forgotten',
and there was 'no readily available corpus of lessons learned',
it had considerable influence. Despite the War Office's recent
pamphlet, Gwynn asserted that without further guidance for the
Army, 'I.S. .. tradition becomes the only means of broadcasting
experience.' He referred to several episodes after 1918 and
offered analyses of various 1.S. threats and Britain's
responses to them as a learning tool for the Army. Another
Staff College text of the period posited that the Irish and
Moplah affairs were 'particularly important' in preparations
for I.S. duties. Yet, the Army was not encouraged to study
Irish COIN at the College, and Gwynn cautioned that
generalisations inferred from that 'unusual' case were
unsound. 4° In fact, insurgency was not the most common form of
intrastate conflict which the Army confronted, and Gwynn
clearly concentrated on those examples that he believed would
40. On Gwynn and WO doctrine, Jeffery in Mclnnes/Sheffield,
P.31; Mockaitis m/s, P.423. On the printing of Imperial
Policing, Jeffery Intelligence 1987, P.146. Gwynn was
recommended in Cole/Priestley, P.395: which Mockaitis m/s,
P.62, notes was also a Camberley text. On the subsequent
use of Gywnn, Charters Jewish Insurgency P.137; Chapter 3.
On the status of interwar I.S. thought, Shy/Collier in
Paret, P.832. On particular I.S. examples, Cole/Priestley
P.395; Gwynn passim, especially, P.6,108.
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offer the greatest practical benefit to officers. But such
selectivity, similarly practiced by the War Office in its study
of history, militated against any radical reassessment of the
Army's I.S. line.
Gwynn classified several types of conflict, including one
that featured revolutionary irregulars, and he identified the
people as the key to the provision of counter/guerilla
resources. He envisaged 'a battle of wits in which the
development of a well-organised intelligence system, great
mobility, rapid means of communication and close cooperation
between all sections of the Government are essential.' In
addition, the former Camberley Commandant proposed the adoption
of some unusual I.S. ideas, including a civil-military-police
committee responsible for producing an overall I.S. plan, and a
single army commander acting under Martial Law or Emergency
powers to implement it. He argued that these were 'general
principle[s]' for countering rebels and declared that the 'Army
should neglect no methods by which it can attain its
objective', including assisting the government with its
propaganda effort. He also pointed out that in the recent
Burmese revolt, drives and encirciernents designed to 'surprise
and capture [rebels].. w[ere] almost out of the question',
because of inadequate intelligence, the rough terrain and
guerilla dispersal. Yet Gwynn trusted 'the normal pattern',
believing that it was not immediately made defunct by unusual
I.S. circumstances, and he contended that the Army had to make
its policies work by improving its I.S. training and practice.
Similarly, Staff College guidance asserted that the opposition
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'could not hope to win.'41
The Army's I.S. line was also scrutinised by Major H.J.
Simson in his Staff College text of 1937, British Rule and
Rebellion. He insisted 'that our methods of dealing with modern
rebellion, are comic .. [in the face of the rebels'] new
methods .. it is time that we armed ourselves with new methods
of ruling.' Simson stressed that the widely expounded view that
each intrastate conflict 'should be dealt with on its own .. as
it arises .. [ignores the] experience of Ireland, Palestine and
elsewhere .. if we keep losing or mislaying our experience
we only preserve tactical lessons.' He wanted an 'inquiry into
the methods adopted' by the army in Palestine in 1936 and 1937,
reflecting the precedent set by the Record of 1922, and the
Army was criticised for being 'unaware that it ha[d] a new
problem to face', which he labelled 'sub-war'. This was
prosecuted by groups employing propaganda and terrorism to
isolate the people from the authorities, and guerilla war
against the State's armed forces. Indeed, he understood the
underlying causes of trouble, but reiterated the current
military view that it was 'not the business of the armed forces
to find a cure' for disorders in the imperial body, and he
entreated the Colonial and India Offices to take the requisite
remedial extra-military action. Simson proposed to prevent
challenges to authority by executing 'good government' and 'a
policy of conciliation' to address any 'national grievance.'
Further, he encouraged government propaganda to gain popular
41. Gwynn, on I.S. policies, P.5,11-2,14-5,21-3,25,33,81,98,
100,108,114,311,327,330: on flaws in policy, P.322; also
see Cole/Priestley P.280, who noted that in South Africa
guerillas subjected to drives 'usually got away.' But they
still had faith in ultimate British success, P.40,279;
also, Gwynn P.114.
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cooperation, and small unit patrols for 'anti-intimidation'.
Following the recent Palestine events, he also pressed for more
effective population-resource control, a tripartite operational
planning committee, and the prosecution of operations under a
single commander. 42 Hence, like Gwynn, he accepted some
valuable, innovative I.S. concepts, but continued to advocate
'normal' I.S. policies.
Colonial police forces were increasingly involved in joint
E.S. operations with the Army during the interwar years, and
the Colonial Office apparently made a greater effort than the
War Office to transfer 1.5. 'lessons' to them. The Colonial
Office had a 'long-established .. system of filling senior
[police] posts by transfer from one colony to another [so that]
a good deal of interchange of knowledge and experience
[occured. This] .. fostered Ethel application in one territory
of lessons learned in another.' Thus, members of the Royal
Irish Constabulary [RId and its Auxiliaries were seconded to
Palestine and other unruly areas in the 1920s, and senior
colonial police officers were trained in Dublin. Some key I.S.
policies were also generally applied, such as area-deployment
of the police in local posts for patrolling and intelligence-
gathering. The Colonial Office furthered the trend towards a
common approach to policing by urging colonial administrations
to accept the advice of visiting Scotland Yard Special Branch
experts, and there were high level contacts between numerous
42. H.J. Simson British Rule, and Rebellion (London, 1937)
P.5,16,30,33-5,40-9,53-5,62,66-77,81-3,96,103,105,112-3,
119,121-7,329. Also on the lack of progress in military
thought, Bell On Revolt P.29.
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forces and the UK, 43 allowing I.S. lessons to be exchanged. But
COIN probably was not dea)t with in communications between
London and the outposts of Empire, and the Colonial Office did
not attempt to systemise I.S. lessons from various colonial
police forces into a general doctrine ready for future usage.
The Palestinian Arabs rebelled from 1936 to 1937, and
uncoordinated irregulars who 'knew little about guerilla
tactics and had virtually no training' acted alongside
propagandists and terrorists, and were nurtured by extensive
popular support and urban disturbances. The British response to
such unusually widespread mass opposition was to apply a
trusted formula of local military/police action, along with a
separate political initiative by London, in this case a
proposed Royal Commission to investigate the possibilities of a
general Palestine settlement. The Mandatory adopted negative
psywar with threats of Martial Law and repression, and the army
undertook drives and encirciements that inflicted casualties on
Arab irregulars, especially as new roads, motor transport and
air support increased its mobility against the tactically weak
opposition. The army was able to use 'tactics based on NWF
principles with common sense modifications', and the recent War
Office manual which was 'a close and constant guide.' By the
spring of 1937, the rebel campaign petered out because of I.S.
operations and the promise of a Crown enquiry which deprived
43. Sir C. Jefferies The Colonial Police (London, 1952) P.38;
S. Hutchinson 'The Police role in COIN operations' JRUSI
114, Dec. 1969, P.56.
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the rebels of their support, 41
 and this revolt therefore gave
the Army little reason to reassess and revise its I.S line.
The Palestine administration faced a resurgent Arab
opposition from October 1937 to the winter of 1938 to 1939,
when a new insurgent organisation engaged in political
propaganda, terrorism and modern guerilla warfare, as well as
other irregular activities. But familiar I.S. policies again
succeeded, mainly because of the innate weakness of the
government's foe. Interfactional fighting and feuding led to
the provision of information to the British, much of the
population were apathetic to the insurgent cause by 1938, and
many irregulars stood and fought against the army instead of
dispersing. 45
 The lack of security force
	 cooperation,
44. On the nature of the Arab irregulars, J. Dimbleby The
Palestinians (London, 1979) P.73; J. Marlowe Rebellion in
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the GOC, Gen. Dill, 'Preliminary Notes on the lessons of
the Palestine Rebellion, 1936' (Feb. 1937); 'Military
lessons of the Arab Rebellion, 1936-7', (1938), W0191/75;
WO, 'Report on Palestine Disturbances, 1936-7', W0191/70.
45. On the insurgent movement, and British counteraction,
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Bowden ibid P.243; Townshend Civil P.108; M.J. Cohen
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their defective intelligence organisation arrangements, and
reliance on large scale/unit military policies, indicates that
the few fresh proposals for I.S. action contained in approved
Camberley texts of 1936-7 made no obvious impression on British
officers in the field. Nonetheless, by May 1938, Major Orde
Wingate developed counterguerilla tactics by forming an
unorthodox force for snap raids on Arab houses and overnight
ambushing of trails frequented by guerillas. Further small unit
experimentation occured with the creation of pseudoguerilla
'gangs' that feigned active rebel status, including some former
guerillas who were 'turned' to the counterinsurgent side.
Indeed, by the end of the year, most army operations were 'of
small units .. more often of platoons.' Yet the army head-
quarters in Palestine affirmed that 'envelopment will always
achieve best results', and the War Office was disturbed by
allegations of torture by Wingate's Special Night Squads [SNS]
and insisted on their disbandment. Moreover, the upheavals of
1936 to 1939 were seen by the higher levels of the Army in a
similar light to those of 1919-21. These rebellions were of an
exceptional nature, in that a majority of the population was
embroiled in them for a prolonged period, and in view of this
fact, top army officers warned that 'care should be taken in
applying lessons from Palestine to elsewhere.' 46 The infrequent
occurrence of insurgency, and its atypical character, led the
Army to treat problems experienced with its I.S. policies as
being unique to the situation, while COIN success by 1939,
albeit partly reliant on the shortcomings of the adversary,
meant that once again established policies appeared justified.
46. I.S. adaptation was limited to tactical policy, as in the
WO's Reports, WO191/70; H.M.G. 'The Political History of
Palestine' (1947) P.19-20, CO537/2343; Marlowe Rebellion
P.195,216,224,228; Bowden ibid P.248. On 1ingate, C. Sykes
Orde Wingate (London, 1961) P.141,147,156,172.
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The War Office updated its 'duties in aid' doctrine in
1937 and 1938, but the Army's late mastery of rebellion
indicated no imperative need to alter the 1934 'Notes'. As
another European War loomed, the War Office understandably paid
scarcely any attention to 'Imperial-policing', and up-to-date
files on unconventional war were not kept. Its repository of
wisdom was confined to two works on guerilla warfare by Sir
Cohn M. Gubbins, a veteran of Irish COIN during 1921-2, which
were written for Home Defence in 1939. These detailed the
character of 'modern' guerillas, and also indicated that sweeps
and drives could be avoided by utilising intelligence, mobility
and dLfficult terrain. This should have alerted the War Office
to possible flaws in its I.S. doctrine, but it had other more
immediate and pressing conventional war problems. The Staff
College also concentrated on these, and prior to the outbreak
of war conducted 'only three brief I.S. exercises.'47
In 1939, the War Office Directorate of Military Operations
[DNIO], the Chiefs of Staff [COS], and senior officers, were
initially slow to appreciate the possibilities offered by non-
conventional modes of warfare. In the Government , only Hugh
Dalton readily extolled the virtues of 'political and
subversive warfare', and other proponents of guerilla war
47. WO, Duties in Aid, Aug. 1937; Sept. 1938, MODL. On views
in the WO by 1939, M.R.D. Foot 'Special Operations/2', in
M. Ehliot-Baternan (ed.) The Fourth Dimension of Warfare
(Manchester, 1970) P.37; and on Gubbins, France P.2. Sir
C.M. Gubbins The Partisan Leader's Handbook (Wa, 1939),
P.1-4,7-10,12,32-7; The Art of Guerihla Warfare (wo, 1939)
P.1-4,6-21, MODL. On the Staff College, Charters Jewish
insurgency P.137.
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outside the government were ignored. 48 However, 'wars are the
perfect medium for .. the development of new ideas', and
numerous individuals set about doing just that. In 1939, the
War Office Directorate of Military Intelligence [DM1] formed a
small Military Intelligence (Research) staff, and it studied
guerilla warfare. The section included Gubbins, who possessed
first-hand knowledge of the Frontier, Gerald Templer, a veteran
of the Palestine campaign, (and later on, Malaya), and J.C.F.
Holland, with Irish COIN experience. Holland and Gubbins
analysed twentieth century guerillas in South Africa, Arabia,
Russia, Spain, and China, and the group 'shared many ideas.'
Holland suggested that the British should form what he termed
'Commandos', for guerilla-style raids, but found he was able to
'make little headway against .. [dominant War Office]
traditional thinking.' 49 Nevertheless, Colonel Dudley Clarke,
Military Assistant to the CIGS, General John Dill, who had been
the GOC, Palestine, from 1936 to 1937, carried out similar
research, and in May 1940, Clarke proposed small sea-launched
coastal raids. With the desperate Continental situation,
48. On the DM0, and Dalton, Foot France P.2. On the COS's
opposition to the widespread use of regular guerillas, A.
Kerr Guerilla (London, 1942) P.9. On army officers' views,
Tulloch P.147. Popular works of the time included those by
A. Kerr Guerilla; The Art of Guerilla fighting and patrol
(London, 1940).
49. On wars as a source of new thinking, W. Seymour British
Special Forces (London, 1985) P.126. Wartime ideas and
their background in, D. Dodds-Parker Setting Europe Ablaze
(Surrey, 1983) P.35; M.R.D. Foot SOE (New York, 1986)
P.11-2,17; J. Ladd Commandos and Rangers of World War 2
(London, 1978) P.16; B. Pimlott Hugh Dalton (London, 1985)
P. 296 , 315.
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Churchill and Dill backed his notion, and the War Office soon
fell into line. It planned short, sharp raids, as well as large
ones on the enemy's main coastal forces. Gubbins proposed the
formation of 'Independent Companies' for small scale raiding
expeditions, and the War Office called on the services of '20
experts on mountain warfare, flown home from the .. Frontier
[to] .. put to good use their knowledge'; indeed, many of
those in the ranks of the early Commandos served there before
the War. However, the War Office's use of I.S. experience was
not extensive and it lost its enthusiasm for small raids after
July 1940. The High Command perceived them as a relative waste
of resources, and only 1250 Commandos continued such minor
raiding exploits in 1940
	 and did relatively few thereafter.
Indeed, 'most if not all the Prime Ministers advisers,
led by .. Brooke were opposed to the concept of Commandos
[altogether]'. Yet, by 1941, Churchill, who generally supported
'the unorthodox in warfare', approved of Special Operations
Executive [SOE] training in sabotage and, especially after
1942, guerilla warfare. He also supported the employment of
fairly small numbers of regular guerillas such as those of the
Small Boat Section [SBs], Popski's Private Army, and Captain
David Stirling's Special Air Service [SAS]. Stirling's idea of
semi-independent 4-12 man patrols operating for several weeks
at a time, often 'behind-the-lines', was championed by Major-
General Neil M. Ritchie and General Harold Alexander, (who were
both concerned with I.S. matters from 1945), and the SAS
achieved regimental status by 1942- 'something the British Army
did not do lightly.' General Bernard L. Montgomery was dubious
about the worth of such a '"special force"', but there was a
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general 'measure of acceptance' of it in the Army. 5° By that
time, 500-man Commando groups were commonly undertaking large
seaborne raids, and from September 1942 some 'spear-head[ed]
invasions' and acted as a vanguard force, giving a tactical
thrust to several offensives. However, the SAS maintained its
original guerilla-style role, 51 offering the Army a potentially
valuable insight into the mechanics of such operations.
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J. Strawson The History of the SAS Regiment (London, 1986)
P.19-20; and on small raids, Ladd Rangers P.17,20,239;
Morris Armies P.241; Seymour P.22-3; and on the SBS/
Popski, P.94,207; and the SAS, P.199; V. Cowles The
Phantom Major (London, 1989) P.22-3; J. Ladd SAS
Operations (London, 1989) P.29: and on Montgomery, P.41;
Ritchie in, P. MacDonald The SAS in action (London, 1990)
P.10. On SOE, Foot France P.233-4; B. Pimlott, P.316. On
the influence of the Frontier, Ladd Rangers P.16; P. Young
Commando (London, 1969) P.12.
51. On the Commandos, Morris Uniform P.182; Warner P.96; P.
Young P.156; Seymour P.13,34-5; Ladd Rangers P.55,123: and
the SAS, SAS P.40,67; Seymour P.212-3,251-2,262.
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Experience in guerilla war was also accumulated by
Wingate, who adapted Frontier tactics and his SNS concepts to
organise a guerilla 'Gideon Force' in Eritrea in 1941. In
addition, Stirling's comrades, Majors Mike Calvert and Spencer
Chapman, trained 'V Force' in Singapore during 194 1 , backed by
Major-General Sir William Slim, and Alexander and Wavell, who
likewise saw unorthodoxy as a virtue. 52
 Calvert drew on the
expertise of officers familiar with the Boer revolt, Eritrea,
and COIN in Ireland and Palestine, to devise guerilla tactics,
tapping a rich source of wisdom, just as various British COIN
agencies did after the War. Meantime, Wingate devised 'deep
penetration', incorporating large scale raids, guerilla ambush,
and air support, and although opposed by conservatives in the
Indian Army, the War Office, and the RAF, the theory was
accepted by Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff. Following its
inconclusive practice in the spring of 1943, a second Chindit
venture from the winter of 1943 to spring 1944 'alternat[ed]
guerilla tactics with conventional attack and defence', as
Wingate tried out his 'stronghold' concept, involving 500-man
columns operating from strategic bases to provoke battle. The
Chindits' overall worth is still disputed, but they were
important in that, as Admiral Louis Mountbatten stated, by 1944
'the whole Army was Chindit-minded.' Slim understood the need
for 'tactics never taught in a Western Staff College', and the
impression made by the Chindits permeated many British
52. Wingate's action, A. Jones in Howard, P.318; W.E.D. Allen
Guerilla war in Abyssinia (Middlesex, 1943) P.36,45,77-
8,90; Sykes P.266,282,295. On 'V Force', S. Bidwell The
Chindit War (London, 1979) P.51; Seymour P.57-8. High
level army officers' views, Morris Uniform P.175,185-6; R.
Callahan Burma, 1942-5 (London, 1978) P.64; E.D. Smith
Battle for Burma (London, 1979) P.46; Strawson P.14; R.R.
James Chindit (London, 1980) P.8.
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institutions concerned with I.S. matters, inspiring numerous
individuals who subsequently developed COIN tactical thought.
While the Frontier was the Army's interwar 1.5. archetype, 'to
say an officer was "Frontier-minded" [now] was to condemn him.'
The Army exploited the E.S. knowledge of serving men to devise
unorthodox units and policies, with War Office approval and
assistance, and the methods that they devised and the fact that
they proliferated and gained successes during the War gave a
new impetus to British military thought. By '1944, jungle
warfare became respectable in training manuals', and just prior
to this, a military journal implored the Army to use Commandos
instead of 'stereotyped military Frontier columns', for
ambushes and raids against irregulars. Furthermore, Lieutenant-
Colonel F. Simpson's prophetic article called for it to 'take
to the hills and fight [the guerilla] .. at his own game', by
employing Commandos and paratroops with helicopter support, and
acting on 'the sober framework of a new tactical doctrine',
derived from wartime experiences, from which there were many
'lessons to be learnt.' 53 Yet, 'there were few military men
53. On the Chindits, J.M. Calvert Prisoners of Hope (London,
1971) P.45,75,85; Callahan P.65-5,84-5,138-9; Bidwell
Chindit War P.51,75; Morris Uniform P.193-5,199,211,235;
0. Heilbrunn Warfare in the enemy's rear (London, 1963)
P.79-84; E.D. Smith Battle P.52; James P.78,106; Tulloch
P.165,194,268; Sykes P.394,397,402,452,457,460. Those
opposed to them, Tulloch P.116,147; L. James P.22; Calvert
P.23; Morris ibid P.206-8; Mead P.34. On their general
acceptance, and later influence, Asprey P.649; James
P.120; Bidwell ibid P.53-4; Calvert P.15; Swinson P.390;
E.D. Smith ibid P.174. Articles expounding new I.S.
methods in JUSII- 'Commandos and Waziristan' 309, Oct.
1942, P.351-3; Lt.-Col. F.C. Simpson 'Frontier warfare in
retrospect and prospect' 313, Oct. 1943, P.381-5.
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who understood how [guerillas] should be properly employed', or
how to develop unorthodox forces for peacetime uses. Indeed, in
1943 Captain Basil Liddell Hart stated that the Army would
always defeat colonial opponents with policies applied in South
Africa and Ireland, 54 despite the failings of Cost-Benefit
policies like collective punishment and stringent controls
implemented against partisan irregulars by Axis forces. The
British military formed several unorthodox forces during the
War, and trained and fought as guerillas; and although the Army
was yet to analyse their characteristics, capabilities and
possibilities, or indeed, other non-military aspects of
'partisan war' that could prove beneficial for COIN purposes,
in 1944 the War Office foresaw the spectre of a long drawn-out
Nazi underground resistance to Allied invasion, and studied
contemporary unconventional war in readiness for devising
counteraction to it.
The War Office analysed the Nazi reaction to partisans,
which concentrated on the negative psywar approach, coupled
with the limited use of positive measures such as offers of
rewards for information, and propaganda. Well-known coercive
controls were the mainstay of the German response, along with
counterguerilla encirclement, drives and sweeps. But by 1944,
small unit 'jagdkommando' and pseudogangs were also operating
with improved results, although they often extracted
intelligence from the population by force. The War Office
recognised that small units using 'imitation and innovation'
could prove a worthwhile development, and large scale
54. On the lack of understanding in the Army about guerilla
war, Strawson P.121; Foot France P.390; MacDonald P.25.
Support for old I.S. schemes in, K. Chorely Armies and
Revolution (London, 1943) P.37,41,50,61; B. Liddell Hart,
in Foreword, P.10.
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operations were considered 'seldom successful .. [as]
guerilla[s] withdraw and disperse.' It pondered new tactical
policy options, and also called for propaganda to 'win over the
population.' 55 A second report suggested that population
identification-cards could cut irregulars 'off physically and
morally from the local[s]', while the government was 'securing
the[ir] cooperation .. against the guerillas' with 'measures of
protection', including innovative counterterrorist self-defence
forces. But, at the same time, the report endorsed customary
I.S. ideas and explicitly discouraged intelligence collection
by army units, in contrast to the astute recommendations of the
War Office's Irish Record. Once information was received, 'to
obtain decisive results .. surprise must be gained and .. [the
Army had to marshal] forces .. adequate in numbers and
sufficiently mobile to achieve encirclement.' The report
identified 'mobility' as the key military principle in counter-
guerilla warfare, and hence proposed air-supported troops, 56 to
reinvigorate tactical policies that appeared to have been
impaired when practiced against partisan 'modern' guerillas.
Therefore, War Office analysts advanced certain aspects of
military thinking about unconventional war, although those
Commands that received its reports were given only a limited
reappraisal of the Army's prewar I.S. line.
During the winter of 1944 to 1945, the Allied Forces HQ
distributed 'Notes' on guerilla war, covering its occurrence in
Russia in 1812-4 and 1918-21, the Great War, interwar China,
and the Second World War. Some sets of notes emphasised
55. Nazi policies in, 0. Heilbrunn Partisan Warfare (London,
1962) P.33,46,148-50; and especially, WO, 'German guerilla
and underground resistance', 12 Nov. 1944, W0169/19521.
56. WO 'Guerilla Warfare', Dec. 1944, W0169/19521.
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'intensive intelligence work' to identify guerilla supporters
and their organisation, as well as to produce tactical
information. They also commended the achievements of
'jagdkornmando' and pseudogangs, and maintained that repressive
policies were not 'even temporarily successful.' But others
recommended vintage military-security and control policies,
including blockhouses and concentration (as opposed to wartime
Nazi extermination) camps. 57 These notes therefore offered an
array of possibilities rather than firm conclusions about the
best counterguerilla policies, and left individual Commands-
responsible for I.S. affairs in their particular theatre- to
decide how best to apply them. There was insufficient high
level direction to the Army to guarantee the general
assimilation of novel ideas at the start of 1945, while
establishing a new bureaucratic organisational structure
capable of ensuring unified policy-direction was not a postwar
government priority, and was 'contrary to the whole political
culture and ethic of British .. government.' 58 Thus, in early
1945, the War Office continued to delegate much of the
responsibility for procuring sound I.S. schemes to lower levels
of the Army, and it was soon plunged into 'post-hostilities'
I.S. commitments, having had little chance for rumination on
the subject.
The army relied on standard 'duties in aid' riot control
and curfews to put down turmoil in south French Endo-China in
the winter of 1945, and the RAF flew Frontier-style punitive
57. AFHQ 'Intelligence Notes' on guerilla war: 59,61, Nov.
1944, 78,84,86,91, Jan. 1945, W0169/19521.
58. On British political culture, H. Edmonds (ed.) 'The higher
organisation of defence in Britain 1945-85' in The Defence
Equation (London, 1986) P.58.
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raids against recalcitrant villages. But army reprisals for
actively assisting guerillas operating by November 1945 were
opposed by the Chiefs of Staff, (as they were in the
Netherlands East Indies). The army tried to clear small rural
areas of irregulars using drives, ericirclements, and 'strong
offensive patrols', but although some of its opponents were
tactically unskilled, British units were evaded frequently.59
However, the validity of its tactics was not questioned on the
basis of this somewhat minor skirmish. Indeed, the army
successfully crushed traditional irregulars concurrently
operating in Iraq using large Frontier-style columns. Further,
during the Dutch East Indies rebellion in the winter of 1945 to
1946, it relied on counterguerilla reactive patrols, settlement
cordon-and-search for arms and rebels, and movement control
road-blocks. The South East Asia Commander, Mountbatten, warned
London that a position 'analagous to Ireland [in 1919-21]'
might develop, but the military were engaged mostly in urban
pitched battles and soon dominated the rebel opposition.
However, the Cabinet limited the scope of British involvement
in the Dutch colony, and did not authorise the Army to embark
on COIN operations. The Government had recognised the
nationalists in India, and therefore wished to avoid using
Indian troops to stamp out another native Asian nationalist
movement. This would have been politically damaging, and
indeed, the Government also resisted any major entanglement in
59. On South Indo-China, S.W. Kirby The War against Japan,
Volume 5 (London, 1956) P.299,258-9; P. Dennis Troubled
Days of Peace (Manchester, 1987) P.39,175; P.M. Dunn The
first Vietnam War (London, 1985) P.140,204,224,237,261,
269-70,274,288,290,294,297,320,321,324; G. Rosie The
British in Vietnam (London, 1970) P.80,84; P.B. Davidson
Vietnam at War (London, 1988) P.24.
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the postwar civil disorders in India. 60 Over 30,000 British
troops were involved in security operations in the French and
Dutch possessions, but these did not indicate any need to
question the Army's traditional I.S. policies. Nonetheless,
Godfrey argues that the East Indies episode was 'to prove
valuable as Britain in turn faced the first of .. [its postwar]
demands for political independence', and counterguerilla
tactical innovations there were a forerunner to those that
followed in British COIN campaigns. However, any encouragement
for the Army to develop its tactical policies was balanced by
its experience during other I.S. commitments, such as that in
Burma from 1945 to 1947. Dacoitry was endemic there and police-
military flag-marches and deterrence patrolling on the
traditional pattern were applied. Furthermore, communist
guerillas emerged by November 1946, and the General Officer
Commanding [GOC], Major-General Harold Briggs, held daily
conferences on the situation. He organised multi-battalion
operations to 'flush [them] out .. in an encircling drive', and
the security forces pressured dacoit-communist bands for two
months in 'Operation Flush' and eventually crushed them.
Although victory was mainly achieved because of the 'very bad'
60. The Cabinet's position on India, JP(45)301(Final), 6 Dec.
1945, CAB84/77. On the Indies situation, E.V. Donnison
British Military Administration in the Far East, 1943-6
(London, 1956) P.427-8; A. Reid Blood of the People (Kuala
Lumpur, 1979) P.158,168,241-2; L. Fischer The Story of
Indonesia (London, 1959) P.83,92; D. Wehl The Birth of
Indonesia (London, 1948) P.94; Dennis P.126,188-9,195; and
Mountbatten, P.149. For the Cabinet's views, J.K. Ray The
transfer of power in Indonesia, 1942-9 (Bombay, 1967) P.60
-3; C.W. Squire Britain and the transfer of power in
Indonesia PHD, 1979, P.74,115,125. On I.S. in Iraq, S.H.
Longrigg Iraq, 1900-50 (London, 1953) P.327.
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tactics of the Burmese, 61 large scale/unit offensives were once
more practiced successfully, and traditional policies were
therefore validated.
Britain faced insurgency at the end of 1945, and for many
British citizens 'traditional values [had] lost much of their
force •. and imperial greatness was [considered to be] on the
way out', 62 resulting in their diminished willingness to
support the whole imperial edifice. But the Government's
primary priorities remained the protection of the Empire, and
L.S. tasks. 63 Many career soldiers who were familiar with the
prewar I.S. line stuck to it, and when the RAF reviewed E.S.
questions in the spring of 1945, it reaffirmed recognised
61. Tactical innovations in the Indies are related in Chapter
3. On the influence of events there, F.A. Godfrey 'The
responsibilities of world power', in J. Pimlott (ed.)
British military operations, 1945-84 (London, 1985) P.19.
On the Army and Burma operations, J.H. McEnery Epilogue in
Burma (Tunbridge Wells, 1990) P.31,44-6,53,59,65,80,90,99,
100-3.
62. British public attitudes and their effects in, A.J.P.
Taylor English history, 1914-45 (Oxford, 1965) P.600; J.B.
Bell 'Revolts against the Crown' Parameters 4, Mar. 1974,
P.36-8; A. Nachmani 'Generals at bay in postwar Palestine'
Journal of Strategic Studies 6, Dec. 1983, P.68.
63. 'Provisional requirements of the postwar Armed Forces',
COS memo, D0(46)7, 17 Jan. 1946, CAB131/2. First priority
went to imperial t.S., followed by 'General War'. Also,
'Statement on Defence', Cmd. 6746, (1946), which outlined
eight 'essential commitments', including imperial I.S.,
Palestine, and remedying the unstable Greek situation.
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policies, as did the Joint Planning Staff [JPs] of the Chiefs
of Staff. Further, most British military writers 'thought and
wrote in terms of traditional ideology', although they focussed
on conventional war more than I.S., which was a topic whose
advancement offered soldiers few prospects for promotion, and
was not even covered at Camberley in 1945.64 Indeed, the
'failure to include any instruction on the mechanics of the
news process' there, at the army training colleges, or in War
Office doctrine, resulted in the Army's inability to handle
COIN propaganda issues. Moreover, 'political warfare' units
possessing knowledge of propaganda were disbanded in 1945, and
'experts returned to civilian life, leaving politicians, civil
servants and servicemen as ignorant on the subject as if the
War had never been.' This was on account of postwar cutbacks,
but also 'persistent negative official attitudes towards SOE
and all its associations', which were run outside normal
64. On the RAF and the Joint Planners, RAF Director of
Planning, W.L Dawson, to his Deputy, D.J. Lee, in
'Development of aircraft for IS duties', 17 Feb.; Lee to
Dawson, 15 Mar.; and Director of Air Policy, to Dawson,
28 Feb. 1945, AIR9/180. On military writers, P. Darby
British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1945-73 (London,
1973) P.50; also see, J. Lider British military thought
after World War 2 (Aldershot, 1985) P.81. On the Staff
College and I.S., Mockaitis m/s, P.429,440.
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channels, much to their displeasure. 65 The major government
departments therefore made no attempt to retain this
accumulated expertise which could have been useful to counter-
insurgents. But, Darby's statement that the Army 'assumed that
policing tasks would continue on the traditional pattern
[and so] postwar operations were undertaken in accordance with
this', 66 as was the case in 1919, is somewhat oversimplified.
The Army did not undertake COIN wholly in congruence with
tradition in the early postwar years.
The Army and other agencies fought insurgency in a media
and political environment that was characterised by greater
criticism of repression. Further, wartime familiarisation with
unconventional warfare sparked debate in the Army over its
potential applications, and in 1945 the SIS secured official
approval to retain a body of expert wisdom on the subject, and
it enlisted numerous SOE officers for this purpose. The Secret
Service also liaised with M15, which was responsible for
counterintelligence in the Empire, to assist the security
forces in their COIN tasks. Additionally, despite the War
Office's concentration on 'General War', leading SAS officers
pressed the Chiefs of Staff and other senior soldiers to study
65. On inadequate instruction about the media for the Army, A.
Hooper The military and the media (Aldershot, 1982) P.211.
The WO's 'DIACP' doctrine was updated in 1945, see, 'Notes
on Imperial Policing and DIACP, 1949', MODL. On postwar
staff cuts, Tugwell PHD, P.42-3; J.B. Black Organising the
propaganda instrument- the British experience (Den Haag,
1975) P.x. The SOE, and 'political warfare' in, Dodds-




unorthodox forces and assess their possible future roles,
specifically including COIN missions. 67 Indeed, within the
wider ranks of the Army, 'officers were not cynical and yawning
with boredom as they had been in the 1930s [but were] .. far
more professional and ambitious', and they were more willing to
develop military thought. However, senior officers were aware
that it was 'the eccentrics, the social oddities .. [who had
been] attracted to irregular and clandestine units', and the
idea of retaining substantial unorthodox forces 'threatened
unwelcome change in the structure of the military organism
[which was initially] beyond the sympathy .. of those in
power.' 68 The War Office lent no particular urgency to the
debate about unconventional war, and during 1945 and 1946 the
Army was obliged to undertake COIN operations without any
immediate move by the upper echelons of the State to adapt
wartime experience for I.S. purposes.
The army colleges were amalgamated at Sandhurst in 1945,
and catered for 965 students by 1947. In the absence of any
prompt postwar direction to reassess I.S. wisdom from other
67. More intense media interest in I.S. after 1945, L. James
P.17. On the SIS/M15, West P.10; J. Bloch/P. Fitzgerald
British Intelligence and covert action (London, 1983)
P.30. On the War Office and the SAS, Brig. M. Calvert,
interview, 10 Apr. 1991; 'COIN policies', Paper, 20 Mar.
1991. Also see, B.A. Young The Artists and the SAS
(London, 1960) P.53, and Chapter 3.
68. On army officers' outlook, Bidwell/Graham P.293. On those
who had fought in unorthodox forces, M.R.D. Foot/J.M.
Langley M19 (London, 1979) P.88. Opposition within the
military establishment, Elliot-Bateman (ed.) in Revolt to
Revolution P.282; also Bell Myth P.70.
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established I.S. agencies, it and the professional military
journals, which became even more influential than hitherto,69
offered other fora for the development of I.S. concepts. The
crux of the following analysis is to identify the factors
encouraging the process of COIN doctrinal and policy
development, and those militating against it, from 1945.
69. Changes at Sandhurst, Shepperd P.163. On military
journals, Bidwell/Graham ibid.
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Chapter 3: The development of COIN policies and doctrine,
1945-7, with special regard to the campaign in Palestine.
The Jewish insurgency of 1945 to 1947 succeeded a minor
wartime rebellion, and like the wider Arab-Jewish Question, it
is referred to only so far as it affected later COIN
developments. Three Jewish political violence movements with
different previous strategies started an insurgency at the end
of the War. The Jewish Agency, responsible for representing the
interests of its community in Palestine, the 'Yishuv',
controlled a military force, the 'Haganah'. This was trained
in guerilla warfare from 1937,1 but confrontation between the
Mandatory and the Agency during the Second World War was
limited to the latter's diplomatic pressure for mass Jewish
immigration into Palestine. However, the Cabinet deferred to
Arab interests and rejected such an influx in the summer of
1945, and thence the Agency's attitude changed and it supported
military action to erode Britain's 'position .. and .. convince
Whitehall that without the consent of the Jews, Britain could
not keep Palestine.' 2 The Agency's political propaganda
attacked Britain, and the Haganah initiated guerilla war, along
with the Irgun Zvei Leumi [IZL] and, (from 1947), the Lochmei
He'rut Israel [LHI], two fanatical groups that also began a
campaign of political terrorism. Their covert units had jointly
initiated a rebellion from February 1944 until April 1945,
following separate and sporadic propaganda and terrorist
efforts in 1942 and 1943, and this gave the British some
experience of the instruments used by the insurgents from 1945.
1. For details about Haganah, which numbered 50,000 in 1945,
Y. Allon The Making of Israel's Army (London, 1971) P.25.
2. On the Jewish Agency's shift, Bell On Revolt P.52. For
terms of immigration, see the 1939 White Paper, Cmd. 6019.
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From 1942 to 1944, police and intelligence sources in
Palestine identified the IZL as a cellular organisation of 5000
personnel, and the LHI as a 'politically insignificant' group
of 100. Indeed, its leaders were arrested on information
provided by the Yishuv in February 1942, and the police also
knew about Jewish Agency control of the Haganah. Yet, little
was known about the rebels' strategy, organisation or
membership. 3 In November 1943, the Secretary of State for War
was informed by officials that 'the experience of Ireland in
1919-21 holds many warnings for what may well arise in
Palestine', but there is no evidence that the War Office
directed the Palestine authorities to act in the light of past
COIN. Many Palestine police officers had served with the RIC,4
3.	 On the nature of the rebels, PPF CID, 'Notes on Illegal
Jewish Organisations' (n.d.), received Oct. 1944, in Sir
R. Catling Papers, MsMediterranean.s20, RHO; 1 Guards Bde.
ISUM2, 30 June 1946, W0261/666; BGS,GHQMEF, note, 23 Nov.
1945, W0169/19517; Maj.-Gen. G.H.A. MacMillan, (GOC),
report, 5 Aug. 1947, in General Sir H. Stockwell Papers,
6/25/2, LHC; Clark D.Phil., P.83. Also on the IZL, D.
Charters, Insurgency and counterinsurgency in Palestine,
1945-7 PHD, 1980, P.87; British Intelligence in the
Palestine campaign, 1945-7 Paper, 1989 P.4. On their aims
before mid-1945, J.B. Bell On Revolt (London, 1976) P.45;
M. Begin The Revolt (London, 1955) P.60,84; Supplement to
the Survey of Palestine (London, 1947) P.86. Also on LHI,
S. Katz Days of Fire (London, 1968) P.55,89; Y.S. Brenner
'The Stern Gang, 1940-8', in E. Kedourie/S. Hairn (eds.)
Palestine and Israel (London, 1982) P.121.
4.	 On Ireland, Army CoS Brief for SSW, 20 Nov. 1943, 'The
Present Position in Palestine', W032/10260. On officers,
N. Bethell The Palestine Triangle (London, 1979) P.172-3.
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but few if any were experienced in countering urban terrorism
or guerilla warfare, and the force was poorly equipped to fight
it.
The Palestine police understood that information was vital
for effective military-security action, and Kimche asserts that
'intelligence in Palestine was pretty good.' But the CID
Political Branch in the mandate was undermanned, its
information-gathering effort was flawed by inadequate contacts
with the Yishuv, and there was no effective intelligence
processing system. The GHQ Middle East Forces, responsible for
theatre military I.S. preparations, notedthatmost'troops [we]re
not trained for or intended' to do intelligence duties; and
although the security forces acted under the wartime command
of the GOC, theoretically affording centralised operational
planning and control, their reliance on CID intelligence
ensured that military-security operations were impaired in
practice. Indeed, by 1944 the Yishuv were 'less inclined to
cooperate' because of the Cabinet's refusal to allow a massive
influx of Jews from the Diaspora following the Holocaust.
Therefore, the security forces relied on a reactive 'striking
force to deal with local disturbances', and few in-roads into
the rebellion were made. Although the IZL and LHI 'were never
more than a fringe minority' [emphasis added], London and
Jerusalem were 'neither impressed [n]or particularly concerned'
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with such 'gangsters', 5 and they underestimated the dangers
posed by their terrorism and propaganda campaigns.
The potential power of propaganda to influence popular
attitudes was evident to the mandate authorities during the
5. On PPF primacy in I.S. action, G. Blaxland The Regiment s
Depart (London, 1970) P.32. On PPF capabilities and
intelligence, TIC, Gen. Sir A. Cunningham, to SSC, Sir A.
Creech-Jones, 7 Aug., Cunningham Papers, 5/1; 1 Aug.,
Cunn. 1/2, MEC; Supplement to Survey P.86; J. Kimche Seven
Fallen Pillars (London, 1950) P.171; Charters Intelligence
P.12,35-6; Jewish insurgency P.89; E.B. Home A Job Well
Done (Tiptree, Essex, 1982) P.207,278,283; Wickham report,
2 Dec.; and CID, Moffatt Report, 2 Dec. 1946, CO537/2269.
On rebel support, M.J. Cohen The Rise of Israel (ed.) (New
York, 1987) Intro.; Charters Jewish insurgency P.43.
British views of the threat, GHQMEF note, 15 Feb., W0201/
2537; 30 June, W0214/47; J.H.H. Pollock, (District
Commissioner, Jerusalem), 24 Mar. 1944, Diary, D1581/10,
Papers, PRONI; Bethell P.173; J.B. White Sabotage is
Suspected (London, 1957) P.196; Bell Parameters 1974,
P.31: on arrests, Terror out of Zion (Dublin, 1977) P.70-
1,74,78. On reactive Police Mobile Forces, 'A Handbook of
Palestine', 5 Apr. 1944, Chief Sec., Palestine Government,
W0275/13; HC to SSC, 30 Sept. 1946, CO537/1696. Examples
of the British belief that the Yishuv would cooperate, HC,
Sir H. MacMichael, CINCMEF, Maj.-Gen. B. Paget, Asst. PPF
chief, A. Giles, and SSC, 0. Stanley, in, SSC to HG, 10
Nov. 1944, WO208/1706; Bethell P.176. Actual attitude, D.
Trevor Under the White Paper (Jerusalem, 1948) P.102-4;
Brenner in Kedourie/Haim P.122; B.R. Hoffman Jewish
terrorist activities and the British government in
Palestine, 1939-47 PHD, 1985, P.161; Clark D.Phil., P.192.
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War, and they provided reporting facilities in a Public
Information Office [ plo]. But with an estimated ninety percent
of the Yishuv opposed to rebel terrorism, a propaganda
campaign for I.S. purposes was not contemplated, and its use
was limited to trying to forge better inter-communal relations
as a groundwork for a postwar political initiative by London.6
In response to the IZL/LE-II campaign, British officialdom put
its faith in a well-trodden I.S. path, introducing Emergency
powers for arrest, detention, deportation and execution, in
March 1944. The negative psywar approach was reinforced by a
public warning to the Yishuv that unless information about the
rebels was forthcoming, repression would ensue. The GHQ Middle
East Forces decreed that 'ordinary tactical doctrines apply',
and the military approach to I.S. was enshrined in its Middle
East Training Pamphlet 9/13, issued in July 1943, and adhered
to by the army in Palestine until its withdrawal in May 1948.
The Pamphlet concentrated on riot procedures, disarmament, and
offensives based on the principles of mobility, the economy of
force and police cooperation 'which cannot be overstressed.'
This reflected the War Office's 'Notes' of 1934, and 'Duties in
Aid' of 1937, and it was updated and given 'to every officer'
in July 1944. The pamphlet advocated large 'mobile columns' for
reaction to 'incidents', urban deterrence patrols, and curfew.
In addition, the GHQ proposed the creation of a joint
operations room and posting of inter-force liaison officers, an
organisational scheme derived from the precedent of Palestine
6. On the Yishuv, N. Yallin-Mor, (LHI Commander), in Bethell
P.161. On government propaganda, Supplement to Survey
P.875-7; Mol 'Plan of Propaganda for Palestine', 14 Sept.
1943, INF1/943.
-95-
between 1937 and 1939. Contrary to Hoffman's belief, some
mobile columns were formed in 1944 with the approval of the
theatre GHQ, the Chiefs of Staff, and the Cabinet, and by
September 1944, large scale cordon-and-search was sanctioned
for its counterorganisation and negative psywar effects.8
The sizable commitment of army manpower to I.S. duties in
Palestine was unwelcome during the War and the authorities
7. On the administration's view of I.S. requirements, M.J.
Cohen Palestine: retreat from the Mandate (London, 1978)
P.157-64: the Army view, Maj.-Gen. B. Paget, to Lt.-Gen.
M. Wilson, HQ, 30 June, W0214/47. GHQMEF on I.S.
doctrine, in Lt.-Col. N. Charteris, 'Scylla Note', for
GOCPa1., 16 Aug. 1944, W0169/15850; GHQMEF METP9/13, July
1943, GHQMEF Dirve. and revised 9/13, 12 July 1944, Manual
of Military Law, 1929, and King's Regulations, 1940, in
PREM3/29619; and security force methods in, W0206/1706,
passim; Trevor P.94-6,123,126; Home P.283; Bell Terror
P.117,120; On Revolt P.47; Clark D.Phil., P.21; Hoffman
PHD, P.152-8,164. For 1930s WO doctrine, and other I.S.
organisation, such as that in prewar Burma, see Chapter 2.
8. B.R. Hoffman The Failure of British military strategy
within Palestine, 1939-47 (Jerusalem, 1983) P.17. Support
for mobile columns- 120-man, GHQMEF note, 19 May, W0201/
2537; CINCME to COS, 28 Oct., AIR2O/4959; 200-man, COS to
CINCME, 29 Nov. 1944, W0208/1706; GHQNIEF Dirve., Jan.
1945, W0169/19510. Cabinet, WM(44)155, 21 Nov., W0208/
1706. Joint columns in, Exercise Scylla/25 July, Lt.-Col.
M. Charteris Notes, 7 Aug., W0169/15850. On operations,
M.J. Cohen From Palestine to Israel (London, 1988) P.163;
Bell Terror P.46; Home P.284,288; Bethell P.184; CO/HC,
H. MacMichael, note, 20 Sept. 1944, Cunn., 4/3, MEC.
-96-
sought to end it quickly. Hence, they pursued not only direct
counter-rebellion measures, but also attempted to conjure up an
indirect solution by pressuring the Jewish Agency to act
against the rebels. This course of action was inspired by its
prewar cooperation with the British administration, and by the
Agency's expressions of concern that militancy might jeopardise
the chances of achieving a pro-Zionist settlement by alienating
the British, and even unleash a repression that would harm the
Yishuv. By 10 October 1944, the Agency instigated a 'Saison',
excluding the Jewish rebels from Yishuv life and encouraging
the people to assist with police enquiries. Then, at a time
when the British Cabinet was pondering a political solution for
Palestine, the LHI murdered Lord Moyne, a friend of Churchill,
resulting in the Prime Minister's suspension of political
progress. 9 The 'Saison' was intensified and the rebellion was
crushed by April 1945, which can only have confirmed the
British perception both of the extremists' weaknesses, and the
value of a dual counter-rebellion strategy. The administration
suggested employing the Haganah in future counterterrorism, but
this proposal was rejected by the Agency. Nevertheless, the
dual strategy had a lasting impact on British counter-
insurgents, and furthermore, the negative psywar approach of
coercive measures and the threat of repression appeared to have
been successful.
British I.S. preparations in 1945.
Palestine was not one of the Cabinet's priorities in 1945,
and it was more concerned about the possibility of renewed
9.	 Details of the Saison, Begin P.92; Bell Terror P.46; On
Revolt P.119-21,124; Hoffman PHD,P.168,171,180,193.
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Arab violence than a Jewish resurgence, 1° because of the
significant menace to imperial strategic interests that an Arab
revolt posed. The security forces prepared for violence from
whatever quarter throughout the year, and COIN operations from
October 1945 were founded on formal doctrinal instruction,
training and exercises, as well as the knowledge possessed by
individual officers. The fighting experience they gained before
and during the War moulded the army's action to a degree that
cannot be verified, although Tugwell asserts that I.S. 'general
knowledge' was all but forgotten and had been supplanted by
conventional war thinking. However, other studies on this
subject have overlooked the security forces' I.S. preparations
during 1945. Much traditional I.S. wisdom was retained at both
theatre and local level, as well as by the police, and this was
disseminated in tuition given to all officers and non-
commissioned officers [NCO] in Palestine. The average twenty
year-old British soldier serving there could boast little if
any experience of I.S. duties and some were 'veterans of battles
in Europe', but they too acquired basic guidance. Despite the
fact that some senior officers tried to minimise its
'interference' with training for conventional war, and that
10. On the Haganah and the PPF, Hoffman PHD, P.159-60. On
British strategic interests, and the Cabinet's views on
Palestine, Cohen Palestine; retreat P.155,177-8; COS(45)63
(0), 23 Jan. 1945, PREM3/29619.
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'the British still did not feel seriously challenged', 11 the
subject of I.S. received considerable attention in 1945.
Hoffman states that the army referred to the War Office's
Notes of 1934 for COIN guidance at the outset, and its 1937
Duties manual was consulted by some officers later on in the
campaign. Moreover, the theatre Command and the Palestine HQ
produced 'various manuals and pamphlets' reflecting War Office
I.S. doctrine, and the HQ ensured that intensive training was
undertaken following the defeat of the December 1944 Athens
Revolt by British troops and the occurrence of other post-
Liberation disturbances in Europe. In readiness for possible
disorder in Palestine, an I.S. exercise tested the movement of
mobile columns and riot procedures on 13 January 1945, and
there were similar drills in April and May. Indeed, a GHQ
directive to form large columns was fulfilled by some units in
the spring of 1945, and these were retained until October. The
local army HQ also conducted exercises in large scale
settlement cordon-and-search in February, April and May, and
traditional I.S. wisdom was reiterated at the Staff College in
11. Tugwell PHD, P.123. On British soldiers and their
experience, Lt.-Col. Young, Notes, c. Jan. 1949, in
Stockwell, 6/26, LHC; GOC, Lt.-Gen. J. D'Arcy, in Bethell
P.241. On their dislike of I.S., Lt.-Col. M. Charteris 'A
Year as an intelligence officer in Palestine' Middle East
Soc.ety Journal 1, 1946 P.18; Maj. R.D. Wilson Cordon and
Search (Aldershot, 1949) P.xiii,4. On conventional war
training, GOC, 30 June, W0169/23O22; the COS back mobile
columns only, COS(46)77, 15 May 1946, CO537/1697.
Assertion that I.S. was ignored, Blaxland P.30. But, I.S.
was given primacy in, 6 Arldg. Bde., report, 7 Nov. 1945,
W0169/19706. On the I.S. situation in 1945, J.C. Hurewitz
The struggle for Palestine . (New York, 1950) P.225.
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Haifa, which gave instruction on Mountain Warfare and organised
training sessions in June and November. In addition, all units
underwent I.S. tests, and the HQ arranged a conference on I.S.
policy for 14 June. Finally, both the Palestine and the General
Headquarters updated their I.S. doctrine in 1945 and this
used for COIN by the army.12
By January 1945, the War Office had taken the unusual step
of informing the Middle East GHQ about recent counter/guerilla
developments. This guidance could have been used by local
British HQs to adapt their I.S. plans and improve their chances
of success against armed opponents. The Department was slow to
give unsolicited I.S.-related information to the Army during
the interwar years, but was probably encouraged to do so in
1945 by the concurrent rebellion in Greece. Furthermore, the
Chiefs of Staff recognised that Jewish partisans arriving in
Palestine demonstrated a 'good technique in guerilla war' and
posed an I.S. threat. In January 1945, the Middle East Forces
studied War Office and Allied HQ guerilla reports written in
1944 and 1945, and produced 'Notes on the Development of
Guerilla Warfare', which was forwarded to Palestine by March.
12. Hoffman Failure P.18-9. On use of 1937 'Duties', Maj.-Gen.
H. Stockwell, (GOC, 1947-8), note, n.d., 6/27, LE-IC. I.S.
guidance, and reasons for it, GHQMEF Dirve., Jan.,
WO169/19510; Exercise HAWK, Lt.-Col. M. Charteris note, 3
Jan.; HQPa1. paper, 11 Jan., W0169/19632, 19743; WD, 19
June; Special Exercise/24 Apr., Notes 2 May; Note, May,
WO169/21631,19743,19744; 2 Inf. Div. 0011, 1 Feb., W0169/
19699. Carried out, in, 1 Inf. Div. OIl, 12 Feb., IS
Scheme, 7 Aug., WO169/19656; 3 Inf. Div. OIl, 25 Mar.,
012, 13 Apr., WO169/197O2; 2 Inf. Div. 0022, 16 Feb., 2
Oct. 1945, WO169/19699. Staff College Programmes, 19 Feb.,
5 May, 1-2 June, 28-9 Nov. 1945, WO169/21639.
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The theatre Command remarked that 'guerilla warfare is closely
related to IS ops', and its 'Notes' endorsed key aspects of
accepted British counterguerilla wisdom, but also raised
questions about large scale/unit operations and suggested
limited tactical and organisational innovations. Further, the
local Staff College studied the Chindits in early 1945, and
guerilla warfare in May. Indeed, the Palestine HQ was eager to
learn from I.S. operations in 1945, and it ensured that the
army was kept apprised of new 'lessons' through its Operational
Orders and Instructions.' 3 Yet, although an official precedent
for utilising wartime experience was set, it is evident from
other contemporary local I.S. doctrine that high level army
studies of unconventional warfare caused no instant re-
evaluation of I.S. practices by COIN agencies.
The Middle East Forces reiterated 'normal' procedures at
the beginning of 1945, and suggested that 'junior officers
[should] be made aware of civil disturbances [of] .. the past.'
Indeed, the army HQ recommended 'Gwynne's [sic.] "Imperial
Policing" [not as a] .. book of reference .. [but] as a guide
to .. some of the .. problems' arising when countering I.S.
threats. The GHQ stated that the likely danger came from two
types of civil disorder, and a distinctive 'organised revolt
[comprising] guerilla war [that] .. may require a definite
military operation .. to suppress [it, and also] .. armed
raids, sabotage, ambushes, sniping and acts of terrorism.' The
military features of insurgency were described, and to counter
them was considered easier than tackling rioters because riots
13. COS on Jewish partisans, COS(44)861(0), 1 Dec. 1944,
AIR2O/4959. MEF 'Notes' on guerilla war, and their use,
CGS, GHQMEF, Maj.-Gen. A.C. Maynard, 31 Jan. note, 14
Mar., to HQPa1.: on the Staff College see, Programme, June
1945, W0169/19521.
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required a more discriminate and hence demanding use of force.
The basis for responding to rebellion was laid down in the HQ's
Operational Instruction 21/1 of February, and in the GHQ's
updated 9/13 Training Pamphlet of May 1945.14 The former
booklet, revised in October 1945, was an I.S. 'book of
reference', and contained measures that were applied against
Jewish rebels a year before. But the Command realised that
political considerations may restrict the postwar application
of coercive I.S. policies, and it therefore queried whether
suppression like that of 1936 to 1939, involving many
executions, military-control areas, and the ready use of
military force in rural areas, would be acceptable in future.15
The methods that defeated the Arab revolt were
persistently referred to by some British officials as offering
the best format for COIN, and the army was urged to consult the
government's 'The Handbook of Palestine', and 'The Palestine
14. I.S. guidance in, GHQMEF G(Ops), Lt.-Col. W.W. Graham, TI,
to HQPa1., 8 Apr., W0201/2539,WO169/19508; GHQMEF Training
Notes, Appx. J7, May, W0169/19521; CGS,MEF Maj.-Gen. &.C.
Maynard, to GOCPa1., 10 Jan. 1945, W0169/19508.
15. 0121/i, 8 Feb., and notes, 13 Feb., 27 Oct., W0169/19743,
W0275/1. METP9/13, May- 'Notes for Officers on Internal
Security Duties'- W0169/19521. Use, in, GHQMEF 00 Oct.,
W0169/19509; 1 Gds. Bde., 30 Oct., WO169/19697; 6 Arldg.
Bde., OIl, 29 Oct., W0169/19706; 3 Para. Bde., Sept.,
WO169/19709; 185 Inf. Bde., 18 Oct. 1945, W0169/19717;
HQPa1. 0174, 31 July 1946, 6 Arbne. Div., G(Ops), 15
Sept., WO275/13; 3 Para. Bde. Ols, 4 June, 23 Sept.,
W0275/23; 6 Arbne. Div., 23 Apr. 1947, W0275/17; 6 Arbne.
Div. OIl, 30 Jan. 1948, W0275/19. And on all the local
doctrine used, 9 Inf. Div. 1S13, 5 Dec. 1945, W0169/19709.
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Problem', written by the GHQ, for accounts of interwar events.
But, having assessed the rebel Jewish opposition by the autumn
of 1945, the GOC, Lieutenant-General John D'Arcy, asserted that
there existed 'no precedent and little help in our long history
of Imperial policing.' Indeed, he implied that the threat from
the Palestinian Arabs seven years before differed from that
currently posed by the Jews. Having studied the Arab revolt and
the Irish insurgency, he stated that the Jews were trying to
emulate the 'limited success of revolt' resulting in the Free
State and the 1939 White Paper. However, D'Arcy was unable to
draw any COIN lessons from past campaigns, and, like other
British officials, he confirmed the correctness of applying
the Army's existing I.S. line against postwar insurgents.16
The revised local I.S. doctrine acquired by the army in
1945 was supplemented by the tutelage of the GHQtIEF Training
Team 12, which incorporated training exercises, lectures, and
models for riot control, convoys, mobile columns, and the
'village clearance' familiar to graduates of the army colleges.
It visited all formations in Palestine and instructed over 500
officers and NCOs in February 1945, and many more later on that
year. Its teachings were considered 'vital' by some units,17
16. 'The Handbook of Palestine', in WO275/13; 3 Inf. Div. 013,
13 Apr., W0169/19702; 1 Inf. Div., 12 Feb. 1945, W0169/
19656. 'The Palestine Problem', (Oct. 1945), in 'G' Branch
Float File, in Col. C.R.W. Norman, (GSI, 1946-7), Papers,
87/57/2, IWM. Lt.-Gen. J. D'Arcy, GOC Dirve., 20 Oct.
1945, W0169/22991; letter, 26 Nov. 1945, WO169/19745.
17. GHQMEF #12 Team WD/Notes, Feb., WDs Sept. to Nov.,
WO169/19621; GHQMEF BGS(Trg) QHR, 30 Nov., WO169/19522. On
the value of its instruction, 9 Inf. Div. 1S13, 5 Dec.
1945, WO169/197O9.
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and all were well-versed in traditional I.S. wisdom when
insurgency broke out.
Security force I.S. preparations were confined to the
military-security sphere, and therefore excluded propaganda and
political measures, (which were given the contemporary label of
'political warfare'). This was regarded as falling within the
purview of civil organisations, or specialists like those
working in the SOE. However, by the summer of 1945, of the War
Office's 175 Political Warfare experts,and 7500 SOE personnel,
only a handful of the former and 63 of the latter were in the
Middle East, and consequently there was a dearth of military
experience in this field. The local M15 Defence Security Office
Field Wings summarised Jewish propaganda to help the army
acquaint itself with its opposition, but the military was
intrinsically	 suspicious of the media and did not consider
trying to use it to its advantage, merely ordering good
conduct in the ranks so as to avoid hostile press coverage. The
police and the Public Information Office gave interviews and
some press conferences, and the P10 also continued its wartime
propaganda. 18 But there was no initiative to adapt it for I.S.
usage after the War ended.
18. SOE, Political Warfare and Mol personnel, WO Paramilitary
Establishments, 26 July, WO33/2454; July 1945, W033/2450;
5 Jan. 1946, W033/2501. The Army view on propaganda, D.
Charters 'From Palestine to Northern Ireland' in, D.
Charters/M. Tugwell (eds.) Armies in Low-Intensity
Conflicts (London, 1989) P.227; Charters Jewish insurgency
P.125; Wilson P.19-20. On the use made of ISUMs, 185 Inf.
Bde., 002, 20 Oct., W0169/19717. DSO ISUMs such as, W0169/
15851,19758; 3FSS, W0169/21414: PlO and PPF action, WO169/
15861, passim; Mol 'Plan of Propaganda for Palestine', 1
June 1945, Miscellaneous File 1271, IWM, INF1/943.
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The onset of insurgency and the British COIN line.
Communal tension and riots in Palestine in May 1945
generated 'sufficient general hostility' to rekindle the rebel
movements recently subdued by the 'Saison', and they were given
a boost in September when the Cabinet agreed to sanction only
minimal new Jewish immigration. Following this decision,
official Zionist bodies pressed American politicians to alter
the British Government's attitude and policy. The Foreign
Secretary, Ernest Bevin, felt that American support was crucial
for devising and implementing any workable settlement, and to
reduce Zionist pressure and involve the US, a British-American
Committee of Enquiry into Jewish refugees and the future of
Palestine was set up on 11 October. Bevin envisaged that its
report would form the basis of an interim Arab-Jewish
agreement, followed by United Nations ratification. Hence, all
other political 'policy discussions were suspended until the
Committee' reported, 19
 and with a settlement consigned to an
indefinite future, the Agency decided to enter into a marriage
of convenience with the IZL and LHI, as the United Resistance
19. On the position of the rebels, A Survey of Palestine
(Jerusalem, 1946) P.77; Bell On Revolt P.54; Blaxland
P.31; Hurewitz P.225,252; Kimche P.168; Trevor P.145,153,
176. Cabinet decision on immigration, CP(45)156, 8 Sept.,
CAB129/2. On the US dimension, R. Ovendale Britain, the
United States and the end of the Palestine Mandate
(Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1989) P.89-90,94-5,102; A. Bullock
Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary 1945-51 (London, 1983)
P.176,254; M. Jones Failure in Palestine (London, 1986)
P.60; Cohen Palestine to Israel P.220; Palestine and the
Great Powers (London, 1976) P.32; Bethell P.211; J. Darwin
Britain and Decolonisation (Ramps., 1988) P.117. The Bevin
plan in, GHQMEF Weekly IR, 16 Nov. 1945, W0169/19517.
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Movement, or URM. It began an insurgency in October, and COIN
was handicapped at the outset by having the counterinsurgent's
'political arm' tied until the Committee presented its report
on a separate political settlement.
The URM tried to build support both within Palestine and
across the globe through its political propaganda, and non-
cooperation with the Mandatory was encouraged. The Haganah
organised illegal immigration, and its elite 'Palmach' forces
prosecuted guerilla warfare. They were joined in this by IZL
units from the spring of 1946, although the Irgun and the Lehi
concentrated on political terrorism against civilians and the
police. From 21 November, the new High Commissioner, Major-
General Sir Alan Cunningham, was responsible for I.S. to the
Colonial Secretary, George Hall, and the Colonial Office
'tended to follow' Cunningham's lead. He and the GOC, D'Arcy,
were in broad agreement on the COIN line needed in 1945,
although policy debates and divisions were to emerge later
between the War Office and the Chiefs of Staff, and the
Colonial Office. 2° Some high level army officers wanted a Cost-
Benefit military repression, and the Chiefs of Staff favoured
an unyielding use of firepower against rural opponents in early
1945. This course was discussed locally until November, and the
Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Forces [CINCMEF], Major-General
Bernard C.T. Paget, who had fought on the Frontier in 1936 and
1937, said that 'it might be necessary to use full force.'
Indeed, the CIGS, Field-Marshal Alan F. Brooke, commended
extensive large scale/unit military-security operations and
20. The CO and the HC's position, D. Goldsworthy Colonial
issues in British politics, 1945-61 (London, 1981) P.41-2.
On the roles of the GOC and HC, Survey P.83,108,123;
Wilson P.16-7. On the attitude of the military hierarchy,
M. Jones P.82.
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stringent population-resource control measures, including mass
disarmament and arrests. Generals Paget, D'Arcy and Cunningham
agreed that the latter counterorganisation measure would be
valuable, and proposed police supervision of Agency leaders.
But they conceded that this could provoke 'systematic sabotage
and guerilla warfare over a prolonged period', 21
 and as a
consequence the plan was shelved. In the event, protracted
guerilla war occurred anyway, but Bevin convinced the Cabinet
to reject full-blown repression in late 1945, in view of the
need to retain American goodwill during the search for an
overall political solution. Further, he probably bore in mind
the adverse American reaction to the bloody fighting between
British troops and Greek rebels from December 1944 to January
1945, as well as the growing British public distaste for
coercion. 22
Insurgency began in October 1945, and the military
21. JPS/COS on I.S. policy, JP(45)15,30, 18 Jan., 15 Feb.,
AIR2O/4959. Local I.S. discussions, HQPa1. to GHQMEF, 19
Sept., Paget note, 7 Nov., W0169/19509. On Operation
BROADSIDE for arrests and disarmament, HQPa1. Dirve.'s,
50,51,63, 16 Nov., W0261/568. Army plans, DO(45) 31, 19
Nov., Paget to COS, 14 Nov., Cunn. 5/4, MEC; COS (45)272,
16 Nov., CAB79/41; 31 Oct. entry, A. Brooke Diaries, 5/11,
LHC. On the Agency, and problems with large scale designs,
MIDEAST to COS, 22 Dec., Cunn. 1/4,5/4; to SSC, Hall, 30
Dec., 1/1, MEC; HC note, 29 Nov., AIR2O/4963; DO(45)14, 26
Nov., WO32/10260. Actual action taken, COS(45)291, 31 Dec.
1945, CAB79/42.
22. The Cabinet on I.S. policy, CM(46)1, 1 Jan. 1946, CAB128/
5. On US opposition to British operations in Greece, C.M.
Woodhouse Apple of Discord (Reston, Virginia, 1985) P.221.
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responded, equipped with basic GHQ background information on
Jewish rebels provided in August. This gave fair estimates of
the strength of the LHI, IZL and Haganah, and noted that the
IZL consisted of 50-man guerilla small units, and the LHI of 3-
man terrorist cells. However, the security forces still knew
little about their organisational structure, strategy and
supporters. The army was instructed to 'obtain as much
information as possible about the locality, inhabitants, their
habits, leading personalities', and to plan operations on
police intelligence. But with flaws in its system of
information procurement and insufficient sources, security
force action was all too infrequently based on firm
foundations. Their problems were accentuated by an inadequate
overall COIN organisation until early 1946, whereby the
military and police relied on informal meetings to discuss COIN
policy, 23
 which resulted in a lack of central coordination and
direction, and further diminished the effects of applied
policies.
COIN military-security policies in the winter of 1945-6.
The Cabinet backed the Palestine government's relatively
'mild' Cost-Benefit line, and in January 1946 reiterated its
support for any action that was 'obviously justifiable and
necessary.' Security force operations were based on their
I.S. indoctrination and training conducted during 1945, but the
insurgent's offensive centred on urban areas and therefore
large mobile columns were not deployed. Joint patrolling was
23. GHQMEF Weekly IR, 15 Aug., W0169/19517, and /19516 passim:
on IZL, Begin P.102: on Haganah, JPS(45)145 (Final), COSC,
8 Aug., CAB79/37. Information-gathering, 1 Gds. Bde. TIl,
30 Oct., WO169/19697. Ad hoc meetings, as 10 Oct., 20
Dec., 185 Inf. Bde. WDs, Oct./Dec. 1945, W0169/19717.
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carried out as 'a matter of course' to deter and to 'seek out
and destroy' irregulars, but it was not systematically planned
until after spring 1946, initially being in reaction to attacks
'as and when .. necessary.' In addition, population-resource
control measures designed to 'interfere .. with hostile plans
by restricting movement' were limited at first to the
protection of vulnerable points, pass schemes with road-block
checks, snap searches, and curfews for up to thirty-six hours.
But from 20 November, large cordon-and-search operations were
authorised for control and counterorganisation by
'restrict[ ingj movement with a demonstration of force, in order
to [arrest] known ringleaders and/or wanted persons.' These
policies were enforced throughout the winter of 1945 to 1946,
and some formations declared that they would 'eliminate
terrorist activities.' 24 During these early months of COIN, the
Nliddle East Command asserted that 'recent practical experience
has shown that training has been based on correct principles
[and methods]', and although no real progress was evident, the
GOC stated in March 1946 that it should take '4 to 6 months to
break the back of the resistance.' Such optimism may have been
24. All /ref's in WO169/. Joint patrol operations, 6 Arldg.
Bde., 26 Nov., /19706. Cordons, 3 Para. Bde., 22 Dec.,
/19705; 3 Inf. Div., 10 Nov., /19703; Gen. C.W. Dunbar
'Notes on 8 Para', n.d., Papers, LHC; Brig. R.N. Anderson
'Search operations in Palestine', Army Q'ly 55, Jan. 1948,
P.204-6; HC to SSC, G. Hall, 29 Dec., Cunn. 1/1, MEC.
Curfews, 185 Inf. Bde. 002, 20 Oct., /19717; 1 Inf. Div.
019, 19 Oct., /19656; checks, 1 Gds. Bde. 012, 30 Oct.,
/19697; 6 Arbne. Div. 011, 7 Oct., /19685; 2 Inf. Div.
0114, 19 Oct., and notes, 2,6,11 Nov., /19699. All
operations, HQPa1. 003, 13 Oct., /19745; 0130, 12 May,
/19744; Wilson P.36-7. On mobile columns and guard duties,
1 Gds. Bde., TIl, 30 Oct. 1945, /19697.
-109-
fuelled by the success of cordon-and-search, patrols, curfew
and movement restrictions in urban areas of south Indo-China
and the Netherlands East Indies during winter 1945 to 1946.
These I.S. ventures certainly did not cause the army to rethink
its COIN policy in Palestine, although the GHQ recognised the
need for 'constant improvement of our methods' and noted that
'new lessons will be incorporated [into I.S. guidance]'.25 The
Army was keen to learn from new experiences, but saw no reason
to question the 'mild' Cost-Benefit line and policies used so
far.
British psywar policies, and views about COIN political
action in the winter of 1945 to 1946.
The authorities paid scant attention to matters outside
the military-security sphere at the beginning of the COIN. The
army provided Public Relations Officers to inform the media
about its activities and to try to prevent a 'bad press', and
the Chief Secretary, John Shaw, warned Jewish newspapers
25. GHQMEF view, TI 25, Nov., WO169/19522. GOC, to British-
American Committee, in A. Koestler Promise and Fulfilment
(London, 1949) P.123. On action in South-East Asia, see
Chapter 2. Tactical lessons, sent between HQPa1. and army
formations, HQPa1. 'I.S. Lessons', 7,25-6 Nov. 1945,
W0169/19745; 3 Inf. Div. Dirve.'s 1,5, 23 Jan., 19 Feb.,
W0169/22967; 185 Inf. Bde., 'Report on Ops', WD, 25 Jan.
1946, WO169/23006.
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against incitement to violence in November 1945.26 The High
Commissioner also realised that Zionist propaganda could rally
anti-British sentiment. But he only voiced concern about the
URM's campaign outside Palestine and took no steps to ensure
that a realistic State counterpropaganda effort was formulated,
probably because of London's misgivings about the idea of
Britain engaging in peacetime propaganda. The COIN positive
psywar approach was confined to standard army 'flag-showing'
patrols, and Cunningham supported 'punitive' curfews and
searches that constituted part of the military's preferred
negative approach. These measures were afforded by what he
termed 'drastic' Emergency legislation, but its provisions were
not primarily designed to further the negative approach by
pressuring the Yishuv. Indeed, Cunningham opposed reprisals,
and although new laws in January 1946 authorised the 'stick' of
collective punishment, he applied it infrequently, and then
only on those locales definitely implicated in supporting the
insurgents. The High Commissioner believed that coercion could
alienate the population, and moreover, favoured more positive
psywar action than has hitherto been credited.
Cunningham suggested political moves as an incentive for
the people to assist the State, on the basis that a majority of
26. Propaganda, Mol, 'Measures to combat anti-GB propaganda in
Palestine', Dec. 1945, to India Office, IOLR. All /ref's
in W0169/. The army and the media, 6 Arldg. Bde., 11 Oct.,
014, 17 Oct., /19706, /19685; 3 Para. Bde., TIl, 16 Oct.,
/19705; 1 Inf. Div. Dirve. 1, Nov. 1945, /19656;
'Publicity', 8 June, /22957; 2 tnf. Div., 24 Oct. note,
/19699; HQPa1. 'Lessons' 7 Dec., 0156, 31 Dec., /19745;
0167, 17 June 1946, /23022; 6 Arbne. Div. 0112, 15 Jan.
1947, W0275/16. On the PlO and the Chief Sec., Survey
P.123; Supplement to Survey P.877; Trevor P.162.
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the Yishuv resented terrorism, and therefore might be enticed
from their passivity into either resisting it, or helping the
security forces. And he identified two issues as the key to
Jewish behaviour: firstly, the promise of a future political
settlement, and secondly, parochial concerns about land tenure,
immigration, and economic matters. Recognising that the
insurgents played upon these grievances for support, and with
an overall political settlement out of his hands, Cunningham
stated that, 'if in anyway the humanitarian part of the problem
can be reduced, if a wedge could be driven between .. political
and humanitarian issues, the extremists might well lose much of
their power.' Thus, he pressed London for a sharp increase in
Jewish immigration to bolster moderates in both the Yishuv and
the Jewish Agency. It had 'preknowledge .. of most incidents'
and 'an enormous degree of influence over the [Yishuvj', and he
wanted it to encourage opposition to the insurgency. However,
he knew that the Cabinet was unlikely to increase immigration
quotas for fear of a violent reaction by the Arab community
that would upset the prospects for a successful outcome from
the British-American initiative. 27
 Thus, while Cunningham
basically understood the benefits that could be derived from
some COIN political action, the British Government was
unwilling to introduce any. As the insurgents gained ground he
did not completely rule out the Chiefs of Staff's preferred
27. HC on propaganda, to SSC, G. Hall, 4 Dec. 1945, Cunn.
1/1: on Emergency laws, to Chief Sec., 29 Nov., Cunn. 5/4.
On psywar, HC to SSC, 1 Feb. 1946, Cunn.1/1, MEC; note, 4
Dec., AIR2O/4963; 29 Dec., quoted in, Clark D.I'hil.,P.198;
HC in, DO(45)14, 26 Nov., W032/10260; to Chief Sec., J.
Shaw, 20 Dec., Cunn.611, MEC. Punitive action, 1 Gds.
Bde., TI1, 30 Oct. 1945,W0169/196971. Laws in 1946, Trevor
P.182-6; Home P.213. On the Jewish Agency's influence,
'The Palestine Problem', in Norman, IWM.
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option of applying the routine Cost-Benefit I.S. line involving
repression like that used from 1936 to 1939, and in early 1946
he agreed with the GOC that it was necessary to effect a
'forcible suppression of the armed opposition.' But he
countenanced greater military pressure only as a last resort,
advocating the continuation of present security force policies
'in the earnest hope that [he could] .. avoid .. the weight of
large scale operations.' 28
 The High Commissioner therefore
tried to moderate the Cost-Benefit line, while relying on its
provisions in practice.
Security force COIN policies and doctrine up to mid-1946.
The administration concluded at the start of 1946 that the
insurgency 'constitute[d] an entirely different problem in
regard to I.S.' from all the previous threats that it had
encountered. Indeed, some officers were disgruntled by the
army's lack of progress in countering Jewish irregulars, and
the commander of the Third Infantry Division, Major-General
Lashmer Whistler, admitted, 'I am pretty stumped for ideas.'
Therefore, he sought inspiration from the War and suggested
"commando"-type patrols' of small units moving into a
disturbed area where they would attempt to ambush irregulars
and then swiftly exit. He did not propose a paraguerilla mode
of operation, but the General evidently tried to adapt the
style of the early British Commandos for COIN purposes, and
this was an original idea. However, it demanded changes in the
constitution of units which contradicted 'War Office policy
[directives that formations undertaking I.S. tasks must]
28. The HC on military action, its effects and the Agency, to
SSC, 31 Jan., 19 Feb., and Note, 27 June 1946, Cunn.1/1,
MEC; CO537/1708.
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remain organised as a standard infantry division.' 29 The
conditions for cultivating new tactical ideas clearly were
absent, as Whistler's proposal was not developed into a new
policy. Instead, the security forces continued to tackle the
insurgents with familiar I.S. tactics.
The Chiefs of Staff persistently sought reassurances that
the COIN commitment would not interfere with training for
General War, and the Middle East GHQ stated that the army
should only be diverted to I.S. tasks when it was absolutely
necessary. Yet, by the middle of 1946, the army took the lead
in operational planning, and while some units relied on
'learning on the job' and many officers viewed active duties as
'excellent training for young leaders and troops', 3° army I.S.
indoctrination and training was continued in 1946 to a greater
extent than has previously been imparted. Between February and
April, there was a concerted effort by every battalion to set
aside about one month for I.S. studies. This incorporated
practice in cordon-and-search, 'village fighting', and curfews,
29. The government view of I.S., Chief Sec. Shaw, Survey P.37-
8,44; Vol.11 P.598-9,600,603. Maj.-Gen. L.G. Whistler, 3
Inf. Div. Dirve. 6, 25 Feb.; WO Dirve., to 3 Inf. Div., 14
Mar. 1946, W0169/22967.
30. COS and GHQMELF on training, GHQMEF Dirve. 245, 13 Apr.,
W0169/22879; COS(46)77, 15 May, CO537/1697; GOC, 31 June
W0169/23022; CINCMELF, Maj.-Gen. M. Dempsey, in CoS, MELF,
Maj.-Gen. Sir 1. Pyman note, 17 Dec. 1946, Diaries, 6/1/1;
Pyman note, 8 May 1947, 6/1/5, LHC; Charters Jewish
insurgency P.149. 'On-the-job' learning, 1 Gds. Bde. 018,
9 Aug., W0261/664; Gen. C. Dunbar, 'Notes on 8 Para', LHC.
Army I.S. training plans, GOC, Lt.-Gen. E. Barker, 0167,
17 June 1946, W0275/13.
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but also 'I.S. Discussions' in which tactical and procedural
lessons were 'passed on to all ranks' in a systematic attempt
to disseminate new knowledge. These periods were discontinued
by the autumn, and the six-man GHQMEF Training Team 12 was also
disbanded in August as part of postwar cut backs. But prior to
that, during January and from March to April, through lectures,
models, discussions and exercises in Palestine, the Team
recapitulated wisdom enshrined in the GHQ Training Pamphlet
9/13 and the HQ Instruction 21/1. After summer 1946, the
responsibility for providing a grounding in I.S. went 'to
Commands and units', but lessons continued to be relayed by the
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Palestine HQ and exchanged within the lower echelons.31
Although the central assimilation of all new lessons was not
achieved by the army authorities, they did attempt to
institutionalise the local refinement of COIN policy.
The army was well aware that COIN operational success
depended 'on good information', but when its patrolling was
reduced in the largest Jewish cities during April and May,
probably due to overconfidence about its 'calming' effect on
the Yishuv, as well as to allow unit training for conventional
31. All /ref's in W0169/. Unit training, 2 Para. Bde. Dirve.
2, 3 Jan., Dirve. 5, Jan., /22992; 3 Inf. Div. note, 4
Apr., /22995; Wilson P.20-i. Battalion training and
discussions, 1 Inf. Div. Report on Reorganisation, 5 Apr.,
2 Inf. Div. notes, 6 Mar., 'I.S. Discussions, 25-6 Feb.',
/22993; 1 Inf. Div. WD, 22 Mar., I.S. Study Day; 3 Inf.
Div. TI17, 26 Jan., I.S. Study Period, 19 Mar., /22995. On
MEF #12 Training Team, CGS, GHQMEF, Maj.-Gen. Hunter,
notes, 15 Jan., /22946; 12 Team WDs, Jan.-May 1946,
/22947; 185 Inf. Bde. WD, 10 Oct. 1945, WO169/19717; GHQ
(Trg.) QHR, 30 Sept., WO261/58; MELF Liaison letter 12, 31
Dec., WO261/59. On the use of METP9/13 and 0121/i, 3 Para.
Bde. T19, 26 May, /22997; 1 Inf. Div. 004, 22 Apr.,
/22956; to HQPa1., 23 Mar., /22956; 3 Inf. Div. 003, 5
Jan., /22967; GHQMEF Dirve. 245, 13 Apr., /22879; all
/ref's in JO261/, 2 Para. Bde. 015, 27 Sept., /214; 3 Inf.
Div. 0123, 28 July 1946, /679; 3 Para. Bde. 0138, 30 Apr.,
/219; 1 Gds. Bde. 019, May, /666; 0111, 24 July 1947,
/667; HQN,Pal. ISI1, 16 Feb. 1948, /645. Tactical lessons,
3 Inf. Div. AGATHA Report, 3 July, /679; HQS.Pal., SHARK
Report, 22 Aug., /646; 1 Para. Bde. QHR, 30 Sept., /695; 3
Para. Bde, 6 Sept. 1946, /705; HQPa1. 'Combined military
and police action', June 1947, P.8-9, W0275/13.
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war, anti-British sentiment was manifested in rioting. The
security forces' operations were failing to stem the insurgent
tide and consolidate the government's position, and although
the 'passing, receiving and processing of information was part
of the operational routine' of the security forces, the CID
Political Intelligence Branch procured insufficient background
information on the insurgents, and contact intelligence was
sorely lacking. Hence, the State's forces found themselves in a
position where, on the whole, they could only react to
'incidents' and pursue speculative patrolling. However, the
army did not attempt to remedy this situation through any
initiative of its own, adhering to its conviction that
'intelligence and counterintelligence .. [was] a secondary
task.' Only five army HQ officers worked on I.S. intelligence
from November 1945, and they were 'too young and inexperienced'
to produce results. Indeed, their commander from the middle of
1946 had no previous relevant experience, and although there
were weekly meetings for 'constant liaison between all
intelligence staffs', inter-agency coordination left a lot to
be desired. The Palestine HQ collated considerable background
data and distributed fortnightly summaries to units, but it was
endowed with neither the inclination nor know-how to forge
productive links with the Yishuv. Several units independently
established useful local contacts, but their efforts were
undermined by unit movements and the transfer of some of their
personnel within or out of Palestine, resulting in the loss of
linkages between individual soldiers and the few helpful
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citizens amongst a generally uncooperative Jewish community.32
The only major British COIN advance by the summer of 1946
was the creation of a new committee system to replace ad hoc
high level security force meetings. This was an unusual step
and its origins are unclear. However, it resembled the
structure created by the British authorities in Burma in 1931
during the nationalist revolt, and Cunningham certainly studied
that conflict in 1947. In addition, the Palestine HQ examined
Gwynn's Imperial Policing at the start of 1945, and it
advocated a committee organisation. The Palestine Central
Security Committee was an improvement on I.S. arrangements of
the preceding decade, bringing military, police and civil
agencies into a central planning forum for weekly meetings. The
police Inspector-General represented the security forces, and
the GOC attended only when necessary, which was a potential
flaw. But he was rarely absent during 1946 and 1947, and the
local M15 and army intelligence chiefs were members of the
32. All /ref's in W0169/. Operational routine, 185 Inf. Bde.
28-31 Jan. 'Schedule', Jan. WD, 012, 10 Jan., /23006; 1
Para. Bde. OIl, 25 Apr., /22991; 3 Para. Bde. note, 2
Apr., /22995. Random patrolling, 1 Gd. Bde. note, 8 Mar.
1946, /22989. Reliance on PPF intelligence, 1 Inf. Div.
notes, 7 Aug. 1945, /19656, Mar. 1946 Course, /22956. The
army role in intelligence affairs, GSI Cal. C. Norman,
'Intelligence in Palestine', 23 June 1947, 11 Aug. 1946
notes, 87/57/2, IWM; 6 Arbne. Div. 1S17, 17 Oct. 1945,
W0275/14; Charters Intelligence P.14,20,23-5; R. Gale A
Call to Arms (London, 1968) P.163-4,166-9. On FSS's,
GHQMEF Dirve., 24 Apr. 1946, W0169/19510. The army's
priorities, 'Redistribution of intelligence duties',
HQHaifa, 22 Nov. 1947, WO261/620; and CID, Charters ibid
P.14. Unit moves, Wilson P.21-4,220-5; Blaxland P.34,43.
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tripartite Committee. It was responsible for overseeing and
guiding the operational planning and execution carried out at
district army HQs with police and RAF liaison officers. Inter-
force coordination was still imperfect in 1947, and the
committee system was not moulded into a powerful executive tool
with jurisdiction over all COIN business. However, it was
served by six tripartite District Committees consisting of
police, army and civil authorities, which discussed both
operational issues and analyses provided for the Committees by
intelligence agencies represented on them. The Districts
produced recommendations for the Central Committee on request,
and it decided on broad COIN policy matters. The system
produced a better conceived and more unified security force
effort, and was an alternative to the Martial Law mechanism
recommended for coordinating their actions in War Office I.S.
doctrine.33
Debate over the British COIN line in the summer of 1946.
In April 1946, the British-American Committee proposed a
binational state and the immigration of 100,000 Jews. But the
Cabinet baulked at the financial cost that this would entail
33. On the Central Committee, Charters Intelligence P.16-7,22-
3; 'British intelligence in the Palestine campaign 1945-7'
{revised] Intelligence and National Security 6, Jan. 1991,
P.119-121. Its meetings in 1946-7 in, Cunn. 4/1, MEC,
passim; Survey, II P.582. Liaison at army HQs, 3 Inf. Div.
002, 5 Jan. 1946, W0169/22967; 1 Inf. Div. IS Scheme, 7
Aug. 1945, W0169/19656. On problems faced by the
authorities in organising COIN, Home P.560-i. WO
doctrine, such as the 1934 'Notes', P.28-9,33-4, RMAS. On
Burma, see Chapter 2. The HC's 1947 study is dealt with on
P.149. On Gwynn, see ff.14.
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and the probability of a violent Arab reaction, while the
American President would not agree to give money or troops to
help institute it. Therefore, Bevin insisted that the
insurgency must be ended before the Report could be adopted,
and he set up a special committee of experts to evaluate the
likely effects of its implementation. 34 In the meantime, the
IZL murdered six sleeping soldiers in what became known as the
'Car Park Killings', and the increasing scale of insurgent
attacks and the stalemate over a separate political solution
led to debate about COIN policies. By May 1946, the Palestine
HQ considered imposing a huge collective fine and extended
curfews on Jewish cities, and occupying Jewish buildings, as
local commanders demanded 'drastic and spectacular punitive
action' both to retain troop morale and for negative psywar
effects on the people. But in view of the pending British-
American initiative, the Cabinet refused to authorise this.35
Nonetheless, from 10 to 18 June, the URM carried out scores of
bombings and kidnapped five army officers, and as senior
officers' fears rose that the security forces would undertake
their own reprisals if there was no official response, on 20
June the Cabinet sanctioned a 'full plan against Jewish illegal
organisations and the Jewish Agency.' Operation AGATHA was put
into effect nine days later to supplement the indecisive COIN
operations carried out so far, and it incorporated large scale
urban cordon-and-search and curfews lasting for several days.
34. Cohen Palestine and Great P.110; Palestine to Israel
P.221; Ovendale Britain P.120.
35. Military view, COS(46)61, 17 Apr., CAB79/47; D'Arcy and
local officers, in Chief Sec. J. Shaw, Memo for 26 Apr., 1
May meetings, Cunn. 5/4, MEC; Gale P.168: political
constraints, SSC to HC, 16 May 1946, Cunn. 1/1, MEC; Cohen
Palestine and Great P.80.
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It explicitly aimed for the counterorganisation arrest of
Palmach leaders, to gain evidence of Jewish Agency promotion of
insurgency, and to disrupt opposition planning. But AGATHA was
designed to have a psychological and political impact too, as
success could give a boost to government supporters, reassure
the Arabs, stabilise the security forces, and enhance British
claims to legitimacy. Further, as Clark suggests, it was used
for negative psywar to pressurise the Yishuv. The High
Commissioner was instructed by the Colonial Office to announce
that the enterprise was not a collective punishment, but it was
meant to sway the Yishuv into assisting the forces of law-and-
order by disrupting their social and economic life, and thus
convince them of the need to forestall any repetition of such
action. It also served to renew the administration's interest
in the indirect strategy of pressing the Jewish Agency to
relieve the Yishuv's discomfort by instigating another Saison.
Moreover, Operation AGATHA significantly increased the debate
among COIN agencies about the best psywar approach to follow,
and Cunningham, and also on occasion the GOC- from June 1946,
Lieutenant-General Sir Evelyn H. Barker 36 - differed on their
preferred COIN line from the theatre Commander, the Chiefs of
Staff and the War Office.
36. AGATHA's explicit aims, CM(46)60, 20 June, CM(46)72, 23
July, CAB128/5; HQPa1. 0168, June, W0275/29; GOC note, 11
July, WO275/27; Wilson P.57-8. Cabinet debate about it,
CP(46)238,	 19 June, CAB129/1O. Reasons behind it-
kidnapping, Bethell P.248; M. Jones P.118: Jewish Agency
complicity with insurgency, HQPa1. 'G' QHR, Sept., W0261/
562: the Arab aspect, Ovendale ibid P.138-40; M.J. Haron
Palestine and the Anglo-American Connection, 1945-50 (New
York, 1986) P.60; HC to SSC, 19,20 June, Cunn. 1/1, MEC.
On its indirect effects, Clark D.Phil.,P.213; HQPaI. 0148,
June 1946, Cunn. 5/4, MEC.
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General Cunningham agreed to AGATHA, despite the paucity
of intelligence on which to act, because he believed that it
was 'essential to do something drastic' to bolster security
force morale after recent insurgent atrocities. Indeed, he also
suggested suspending Jewish immigration, imposing collective
fines, or intensifying arms searches, in spite of realising
that this would have 'severe political repercussions.' The
Cabinet rejected his proposals on these grounds, and while
Cunningham's attitude hardened as a result of insurgent
excesses, his recommendations did not signal a shift in his
opposition to the wholesale subjugation of the Yishuv as a
means to compel them to cooperate with the COIN forces. Rather,
he judged that swift and stern action was necessary to retain
the State's political credibility and to achieve limited
psychological effects. Although the High Commissioner publicly
proclaimed that AGATHA would 'root out terrorism [and] restore
order', this was to boost government supporters' morale. He
appreciated that the situation could 'not be settled by force',
and privately never viewed AGATHA in this light.37
The new GOC, General Barker, assessed the COIN position on
his arrival in Palestine, and affirmed that the key to the
conflict was 'the support, active or passive of the general
Jewish public.' He understood that many of them were
37. HC, on the need to act, to SSC, 19 June, in CP(46)238,
CAB129/1O. The reasons for AGATHA: gaining Yishuv help, to
SSC, 19 Aug.: for effect on the Agency, Note for Chaim
Weizmann meeting, 29 June: for arrests, Note, 27 June: on
the intelligence position, to SSC, 23 July, Cunn. 1/1,
MEC. And arrests, Hurewitz P.254-5; CM(46)60, 20 June,
CAB128/9. On the Yishuv's reaction, Bethell P.238; CAB(46)
72, 23 July, CAB128/6. Its results, HC to CO, 9 Aug.,
Cunn. 1/2; Note, 22 June 1946, Cunn. 5/4, MEC.
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uncooperative owing to terrorist intimidation, and he endorsed
the army's chosen psywar approach of trying to foster popular
support by gaining military successes, combined with a degree
of coercion of the Yishuv to convince it that opposition to the
insurgency would be to its benefit. However, the continuous
exertion of negative psychological pressure was not his
favoured approach, because it was 'impossible perpetually to
subjugate a country by force.' He was wary about initiating
large scale operations that could 'rouse .. the Yishuv against
us', and he approved of AGATHA mainly to improve security force
morale and influence the Jewish Agency, sharing the High
Commissioner's reasoning behind the operation. In addition,
Barker referred to the prewar SNS to suggest incorporating the
Haganah into the police for COIN action, underlining British
interest in the indirect strategy. But he recognised the
ultimate need for a 'satisfactory political answer', 38 while
repression would exacerbate the position. Therefore, the local
political and military hierarchies were cautious about the
widespread and persistent use of large scale military-security
operations and tough controls that were akin to the traditional
and more rigid Cost-Benefit line. However, this line received
the blessing of higher British Army authorities.
The CIGS from 26 June 1946, Field-Marshal Bernard L.
Montgomery, was a key figure in postwar British COIN, and he
acted as a bulwark against radical new changes in policy. His
views and actions were based on his past experience of COIN in
Ireland and Palestine, and the Second World War, (and
subsequently, of COIN in Greece). In early June, the then
38. Lt.-Gen. E. Barker, 'Military Action to be taken in order
to enforce law & order in Palestine' 22 June, drafts,
Cunn. 5/4; W0275/29,W0261/568. Also, notes, 11 July,
W0275/27; 00, 25 July 1946, Cunn. 5/4, MEC.
-123-
CIGS, Field-Marshal Brooke, and the CIGS-elect, discussed the
Palestine conundrum, and compared conditions there to
concurrent turmoil and factional violence in India, although
these were essentially dissimilar I.S. problems. However, it
was the Palestine campaign of 1936 to 1939 that had made the
deepest impression on Montgomery, and he persistently referred
to it and forcefully upheld the Cost-Benefit line which
triumphed there. The CIGS wanted to 'reorient the Army' away
from its present methods to prewar policies of multiple large
mobile columns, large scale searches and sweeps, military-
controlled areas, extended curfews, and a liberal dose of
executions to counter the 'un-English methods' of the Jew. He
contemplated a 'war with the Jews [to] .. smash forever [the
URM, to] .. completely and utterly defeat .. the Jews as soon
as possible', and to coerce the Yishuv out of their presently
uncooperative stance. He stated that such a 'showdown' would be
'handle[d] quite easily', and visualised 'matters purely from a
military angle.' The Field-Marshal had no conception of Hearts-
and-Minds action, in fact noting that it was his 'duty .. to
avoid becoming involved in the political side of this problem.'
His views were reiterated by the CINCMELF, Major-General Sir
Miles C. Dempsey, and these high level army authorities hoped
that AGATHA could be the first step in altering the COIN line
applied in Palestine. The CIGS asserted that his opinions
'greatly influenced the Cabinet', with more drastic legal
powers being sanctioned by July 1946, but he failed to obtain
approval for a reversion to the panoply of interwar I.S.
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policies.39
AGATHA soured relations between the administration and the
Jewish population and political institutions, consequently
damaging the COIN effort in the long run. However, it lead to
a lull in insurgent attacks until August 1946, and to the
arrest of half the leadership of the Palmach. Moreover, the
Jewish Agency withdrew the Haganah from the URM on 23 August,
and moderate elements within the Agency supported political
talks with Britain. 40 In the interim, the Cabinet rejected the
British-American Report on 11 July, and two weeks later backed
the new Morrison-Grady plan, which focussed on provincial
autonomy. When, for electoral reasons, President Harry Truman
opposed its pro-Arab clauses, Bevin was forced to try to bring
39. On his experience, B.L. Montgomery The memoirs of Field-
Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein (London, 1958)
P.423; Appendix 1; T. Hamilton Montgomery: the Field
Marshal (London, 1986) P.636, and on India, P.637; A.
Chalfont Montgomery of Alamein (London, 1976) P.76,105,
289. On I.S., CIGS to Dempsey, 27 June, WO216/194,
Montgomery Diaries, 211/3, IWM. On the ease of the task,
Note, June, Army Commanders Conf. notes, 23 July, 175/1,
IWM. Political aspects, CIGS to Dempsey, 24 July, in H.
Green, MA, notes, to Dempsey, 23 July, WO216/194; to SSC
Hall, 23 Nov., CO537/1731. COS/CINCMELF view, COS(46)95,
19 June, CAB79/49; Dempsey to CIGS, 4,10 July, W0216/194.
CIGS on the impact of I.S. policies, Notes, June, 175/1,
IWM. New powers for military courts and property
forfeiture, HQPa1. 0167, 17 July 1946, W0275/13.
40. On AGATHA's success, Wilson P.166-76; Bethell P.253; Bell
Terror P.177; On Revolt P.59. Cf. its disadvantages,
Kimche P.168; Cohen Palestine and Great P.80.
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about a settlement without American assistance. But the Jewish
Agency reconsidered its position and decided to support the
partition of Palestine, and promised to attend a conference on
the subject if several detained Jewish leaders were released.
However, the Cabinet considered that there was no real prospect
of agreement between the Arabs and Jews, and formal contacts
were ended by 2 September. Although Agency officials moderated
their political demands after AGATHA, prospects for a
settlement remained poor in the summer of 1946.41
On 22 July 1946, the IZL murdered ninety one people in the
'King David Hotel Bombing' in Jerusalem, an attack on the
Palestine HQ and the administration Secretariat. The British
authorities were understandably bitter, and Barker protested
that the Yishuv 'bore a share of the guilt .. if the Jewish
public really wished to stop these crimes they could do so .. I
am determined they shall suffer punishment.' This could only
increase Jewish animosity towards the Mandatory, and Major-
General Richard Gale, commanding the First Infantry Division,
warned his superiors that it would further damage relations
with the Jews and push them towards the insurgents. But Barker
feared security force reprisals if there was no official
riposte, and as a result Cunningham authorised a huge
collective fine and arrests of Jewish Agency leaders implicated
in sponsoring the insurgency. He did not approve out and out
repression, but, realising the inadequacy of present COIN
policies he hoped that these punitive measures might pressure
the Agency into agreeing to another 'Saison', having concluded
that 'the .. only hope lay in securing Haganah help .. [for]
41. Cabinet plans, CM(46)67, 11 July 1946, CAB128/6; Ovendale
Britain P.150. On Bevin and the Agency, Hurewitz P.271; M.
Cohen The Origins and Evolution of the Arab-Zionist
Conflict (London, 1987) P.113; Palestine and Great P.156.
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preventive measures' against Jewish irregulars. 42
 In the event,
despite scarce intelligence, the Cabinet quickly subscribed to
large scale cordon-and-search operations and curfews on the
major Jewish cities in Operations HARRY and SHARK from 29 July
to the first week of August 1946, ostensibly with the aim of
arresting IZL and LHI members. District army HQs believed that
this action helped to restore order in the short term. But
there were few tangible results, and the Cabinet concluded that
these operations had failed. Bevin was engaged in a fresh round
of diplomacy and as a 'senior and powerful minister .. in
Cabinet' he successfully opposed the CIGS's favoured COIN line.
Hence, the COIN forces continued with their operational
routine, and 'large scale Chiefs of Staff planning ceased to be
approved in London.'43
COIN authorities' anxiety about operational policies from
summer 1946, and the introduction of 'expert' advice.
42. HC for fine, Bethell P.269. On Yishuv, Note, 1 Aug., to
SSC, 29 July, Cunn. 1/1, MEC. On Haganah usage, Clark
D.Phil., P.216-7; HC, R. Gale A Call P.168; in CM(46)73,
25 July; and GOC, in CM(46)72, 23 July, CAB128/6, W032/
10260. GOC on fines, note, 26 July 1946, CO537/2291.
43. COIN operations, HQPa1. reports, W0275/31; ISUM, 9 Aug.,
W0275/58. Their flaws, Wilson P.67,73; Begin P.227-30.
Cabinet decisions, CM(46)72,73, 23,25 July, CAB128/6; SSC
to HC, 29 July, Cunn. 1/1, MEC. Bevin's influence, Hoffman
PHD, P.35. Results of operations, HC to SSC, 22 Sept.,
CO537/1789; note, 27 Sept. 1946, Cunn. 1/2; letter to
Daily Telegraph, 9 Dec. 1958, 5/4, MEC; GOC Appreciation,
10 Dec. 1946, WO261/54; Nachmani Strategic Studies 1983
P.69.
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The administration and the army were aware by 1945 that
guerilla war and political terrorism were devised and executed
with the help of European Jews seasoned in unconventional war
against the Axis. Cunningham noted that, of illegal immigrants
in 1946, 'former guerilla fighters in Europe are given priority
[due to] their experience', and by at least 1947 he equated
the URN with wartime underground resistance movements. 44 Most
COIN institutions apparently did not bear the War in mind when
analysing the insurgency and devising counteraction, although
the Colonial Office selected Lieutenant-Colonel W. Nicol Gray
to replace Captain John Rymer-Jones as the police Inspector-
General from 10 May 1946. Gray was their second choice for the
position, but he was picked as a training expert and forceful
personality, and also because he had served during the Arab
revolt and as a 'protege of Laycock' in the wartime Commandos.
In practice, he was a 'mobility and firepower' exponent and was
unable to devise effective COIN policies or organisation. But
his unorthodox war record supplemented his knowledge of I.S.
and was evidently viewed by the Colonial Office as offering a
fresh perspective on COIN policing, for Gray was appointed
despite vocal and deep-rooted opposition within the police
force to the.choice of a soldier for this post, rather than a
44. [-IC to SSC, 25 July 1946, Cunn. i/i, MEC; Notes for RIIA
lecture, 22 July 1948, Cunningham Papers, 8303-104/26,
NAM; 'The last days of the Mandate', International Affairs
24, summer 1948, P.485-6.
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policeman from the Empire. 45 However, this was the extent of
Colonial Office 'intervention' in COIN that year, as it
generally waited on the High Commissioner's opinions about the
situation.
The Colonial Office's worries about the I.S. position
were amplified by Cunningham after the large scale operations
of summer 1946. He informed the Colonial Secretary on 1 August
that he was 'anxious to be assured that our police methods are
the best that can be devised and I would welcome a visit of
some expert .. to advise me', especially on the CID, which may
'require some new ideas.' Cunningham was uncertain as to
whether current police organisation and tactical policies were
the most appropriate in the circumstances, and he showed
special concern for the present lack of contact intelligence.
He proposed Major-General Sir Charles E. Wickham, who was a
former chief of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [RUC] and
presently Head of the British Police and Prisons Mission to
Greece, to advise on police reorganisation and COIN. Wickham's
Hellenic posting was arranged before the Palestine insurgency
began, with the approval of the Foreign, Colonial and Home
Offices, and he was widely regarded as an expert on I.S.
issues. Cunningham wanted to benefit from his 'experience of
terrorist activities in an unfriendly population', hoping that
his knowledge of unusual I.S. conditions would assist the
Palestine police. Although this search for fresh ideas was not
initiated by the Colonial Office, not least because it believed
45. On Gray's position, Home P.556-7; D. Charters 'Special
operations in COIN: the Farran case', JRUSI 124, June
1979, P.124; Intelligence and National 1991, P.127. On his
background and ideas, B. Fergusson The Trumpet in the Hall
(London, 1970) P.199,202; Montgomery to VCIGS, 2 Dec.
1946, 177/9, IWM; Bell Terror P.159.
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that there were no available personnel in the Empire who were
qualified for advising on such matters, it enthusiastically
took up the proposal, and agreed that Wickham and two officers
who had been exposed to IRA methods should visit Palestine in
October 1946. By August 20, Wickham requested Captain R.H.
Hamilton, who served with him in the RIC during the Irish COIN
in 1920, and Lieutenant-Colonel William H. Moffatt of the RUC
Special Branch, who was familiar with conditions in Ulster.
Although Hamilton refused the offer, Moffatt was seconded on 16
October, and he studied the CID from 2 November. Wickham began
to look more generally at the police force and its tasks a
fortnight later.46
The Colonial Office and the High Commissioner questioned
the police COIN effort and then considered modifications
suggested by hand-picked men conversant with Irish COIN, and
also the conflict in Greece, a country which, like Palestine,
was a responsibility of the GHQtIELF. However, it evidently drew
no parallel between COIN in Greece and in Palestine;
understandably in view of the different emphasis placed on
various policy instruments by the Jewish and communist
insurgents, and the contrasting rural and urban settings. But,
although pressure for the amendment of COIN practices in
Palestine did not come from the theatre Command, some local
army units underscored the concerns of civil authorities in the
mandate.
46. On the special advisors and their mission, HC, Note, and
to SSC, 1 Aug., Cunn. 1/2, MEC, CO537/3847. CO views in,
SSC to HC, 7 Aug., Under-Sec. G. Gater, CO note, 13 Sept.;
and	 appointments,	 'Moffatt	 seconded	 for duty	 in
Palestine', n.d., CO537/3847; 	 Wickham Report, 2 Dec.
191+6, CO537/2269.
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During the summer of 1946, the Sixth Airborne Division HQ
noted that advice on I.S. from the theatre and local HQ levels
failed to take account fully of the needs of the situation.
Army 1.5. training continued on the basis of a revised 9/13
Pamphlet of July 1946, and tactical revisions were incorporated
into Operational Orders and Instructions 'based on experiences
gained in Palestine.' Indeed, the Division's commander, Major-
General R.D. Wilson, appreciated that it was 'the duty of the
Army to keep abreast of .. changes and adjust methods
accordingly.' But the Airborne HQ criticised the Middle East
Training Team's I.S. instruction, with its concentration on
mobile columns, as 'breaking .. the principles .. of aid to the
civil power.' Although they did not elaborate on this
criticism, the formation pointed out that the Palestine HQ's
advice was basically 'written .. as a result of experience in
the Arab troubles of 1936-9', and that this fell short of
providing the foundations for success in the present
circumstances. The critics presented no alternative military-
security policies, but they were unhappy with the operational
formula followed by the army throughout 1946, and referred to
current events in India as 'the nearest parallel', in a bid to
derive I.S. lessons from this source. 47
 The problems
encountered in the dissolving Raj clearly could not offer
solutions for counterinsurgents in Palestine, but some patently
felt that a new impetus was required.
COIN agencies on extra-military-security action in 1946.
47. METP9/13, in 0174, 31 July, and HQPa1. 0182, 24 Oct.,
WO275/17. 6 Airbne. Div. HQ, G(Ops), on training, notes,
22 July, and on HQPa1.,2OSu(y1946,W0275/13. Wilson, 6
Airbne. OIl, 30 Jan. 1948, W0275/19. Cf. 1936-9 operations
to postwar, as in Marlowe Seat P.211.
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The administration's limited propaganda effort was
continued after April 1946 by a new Central Office of
Information, which relied on the printed word and official
statements to attack the opposition and call for assistance.
But Cunningham's efforts to improve the COIN campaign were
confined to the operational scene until September, when the GOC
proposed a separate 'psywar department' that could devise
propaganda. They adhered to the accepted wisdom that this must
be a civilian rather than military body, and agreed that it
should liaise with the Security Service and army intelligence
to tap all information sources and secure the help of these
organisations in developing its product. Indeed, the theatre
Joint Intelligence Committee invited the Colonial Office to
appoint a 'political warfare officer' in November, and Barker
asked for a person who knew 'Palestine conditions and
especially the psychology of the [Yishuvj'. Clearly, as time
went on local COIN authorities appreciated the importance of
counterpropaganda, yet no psywar department was created,
probably because of Whitehall's unease about using propaganda,
an attitude which prevailed until the emergence of the Cold War
during 1947. Nonetheless, increasing local interest in the
instrument was reflected in Central Security Committee
meetings, where henceforth considerable attention was given to
domestically-oriented Jewish propaganda. Furthermore, although
such activity lay outside its normal compass, from September
1946 the Field Security Section [FSS] number 317 team began a
systematic effort to inform all army units of insurgent
propaganda. In turn, some units indicated the importance of
providing swift press statements on events and gaining 'the
right angle to the story', and by December the GSI was
coordinating Army Public Relations policy. However, this
increased awareness of psywar did not result in a
transformation of COIN practice, and the army's own positive
psywar effort was restricted to treating the Yishuv 'with
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decency .. [to] get .. them on our side.' 48
 Therefore, COIN
authorities were extending their vision, but they lacked the
proficiency and the political backing to translate their
concerns into the necessary action.
Security force operations in late 1946.
During the winter of 1946 to 1947, some army formations
increased the frequency of their small unit half-hour patrols
in areas prone to insurgent attack, in order 'to check
terrorist activity' and 'annihilate' them in 'an ambush and
recce role.' But these operations were 'largely deterrent by
hampering movement and training', because of the dearth of
tactical intelligence required for pre-emptive military-
security action. In addition, the control routine continued,
with security units carrying out, for instance, two snap checks
and two road blocks a day, and two night patrols a week. The
new Colonial Secretary from 4 October, Sir Arthur Creech-Jones,
noted that no new policy options were proposed by any official
48. GOC/HC on psywar, Security Conferences, 25,27 Sept., Cunn.
4/1. Joint Intelligence Committee,MELF/GOC, in HC Note, 13
Nov., to SSC, A. Creech-Jones, 20 Nov. 1946, Cunn. 1/3,
MEC. On FSS activities, Maj.-Gen. H. Stockwell note, n.d.,
6/4, LHC. Army psywar action, 1 Inf. Div. 'Publicity', 8
Aug., W0169/22957; HQPa1. 0182, 24 Oct. 1946, W0275/13. On
the GSI, Col. Norman, 'Intelligence in Palestine', 23 July
1947, 87/57/ 2, IWM. HQPa1. tasks, BGS,HQPa1., Maj. A.
Cochrane, 14 Sept. 1946, 'Action to be taken against
Jewish terrorists', in, Stockwell, 6/1, LHC.
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British source, 49 and most of the security forces functioned
within an analytical vacuum. The only suggested alternative
came from top army officers who wanted to repeat the supposed
past glories of large scale/unit operations and repression, but
these methods were not supported by local COIN authorities, and
such a course was anyway inhibited by Bevin's diplomatic
mission. Despite the release of detained Jewish leaders to
attend a conference in October 1946, the Foreign Secretary's
effort was handicapped by intransigence on both sides. The Jews
pushed for partition, especially after Truman's supportive
speech of 4 October, while the Arabs were wholly opposed to it.
By December 1946, Bevin contemplated offering the apparently
intractable problem to the USA or U.N., but persevered again in
London at the start of 1947,50 and while political bargaining
proceeded, the Cabinet was reticent about sanctioning a sterner
Cost-Benefit COIN line.
49. All /ref's in W0261/. COIN operations, 2 Para. Bde. 018,
19 Sept., QHR, Sept., /213; 0111,12, 27 Oct.,22 Nov., and
18 Oct., /214; 9 Inf. Div. 0110, 7 Nov., /207; 1 Para.
Bde. 0116, 3 Nov., /209; GHQMEF G(Ops) QHR, 20 Dec., /545;
6 Arbne. Div., QHR, Sept., /656; 1S16, 20 Sept., W0275/14;
HQPa1. ISUM12, 4 Oct., W0275/58; Wilson P.82-4. The set
pattern of controls is in, for example, 1 Gds. Bde. 018,
Aug., /664. SSC, to HC, 10 Oct. 1946, Cunn. 1/2, MEC.
50. Cabinet, FO and CO views on the diplomatic effort, W.R.
Louis The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-51
(Oxford, 1984) P.393,454; Bullock P.299-300; Ovendale
Britain P.178: on Truman, P.164-6,187-9: and on the London
Conference, P.158,161. HC's views, to SSC Hall, 11. July,
27 Sept., CO537/2287; to SSC Creech-Jones, 4 Nov. 1946,
Cunn. 1/3, MEC.
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Debate between the Army establishment and local COIN
agencies over the Cost-Benefit line by winter 1946-7.
In November 1946, the CINCMELF, General Dempsey, noted
that 'the main reason we catch no terrorists is that the people
take no action directly or in giving evidence' about the
insurgents. He sought to wring contact intelligence from the
Yishuv by intensifying the State's negative psywar action,
dispensing fines 'on all and sundry' and carrying out suspended
capital sentences. Further, he desired a tougher military
approach that would also be of negative psywar value by
'bringing physical pressure to bear' on the Jewish community.51
The CIGS affirmed that 'the only means of combatting terrorism
[is] constant harrying, which will keep the terrorists on
the move and disrupt their plans', and he supported the large
scale/unit offensive policies contemplated by Dempsey.
Montgomery maintained that the menace disturbing Palestine had
'appeared in many countries at various times' in the past-
implicitly equating insurgency with other types of intrastate
conflict- and hence he believed that insurgent forces could be
beaten by vintage 'robust methods' which were not 'concerned
with politics.' He argued that 'no real harm will be done to
the population, and they will tire of being upset and
cooperate' 52 by providing information and resisting pressure
51. CINCMELF, to WO/CIGS, 16 Nov., W0216/194, Montgomery,
211/2, IWM; to CIGS, 21 Nov., W0216/194; to WO, 21 Nov.,
Cunn. 1/1,13, MEC; in HC to SSC, 23 Nov. 1946, CO537/1731.
52. Montgomery, in Memo, 29 Nov., 177/1, IWM, Cunn. 1/3, MEC;
in DO(46)145, 19 Dec., 'The use of the armed forces, II:
the WO view', and notes, CO537/1731,W032/10260,PREM8/864,
211/22, IWM; Notes, 19 Dec.; to CINCMELF, 18 Dec., W0216/
194; in HC to SSC, 3,12 Dec. 1946, CO537/1731.
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exerted on them by insurgents. This was an unrealistic view of
the dilemma facing the Yishuv, who were under the influence of
insurgent political terrorism and propaganda, and obviously the
Chief of the General Staff did not understand the workings of
insurgency. Nonetheless, his outlook was accepted by the War
Office and so reflected the British Army's COIN line at an
official level, which was no different to that of the 1930s.
Although the Cost-Benefit line was not fully implemented in
Palestine in 1945 and 1946, it was persistently questioned at
the time by local COIN agencies.
The High Commissioner was cautious about resorting to the
I.S. policies propounded by military traditionalists,
especially as Sir Charles Wickham's ideas about COIN conflicted
with them. He wrote to Cunningham in early October, stating
that to defeat Palestine's 'particular brand of the IRA' posed
a most difficult problem. He pointed out that there were 'no
rules' or written principles for tackling such opponents,
recognising the atypical nature of insurgency and the previous
lack of British doctrinal preparation for countering it. But
Wickham applied his experience of policing and COIN in Ireland
and Greece, and stated that the key to victory was
'information, and you don't get [that from the people] .. until
you get some success.' Thus, he advocated the usual security
force offensive operations aimed at inflicting visible losses
on the opposition and thereby giving the population the
confidence to assist them in future. However, he was unsure
whether such positive psywar action would produce the desired
results, bearing in mind that 'the informer has always been a
feature of Irish revolt' but that this was not the case with
the Jews. Wickham could offer no new positive psywar ideas, but
he rejected the strong negative psywar approach of Montgomery
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and his supporters, 53
 which would undermine rather than advance
the British position.
In November 1946, the British police advisors studied the
Palestine force and its tasks, and proposed to fight
unconventional war by an 'intensification of normal procedure
and operation .. which includes [the] assistance of the armed
forces.' Wickham indicated the importance of local police posts
as bases for small unit security patrols, and such an area-
deployment pattern followed the examples of interwar Ireland
'and elsewhere', not least Greece where he had instituted this
counterterrorist policy during 1945 and 1946. He emphasised
that 'the public .. [was] the main source of information', and
that it was therefore vital 'to establish friendly relations
with the public and obtain its respect and confidence.' This
required a reorientation of the Palestine police force from
paramilitary to normal civil policing, with particular
attention being given to intelligence procurement. He clearly
overestimated the effect that the presence of police units
could have on a population subjected to intense propaganda and
terrorism, but he considered that widespread military pressure
was only acceptable in reaction to an 'open rebellion',54
(meaning a mass uprising). Wickham's findings can only have
served to underline Cunningham's misgivings about Montgomery's
favoured line.
There are claims that Cunningham readily supported large
scale/unit military-security operations and other repressive
measures, and it is true that he supported a measure of
53. Wickham, letter to Cunningham, 4 Oct. 1946, CO537/3847.
54. Wickham's views, and his and Moffatt's Reports, 2 Dec.,
1946, CO537/2269; CDC, DO(47)11, 14 Jan. 1947, CAB131/4.
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'punitive' action, especially to retain British morale. But
although he threatened coercion, this was to further the
indirect strategy of pressuring the Yishuv and especially the
Jewish Agency 'to deal with the matter themselves', as both he
and the GOC believed that this was the easiest way to resolve
the situation. 55 But the Agency proved uncooperative, and
from late November to early December 1946, as Wickham wrote his
police report for Cunningham's scrutiny, the head of the
administration also sought lessons from history. He
perspicaciously noted that irregulars in postwar Palestine were
unlike the Arab rebels active between 1936 and 1939, and he
asserted, in rather broad terms, that there was 'no comparison
between that situation and the present.' He concluded that
State intimidation then, and in Ireland from 1919 to 1921, had
'not the slightest effect on terrorism and might well increase
it.' He insisted that repression would ostracise the 'major
section' of the Yishuv who were 'the only feasible weapon for
controlling the terrorists', making the COIN task even more
difficult. Montgomery protested that, 'I cannot follow such
reasoning', but General Barker also took issue with the
proposal to resort to wholesale collective punishments which
would 'hit a large number of innocents', and while positing
that. large scale military-security operations would disturb
irregular planning and activities, he realised that they could
not eliminate Jewish paramilitary forces. Cunningham
subsequently stated that the CIGS 'never appreciated that
dealing with Jewish terrorists hidden by the whole population
was a very different matter to the previous activities of the
55. On Cunningham and coercion, Hurewitz P.281; Begin P.231.
HC's actual views, to SSC, 6,12 Dec., in DO(46)33, 20
Nov., SSC to 1-IC, 10 Dec., CO537/1731; [-IC to SSC, 23 Nov.,
5 Dec. 1946, HC Note, 3 Jan. 1947, Cunn. 1/4: GOC view, 21
Nov. 1946, to MELF, Cunn. 1/3, NEC.
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Arabs', and he advised London that Montgomery's military
approach would be 'ineffective against the type of terrorism'
encountered in 1946. Although Cunningham was unable to answer
the tantalising question of how to gain the people's active
support, he hoped that tactical modifications to present
security force policies and better police intelligence work
would improve operational results. The local executive clearly
did not share some senior officers' firm belief in the prewar
COIN model.
Cunningham was equally unconvinced of the merit of
releasing detained Jewish leaders and assuring them that large
cordon-and-search operations would be suspended, in order to
prepare the way for a conference in October 1946. This would
throw away a useful political threat and an element of his
indirect strategy, and he complained that one-off political
'gestures' were detrimental to the British position, at a time
when they could be construed as concessions to terrorism.
Cunningham recognised that to have any impact, COIN political
action needed to be part of a policy, such as his oft requested
increase in Jewish immigration quotas. The GOC agreed that 'no
action taken by the military alon[e] can stop terrorism .. [and
it] must be in support of some political policy which is not
existent at present.' Although Barker visualised a separate
political settlement more than dedicated COIN political action,
he nonetheless felt that the State was neglecting its
'political weapons', placing an emphasis on COIN different to
that of Field-Marshal Montgomery, who was condemned by
Cunningham for viewing COIN 'solely from the military point of
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view .. the political aspect is in no way considered.'56 The
High Commissioner and the GOC reappraised past I.S. doctrine
and practice in the light of the failure to eradicate the
Jewish insurgents, and the Colonial Office was informed of and
agreed with their views, in contrast to the Army establishment.
The IZL flogged two British officers on 29 December 1946,
and taken together with its earlier kidnappings and the
stalling of the diplomatic effort, London reacted firmly to
this blow to British morale and authority. On 1 January 1947,
the Cabinet directed Cunningham to pursue 'all possible steps'
to improve the I.S. position, and the Chiefs of Staff suggested
the adoption of their tough traditional I.S. line. Meeting at
the Colonial Office at the beginning of January 1947 to decide
on future COIN action, Montgomery and Cunningham were 'at
complete variance.' 57 The CIGS pressed for a blanket
application of Cost-Benefit policies against what he termed
56. HC on the CIGS, to SSC, 3 Dec. 1946, PREM8/864, Cunn. 1/3;
and on reprisals, Note, n.d., Cunn. 4/2; letter to Daily
Telegraph, 9 Dec. 1958, Cunn. 5/4. Montgomery on HC views,
to VCIGS, 2 Dec., 177/9, IWM. HC on Ireland and Palestine
examples, Note, 18 Dec., WO216/194; to SSC, tele.'s, 23
Nov., CO537/1731,/2345;W0216/194,PREM8/864,Cunn. 1/1; and
HC/GOC on COIN in, MacDonald, CO, to Montgomery, 23 Nov.,
211/18, IWM. GOC on action for psywar/morale purposes,
BGS,HQPa1., for GOC, to GHQMELF, 21 Nov., Cunn. 1/3. HC on
positive psywar, 23 Nov. 1946, Cunn. 1/4, MEC.
57. The Cabinet's decision, DO(47)1, 1 January, CAB131/5;
Montgomery P.469; CO Brief for SSC, 15 Jan., CO537/3870:
COS views, COS(47)2, 2 Jan.; [-IC, in GHQMELF QHR, 20 Mar.,
W0261/546. CO/WO in Conf. notes, 3 Jan. 1947, Montgomery,
211/24, IWM, Cunn. 5/4, MEC.
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'terrorism and lawlessness', illustrating his undifferentiated
conception of the conflict in progress in Palestine. Although
not demonstrating a complete understanding of insurgency,
Creech-Jones and Cunningham shared the view that 'terrorism',
(or, more precisely, insurgency), 'was quite distinct' from
other threats to I.S. in the mandate, suggesting their greater
appreciation of the dangers posed by the insurgents than the
CIGS. Indeed, Cunningham called for calculated COIN action,
rather than the blunt and unsophisticated path favoured by
Montgomery, who countered that the High Commissioner was
'definitely wrong.' The CIGS wanted 'large scale country-wide
action .. [turning Palestine] upside down .. without waiting
for evidence .. [with the land] flooded with mobile columns',
and 'the most ruthless methods [applied,] such as razing to the
ground of .. most .. villages to get at hidden weapons', thus
displaying his faith in the old ways. 58 After more than a year
of impasse in the mandate, Attlee agreed with Montgomery that
Yishuv attitudes were unlikely to change drastically, and with
Creech-Jones 'shouted down' in the Cabinet, a directive was
sent to Cunningham urging him to take all steps 'as may be
necessary' to restore order. Charters notes that the Cabinet
was 'inclined to minimise the role of the police', and under
pressure from the Cabinet and military officialdom, the High
Commissioner publicly warned the Jews of impending 'drastic'
action if their assistance was not forthcoming. But he hoped
58. CIGS, SSC, and HC views in, CO Conf. notes, 3 Jan.,
Montgomery, 211/24, IWM, Cunn. 5/4, NEC. On 1936-9 style
I.S. policies, CIGS to CINCMELF, 15 Jan., in Pyman, 6/1/2,
LHC. On army action, CDC, DO(47)1, 1 Jan., CAB131/5;
Montgomery P.467; CO Brief for SSC, 15 Jan., CO537/3870;
CINCMELF to GIGS, 15 Jan., W0216/194; CIGS note, 4 Jan.,
210/4, IWM; Jan./Mar. diary notes, 180/1,5, IWM. On its
psychological impact, CP(47)3, 15 Jan. 1947, CAB128/9.
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that they might yet cooperate in COIN, or with another Agency-
led 'Saison', and hoped to cultivate their sympathy by
persistently championing increased legal Jewish immigration.
Furthermore, following the reorganisation of the police force
by January 1947, and months of limited intelligence
accumulation, from 30 December 1946 the security forces
markedly increased the number of their small unit operations.
Cunningham tried to put off action desired by the CIGS for as
long as possible, and a leading civil official recorded the
administration's conviction that 'every possible chance must be
given for Jewish authority to assert itself.'59
Adjustment of the COIN military approach in early 1947.
In January and February 1947, a series of security force
small unit ambushes, searches and raids took place during
Operation OCTOPUS. It did not herald the army's rejection of
its existing tactical policy in order to concentrate on
developing paraguerilla operations, but the continuing
frustration of counterinsurgent offensives led them to
experiment with 'sudden swoops onto selected targets rather
than the more elaborate searches over a large area.' Much of
their activity was still speculative half-hour patrolling of
59. HC on the Yishuv, Agency, and immigration, CO Conf. notes,
3 Jan., ibid; Note, 3 Jan., Cunn. 1/4, Note, 17 Jan.,
Cunn. 5/1; in Lt.-Gen. G.H.A. MacMillan 'Narrative of
events', 3 July 1948, in Stockwell, 6/25/1, LHC. Also on
these issues, Under-Sec. E.R. Edmonds, for SSC, to Maj.-
Gen. Hollis, WO, 14 Jan., CO537/2269; OAG to SSC, 7 Jan.,
CO537/2294. Cabinet directive, CM(47)6, 15 Jan., CAB128/9;
SSC to HC, 20 Jan., CO537/3870; Charters PHD, P.59. On the
PPF, HC note, 3 Jan., Montgomery, 211/1, IWM; Under-Sec.,
CO, Trafford-Smith, to HC, 10 Jan. 1947, Cunn. 5/4, MEC.
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'known blackspots' by platoons, to deter and keep insurgents
'on the run', because tactical intelligence remained
'extremely weak.' But thirty suspects were arrested, and there
were some 'antiterrorist slipper patrols' to ambush irregulars,
which was an advance on previous military-security tactical
policy. The Sixth Airborne HQ noted that, 'the large scale
operation .. SHARK .. [failed to achieve success, and this]
serves to confirm that .. [a] very small scale raid based on
sound intelligence is likely to catch more terrorists than an
extensive operation without information.' The COC commended
OCTOPUS, and envisaged the 'suppression of terrorists being a
long business', rather than the relatively short-lived affair
that proponents of large scale/unit tactics envisaged.60
However, OCTOPUS was flawed in practice by meagre intelligence,
and moreover, many local commanding officers failed to
appreciate its potential, as was evident in January 1947, when
brigade and district army areas were swapped over. This broke
existing security force links with members of the Yishuv, and
consequently discarded the knowledge which they had acquired
about their patrol areas, annoying some army officers. Further,
the CIGS evaluated the operational scene in late January and
complained that the implementation of 'the new directive [is]
60. On the intelligence position, HC to SSC, 4 Feb., Cunn.
1/4; CoS,MELF, Maj.-Gen. Pyman, note, 11 Jan. 1947, 6/1/2,
LHC. Details of operations and decisions in, CINCMELF to
CIGS, 21 Jan., Montgomery, 178/1, IWM; 6 Arbne. Div., 20
Jan., W0275/34; HQPa1. ISUM12, 13 Jan., W0261/171; 9 Inf.
Div. 0112, 1 Jan., WO261/2O8; 1 Gds. Bde. Ols, 25 Jan., 8
Feb., W0261/187; GOC, in 1-IC Note, Jan., Cunn. 5/4.
Operational results, OAG to SSC, 14 Jan., CO537/2294;
GHQMELF Weekly IR, 21 Jan., WO275/ 120; GOC, to Chief Sec.
/MELF, 23 Jan., Cunn. 1/4, MEC,Stockwell, 6/2: COC, in
Pyman, to CINCMELF, Jan. 1947, 6/1/2, LHC.
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useless.' Thereafter, he badgered the CINCMELF about securing
the implementation of more large scale/unit offensives.61
Continuing debate among COIN agencies over the Cost-
Benefit line in early 1947.
Concurrent with OCTOPUS, Cunningham tried to advance his
indirect strategy by proclaiming that 'plans were in train' to
implement Montgomery's tough COIN line. The Jewish Agency
responded with an ineffectual 'Little Saison', but on 28
January, Creech-Jones announced that repression was imminent.62
The High Commissioner was under pressure to intensify Cost-
Benef it action, and so Operations POLLY and CANTONMENT
evacuated non-essential Britons and concentrated the rest into
defended areas, as a means of protection against further
kidnappings rather than as an integral COIN policy. By 4
February 1947, Cunningham accepted the imposition of statutory
martial law in principle, to afford army control of specified
areas and the implementation of sterner population-resource
control and negative psywar measures; but on the condition that
this followed insurgent attacks that created an atmosphere in
which such procedures would be more politically acceptable. He
also authorised the army to occupy some Jewish houses, as a
negative psywar measure as well as to encourage Jewish Agency
assistance, admitting that this was 'devised to get that help
either by pressures or through willingness.' Then, on 13
February, the British government's search for a Palestine
61. On Army movements, Charters Jewish insurgency P.89:
criticism of them, Gale P.171. Montgomery's views, to CINC
MELF, 30 Jan. 1947, 211/30, IWM.
62. On the Little Saison, Cohen Palestine and Great P.243.
Yishuv action, HC to SSC, 4 Feb. 1947, Cunn. 1/4, MEC.
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political settlement came to an end, and the problem was
referred to the U.N. by the Cabinet. With political restraints
on the Cost-Benefit line reduced, the course favoured by the
Chiefs of Staff was realised63
 - if not wholeheartedly by the
High Commissioner. He believed that military control areas were
a 'diehard' Army device, and the GOC agreed that they were 'a
last resort.' Alternative Hearts-and-Minds policies continued
to lie outside Cunningham's grasp, but he consistently warned
London that the State could not 'stop terrorism by any military
or repressive action alone', and contended, with General
Barker's support, that the Cabinet must 'either increase the
immigration quota, which gives the only chance of cooperation
or .. embark on a period of military repression', with
unpredictable consequences. In these circumstances, the GOC
foresaw conditions 'only deteriorat{ing]'. He and Cunningham
favoured political action instead, and the High Commissioner
vowed, 'I will not .. proceed with military control if it can
be possibly avoided.' But Creech-Jones retorted that political
measures would require a 'period of quiet' to ensure that they
could not be perceived as concessions to terrorism and cause an
Arab backlash. The pressure on Cunningham became inexorable,
and following the murder of 18 troops on 1 March 1947, he
inaugurated statutory martial law in major Jewish cities. This
involved stringent controls and a suspension of civic services
63. Arrangements for POLLY/CANTONMENT, as 9 Inf. Div. 0125, 2
Feb., W0261/202; 1 Para. Bde. QHR, Mar., W0261/210. HC
views, to SSC/PM, 4 Feb., CO537/2298. On limited negative
psywar, Security Conference, 5 Feb., Cunn. 4/2, MEC; also,
HQPa1. to Chief Sec., 5 Feb., W0261/140; HC in, SSC to
Attlee, 4 Feb., CO537/2298. Cabinet's UN decision, CP(47)
59, 13 Feb. 1947, CAB129/17. On the COS's influence on
policy, Charters Jewish insurgency P.107; Hoffman Failure
P.10. Cf. Kimche P.194 on the role of the HC and HQPa1..
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for two weeks, 'to bring the greatest possible pressure to bear
on all sections of the JEWISH community in order to force them
to assist the security forces.' Cunningham identified 'the
crux' of these negative psywar operations as their impact on
Jewish business, but he was not certain whether they could
deliver any long term benefit. Only limited information was
elicited during the martial law period, while considerable
Yishuv hostility was engendered. 64 General Barker conjectured
that statutory martial law 'should get more [Jewish]
cooperation .. and greater willingness to tell us details of
the [insurgents] .. this may, however, not be the case.' He was
therefore uncertain about negative psywar methods, and he
opposed an increase in the number of executions which would
undoubtedly anger the Yishuv. But the army HQ staff was willing
to test the martial law weapon in preference to simply relying
on routine COIN policies. The new GOC from March 1947,
Lieutenant-General Gordon H.A. MacMillan, also preached
firmness, urging that the State had to bring 'home to the
Jewish psychology by strong armed and economic pressure and
coercion' the importance of their cooperation. However, he too
warned against 'military dictatorship', in view of the fact
that since only an estimated one percent of Jews were
64. All /ref's in CO537/. HC on martial law, to SSC, 14 Feb.,
and with GOC, 20 Feb., /2234; to SSC, 24 Feb., /2294. GOC,
Security Conf., 23 Feb., Cunn. 4/1. Political action, HC/
GOC, to SSC, 20 Feb., HC to SSC, 3,9 Mar., SSC to HC, 2,7
Mar., /2234; HC to SSC, 14 Mar., /2299; 29 Apr., /2294; On
the Yishuv's attitude, to SSC, 2 Mar., /2299. Army views,
Conf., 5 Feb., Cunn. 4/2: action, CM(47)33, 27 Mar.,
CO537/2334; HQPa1. Report, 30 Mar., WO261/566. HC on
psywar, to SSC, 16 Mar., /2299; Conf., 5 Feb. 1947, Cunn.
4/2, MEC; RIIA notes, 22 July 1948, Cunn., 8303/104-26,
NAM.
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participating in the insurgency, the government must avoid
being manoeuvred into a harsh reaction to terrorism that would
alienate the rest. 65
 Despite his own circumspection, Cunningham
also agreed to investigate the prospects of the traditional
strict Cost-Benefit line.
Operations ELEPHANT and HIPPOMINIMUS [sic.] carried out in
March 1947 netted many insurgents and their supporters, and
this 'punitive' action lead to a short term influx of
information to the security forces. Further, Charters notes
that, judging by the diminished incidence of insurgent
violence in the following months, they were 'apparently a major
blow' to the insurgents. Indeed, the Joint Planning Staff in
London studied the possibility of extending military-control
areas nationally, following the 1938 example. However, the new
CINCMELF from July, General Sir John T. Crocker, reflected that
the army's modus operandi was now a course of 'last resort',
and sterner army control methods were discounted on the grounds
of their predicted ineffectiveness, drain on manpower, and the
likelihood of a violent Arab reaction. At this time,
Cunningham also extended the scope of his analytical vision to
the War, and criticised such plans on account that 'not even
Nazi ruthlessness' defeated underground movements, which he
equated to the Jewish insurgent organisation. By the summer of
1947, General MacMillan also accepted that popular support
65. On martial law, HQPa1. note, 5 Feb., W0275/36; Barker to
HC, 3 Feb. 1947, in Stockwell, 6/1; MacMillan,
'Narrative', 3 July 1948, 6/25/1, LHC; Appreciation, 23
Mar., W0261/666; guesstimate of active insurgent support,
CM(47)33; HC note, 27 Mar. 1947, PREM8/864.
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would not be attained by the traditional Cost-Benefit line.66
Statutory martial law was invoiced again in July and August, but
this was primarily to maintain security force morale in
response to more insurgent atrocities.67
The Army considered its COIN line during the
	
summer
months, while Cunningham re-stated the differences he saw
between the prewar Arab rebels and the current Jewish
insurgents. He contrasted their disparate military tactics and
organisational structures, as well as the general Jewish
distaste for political violence vis-a-vis past Arab support for
it. Hence, he concluded that persuasion rather than overt
pressure was required to persuade the Yishuv to oppose it. To
66. Operation aims, COS 'Imposition of Martial Law: draft
report', 25 Mar., CO537/2299; 1 Gds. Bde 016, Mar., W0261/
187; 9 Inf. Bde. 0120, 7 Mar., W0261/208; 1 Inf. Div.
report, P.4,30; 1S14, 2 Mar., Stockwell, 6/23; Appendix
'B', 6/25/2, LHC. Their apparent success, HC to SSC, 11,24
Mar., Cunn. 1/4; Charters Jewish insurgency P.123,155;
Intelligence P.30. Long term effects, 9 Inf. Bde. 0119,
report, 22 Mar., W0261/208; Col. Norman, Review, 22 June,
87/57/2, IWM; Bell On Revolt P.68. Cabinet views,
CM(47)30,33, 20,27 Mar., CAB128/9. JPS, JP(47)38(0), 20
Mar., Director of Plans to Director of Joint Planning, 21
Mar., CO537/2299; HC note, 14 Mar., Cunn. 4/1. CINCMELF
views, Dempsey, to GOC, 3 Mar., to CIGS, 4 Mar., Pyman,
6/1/3, LHC; Crocker, to HC, 13 Aug., Cunn. 5/4, MEC; to
VCIGS, 3 Aug., W0216/221. MacMillan, note, 5 Aug., in
Stockwell, 6/25/2, LHC. HC on the Nazis, note, 31 Aug.
1947, CO537/2299.
67. On the use of statutory martial law for morale, HG to SSC,
4 Aug., CO537/2299; 7 Aug. 1947, Cunn. 2/2, MEC.
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devise more effectual COIN policies he diligently sought
further historical guidance, yet derived nothing of importance
from the Irish COIN of 1919 to 1921 or the Burmese revolt of
1930 to 1934, commenting that it was 'not possible to compare
the[s e ] situations' with Palestine. He listed dissimilarities
between irregulars and their infrastructures, the Burmese
possessing a relatively weak organisation and tactical methods,
while the Jews were 'trained in .. underground tactics employed
in wartime Europe.' His unusual reference to partisan warfare
did not immediately spark new COIN ideas, although Cunningham
noted that, within local COIN agencies the 'search for novel
action is continuous.' 68 The High Commissioner's concerns were
shared within the army in Palestine, and Colonel Norman, its
head of intelligence, declared in July, 'how [the insurgentsj
are going to be eradicated, I don't know.' Moreover, the
HQ's Chief of Staff, Brigadier John M. Kirkman, provided
supplementary counsel to units in the summer of 1947, for their
'interest, information and guidance.' He was conversant with
Greek COIN efforts during 1945 and 1946, but he was obviously
unable to suggest any lessons from this conflict, distributing
only the HQ's own 'Notes on the Arab Rebellion 1936-9.' Kirkman
added that 'recent experience has enabled us to improve on the
procedure recommended', and the Palestine HQ emphasised the
value of employing air support and night operations. However,
these Notes focussed on recounting the prewar Arab campaign and
the British response to it, and recommended using the War
Office's 1934 Notes, and 'N.W.F.[rontier ] principles' adapted
68. HC, Memo, to SSC, 19 July 1947, Cunn. 2/1, MEC; Begin,




 The local army Command recognised that its
guidance had limitations, but was unable to devise any
substitute policies. And the idea of developing COIN policy
through the application of wartime experience initially came
from outside the ranks of the military.
New tactical military-security policies and counter-
terrorism proposals up to the spring of 1947.
Administration officials sanctioned unorthodox military-
security operations by the SNS in 1938 and 1939, and during the
War they originated an indirect counter-rebellion strategy,
pressing the Agency to curb rebel Jewish elements. During 1946
the Jewish Agency resisted overtures from Cunningham to
organise a programme against the insurgents. But he became
exasperated by the shortcomings of COIN policies and was under
intense pressure from his superiors to take effective action by
January 1947, and thus he suggested to Agency officials that
they act against the IZL and LHI, while the authorities would
'turn a blind eye to whatever the Haganah might do.' Cunningham
also referred to the action of British Special Constables
between 1939 and 1945 to propose a counterterrorist population
protection force led by the Palmach. Both proposals were
imaginative and recognised the need for active Jewish COIN
participation. But Cunningham initially conceived operations
directed by the Agency, probably incorporating paraterrorism,
69. CoS, Brig. J. Kirkman notes, 2 Sept., and HQPa1. G(Trg),
'Notes', incorporating three reports by 8 Inf. Div./HQPa1.
of 1937-9, W0275/111. Kirkman was formerly with BMM(G) and
LFGHQ, see Appendix 1. Col. Norman, lecture, July, 87/57/
2, IWM. There was hardly any use made of air support from
1945 to 1947, although it was advocated in WO 1934 Notes,
and as in, 1 tnf. Div. ISI7, 1 Oct. 1947, W0261/182.
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as an alternative to the reshaping of British military-security
policies, rather than as a point of departure from which to
develop government unorthodox COIN methods. In the event, the
plan was discarded on the Attorney-General's advice that it
would be legally 'very tricky.' Nonetheless, the High
Commissioner was evidently inspired by the idea, retaining an
interest in the indirect strategy and in new forces during
1947. He favoured the formation of Jewish 'watchmen' to defend
the Yishuv, a scheme similar to the 'Home Guard' created in
Greece in October 1946 with the War Office's assent. The
Service Department did not press Jerusalem to adopt the policy
in Palestine, but Jewish self-protection units were approved by
January 1948, albeit in the face of Arab rather than Jewish
violence. Moreover, in the period during which the Mandatory
resorted to 'strong-arm' military tactics from March 1947,
Cunningham became convinced of the desirability of security
force trials in unorthodox military-security operations, and he
observed that 'the search for new methods is continuous.' He
defended Wickham's view that in general the police should not
be diverted from their prescribed 'normal duties', but he
accepted some experimentation in principle. Hoffman notes that
the venture with unorthodox forces in Palestine during the
spring of 1947 represents a shift in police COIN practice,
rather than in Army thought, but the War Office also helped to
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develop the new tactical policy, 70 and this clearly reflected a
wider British military interest in non-conventional warfare at
the time.
From 1945 there was growing curiosity in the Army about
unorthodox forces, and broadly in unconventional war, despite
'hostility in some parts of the military establishment.' A War
Office Directorate of Tactical Investigation committee was
formed in 1945, following pressure on the CIGS and other
officers by 'Calvert, Franks and other senior' SAS soldiers,
who wanted unorthodox units for wartime and particular I.S.
roles. It 'analysed the history of all such units, with a view
to formulating future policy', and the Committee stated that
the SAS was the best example for intelligence-based small unit
patrol. Its re-constitution was recommended in September 1946,
70. HC on indirect action, to SSC, 8,29 Apr., Cunn. 1/4; to
SSC, 6 June, Cunn. 1/2, MEC. HC/Attorney-General on new
methods, Security Conf.'s, 5 Feb., and Agency attitude, 7
Feb., Cunn. 4/1; HC to SSC, 16 Mar., CO537/2299. HC states
that a local Tel Aviv 'watchmen' scheme is 'significant',
note, 28 May 1947, Cunn. 1/4; to SSC, 6 Jan. 1948,
CO537/3852. HC on Wickham, in W.W. Clark, CO note, 12
Feb. 1947, CO537/2270. Hoffman FE-ID, P.131. On Greece, see
Chapter 4.
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and this occurred a year later. 7 ' Further, the War Office and
the Chiefs of Staff approved of 'commandos' for Greek COIN in
late 1946. Apart from this official interest, the influential
military journals featured guerilla war and COIN, 72
 and there
were many popular works on the Chindit expeditions. The Indian
Army's foremost journal regarded I.S. duties as 'distasteful'
but warned that they would be 'at least as numerous and
serious' as before the War, and it therefore considered that
'inten{se]' study of existing doctrine was necessary. However,
71. Also on the Army's interests, Blaxiand P.47. On Army
opposition to unconventional thinking, T. Geraghty Who
Dares Wins (London, 1980) P.45; J.G. Shortt The SAS
(London, 1981) P.18. On the SAS role for 'quelling
rebellions' and 'civil wars', Calvert interview, 10 Apr.
1991, Paper, Mar. 1991; Strawson P.151; Ladd SAS P.99,104;
Lt.-Col. M. Calvert, (see interview), 'Notes on the future
of the SAS', 7 May 1945; Anon., 'Notes on the
organisation, history and employment of SAS troops'; and
WO action, Lt.-Col. L.E.O.T. Hart, 'The SAS', c.1958, in,
McLeod Papers, LHC; Young P.44,53. WO Directorate of
Tactical Investigation 'Report of a working party on
control of special units and organisations', Sept. 1946,
is in W0232/1OB.
72. Examples of articles in the leading British military
journals- Army Q'ly: Maj. P.M. Moore 'The other side of
the kampong', 52, July 1946; Maj.-Gen. R.J. Collins, 'What
happened in Java, 1945-6', 55, Jan. 1948. USII: Capt. J.E.
Heelis, 'Lessons of guerilla warfare', 328, July 1947;
Maj.-Gen. J.F.R. Forinan 'The Netherlands East Indies: Some
lessons from our occupation', 327, Apr. 1947; 'I.S.', 322,
Jan. 1946. RUSt: Col. R. Laycock 'Raids in the late war
and their lessons', 92 , Nov. 1947. On Greece, Chapter 4.
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others discerned that the war years held potential lessons for
I.S., and writing about the conflict in the Netherlands East
Indies in 1946, Major P.N. Moore proposed policies that
departed from War Office I.S. doctrine. He compared the
Indonesian insurgent organisation and campaign to wartime
Resistance, as guerillas aimed to form 'liberation' zones and
an alternative regime, while popular support was built upon
military success and propaganda. Major Moore urged, 'let us
profit from the lessons .. taught us in Europe', and he
proposed a politico-military response, at the heart of which
was the need to 'get the politics right.' He wanted propaganda
to raise pro-government levels of support, and catalogued the
consequences of Nazi repression to question the negative
psywar approach. He did not elaborate Hearts-and-Minds
policies, but the Cost-Benefit line was criticised. Further,
although he supported encirclement tactics, he also commended
the German development of air-supplied small units designed for
the ambush of guerillas on their favoured supply routes. Moore
did not rework the German concept into a new paraguerilla
theory, but he proposed army units operating from strategic
bases to 'control the surrounding country by active patrolling
in strength', following the example of 'the Chindit
organisation.' Thus, he promoted the pressurisation of
guerillas by continuous offensive operations with highly mobile
troops acting on intelligence. In addition, Moore favoured
control measures including a 'series of operations pinching out
food producing areas' for food-denial, and garrisons stationed
in villages to stifle the growth of the insurgent organisation,
because 'without it no guerilla can function effectively.'
Finally, he recommended that all COIN action should be executed
in a single strategic plan. These were astute proposals and the
Army Quarterly's 'Editorial' noted that 'most .. of his
-154-
arguments seem logical and sound', 73 implicitly supporting the
adaptation of the Army's COIN line. Although the influence of
this treatise on British counterinsurgents cannot be gauged,
some new COIN thought was evidently emerging.
The Indonesian rebellion was opposed with familiar I.S.
policies in the winter of 1945 to 1946, but some army officers
experimented with unorthodox forces and pursued small unit
patrolling in 1946. Lieutenant R. 'Turk' Westerling drew on his
experience with the SOE, Commandos, and Chindits, to train
native forces for lengthy infiltration into the jungle where
irregulars were active, and to ambush them on information from
tribes-people and captives. Westerling procured this by
adopting a heterogeneous line, comprising basic civic action,
such as befriending locals and giving them medical aid and
trinkets, in addition to counterterrorist protection; and if
this failed to produce intelligence, he was not averse to
adopting the Asian tradition of the beheading and public
display of dead irregulars. This gained insurgent surrenders
and information, and he even 'turned' some opponents for use in
a pseudoguerilla role. However, although he devised some
innovative and valuable military-security tactics, Westerling
also experienced 'differences of opinion .. [with his] British
superiors.' He disagreed with the policy of collective
punishment, which would alienate innocent people, (an advance
73. On traditional I.S. wisdom, 'I.S.' article, ibid P.87-
8,90-1; on the War, Heelis, ibid P.544. Maj. P.N. Moore
ibid P.248-52; Army Quarterly Editorial, P.150. On Burma,
1943-5, see for example, C. Rob Wingate's Raiders
(London, 1944); B. Fergusson Beyond the Chindwiri (London,
1944); D. Halley With Wingate in Burma (London, 1945); A.
Irwin Burmese outpost (London, 1945); W.G. Burchett
Wingate's Phantom Army (London, 1946).
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on the British Army's preferred psywar approach), but senior
British officers rejected Westerling's extreme brand of
military action in 1946. Nevertheless, small unit patrolling by
former SOE men also defeated Kuornintang guerilla bands in
Malaya in the spring of 1946. It is unclear whether security
force personnel in Palestine were aware of such episodes, but
some tried to adapt techniques devised during the War for COIN
usage by 1947.
In early 1947, following Cabinet pressure to 'tak[e] every
possible step' to defeat the insurgents, the Palestine Police
Inspector-General, Colonel Gray, proposed innovation in
military-security tactical policy. Undoubtedly inspired by his
own wartime Commando experience, and with the High
Commissioner's knowledge, Gray asked his assistant, Major
Bernard E. Fergusson- who had fought with the SAS and Chindits,
and in Palestine in 1937 and 1938- to suggest new tactics.
Fergusson looked to recent military history for stimulation,
referring to the prewar Arab guerillas and Wingate's 'Gideon
Force' of 1941. Moreover, he drew on wartime Burma to suggest
air support to enhance the mobility of ground forces. Yet he
felt 'destitute of ideas' for countering urban terrorism and
guerilla warfare, and in March 1947 he therefore consulted
74. R.P.P. Westerling A Challenge to Terror (London, 1952) on
beheading, P.66-7,70, and other action, P.31,50-1,62-3,65-
8,70-4,80-1,85-7,90-1; H.A. Van den Berg, interview, 11
Aug. 1990; P. Dennis P.199-200. On early postwar action in
Malaya, Maj. H.T. Hutchinson, 'Postwar operations in
Malaya' JUSII, 335, Jan. 1949, P.38,44.
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others who were seasoned in unconventional war. 75
 The War
Office Directorate of Military Operations supported his search
for the 'small number of officers who have both technical and
psychological knowledg[e] .. of terrorism having themselves
been engaged in similar operations on .. the terrorist side' in
the War. Bevin endorsed the application of such 'know-how',
both in Palestine and, six months later, in Greece. The Home
Office was unable to provide any expert assistance, but the SIS
was consulted by the Colonial Office, and the department agreed
to employ three officers trained in 'special operations' and
guerilla war- they had been in the SAS, SOE and SIS- which met
with the approval of the Director of Military Operations,
Major-General A.D. Ward. 76 Thus, officials in all COIN agencies
now accepted the potential value of wartime experience for
COIN, and sought men with the appropriate background.
In practice, two army officers organised twenty Palestine
Police constables- half of whom were ex-SAS or Commandos
themselves- into small units in the middle of March 1947.
Fergusson fostered new tactical thinking, and in what was a
75. Fergusson P.28,72,142,184; Home P.558.
76. On requests for assistance, Maj. B.E. Fergusson to Sec.,
F.A.M. Browning, WO, 5 Feb.; to CO, in HC to SSC, 11 Feb.;
in W.W. Clark, CO Minute, 10,13 Feb.; and on selected
personnel, 'Memo to Palestine Sec., CO', 12 Feb., CO537/
2270; Fergusson P.210,221-2,226; Bethell P.302. The CO
asks the SIS to assist and Bevin approves, West P.31. On
departmental views, Permt. Sec., T. Lloyd, CO, to Speed,
WO, 13 Feb., Speed to Lloyd, 6 Mar., Lloyd to Speed, 11
Mar.; CO, J.M. Martin, note to Lloyd, 13 Feb.; W.W. Clark,
minute, 12 Feb. 1947, CO537/2270. On Bevin and Greece, see
Chapter 4.
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first step towards the development of paraguerilla action, his
force's role was 'not .. to terrorise or .. repay in kind, but
anticipate and .. give a bloody nose' to attackers. The
concept required refinement, as short duration covert foot and
motor patrols were deployed to gather information and lay
ambushes, but prolonged area patrolling based on contact
intelligence was not evolved. 77 Hoffman has criticised the
rationale behind the employment of personnel who had themselves
only grappled with conventional Nazi formations rather than
with urban guerillas or terrorists. But they had engaged in
unconventional warfare against the Axis, and their experience
furnished them with a potentially valuable insight into the
organisation and employment of insurgent forces, which could
have been utilised to frame tactics in the light of perceived
irregular weaknesses. In fact, operations were flawed by
inadequate contact intelligence, and because, in view of the
Cabinet's demands for quick results and of the declining
security position, insufficient attention was paid either to it
or to tactical methods. Indeed, it is possible that summary
justice was resorted to in order to achieve swift 'success'.
One squad's commander, Captain Roy Farran,amemberof the Second
SAS Regiment in 1944, remarked later that the administration
itself was unsure of his units' role; probably reflecting
Cunningham's indecision about the legality of paraterrorism,
and the broader influence of the Wickham report which
discouraged abnormal police practices. Farran stated that '[we
acted] as we pleased', and Lapping asserts that paraterrorism
was sanctioned by the State: In May 1947, Captain Farran was
accused of the abduction and murder of an insurgent. He was
tried, and acquitted in December, although the CID were
77. On the PPF, Fergusson P.210,226; R. Farran Winged Dagger
(London, 1948) P.348. On the uncertainty of the new units'
role, for instance, Charters Jewish insurgency P.150.
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convinced that the kidnapping was his work. However, the Chief
Secretary, Henry Gurney, (who became a central figure in
Malayan COIN), declared that police units were empowered only
to use 'ordinary police methods', and so paraterrorism was
probably not established as an official policy. Nonetheless,
COIN authorities in the mandate and the mother country agreed
to experiment with new tactical ideas based on wartime
unorthodox forces, and some senior Army sources supported this.
A month after the formation of the new unorthodox force,
Gray wrote to Lieutenant-General Richard N. Gale, commanding
officer of the First Infantry Division, about the possibility
of extending the experiment, and inspired by this, 'for the
first time, army patrols left main roads and tracks. Efficient
ambushes in constantly changing locations were placed.'
Charters notes that tactical improvements were unit-specific
and never permeated the army as a whole, but Operation MAGNET
from May to June 1947 was acclaimed by the Palestine HQ as an
advance in military-security tactics. It involved the
deployment of 'strong fighting patrols to operate off [the]
roads' as 'ambush parties to intercept terrorists', and to
undertake 'sudden swoops on small selected targets.' Gray
suggested that 'if a smaller number of men .. [were] introduced
in a more clandestine manner .. and if these tactics were
introduced all over PALESTINE, terrorist planning would be
difficult', and contacts should increase. However, the 'Farran
Case' erupted in May 1947, and Fergusson's Forces were promptly
disbanded. Moreover, as a result of Farran's controversial
activities, there was intense media and public pressure on the
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British authorities and a minor political outcry; 78
 all hardly
conducive to convincing the higher levels of the State to
support greater COIN unorthodoxy. Those devising tactical
policy in Palestine displayed a fair degree of creativity, but
the circumstances in which new ideas were implemented militated
against their being generally assimilated by the British Army
or incorporated into new COIN doctrine. Following the Farran
episode, the security forces made no further attempt to develop
new tactical policies. They proceeded with their COIN
operational routine and the infrequent declaration of military-
control areas, until the effective end of the COIN in October
1947. Thereafter, the army and police undertook riot duties and
self-defence although the I.S. threat was not officially re-
78. On unorthodox COIN operations, Farran P.347-51,375-7,380-
1; B. Lapping The End of Empire (London, 1985) P.129. On
their background, Fergusson P.210-1,225-6; Bethell P.302-
3. Palestine CID views on Farran, in HC to SSC, 5 Jan.
1948, CO537/3872. Chief Sec. H. Gurney, note, 25 June,
Cunne 2/1, MEC. On operations and intelligence, Charters
Jewish insurgency P.73,87,123,150-2,167; JRUSI 1979, P.58-
60. On personnel, Hoffman PHD, P.131; West P.37. All
/ref's in W0261/. Gray's views on tactics, to Lt.-Gen.
R.N. Gale, 1 Inf. Div., 14 Apr., /180. On MAGNET and the
reorientation of army patrolling, 1 Gds. Bde. OIs-9,10, 23
May, /666; 0111, 24 July, /667; 1 Inf. Div. QHR, 15 June,
Lt.-Gen. R.N. Gale 1S15, 14 Apr., /180; HQPa1., 'Survey of
Operations', 30 June, /568; 1 Armd. Div. report, 24 June
1947, in 9/12 Queen's Royal Lancers Papers, NAM. Also see
Appendix 3.
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defined as intercommunal violence until mid-December 1947.
The state of COIN doctrine in Palestine during 1947.
Army training for I.S. duties in Palestine continued on
the basis of standing doctrine, supplemented by tactical
lessons from the local HQ. 8° But it recognised by early 1947
that the turnover of formations often resulted in the loss of
newly acquired knowledge. Therefore, the army produced 'Notes
for Officers acting in Aid of the Civil Power', as an advance
on the 9/13 pamphlet, and worked on a new 'training pamphlet
[and] .. form of battle drill.' A draft was circulated by April
and 'Combined military and police action' was published in
June. This tactical doctrine was co-authored with police
officers and was distributed to all 'platoon commanders and
junior police ranks' during the summer. Some army formations
criticised the early draft copy, for instance, the Sixth
Airborne Division HQ, which commented that it must have been
79. All /ref's in W0261/. COIN operational routine, as 6
Arbne. Div. IS1, 23 Apr., W0275/17; 3 Para. Bde. Ols-
37,38, 20,30 Apr., /219; 1 Inf. Div. 1S17, 1 Oct., /182; 1
Armd. Div. 1S14, 6 June, /178; 3 Inf. Div. 0139, 12 Sept.
1947, /196. On the end of COIN, GOC, MacMillan
'Narrative', 3 July 1948, in Stockwell, 6/25/1; HQPa1.,
'IS Duties', 19 Dec. 1947, 6/1, LHC; Bethell P.351.
80. All /ref's in WO261/. On the use of METP9/13, 6 Arbne.
Div. 0187, 3 Para. Bde. ISI, 23 Sept., W0275/13; 3 Para.
Bde. 0189, 6 June, WO275/23; MELF Trg. Letter, 31 Aug.,
/62; 1 Armd. Div. note, 6 June, /178; 1 Inf. Div. 1S7, 1
Oct., /182; 1 Para. Bde. IS1, 22 Dec., /211; 3 Irif. Div.
0139, 12 Sept., /196. Tactical lessons learnt by units, 6
Arbne. Div. IS1, 23 Apr. 1947, WO275/17.
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written by officers who had no I.S. experience! But it was
hardly amended at all, and embodied previous doctrine on
control measures, short duration small unit multipurpose
patrol, riot control, and large and small scale search methods.
However, minor advances were made regarding the accommodation
of the media by the security forces, and its de-emphasis of the
role of mobile columns. And the form of the pamphlet itself, as
the first doctrine designed explicitly for both police and
military usage, 8 ' demonstrates a general recognition that this
unusual type of rebellion demanded a more uniform and
coordinated security force response.
Some agencies became increasingly aware of the media's
role in the conflict, and Cunningham commented in January 1947
that 'far more publicity of the nature of the problem and
exactly what the Army [we]re trying to do' was needed. Yet, he
failed to translate his understanding of the value of basic
counterpropaganda into a directive to the Central Office of
Information to devise a campaign, probably because he bore in
mind the hostile attitude of Whitehall officials to peacetime
political propaganda. It was not until August that the army
began to forward reports of its operational successes to
Jerusalem for inclusion in the Office's still limited
propaganda, and the GSI chief, responsible for army Public
Relations policy, admitted, '[it is] one part of my job I do
81. On the design, writing, use and criticisms of 'Combined
military and police action' in its draft/final versions:
6 Arbne. Div., note, 26 Apr.; Brig. Lowe, G(Ops), notes, 2
May, 15 Sept., W0275/13. On the PPF's role, and on 'Notes
for Officers', Maj.-Gen. H. Stockwell, note, n.d., 6/27,
note, 5 Aug. 1947, 6/25/2, LHC.
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not really care for.' 82 While the army gradually appreciated
the need for counterpropaganda and improved links with media
correspondents, these matters were given low priority.
Therefore, the army made a minor advance in terms of its non-
military concerns in 1947, but the overall propaganda effort
was of limited COIN value.
High level development of I.S. doctrine in summer 1947.
During the last year of COIN in Palestine, the Cabinet's
Overseas Defence Committee, consisting of senior
representatives of all British COIN agencies, reviewed overall
imperial defence preparations, since 'experiences of the recent
war show that it now needs considerable revision.' The Colonial
Office was called on to examine I.S. arrangements, and its
review ran parallel to a similar investigation by the War
Office Military Training Branch. 83 The military study of I.S.
possibly reflected a degree of anxiety about the army's
difficulties in Palestine as well as an interest in
developments there. In the spring of 1947, Lieutenant-Colonel
82. All /ref's in WO261/. HC on propaganda, to Chief Sec.
Gurney, 8 Jan., Cunn. 1/4; Security Conf.'s, 21,23 Mar.,
Cunn. 4/1. The army and the media, 6 Arbne. Div. IS1, 23
Apr., 3 Para 0138, 30 Apr., /219; 3 Inf. Div. 0139, 12
Sept., /196; 0132, 1 Mar., /195; 1 Inf. Div. 'ELEPHANT'
report, Apr., Stçckwell, 6/25/2, LHC; 'TIGER' report, 2
Aug., W0106/5929, /181; 1 Armd. Div. 1S14, 6 June, /178;
Security Conf., 22 Aug., Cunn. 4/1, MEC; GSI, Col. Norman,
letter, 23 Feb. 1947, 87/57/2, IWM.
83. On the ODC and its role, W. Evershed, ODC Sec. note, 26
Mar.; A.B. Acheson, CO, to W.C.C. King, CO, 2 Oct. 1947,
CO537/2531.
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C.A. Wigham worked on a draft I.S. doctrine, and it was amended
by Lieutenant-Colonel C.P. Warren and Colonial Office
officials. The resulting 'Internal Security Duties 1947' was
ratified by the Colonial, Home and War Offices as 'a military
training manual .. for the guidance of military officers in the
UK and overseas', and further, as a 'common doctrine' for the
use of 'all units' of the security forces, both within the
Empire and in 'occupied countries and other foreign
territories', hence including Greece. It was the first truly
universal British I.S. doctrine, and several hundred copies
were ordered for colonial governments by Creech-Jones. The
'Duties' document of 1947 was discussed by the Colonial and War
Offices in the winter of 1947 to 1948, and was the precursor to
the latter's I.S. doctrine printed in June 1949. However,
Britain's COIN role in Greece was over by then, and the
unpublished copy available before 1949 offered no radical new
thinking. Indeed, it was designed to 'combine and supercede
the earlier booklets "Notes on Imperial Policing, 1934" and
"Duties in Aid of the Civil Power, 1937 f1 , 84
 and it repeated
much of their contents verbatim. The War Office Branch
additionally carried out a 'study of evidence of the past' and
'experience gained in overseas commands', especially in 'India
and the Middle East', and stated that I.S. 'methods must never
be stereotyped' and that 'study and training somewhat outside
the normal vision of military commanders' was required to
devise I.S. schemes. It identified various forms of 'unrest',
and commented on the 'difficulty of codifying rules for the
conduct of troops' when countering opponents ranging from
84. 'IS Duties 1947', draft #(1) by Wigham, #(2) by Wigham/
Warren/CO officials. On its use, draft(1), Intro.,P.1,21,
29,37-8, CO Note, 11 July, WO-CO notes, Aug., CO Note, 22
Sept.; A.B. Acheson, CO, to WO, 24 Nov.; CO-WO discussion
notes, Nov. 1947 to Jan. 1948, CO537/1971.
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'small mobs to highly organised, armed insurrection with
terrorism and sabotage.' 85 But existing War Office I.S.
doctrine was not contradicted, and the 'correct' response to
rebel irregulars was said to include large mobile columns and
large scale, time-limited, set-planned offensives based on
police intelligence, or in its absence, either on a speculative
basis or, as Caliwell advocated, by employing a 'tempting
bait' of a convoy to draw irregulars to battle. Security forces
were to clear areas of armed opposition simultaneously, or
gradually if insufficient manpower was available, and such
operations were judged to be 'usually successful.' 86 The paper
demonstrated an ignorance of the complexities of modern
guerilla warfare and terrorism, and in spite of the
shortcomings of old policies executed in Palestine these were
not repudiated. The CIGS's view that constraints imposed on the
Cost-Benefit line by the Cabinet led to its failure in practice
was evidently shared. In September 1947, War and Colonial
Office officials rejected the idea of nation-wide martial law
in Palestine, but the 1947 pamphlet backed the negative psywar
approach, asserting that collective punishment would bolster
government supporters and pressurise its enemies. Indeed, it
proposed 'military coercion' of the people by widespread
searches and demolitions like those implemented in Palestine
85. On past experience, 'IS Duties 1947'(l), Intro.,P.79;(2)
P.2. On I.S. threats, (1)P.29,38,64-6,68; (2)P.18. On Army
view of its role, (i)P.1. On principles and objectives,
(1) P.19,80, and P.39,45,73, CO537/1971. For 1934 'Notes',
see Chapter 2.
86. 'IS Duties 1947'(l), on police, and intelligence, P.19-20,
22,33,40, 67,78. Fire-support, P.42-5. Military-security
policies, P.30,48,55,66-8,73-5,78-9. Columns, P.30,39,67.
Control policies, P.52, CO537/1971.
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in 1947, and also forced labour and even hostage-taking as a
means to prevent insurgents undertaking kidnaps and road
mining. 87 These methods mirrored recent Nazi practices and also
previous COIN action in Ireland during 1921.
The War Office's 'I.S. Duties 1947' incorporated some
advances in I.S. thought, such as its recommendation for
'systematic dissemination of accurate information and fair
commentary on the situation' by the government. This reflected
the current view of the army in Palestine that propaganda for
'influencing public opinion' was a crucial element of COIN
which the Civil Power must organise. 88 Further, the manual
underlined the importance of decentralised operational control
and noted that military-security operations were 'more often
of platoons than companies', probably alluding to the late
growth of small unit activity in Palestine, although large
scale/unit tactics were not displaced as the preferred policy.
Regarding the police role in COIN, its authors clearly bore in
mind the campaigns in Palestine and Ireland to conclude that,
'experience has shown' that a civil rather than a paramilitary
force was the most suitable. Additionally, the 1947 draft
proposed counterterrorist 'keeps' to protect loyalists, echoing
their appearance several decades before in the South African
War and recently in Palestine, as well as in the
recommendations of the War Office's Irish Record. Moreover, the
new I.S. work advocated 'central and local i.s. committees
charged with reviewing plans for general and military action',
pointing out the importance of attending to extra-military and
87. 'IS Duties 1947', on psywar, (1)P.51-2,67,73,76-7;(2)P.18.
On martial law, Lt.-Col. M. Charteris, WO, to U/Sec. T.
Mathieson, CO, 10 Sept. 1947, CO537/2299.
88. Ibid (1), P.35,66, and ff.97 on psywar, CO537/1971.
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operational issues within a central COIN planning body. A
committee system was evolved in the mandate in 1946, but 'IS
Duties 1947' advised further reorganisation in the intelligence
sphere, suggesting either the introduction of a single agency,
or efficient liaison officers, to remedy an evident deficiency
of Britain's latest COIN campaign. The manual also stressed the
need for peacetime civil-military-police training ready for
future emergencies, 89 recognising that Britain might well meet
similar threats and required better preparations than hitherto
to defeat them.
Summary.
There was a continuing internal debate in the War Office
over operational aspects of I.S. policy, the DM0 supporting an
experiment in unorthodox operations in Palestine during the
spring of 1947, while the political uproar that it caused
allowed its opponents in the DMT- responsible for I.S.
doctrinal development- to champion accepted I.S. wisdom. Most
British counterinsurgents advocated the traditionalist I.S.
line during the COIN campaign, and few developed their thinking
beyond simple 'Imperial-policing' terms. Any petition by
Colonial Office officials for a review of Cost-Benefit policies
in the light of the failure of repression fell on stony ground.
Hence, although Montgomery fought a losing battle over the COIN
line in Palestine before 1947, he won the war over War Office
I.S. doctrine that year. Nonetheless, some COIN agencies were
developing new COIN practices in Greece by that time, such as
unorthodox forces and counterterrorist protection measures,
89. 'IS	 Duties	 1947',	 on police,	 (1)P.38.	 Small unit
operations, (1)P.48. Population protection, P.67. A
committee structure, and other principles, (1)P.36-7,40:
P.30-3,39, (2)P.2,18, CO537/1971.
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with mounting support from the authorities in the United
Kingdom, including senior War Office officials. The British
involvement with COIN in Greece gave Whitehall departments
another opportunity both to refine familiar I.S. policies and




Chapter 4: Innovation versus status quo in British COIN
policies and doctrine, 1945-9, with special regard to the
British 'minimal commitment' to Greece.
Britain's political, economic and strategic interests in
Greece ensured its involvement with the COIN campaign there
from 1945 to 1949, and during these years various British
agencies began to understand insurgency as a distinctive type
of revolt. Britons rarely participated in operations themselves
and did not assume the primary responsibility for planning and
executing them. Nevertheless, they acquired an influential role
as operational counsellors and consultants, which was
authorised by the Cabinet, although never publicly
acknowledged. A new British COIN doctrine was not devised on
the basis of the experience gained by those operating on the
ground in Greece, but numerous original policies and principles
were developed: a fact not previously appreciated.
Details of I.S. conditions in Greece are outlined in order
to indicate how the threat confronting the British evolved, and
because their perceptions of it conditioned their actions
during the Greek conflict. The state of disorder in Greece was
encouraged by the native Communist Party, the KKE, which
adopted a dual strategy for achieving political power,
consisting of constitutional agitation and secret preparations
for revolutionary action if the legal option failed. It took
advantage of post-hostilities social conditions to foster
sedition against consecutive Greek regimes, and this developed
into insurgency by the winter of 1945 to 1946. There is
historiographical debate about the KKE's preferred course of
action,' but it boasted a revolutionary heritage, and allowed
1.	 Cf. H. Richter British Intervention in Greece (London,
1985): E. O'Ballance The Greek Civil War (London, 1966).
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the initiation of insurgency by communist activists in 1946.
The Foreign Office Southern Department and the Cabinet
were convinced that the KKE and its National Liberation Front-
National Popular Liberation Front [EAM-ELAS] affiliates were a
threat to Greece, and from 1943 to 1944 the Left attempted a
violent seizure of political power. But the ELAS commander,
George Siantos, convinced the KKE to make a more peaceable
presentation of its demands, and on 2 July 1944 it publicised
its proposals for the 'sharing' of positions of authority.
These would actually have handed it control, and the British
Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, and the Prime Minister,
Winston Churchill, were determined to prevent this and to
establish a democracy that supported Imperial interests in the
Eastern Mediterranean. Indeed, by November the Foreign Office
and local intelligence sources predicted a KKE 'coup d'etat'
attempt and pressed for the despatch of an expeditionary force
to forestall it; a course the Cabinet approved. 2 The Party's
actual intentions at this juncture are unclear because 'the
evidence .. means what the particular author wants it to
mean', 3
 with Siantos favouring a lawful path, and Ares
Velouchiotis and other influential comrades advocating the use
of armed force. But Nikos Zachariades, (who subsequently became
2. N.B.- Hereafter, all 'R' ref's are in F0371/. On the KKE
and the coup threat, 'D' BLU report, Dec. 1943, to FO,
R1019/43650; FO minute, Second Sec., Sir Denis Laskey, 28
Aug., R13102/43691; Ambassador R. Leeper, to FO, R17752/
43695; Middle East IR, 14 Nov. 1944, in, General Sir R.M.
Scobie Diaries, 82/17/1, EWM.
3. J.	 latrides	 (ed.)	 'Liberation, civil war and the
Americans' in, Greece in the 1940s (London, 1981) P.147.
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the KKE leader in May 1945), supported a dual approach, thereby
masking communist intentions. 4 Whichever was the favoured
route, confronted by Rightist paramilitaries in December 1944,
the KKE staged a rebellion that led to heavy clashes between
British troops and ELAS, and the Foreign Office reiterated its
perception of a future communist subversive threat to Greece.5
The ELAS was subjugated by January 1945, but within a
short time the KKE orchestrated sedition 'to foment
disorder', 6 whilst considering its future alternatives. This
was carried out by uncoordinated communist regional cells and
consisted of political subversion and sporadic terrorism aimed
mainly at consolidating the Party's hold in various regions.
Following the failed rebellion it might have been 'too stunned
to exploit the situation, .. faced by 80,000 British troops.'
But by June, the politbureau propagated a 'self-defence'
underground organisation for the masses, or 'aftoamyna', which
4. Zachariades on KKE dual strategy, S. Vukmanovic How and
why the people's liberation struggle of Greece met with
defeat (London, 1985) P.13-29. Richter, P.12, and D.
Eudes The Kapetanios (London, 1972) P.188, see KKE/ELAS as
acting defensively: in contrast to C.M. Woodhouse The
struggle for Greece (London, 1976) P.13; Apple P.212.
5. FO minute, Sir 0. Laskey, 10 Dec. 1944, R20361/43697.
6.	 On the start of the sedition, Woodhouse Apple P.234.
-172-
retained arms and tried to build up political support, 7 thereby
giving the Central Committee more options during a period of
flux. Further, from the spring of 1945, Velouchiotis inspired
irregular groups attacking Right-wing forces and those elements
of the Greek security forces engaged in terrorism. He claimed
to have started an armed revolution, but these independent
bands comprised only a twenty-five percent pro-communist
membership, and they displayed limited objectives and
capabilities 8
 amounting to social banditry rather than a
revolt. In the months before the end of the War, the security
forces were additionally confronting brigands and irregular
groups engaged in internecine conflict. Furthermore, in the
light of Britain's support for the Greek State in 1945, the
Communist Party intensified the sedition, and it 'had
revolutionary aspects and use[d] revolutionary methods .. a
simulacrum of revolution.' 9
 This state of endemic violence was
the basis upon which British personnel were assigned to devise
I.S. schemes; a situation which would have been recognisable to
7. Richter P.248,261, on KKE wariness about rebellion. Cf.
G.M. Alexander Prelude to the Truman Doctrine (London,
1982) P.98. On the aftoamyna, O.L. Smith, 'Self-defence
and Communist policy, 1945-7' in, L. Baerentzen (ed.)
Studies in the history of the Greek Civil War (Kobenhavn,
1987) P.161.
8. On Velouchiotis and independent bands, latrides (ed.)
'Civil war, 1945-9' in, Greece P.200; W.H. McNeill, The
Greek Dilemma (London, 1947) P.189. On Grivas' 'X' ultra-
Right groups and their attempt to gain power through their
own and security force terrorism, Richter P.8,147.
9. On the sedition, F. Voigt The Greek Sedition (London,
1949) P.163-4.
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any Briton familiar with northern India or southern Arabia.
Churchill made a limited commitment to Greece in early
1945, promising to assist both with postwar reconstruction and
the framing of a new constitution and electoral system. The
dire state of the United Kingdom's finances prevented a very
large aid package, but the British Government's opposition to
communism was implacable, and on 12 March, the Cabinet approved
material and advisory support, including economic, law
enforcement and military missions to provide guidance on
essential organisational and policy matters)° This led to
their entanglement in the business of COIN after 1945.
Britain's aid effort was directed by a multi-agency
Missions Coordination Committee, chaired by the GOC, Lieutenant
-General Sir Ronald M. Scobie, from April to July 1945, and
then weekly by the ambassador, who shouldered ultimate
responsibtlity for all British assistance efforts. In this
unique position, where the UK advised another European nation-
state on I.S. matters, the Foreign Office played a key role as,
together with police and Service personnel, its officials
became involved in the evolution of British COIN thought. The
ambassador, Sir Reginald Leeper, kept the Foreign Office up to
date with appreciations from local sources, including those of
the British Police and Prisons Mission [BPPMI and its
forerunner, the British Civil Police Unit [BCPUI, formed in
December 1944, as well as the Allied Information Service [AIS]
and the Military Attache. Some were forwarded to the Cabinet,
the Chiefs of Staff and their committees, and to other
10. Churchill/COS opposition to a costly programme, PM to
Foreign Sec., 7 Jan., R4931/48245; COS(45)31, n.d., in
R2565/48253. Cabinet views and action taken, PM
Instruction to FO, 12 June 1945, in R10452/48272.
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Departments including the Colonial and War Offices, which also
followed concurrent I.S. developments in Palestine. The War
Office additionally received the reports of the British
Military Mission to Greece [BMM(G)], formed in January 1945
from an existing army Liaison Unit. Despatches from the RAF
Delegation to Greece [RAFDG] and its earlier Unit, also created
in 1945, arrived at the Air Ministry. 11 These agencies became
important players in Greek COIN, and their views on the KKE
threat were the foundation for the British development of an
understanding of insurgency.
Perceptions of the I.S. threat to Greece in 1945, and
reactions to it: British political organs.
From the war years through to February 1946, the Allied
Information Service produced reports on the situation in Greece
that were circulated ira Whitehall. Although not easily
digestible and offering less than concise analyses of the KKE's
activities, these communications gave an accurate description
of the Party's organisation and noted that ELAS was not 'only
an army but an idea, and [that] one cannot effectively be
disarmed without the other.' The Service understood that the
communists could manipulate existing socio-economic and
political injustices to raise mass support through their legal
endeavours and, simultaneously, by campaigns of political
subversion and terrorism. It informed the Foreign Office that
popular grievances must be addressed to deflect the appeal of
communism, and that the government could not beat it solely by
taking military action. AIS reports also described the KKE's
11. Close mission liaison in, Maj.-Gen. Sir K.N. Crawford,
LFGHQ, Review, 17 April 1946, W0169/22879. Appreciations,
such as, Maj.-Gen. K. Airey, to WO, 9 Feb., R3061/48251.
BMM(G) formed from 'X' BLU, Jan. 1945 notes, W0170/4069.
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propaganda and urged the formulation of counterpropaganda to
end the Greek people's 'ignorance [of State policies] .. and
distortion' of them by the KKE. 12 Further, the Service attested
to the need for action against the KKE's legal and underground
infrastructure that disseminated its propaganda. Detailed
counterorganisation methods were not outlined by the AIS, but
London was forewarned that 'British soldiers cannot be expected
and are certainly not qualified to unearth and crush [it]'.
Army intelligence units in Greece added that the aftoamyna's
'underground nature .. [means that] a new intelligence
technique is required to deal with this .. which may be a
foretaste [of the future KKE method of operation]'.13 Hence,
by the start of 1945, the Foreign and War Offices were notified
about the inherent difficulty of identifying KKE clandestine
supporters, the Party's likely use of propaganda in a future
rebellion, and the necessity of counteraction aimed at both the
instrument's source and effects.
In the spring of 1945, the ambassador agreed with AIS
reports that 'large masses [were] under the influence of KKE
propaganda or violence .. [and therefore were] fearful of
cooperating with the government.' By February, the Service had
predicted that the communists would instigate political
terrorism to increase their support and force the population
into submission. It proposed to prevent this by deterrent
patrols of a 'special police force' on an area-deployment
pattern- the counterterrorist policy employed in Ireland. But
the AIS went further, endorsing a locally-initiated Greek
12. IS reports to FO, 2 Jan., R917/48246; Col. Johnstone,
(BLO), and AIS, 27 Jan. 1945, R21981/43700, R2689/48254.
13. AIS report, 27 Jan. 1945, R2689/48254; Maj.-Gen. K. &irey
report, to FO, 8 Dec. 1944, R20761/46398.
-176-
population protection scheme incorporating civilian self-
defence militias. Other British institutions withheld their
support for it at first, on the grounds of the project's
supposed political impropriety in taking over a proper function
of the police. 14 However, by April officials in Britain and
Greece responsible for political matters shared a basic
conception of political subversion and terrorism, and realised
that novel counteraction was vital to prevent communist gains,
and also to increase the level of intelligence provision by the
people. 15
The AIS informed its superiors that the KKE would probably
attempt another 'coup', but also warned that the Party was
'buildling] up in secret, the armed strength .. to seize and
enforce control' through a prolonged rebellion. It advised the
need for military-security operations based on a 'country wide
intelligence service, to provide both political and military
14. On counter/terrorism, AIS reports, to FO, 7 Feb., R3397/
48256; 10 Jan., R2249/48251. On population protection
measures, 11 Apr., R7138/48267; 2 May, R8082/48269. BPPM,
Col.'s Prosser/Srnallwood report, May, R10734/48407.
BMM(G), Lt.-Col. W.W. Stewart report, 9 June1945,W0178/58.
15. Eventual concensus, BMM(G) note, 12 June 1945, W0204/8926;
Maj.-Gen. K. Crawford, LFGE-1Q notes, 10 Oct. 1946, W0261/
771. On State counteraction, Leeper, Despatches, to FO, 5
Apr., R6325/48264; 28 Sept., R16628/48282. Sir D. Laskey,
FO minute, 30 Dec. 1945, R21142/48288.
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information [on irregular] bands',' 6 appreciating that both
background detail on the politico-military character of the
opposition and contact intelligence for security force
operations was required. The amalgamation of guerilla warfare
with the assorted policy instruments of sedition into a revolt
was not foreseen by the AIS, but in early 1945 it pressed for
'effective military and police forces .. competent
administration .. a propaganda organisation •. to instruct the
public .. [and] .. constructive economy, finance and supply
policy.' 17 The Service did not furnish the Foreign Office with
a clear view of the I.S. threat, but it propounded the
importance of organs and policies to invalidate the communist
activities it described, and forwarded familiar and innovative
proposals to this end, which met with the approval of other
local British authorities.
Perceptions of the I.S. threat to Greece in 1945, and
reactions to it: British military-security organs.
At the beginning of 1945, the Supreme Allied Commander
[SAC], Mediterranean, General Harold Alexander, described
conditions in Greece for the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He
understood the impact of terrorism on the masses, and proposed
to clear all areas of irregulars gradually using area-deployed
forces. Moreover, Alexander, who had been interested in
guerilla warfare and unorthodox units during the War, suggested
16. On the KKE, AIS reports, to FO, 8 Jan., R837/48246; 11
Jan., R2245/48251; 17 May 1945, R9190/48270. And on
intelligence, Col. K. Boyd, (BLO), in AIS report, to FO,
29 Dec. 1944, R2383/48252.
17. AIS reports, to FO, 14 Feb., R3353/48256; 7 Feb. 1945,
R3397/48256.
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that guards should 'maintain [the] authority of [the]
Government, and law and order, in each area as cleared thus
relieving .. regular forces .. to deal with subsequent
areas.' 18 This idea stemmed from the fact that Greece could not
muster adequate military manpower to dominate all areas
afflicted by irregulars at once, which was the offensive
military-security strategy preferred by the British Army.
Nonetheless, the SAC's proposal for 'Clear-and-Hold' offered a
foundation for resolving the problem of how to dispose of many
widely distributed small guerilla bands, and this concept was
relayed to the Chiefs of Staff and the War Office. It was
affirmed by the GOC, Scobie, although he wrote in more familiar
terms that the Greek situation was like 'the Northwest
[F]rontier all over again', exemplifying the pervasive
influence of this theatre on many experienced British military
men. Indeed, his leaning to traditional I.S. wisdom was evident
when he opposed an original Greek proposal of 21 March 1945, to
deploy armed civilians to hold cleared areas. However, this was
because he believed that the KKE could brandish civilian as
opposed to police law-enforcement as evidence of government
bankruptcy in its propaganda, 19 indicating that Scobie had an
uncommon appreciation of non-military I.S. matters for a
soldier.
18. Alexander, to CCOS/FO, 25 Jan., R2631/48253; to PM, 17
Jan., W0214/44; to COS, 8 Jan. 1945, PREM3/213.13; 19 Dec.
1944, R21820/43788. On the SAC's wartime interests, see
Appendix 1.
19. Lt.-Gen. R. Scobie note, 21 Mar., 82/17/1, IWM; in H.
MacMillan, to PM, 4 Feb. 1945, R2543/48252. Also in
reference to the Frontier, for example, AOC, Air Cdre.
J.A. Gray, to Air Mm., io Sept. 1947, JR46/3O.
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The Land Forces Greece HQ, responsible for the British
army garrison and the BMM(G), also outlined the danger. Its
staff noted that the extreme Left maintained a 'lie low'
posture, and that although they aspired to electoral victory,
if this was not attained they would start a rebellion
'by means of espionage, propaganda and sabotage .. [The
former elements] demand .. [no] special measures apart
from normal security countermeasures .. [but] sabotage is
vastly different .. To effectively control the activities
of ELAS supporters .. or even to establish their identity
is an almost impossible task .. a campaign would
necessitate h[eav] y g [uar ]d commitments .. and the
adoption of a drastic system of civilian control.'
The Land Forces' counteraction proposals included population-
resource controls, 'e.g. curfew', which British troops were
authorised to enforce 'in emergency.' In April 1945, a report
by the HQ's Captain Cassavetti, stated that the people were in
'a state of mental terrorisation .. organised by 2 or 3
inhabitants of a village .. or a descent from the hills by
guerillas.' To remedy these conditions, he recommended summary
trials of armed militants, and 'some form of combined action to
meet the exceptional needs of the situation', based upon
emergency powers. The 'measures necessary' for success were
outlined as an intelligence officer with information on
irregulars, 'a striking force .. to mop up armed bands in the
hills .. [but also] simultaneously, [a] National Guard
deployed to establish order in each area as it is freed.' In
addition to tried and tested I.S. wisdom, he repeated the
atypical and astute strategy favoured by Alexander, and in a
like vein, Cassavetti added that customary collective
punishments should not be implemented because it would lead to
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a spiral of violence. 20
 However, at that time responsibility
for I.S. lay principally with the police and so fell within the
sphere of the British Police Mission, a position reaffirmed by
the Cabinet Defence Committee in August.2'
The Police Mission was assigned the task of re-forming the
Greek police forces, and orienting them for both civil and E.S.
duties. Leeper was determined to ensure that it was capable of
preparing the police for action against irregulars, and at the
start of 1945 he told Eden that officials like the Consul in
Patras, Major K. Nicholls, who 'had relevant experience' of
such matters during his service on the staff of the High
Commissioner in Palestine, should be called upon to offer their
expert advice to the BPPM. 22 Indeed, British staff dealing with
political issues in Greece consistently emphasised the value of
utilising historical, and especially imperial experience, to
devise I.S. schemes. The Foreign Office section concerned
actively sought to ensure that advisors handling I.S. issues
were properly qualified. Hence, in January 1945 it proposed the
employment of former Palestine, India and Ireland policemen,
and suggested Colonel S. Prosser, formerly of the Palestine
force and now Head of the Civil Police Unit in Greece as the
new mission commander. This was predicated upon his 'experience
20. Description and suggestions by LFGHQ, Weekly IR, 15 Jan.,
W0170/7570; Appreciation, 14 Feb., A1R23/7775. British
Army I.S. action, notes, 31 July, W0170/7531. Capt. A.
Cassavetti, LFG report to WO, 30 Apr. 1945, W0170/7555.
21. On police primacy, see Chapter 2; CDC in, DO(45)4, 8 Aug.,
PREM8/49. On the BCPU's role, LFG WD/notes, Apr. 1945,
W0170/7 550.
22. Leeper, to Eden, 27 Jan. 1945, R2761/48254.
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of actual conditions with which the Mission would .. deal.' In
the event, Sir Charles Wickham was appointed to this post and
Prosser became his assistant, but Wickharn's selection was
acceptable to the Foreign Office because 'his experience in
Ireland ought stand him in good stead, since Irish conditions
approximate to Greek.' He had served in the South African War,
with the RIC from 1920 to 1921 during the COIN, and then in
Ulster, and he asserted that he could restore 'law and order'
by utilising his 'knowledge and experience', and that of fellow
officers whom he selected on the basis of their police I.S.
records. 23
 This application of past I.S. experience to the
present situation became a procedure adopted consistently by
the Foreign Office, the Police Mission, and other local COIN
agencies, from early 1945 onwards.
The 48-strong British Police and Prisons Mission began its
work in February 1945, advising on the organisation, training
and use of the police and gendarmerie. Irregulars active during
that year were evidently perceived by the BFPM as being similar
to traditional imperial armed opponents, because it wanted
'normal' mobile patrols operating from police posts for
'preventive work', supported by army units as and when
necessary. In addition, the Mission proposed offensive drives
and sweeps, although in practice the 'results were
23. On the need to use colonial police officers, FO notes, 24
Jan., R1841/4825O; 10 Feb., R2986/48365. On Prosser, FO
Permt. Under-Sec., Sir Orme Sargent, to Asst. Under-Sec.
G. Gater, CO, 13 Feb., R3007/: on Wickham and his
background, minutes, 22 Feb., R3803/; 2 Mar., R3878/48365;
Appendix 1, Wickham on officer selection, note, 7 Aug.
1945, WO204/8928; use of 2 ex-RUC Inpectors, R. Gransden,
N. Ire. Office, to F. Newham, Home Office, 29 Sept. 1946,
CO537/3847.
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disappointing.' 24 Then, early in 1946, irregulars engaged in
social banditry and interfactional strife, and brigand bands,
collectively labelled as 'bandits' by forces supporting the
State, were joined by more organised guerillas who formed part
of an evolving insurgency. The nature of these insurgent
irregulars was not initially understood by the Police Mission,
the prevailing view being that all armed clashes were a
manifestation of 'banditry'.
On 15 September 1945, the Greek Government reiterated that
the police were responsible for the maintenance of internal
order, but exactly three months later, as skirmishes
proliferated, the Greek National Army [GNA] was also assigned
I.S. duties. In the interim, the British army contingent grew
increasingly concerned about conditions in Greece, and
considered possible responses to the increasing disorder. But
the Military Mission's primary task was to advise on the
supply, training and organisation of the GNA in order to enable
it to fulfil its primary function, designated in February 1945
by the Chiefs of Staff and the Greek military authorities as
repelling a conventional attack from a neighbouring nation-
state. It was not meant to be 'trained and armed [as] a
permanent i.s. force', although it was obliged to assist the
police if requested to do so, 'particularly in dealing with
24. BPPM numbers in, Monthly report, 13 June 1946, A1R24/759.
On I.S. support given by the British army, Corp. A.G.
Lawrence, FSS Diary, 6 Sept., 86/29/1, IWM; The King's
Royal Rifle Corps Chronicles 1946 (Winchester, 1947) P.50;
LFGHQ notes, Jan., W0170/7570; AIS report, 7 July, JO2O4/
8874,9304. On the lack of success of Greek large scale
operations, 'D' BLU report, 8 Sept. 1945, W0178/62. On the
implementation of British I.S. policies, E.D. Smith
Victory of a sort (London, 1988) P.183.
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guerilla bands', or to 'quell a major revolt' while the police
handled 'small organised resistance.' The Greek General Staff
was responsible for GNA I.S. preparations, but the BMM(G)
'supervis[ed] .. [the] higher direction and control' of the
Greek Army in 1945, and it 'nearly had the force of command.'
Indeed, it played a major role in devising army 1.5. schemes
drawn up by May, and British Liaison Units [BLU] at GNA
Training Centres and corps HQs also advised on planning for
I.S. 'emergencies'. However, unlike the staff of the BPPM, the
1121 members of the army group were not chosen for their
'relevant' I.S. background, but for 'f{iel]d experience', and
the Mission Command and rank-and-file alike were grounded in
'General War'. This meant that they were also unable to
identify correctly the nature of the insurgency threat that
emerged in the winter of 1945 to 1946, and they simply adopted
orthodox British Army I.S. doctrine. The tendency to block any
progressive thought about I.S. was underlined by high level
directives from London that prevented the BMM(G) from studying
the situation 'in the field', and by budgetary constraints on
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the Greek military 25 that served to concentrate British
advisors' attention on the GNA's main tasks rather than on non-
conventional war matters.
The GOC, General Scobie, reiterated his concern about
mounting 'KKE guerilla' activities in August 1945. Soon
afterwards, the new Mission Commander, Major-General Stuart B.
Rawlins, proposed an I.S. programme to prepare the GNA for
operations in support of the police. The BMM(G) Command's
perception of irregulars operating in Greece mirrored that of
much of the prewar British Army, in 'think[ing] that they
enjoyed a spontaneous birth, springing from .. guns .. and
political indignation', and it urged universal disarmament. But
Rawlins appreciated that this was difficult to accomplish, and
suggested army training 'for mobile operations in the hills and
guerilla tactics.' The Greeks supported this on 2 October, and
although British Mountain Warfare Training Units had been
disbanded in May, the CIGS, Field-Marshal Brooke, readily
25. GNA tasks, Sir D. Laskey, FO minute, 20 Jan. 1946, R911/
58850; BMM(G) WD,Feb., W0178/57; WO 'Instructions for the
formation of the GNA', June, W0202/892; McGregor, WO Note,
9 July, PREM3/213.16. BMM(G) functions, AFHQ Dirve. to
BMM(G), 12 May 1945, W0204/8739; BMM(G) note, 8 Jan. 1946,
W0178/74. On the Mission's influence, McNeill, P.171. On
its personnel, 'War establishments, BMM(G)', Jan., W0178/
74. Their background, Lt.-Col. Turner/Central Med. Forces,
'Personnel for BMM(G)', 15 Apr.; LFGHQ 'British
personnel', 26 Mar., Report, 2 Apr.; BMM(G), Jan. report;
Rawlins, 'Staff List, BMM(G)', Mar., WO204/8748. Mission
Command staff, for example, Brig. H. Wood, (infantry),
'Postings of officers', in BMM(G) Newsletter 1, Jan. 1946,
W0178/74; Maj.-Gen. S.B. Rawlins, (artillery), Scobie,
note, 17 Dec. 1945, 82/17/1, IWM.
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accepted his proposal for British army training of GNA units in
'Mountain Warfare' techniques. This began on 3 November and
included patrolling, the movement of columns, and drives to
kill irregulars and 'break the will' of their leaders. The
BMM(G) Command was concerned about the disappointing results of
gendarmerie-army operations in 1945, and some officers
criticised them as inadequate for countering what they
regarded as 'partisan irregulars' rather than mere 'bandits'.
However, the Command blamed operational failures on inadequate
secrecy in Greek planning and inefficient execution, and these
were indeed major factors. 26
 Hence, traditional and ineffective
I.S. measures were prosecuted against the insurgents who
appeared in 1946 with little further reflection by British army
advisors.
British perceptions of the emerging insurgency threat in
the winter of 1945 to 1946.
The Communist Party did not plan for insurgency in late
26. Scobie, on the KKE, Rawlins, and CIGS, to Alexander, 4
Aug., and notes, 30 Sept.,6,20 Oct., 82/17/1, IWM: on
Greek irregulars, E. Smith Victory P.157,190. British Army
views on them in, K. Matthews, Memories of a Mountain War
(London, 1972) P.132. BMM(G) I.S. proposals, note, 30
Sept., W032/11436. GNA training, AFHQ notes, May,
W0170/4071; BMM(G) notes, 8 Nov., W0202/892; HQ 'D' BLU
report, 8 Sept., W0178/62; BMM(G) note, 3 Nov., W0178/58.
British officers on I.S. conditions and remedies in, HQ
'D' BLU report, 8 Sept. 1945, W0178/62. For criticism of
Mission training see, E. Smith ibid P.236.
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1945, despite assertions to this effect by some authors. 27 On
29 August, Zachariades authorised the expansion of the
aftoamyna, and he stated that, 'we are dealing with the
possibility of a peaceful transition .. [to socialism], not
with the certainty.' But the Party boss indulged in 'verbal
radicalism' and no decision for revolt was made. Nevertheless,
as the year drew to a close, the communist sedition began
unconsciously to evolve into insurgency, with local activists
intensifying their political subversion and instigating
progressively more organised irregular operations. Indeed,
perceptive British officials reported that these 'bandit'
operations were distinct from the plain brigandage of previous
months. 28 The Foreign Office, the theatre Commander and the
BMM(G) Command argued that they were witnessing a communist
attempt to influence public opinion prior to the March 1946
national elections, and the constitutional struggle was
reaffirmed by the Party hierarchy in February. In contrast, the
influential Markos Vafiades persistently pressed his colleagues
to plan terrorism and guerilla war, and although these
27. O'Ballance Greek P.119, and E. Averoff-Tossizza By fire
and axe (New York, 1978) P.183, contend that a decision
for revolt was made on 15 Dec. 1945, at Petric,
Yugoslavia, prompted by promises of aid from Tito. But no
actual decision for insurgency was made, see for instance,
E. Smith Victory P.238.
28. Zachariades in, Richter P.274,278. Leeper on the KKE, to
FO, 23 Sept. 1945, R16280/F0371/48280. Increased communist
efforts, E. Smith ibid P.239; B. Sweet-Escott Greece
(London, 1954) P.49. On the nature of the communists'
action, Consul T. Rapp, to FO, 2 Jan., R931/; Consul E.H.
Peck, to FO, 16 Jan., R2201/58750; Leeper, to FO, 22 Feb.,
R3338/58755; Scobie, note, 9 Jan. 1946, 82/17/1, IWM.
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instruments were not the cornerstone of the politbureau's
strategy, it gradually drifted towards his line. The KKE
abstained from the spring 1946 elections on the grounds that
Right-wing paramilitaries were attacking supporters of the
Left. But this decision stemmed equally from the Party's poor
electoral standing, and its hopes of obtaining Soviet political
and financial support to give it a wider range of options in
the future. 29
 Indeed, following the return of a Right-wing
government, Zachariades allowed Leftist 'ODEK' groups to
organise guerilla warfare in several regions. However, Stalin
refused to assist the KKE in April and hence the Greek
Communists gave no open support to insurgency, only tacitly
sponsoring it by instituting a 'limited armed aftoamyna' from
12 May. They concurrently prepared for a plebiscite on a new
Constitution in September, the KKE leadership seeking to
exhaust all legal routes before concentrating on rebellion. In
the event that this became necessary, it remained undecided
whether to favour insurgency or a Soviet-style 'armed uprising
in the towns.' 3° But from 16 June, the KKE coordinated the
activities of communist subversives and irregulars, and Markos
organised attacks on the security forces in southern Greece, in
29. Analyses of communist action, Laskey, FO minutes, 24 Feb.,
R2684/58754; 2 Mar., R4008/58755; CINCMELF, to FO, 23
Mar., R4933/58682; BMM(G) note, 25 Feb.1946,w0178/74.On KKE
decisions, 0. Smith in Baerentzen P.166. Cf. D.C.
Kousoulas Revolution and Defeat (London, 1965) P.223-39.
On the Party's gradual shift, Richter P.487. Its motives
regarding the election, Sweet-Escott P.51; B. Kunihoim The
Origins of the Cold War in the Near East (Princeton, 1980)
P.352.
30. KKE strategic preferences in, Richter P.530-i. Cf. Eudes
P.265; 0. Smith in Baerentzen, P.161-75.
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order to disrupt government links with the people. The outcome
of the plebiscite was unaffected by communist pressures and the
Greek monarchy was restored, and on 20 September the
politbureau publicly admitted its propagation of insurgency.
This form of opposition was only officially adopted as Party
strategy in February 1947, but considerable resources were
devoted to it by the summer of 1946.31 Thus, insurgency started
with locally organised communist irregulars and propaganda in
the winter of 1945 to 1946, but after six months there was more
central direction, and the security forces were obliged to
react to this.
The position of British agencies, and their views on COIN
in 1946.
The BMM(G) and the BPPM 'exercised continuous and decisive
influence in deciding military policy' prior to the onset of
insurgency. However, both the new ambassador from May 1946, Sir
Clifford Norton, and British Intelligence units, were worried
that previous British I.S. advice was being ignored, and
Wickham's Mission reported Greek 'improvisations to
emergencies.' Norton asked the Foreign Office to secure
authorisation for the provision of binding British I.S.
operational advice, 32 but the Cabinet was wary about the
repercussions of such a course. The UK's minimal commitment was
31. KKE decisions, 0. Smith in Baerentzen P.175.
32. On the influence of the military-security missions,
McNeill P.183. On Greek I.S. action, BPPM report, 13 June,
A1R24/759. Intelligence discussed in, Wickham, to FO, 4
June, F0286/1175.29; G. Chandler The Divided Land (London,
1959) P.113,161. Norton, for a new advisory role, to FO, 9
May 1946, R7098/58690.
-189-
founded on financial constraints, and on 22 June 1946, the
Cabinet Defence Committee agreed that the GNA could only be
subsidised up to 31 March 1947. It reiterated that the BMM(G)
might well function for considerably longer, but refused to
underwrite an expansion of its activities. 33 Moreover, London
was unwilling to extend British responsibilities if this could
lead to a direct clash with armed communists that would have
adverse political consequences both in Westminster and in
relations with Stalin. The Cabinet wished to give him no
grounds for trying to extend Soviet influence using the pretext
of British 'aggression', and thus it attempted to 'divorce all
advisory functions from politics.' Policy directives from
London restricted the missions to advising on the organisation,
training and disposition of Greek forces, which in practice
allowed only an informal provision of I.S. tactical guidance.
In addition, the BMM(G) commander was authorised to give
specific operational advice to the Greek Supreme National
Defence Council [SNDC]- by then responsible for devising I.S.
33. CDC decisions, 22 June, in Louis P.93; BMM(G) Monthly,
Jan. 1946, W0178/74; Baerentzen 'Perceptions of Soviet
involvement in the Greek civil war, 1945-9' (ed.) Studies
P. 237-8
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policy- if it requested his views. 34 But, while Wickham noted
the dangers of political subversion, because of this high level
delimitation of each mission's official areas of concern, he
did not view it as his responsibility and made no attempt to
devise counteraction. The Cabinet's directives discouraged
individuals from assessing the overall I.S. position, and no
dedicated analysis of the developing insurgency was initiated
by British agencies. Norton persistently pressed for British
operational planning advice, especially as 'the situation in
northern Greece was beginning to resemble the one in
Palestine.' In June he was supported by the CIGS-elect, Field-
Marshal Montgomery, but the ambassador did 'not place too much
reliance on the effect of a conversation at very high level
regarding the day to day problem of law and order',35
recognising that the home authorities were unlikely to be
willing to alter their political stance.
Greek military-security operations were directed by the
police up to 26 June 1946, but the GNA took on overall command
34. Cabinet concerns and directives, Chandler, P.161. On USSR,
COS(45)291, 2 Jan., R347/58667. On Britain's financial
position, Bevin, CM(46)54, 3 June 1946, R8581/58695. The
COS want Greek self-help, COS(45)31, 29 Jan., R2565/48253.
But they propose the provision of advice to the SNDC, COS
(45)432(0), 2 July 1945, R11433/48274. Norton, on British
provision of operational advice, to FO, 30 May, R/58694.
On the overall effect of Cabinet directives, Gen.'s
Rawlins/Crawford, in Norton, to FO, 14 Nov. 1946, R16717/
58759.
35. Norton, on Palestine, Louis P.95. On Montgomery, to
Hayter, FO, 29 June 1946, F0286/1175.29.
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on 28 September. 36
 By May, Wickham assessed the threat and
proposed changes in police practices, with the encouragement of
other British officials. His 'considered opinion' was founded
on his experience of I.S. in Ireland, and although not
explicitly describing the nature of insurgency, Wickham
envisaged a Greek revolt involving political subversion and
terrorism. He noted their damaging impact on the amount of
intelligence provided by the people, itself considered an
'absolute necessity' because 'without good information, [the
security forces] rely on .. chance •. encounters .. in the
hills where evasion [is] simple.' He remarked that the current
conditions of ruptured police-population relations were 'the
most difficult situation which can face a police force, and is
very similar to that .. in Ireland after the Treaty.' In
response to these circumstances, Wickham proposed police
'mobile patrolling' based 'on normal lines' to enhance communal
security, and the familiar positive psywar approach focussing
on operational successes to encourage citizens to cooperate.
However, the Mission chief realised that 'where the population
is uncooperative .. normal police and legal methods are
inadequate', and he therefore advocated 'exceptional methods',
namely counterterrorist population protection. He initially
disparaged civilian self-defence units, bearing in mind his
'experience of [reprisals by] B Specials' in Ireland from 1920
to 1921, but soon after accepted the worth of 'Home Guards'.
They freed security forces from static duties and actively
committed the people to the government side, and he stated that
36. S.G.	 Xydis	 Greece	 and	 the Great Powers,	 1944-7
(Thessaloniki, 1963) P.362.
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military action alone 'would not eliminate the problem.' 37 The
BPPM therefore advocated interwar I.S. wisdom in mid-1946, but
also supported an unusual COIN security policy by that time.
British army officers concurrently reported on I.S. to the
War Office, and the BMM(G) is criticised by O'Ballance for a
persistent misconception of communist guerillas as mere
'bandits' during 1946 and 1947, hence leading to its failure to
organise and train the GNA effectively for counterguerilla
war. 38 However, although it is evident that an insurgent threat
was not perceived by the BMM(G) Command in 1946, equally, it
was not guilty of identifying all irregulars as brigands,
despite their common tag of 'bandits'. The Mission perceived
KKE guerillas as being politically motivated and operating in a
sophisticated manner by the summer of 1946, and Rawlins'
reluctance to support the use of the army in counterguerilla
operations was not because he considered that irregulars did
not warrant the attention of the GNA. Rather, he appreciated
that its organisation, equipment and training for conventional
war made it incapable of countering unconventional opposition
competently at that juncture, and that this would continue to
be the case until the Greek regime relinquished its aspirations
for a model conventional army. Its steadfast resistance to this
37. Wickham, to Theotokis, Greek Minister of Public Order, 24
Apr., F0286/1175.29; in Norton, to FO, 20 May, R7674/
58692; to FO, 21 May, R8060/58693, F0286/1175.29; to FO,
22 May, R8060/58693; notes, and to Norton, 4 June, F0286/
1175.29; note, 7 June, R8532/58695; BPPM report, 13 July,
A1R24/759. Local accord with his views, Peck to FO, 4 May
1946, R7360/58750.
38. Criticism of BMM(G) as in, O'Ballance Greek P.129, and
also see Woodhouse Struggle P.187.
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obscured Rawlins' reasoning and his actual conception of the
communist guerillas.
In May 1946, the Mission chief advocated the age-old
military principles of taking the offensive and applying
concentrated force for I.S. operations, and emphasised the
importance of intelligence for locating evasive bands. The
BMM(G) trained Greek army units in short duration patrols and
drives, and these were prosecuted unsuccessfully against
guerillas in the mountains. But the failure of British
stereotyped Imperial-policing policies in practice does not
necessarily mean that the Mission was nonchalant about the
military I.S. threat. Rather, the BMM(G) was imbued with
orthodox military thought, and this was reinforced both by
prewar French training of the GNA, and I.S. instruction given
at the Land Forces Greece HQ by the Middle East Forces Training
Team Number 12. It provided tuition based on the theatre
Command's Training Pamphlet 9/13 during April and May 1946,
duplicating that offered in Palestine, and this theatre level
guidance served to underline traditional I.S. wisdom.
Other interested senior British army officers analysed the
situation as insurgency appeared, and Lieutenant-General
Kenneth N. Crawford, the GOC from spring 1946, warned London
that the GNA could not eliminate guerillas by itself, because
'political banditry .. is essentially a long term problem
[and the security forces merely] driv[e] bandits temporarily to
earth [rather than] .. eliminat[e] them.' Furthermore,
Lieutenant-Colonel P. Sayley, at the Land Forces HQ, noted that
guerilla warfare was only one element of a campaign of
'propaganda .. sabotage, and armed force', directed towards a
'primarily political' goal. He surmised that the aim was to
influence the outcome of a future legal political contest, a
perception substantiated by the KKE's dual approach, and he
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correctly identified the functions of its underground
organisation as coordinating military intelligence, and
material support and recruitment from the population. 39 By May
1946, the British army HQ in Greece recognised the instruments
of insurgency and the form of its organisation, and informed
London that extra-military counteraction was necessary.
The Military Mission and army HQ criticised Greek failures
against communist guerillas during 1946, the defensive
strategic posture imposed on the GNA by politicians who
demanded the protection of their urban constituents, and the
Army's reliance on chance encounters to seek and destroy
irregulars. Indeed, British army officers are described as
having seen 'errors of policy and leadership, Greek officers'
inexperience in counterguerilla war, and lack of imagination in
counterguerilla policies.' 40 But while the Greeks undeniably
made operational and organisational mistakes, the implication
that British soldiers themselves possessed the counterguerilla
experience or 'imagination' to devise effective policies is
unsound. The BMM(G) understood that KKE guerillas were far more
militarily adept than mere brigands, but its expertise was
39. Gen.'s Crawford/Rawlins on the threat, in Norton, to FO,
20 May, R7646/58692. I.S. operations, LFG report, 26 Oct.,
W0261/771. GHQMEF training, Dirve. 245, 13 Apr., W0169/
22879. Lt.-Col. P. Sayley, LFG notes, 14 May, F0286/
1175.29. Some British I.S. ideas were ignored by the GNA
because of the influence of previous French training:
BMM(G) notes, 8 Jan. 1946, W0178/74; Lt.-Col. C.H.T.
MacFetridge (BLO Major), interview, 29 June 1989.
40. British views of the GNA, Crawford 'Note on the GNA', 4
Oct. 1946, R15192/58852; Tossizza P.181; and on BMM(G)
officers, Alexander P.218.
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essentially in conventional war, and it relied on familiar
British I.S. wisdom. The War Office evidently presumed that the
Mission could cope with any I.S. problems with which it might
be presented in Greece, and it had already circulated copies of
its most recent reports on guerilla warfare to the Middle East
Forces GHQ, which was responsible for the British military in
Greece. The Command's own 'Notes' were sent to the army in
Palestine in early 1945, but it apparently failed to assist the
BMM(G) in a similar manner, probably because the Mission
provided minimal I.S. operational planning advice to the Greeks
during 1945 and 1946. Indeed, the GHQ despatched its Training
Team to Athens, indicating that it shared the local British
army contingent's belief that communist irregulars could be
tackled effectively with traditional I.S. policies and
doctrine. Hence, during 1946 about half the GNA received some
instruction in traditional 'Mountain Warfare' methods. 41 Up
until the summer of 1946, this British perception of the
opposition was apposite, but it became obsolete as the KKE
insurgency developed, and the Mission's traditionalist I.S.
training was insufficient for COIN purposes.
As internal disorder spread in Greece, the Cabinet's
concern grew, and on 23 June 1946, Field-Marshal Montgomery met
Norton, Crawford and other senior officers in Athens. The CIGS-
elect stated that the GNA should be reoriented to concentrate
on I.S operations, and he supported an extension of the
BMM(G)'s role to allow it to provide I.S. advice as it saw fit.
He also authorised the three remaining British brigades,
totalling 16,000 personnel, to 'show-the-flag' to deter
41. On WO, GHQMEF, and Guerilla War Notes, see Chapter 3. On
'mountain warfare' training, Tossizza P.189; and the use




 Therefore, customary I.S. procedure was
emphasised, but Montgomery's visit encouraged the BMM(G)
Command to study the current field situation, in readiness for
the possible provision of operational planning advice by the
Mission.
General Rawlins toured north Greece from 7 to 17 July
1946, and reported on a guerilla war in the mountains that had
'centralised control' and was 'based on coordinated planning.'
He understood that terrorism 'deprived .. [the State's] ill-
coordinated forces of intelligence, which is essential in
coping with small and highly mobile bands', and recommended
large scale offensives to eliminate swiftly communist 10-50 man
guerilla bands and small terrorist cells. He urged improved
operational execution by devising better arrangements for
inter-force cooperation and coordination, and suggested that
the failure to secure cleared areas could be remedied by
stationing gendarmes to prevent reinfiltration by irregulars.
Rawlins did not envisage this as a long term 'holding'
commitment, hence undermining its potential value, because the
Mission retained its belief in rapid counterguerilla clearance.
But, by July 1946, the I.S. missions agreed on a basic Clear-
and-Hold military-security strategy, albeit that it needed to
be refined in order to produce counterguerilla success.
However, despite this minor advance, General Rawlins stated
that 'provided .. the army is employed for i.s. in accordance
with normally accepted principles and not dispersed .. it
42. CIGS's views and resulting action in, Norton, to FO, 1
July, R9735/58697; FO memo, 24 July, R10946/58699;
Montgomery, 1 May-26 June diary entries; notes on talks,
23 June; LFGHQ Summary by the CIGS, in 175/1,16,17, IWM.
Actual GNA organisation by Nov. 1946 in, J. latrides
Revolt in Athens (New Jersey, 1972) P.158.
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should carry on .. [an] efficient execution of duties in
aid', 43 emphasising the value of familiar I.S. practices.
British deliberation about I.S. in the light of current,
traditional, and wartime experience, from the summer of
1946.
The BMM(G) commander advised the SNDC on operational plans
that were executed by the Greek military on Mount Olympus from
1 to 11 August 1946. The GNA's weaknesses were manifest, its
various commitments having prevented thorough re-training in
'Mountain warfare', 44 and the operation was flawed in principle
as well as practice. The Greek General Staff planned and
implemented drives and sweeps, and provided for the short term
holding which Rawlins favoured. But the SNDC only acted on
advice that accorded with its own preferred COIN style, and the
Greek line was to destroy the enemy and its will-power by
employing force with little restraint, which included
conventional assaults involving artillery and armour. The
tactics adopted failed to beat the many small communist
guerilla bands conversant with their local terrain, and the
Foreign Office commented that the Greeks applied military force
ineptly. The British charge d'affaires, David Lascelles,
43. Rawlins, Report on the Army, 21 July, to Norton, 28 July,
and in, David Lascelles, to FO, 2 Aug., R/58851; Alexander
P.214. For similar views, Wickham, to Norton,4June1946,
F0286/1175.29. On the irregular threat, L.S. Stavrianos
Greece (Chicago, 1952) P.187; Voigt P.168,179-80; E.E.
Zacharakis 'Lessons learned from the anti-guerilla war in
Greece, 1946-9' Revue Militaire Generale 1960, P.180-5.
44. Norton, to FO, regarding Rawlins' advice, 27 Oct. 1946,
R15744/58759.
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equated the Greek action with punitive expeditions on the
North-West Frontier, and the BMM(G) made similar criticisms. It
recommended a more discriminating use of force in 'drives' and
'encirciements', and the army task force referred not only to
imperial precedent, but pointed out the Nazis' failure to
eradicate Greek partisans by 'scorched earth' methods.45
However, the Mission's appreciation that brute force failed to
defeat wartime guerillas was not matched by a realisation that
large scale German operations similar to those it advocated
also had major deficiencies. Indeed, when Rawlins was again
called upon to give advice to the Greek generals, he vouched
for sweeps, drives, and patrols 'conducted on the lines of
training exercises' from 'firm bases.' 46
 Furthermore, the GOC,
General Crawford, who likewise desired better Greek army I.S.
training, and reorganisation to improve inter-force liaison,
also harked back to previous British I.S. experience. He cited
the example of Palestine in the late 1930s to recommend a four
to one numerical advantage in favour of the State's forces over
the opposition, clearly seeking to make accustomed policies
work. But, both he and the GHQ realised that the answer to the
'perplexing' guerilla problem lay in analysing recent as well
as past operations, which 'will prove valuable if .. lessons
which have emerged are understood.' Crawford outlined these as
the need for greater junior officer operational initiative,
45. D. Lascelles, to FO, 3 Aug., R11465/: FO view in, Asst.
Under-Sec. D.J. McCarthy, minute, 7 Aug., R11485/58701.
BMM(G), in Norton, to FO, 31 Aug. 1946, in R/58705.
46. Rawlins, in Crawford, note, 4 Oct., to FO, R15192/58852,
W0261/771; Embassy note, on operations, Dec. 1946, F0286/
1176.29.
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enhanced security force mobility, and air support, 47 all of
which are vital for a COIN military campaign.
The BMM(G) informed the War Office about persistent flaws
in Greek military planning, communications, training,
intelligence and inter-force coordination during the winter of
1946. Montgomery noted that the Greek General Staff accepted
British counsel on some aspects of the army's organisation, and
asserted that the GNA met 'with correspondingly better
results.' 48 But while the 'exchange of ideas between General
Rawlins and [the] G[ree k ] G[enera l ] S[taff] [wa]s constant',
the Greek authorities resisted pressure from him and the Middle
East Forces to set up a Combined Services HQ to oversee COIN
operational planning and execution. 49 Senior local officers
dealing with Greece realised that such a central planning
system was vital for COIN; as had the British agencies which
established a committee structure 	 in Palestine in 1946.
Moreover, the BMM(G) eventually appreciated that some
adaptation of tactical military policy was necessary, and in
early October 1946 General Rawlins and the Air Officer
Commanding [AOC], Air Commodore Geoffrey Tuttle, proposed to
expand the role of the Royal Helleriic Air Force [RHAF] from
47. Brig. J. Kirkman, CoS,HQMELF, to FO, 20 Sept., R14177/
58851, used identical language to Crawford, GOCLFG, in his
Note on the GNA, 4 Oct. 1946, WO261/771.
48. Rawlins, to WO, 14 Nov., W0202/946. Montgomery, diary, 1
Dec. 1946, 177/12, IWM.
49. On proposed GNA changes, Brig. J. Kirkman, GHQ report, 27
Dec.; Brig. Henry Wood, Acting Deputy-Cdr., BMM(G) notes,
7 Sept., W0202/893. British position, Athens Chancery to
FO, 20 Nov. 1946, FO800/468.
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mere 'flag-showing flights' to air fire support missions.5°
Furthermore, the wartime Commandos inspired a British army
proposal for tactical modification, 5' which signalled a
departure in the British counterguerilla military approach. The
impetuses for change were the recognition that GNA operations
had failed thus far, and the British Army's heightened interest
in unorthodox forces. It is unclear who originated the concept,
but Rawlins emphasised that new COIN measures were needed when
he visited the War Office on 19 November. The Department had
been kept apprised of the Greek I.S. position throughout 1945
and 1946, and supported the proposed COIN experiment with an
unorthodox force, having approved the re-constitution of the
SAS in September 1946, mindful of its potential for undertaking
a similar I.S. role in the future. By 28 November, the Chiefs
of Staff, including Montgomery, who had been sceptical about
the value of such units during the War, approved the formation
of forty 'commando' companies, initially totalling 2900 men,
for 'deep patrolling' missions. They were not designed for
large scale raids like those associated with most of the
wartime Commandos. Rather, they took on a dual role: firstly,
to invigorate major military operations as a vanguard force
providing a cutting edge, echoing Commando exploits in Europe
after 1943; and secondly, to act like the very first Commandos,
and especially regular guerillas such as the wartime SAS, by
undertaking 'deep patrols' into irregular dominated areas in
order to put them under more sustained pressure. The BMN(G)
50. RHAF tasks, in RAFDG reports, 31 Aug., 31 Oct., A1R24/759.
BMM(G)-RAF discussions, in notes, 7,11 Oct. 1946, A1R24/
752.
51. Maj. J.C. Murray 'The anti-bandit war' in, T.N. Greene
(ed.) The Guerilla and how to fight him (New York, 1962)
P.83.
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viewed mobility as the key to counterguerilla warfare, and its
rationale behind the 'commandos' was that they should combine
maximum firepower with minimal logistical support, and be able
to outmanoeuvre and outwit guerillas as a force more mobile and
better trained, disciplined and equipped than them. In
addition, Tuttle also followed an example set in the War to
suggest air supply for light infantry COIN forces. The British
Army gave this concept little attention prior to 1939, but it
was readily accepted in Greece, and evidently both the RAF and
army missions expended considerable time and effort in October
and November 1946 analysing tactics and devising a new military
approach based on wartime experiences. Although they did not
fashion a paraguerilla policy, the missions made considerable
advances. The BMM(G) was optimistic about the GNA's chances of
success using traditional large scale tactical policies
supplemented by air-supported 'commandos', 52
 and they were
approved by the British Army establishment and by the Cabinet.
However, although the Mission pre-empted charges of failing to
address the weaknesses of a Greek army it helped to prepare for
COIN, it was more justifiably criticised for subsequently
placing too much reliance on the 'commandos' to achieve victory
52. On WO officials' persistent reference to the 1946 report on
"special forces" to gain support within the Department
for a peacetime role for the SAS, Calvert, interview. On
the Greek 'commandos', BMM(G) report, 21 Feb.; QHR, Jan.
1947, W0202/946; M.A. Campbell et. al. The employment of
airpower in the Greek guerilla war, 1947-9. (Maxwell,
Alabama, 1964) P.23; on the WO's action and reference to
the raising of the commando strength to 4000, A. Kellar,
in FO minute, 18 Feb. 1949, R2164/78486. On air support,
Air Cdre. Geoffrey Tuttle, notes, 9 Oct. 1946, W0202/946.
Rawlins at WO, and on the COS, Xydis P.432-3. On military
unorthodoxy, see Chapter 2.
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in 1947.
Field-Marshal Montgomery was in Athens from 1 to 4
December 1946, and he ordered the British army contingent to
reverse the trend of Greek military failure. He suggested that
the authorities in London had failed to recognise the
precariousness of the Greek government's position, and
implicitly derided the British bureaucratic system for
contributing indirectly to it. Montgomery's diaries record his
view that, 'the truth [was] .. nobody at home really knew what
the true situation in Greece was', and to him it was 'a never
ending cause of astonishment .. to observe the extraordinary
value of personal contact on the ground', yet to find 'that
there is no laid down drill for ensuring that this contact is
maintained by responsible emissaries proceeding periodically
from Whitehall to trouble spots overseas.' He criticised the
lack of top level analysis of I.S. problems in the UK, and
encouraged greater future British involvement in Greece.53
Then, characteristically, he set about trying to rectify the
situation personally by proposing vigorous action.
The CIGS met the Greek General Staff, leading British
officers, and Norton, and stated that, 'the situation has been
allowed to deteriorate owing to the faulty organisation and use
of the Greek Armed Forces.' On 2 December, he pressed for
complete GNA retraining in 'Mountain warfare', better inter-
force cooperation, an immediate rise in army manpower from
92,000 to 115,000, and in regard to anti-communist strategy,
the Greeks were told to 'kill the whole lot of them.'
Montgomery's ebullient approach stemmed from his own I.S.
experience, including postwar Palestine, which he compared to
Greece. Despite the 'commando' innovation, he again asserted
53. Montgomery, diary notes, 1-4 Dec. 1946, 177/1, IWM.
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the value of sweeps to 'harry' irregulars 'from pillar to
post.' And although the Military Mission deputy-chief,
Brigadier Henry Wood, reflected that 'encirciements' flopped
because of the guerilla's mobility, General Rawlins stood by
the British Army's military-security wisdom, as well as the
use of force for negative psywar effect. Norton concurred with
this psychological approach, but he also wanted supplementary
non-military action to undermine the KKE's support. However,
the CIGS countenanced no such measures, perceiving the Greek
malady as one induced by transnational communist aid that had
to be eliminated to make COIN progress possible. His diagnosis,
confirmed by Rawlins, 54 does not indicate a knowledge of the
nature of insurgency, and hence Montgomery prescribed
'conventional' rather than 'alternative' medicine- solely
military action to eliminate the 'bandit' symptom- which could
not cure Greece of its communist affliction.
While Montgomery was touring the Middle East during
December 1946, the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, and the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Dalton, considered halting
aid to Greece to save money. But the Chiefs of Staff and Ernest
Bevin were adamant that Britain must continue with the tempo of
its I.S. assistance. Already, as RHAF operations increased
during the autumn of 1946, and command was handed over to the
Greeks by the RAF Unit on 11 September, more RAF advisors were
54. Athens talks, CIGS notes of meetings, 2,3 Dec., 177/13,
/14, IWM; CIGS report in, Asst. Under-Sec. Mark S.
Williams, FO, to Bevin, 6 Dec., R17376/58716; Brig. Wood
note, 2 Dec. 1946, W0261/772; Montgomery P.457-8: on
his I.S. career, P.39-40,46-7; and reference to Palestine,
Louis P.96.
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sent to offer assistance by 12 October. 55
 Furthermore, by
December the gravity of the situation was made apparent to the
Chiefs of Staff through reports from the CIGS and the BMM(G).
Thus, on 11 December, the Chiefs recommended authorisation for
the Mission to advise the Greek military on COIN operations
without restrictions. 56
 The Greeks readily agreed to this,
realising that it would mark an increase in the British COIN
commitment.
British military thought on counterguerilla war by 1947.
Up to December 1946, Greek security force operations were
planned at army District and corps HQs, with police assistance.
These followed instructions from the SNDC, which devised broad
plans in the light of advice given by Rawlins. 57
 But, when
Montgomery was in Athens, he became convinced that the BMM(G)
must take on much of the burden of central planning, and on 4
December, Rawlins and Crawford produced outlines for Clear-and-
Hold by means of a one month offensive including air support.
Then, a week later, the Mission deputy-chief, Brigadier Wood,
and Major-General Vimblis of the Greek General Staff, wrote a
memorandum on the GNA's Order of Battle and future I.S. policy.
The GHQ Chief of Staff, Brigadier John M. Kirkman, noted that
55. Government debate in, Alexander P.225-30; JPS report, 6
Nov. 1946, R16360/58713. RAF action, AHQ report, 11 June
1947, A1R46/62; Air Mm. to AHQ Greece, 8 Oct. 1946,
AIR8/1258. The RHAF had 54 Spitfires alone by early 1947,
H. Jones A new kind of war (New York, 1989) P.25.
56. COS(46)181, 11 Dec. 1946, R18419/58718, CAB79/54.
57. BMN(G) notes, 13 Aug., Brig. Wood notes, 7 Sept., W0202/
893; Crawford report, 22 Nov. 1946, to MELF/W0, W0261/772.
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all parties agreed that 'the problem is not so much major
reorganisation, as implementation of measures progressively
evolved since the bandit situation became acute this summer.'
But subsequently, there was significant reorganisation, a
Combined Services HQ for operational planning and execution
opening in the new year. Moreover, the BMM(G)'s future
counterguerilla approach was officially to be based on
'lessons' gleaned from operations and simulative counter-
guerilla exercises, and COIN authorities proposed offensives
based on intelligence, featuring light infantry, mountain
artillery, air support, commandos 'for recce and long-range
patrolling', and a National Guard to hold cleared areas. The
BMM(G) also gave specific 'Irregular Warfare Training' to GNA
units, and by 17 December, corps commanding officers met to
canvass ideas for a 'tactical doctrine for counterguerilla
operations .. as a basis for organisation and tr[ainin]g .. and
for the planning of operations.' The resulting 'Policy for
1947' Paper was based on the joint British-Greek memo of 11
December, and it was then refined by the BMM(G) and RAF Unit on
31 December. On 2 January 1947, the army mission presented an
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'I.S. Paper/BMM(G)' to the Greek General Staff. 58
 The proposed
COIN changes were approved by high level British military
authorities, and further, a local Joint Planning Committee
including BMM(G) and RAF officers was formed. On 10 January
1947, it appealed for improved inter-force liaison, operational
initiative, and a Commander-in-Chief to execute its operational
plans.
As new military-security plans were drawn up in Greece,
the Chiefs of Staff pressed their political superiors for an
extension of BMM(G) and RAF Unit functions. On 1 January 1947,
they argued in the Cabinet Defence Committee that the missions
should provide unlimited COIN operational advice until order
was restored, and the British Government approved an enhanced
British COIN role 'on the advice of the CIGS.' On 14 January,
the BMM(G) received a new directive authorising it to advise
clandestinely on Greek Army, National Guard, and 'MAY' self-
defence force operations as it saw fit. Hence, it was
reoriented 'to give the GNA the greatest possible assistance'
and the Greek army was 'organised to conduct intensive
58. Rawlins/Crawford plans, 4 Dec., WO261/771. Brig. Wood/Gen.
Vimblis Memo, 11 Dec. 1946, 'The policy of the Higher
Military Council'/1947 Paper, [completed in Jan.], W0202/
893. New COIN training, BMM(G) Dep.-Cdr., Brig. C.D.
Steel, notes, 30 Jan. 1947, W0261/637. GHQMELF view, BGS,
Brig. J. Kirkman, draft tele. to BMM(G), 27 Dec. 1946,
W0202/893. Army meeting to discuss policies on 17 Dec.
1946 in, BMM(G) QE-IR, Appx. 'L', Jan. 1947, WO202/946. On
the use of the Wood-Vimblis Memo u.S. Paper, Rawlins, in
Kirkman to Rawlins, 27 Dec. 1946; 1947 Paper, O2O2/893.
On the British military missions' influence, BPPM Monthly
#26, 31 Dec., A1R24/759; LFG to WO, 29 Dec. 1946, MoD to
GHQMELF, 4 Jan. 1947, WO32/11436.
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operations .. so as to restore .. i.s.'. Further, British
Liaison Units were permitted to travel into combat areas and
advise Field Units. If British advice was ignored, Rawlins was
directed to request the CINCMELF to make strong representations
to the Greeks. 59 The BMM(G) and RAF group now operated as key
players in COIN policy-making, and although Montgomery's
traditionalist influence was pervasive, the BMM(G) appreciated
the importance of special training in counterguerilla warfare,
some tactical innovation, and organisational restructuring to
ensure a unified operational effort.
The Greek I.S. plan for 1947 reflected British COIN ideas,
and featured a three stage strategy: firstly, a preparatory
phase where security forces trained and reorganised, second,
the gradual clearance of two corps areas and their holding by
gendarmerie, and finally, their consolidation and eventual
return to civil control. The BMM(G)'s large scale policies were
incorporated into plans, along with Greek designs for massive
encirciernents and conventional assaults. And the enhanced
British COIN role was emphasised by the creation of Mountain
Warfare Instruction Teams, the appointment of an intelligence
officer to the Athens Infantry School, and the Greek General
Staff's acceptance of air support arrangements. Furthermore, on
11 January a RAF Delegation came into being, and soon after,
Wing Commander Phillip Broad, an officer with 'considerable
experience in air support, was sent out by the Air Ministry to
help .. advise the Greeks', and the RHAF approved RAF 'anti-
59. British missions and the new planning committee, RAFHQ
report, 11 June, A1R46/62. COS, 1 Jan., DO(47)1; Bevin, 2
Jan., DO(47)2, CAB131/4. HMG policy directive, to Rawlins,
14 Jan., in, Pyman, 6/1/2, LHC; and, CIGS and BMM(G) role,
Brig. C.D. Steel, BMM(G) memo, 30 Jan. 1947, W0261/637.
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bandit doctrine.' 60 Air support had become an established COIN
concept in both the RAF and British army groups, and the Air
Ministry mirrored the practice of other British institutions in
despatching specially selected personnel to advise the Greeks
on COIN matters.
The principle of applying pertinent experience to COIN was
adopted by local agencies in Palestine by the summer of 1946,
and the BPPM chief, Wickham, was seconded there to study the
problems of its police in COIN. The Police Mission was left
under the supervision of his deputy, Colonel Prosser, who
supported well-known 'Mountain Warfare' methods. But he was
also intrigued by unusual action taken by the Greek Army to
destroy the urban-centred communist underground. 61 Indeed, by
the winter of 1946 'all [COIN authorities] understood that [the
aftoamyna, or 'YIAFKA'] .. was quite as dangerous as the bands
who could not thrive without it', and that its elimination
60. New British advisory role, BMM(G) note, Brig. Steel, 30
Jan., W0261/637; 'The History of the BMM(G), 1945-52',
W0202/908; COS(47)30, 21 Feb., DEFE4/2. On the RAF, its
Delegation, and Wg. Cdr. Phillip Broad, Operations Record
Book Appendices, Mar., A1R24/760. Support for continued
British aid, and new GNA organisation and policies, DO
(47)1,1 Jan., CAB131/4; COSC approve CINCME/JPS proposals
to alter the GNA ready for Clear-and-Hold, including
expansion of the RHAF and commandos, COS (47)15, 27 Jan.
1947, DEFE4/1,6/1.
61. Prosser, to FO, 8 Aug., R12683/58759; Wickham, to FO, 13
June 1946, R9790/58758.
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was crucial for COIN progress.62
British acceptance of new Greek counterorganisation and
counterterrorism policies in the spring of 1947.
British agencies were aware of the guerilla's reliance on
the people for intelligence, supplies and recruits, and
realised that, unlike in past rebellions, these capabilities
were now well organised by the YIAFKA underground organisation.
Consisting of about 50,000 members, it engaged in subversion
and was the cornerstone of communist unconventional warfare.
British authorities supported the use of previously dependable
imperial population-resource control methods to undermine the
YIAFKA, assuming that citizens would shake off its influence if
they were protected from terrorism and psychologically
pressured into doing so. 63 The Greeks implemented curfews,
house searches and arrests in a piecemeal fashion, and
introduced a population identification-card scheme. But the
insurgents were not checked by these measures, and therefore
elements of the security forces decided to act against the
whole YIAFKA. Their new population-resource control policy was
instituted gradually after the autumn of 1946 and soon gained
the backing of the State, but it had few precedents in British
1.5. experience, involving the forcible relocation of sections
of the people to remove the insurgent infrastructure. The
control objective was also furthered by the denial of food and
U.N. emergency refugee relief aid to villages suspected of pro-
62. Field-Marshal C. Papagos 'Guerilla warfare' in, F.M.
Osanka (ed.) Modern Guerilla Warfare (New York, 1962)
P.236.
63. On the YIAFKA, Thompson World P.47-50. BPPM on British
assumptions, Monthly report, 13 July 1946, A1R24/759.
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insurgent support to prevent it reaching guerillas, and this
had a negative psywar objective too.
By November 1947, 250,000 persons were relocated and the
YIAFKA was progressively eroded, but the depopulation policy
was not supported by the British at first, because of its
initially maladroit application. It was not accompanied by any
welfare provision for those moved, and the absence of Hearts-
and-Minds social amenities left many discontented and a focus
for KKE propaganda. This improper execution obscured the
potential benefits of the policy, and the Foreign Office noted
in October 1946 that relocation was unlikely to lead to COIN
success. But, from the start of 1947, and through into 1948,
the GNA moved 15,000 people per month and set them up in
government '"security camps" where [theyl .. w[ere] under the
care of the State', which provided them with basic facilities.
By 1947, British political officials and BMN(G) officers
understood the counterorganisation value of resettlement, and
later on the requirement for some basic civic action. 64 Indeed,
64. Depopulation schemes, A.E. Laiou, 'Population movements in
the Greek countryside during the civil war', in Baerentzen
P.63: BMM(G) backing, P.69. British views on it, Peck to
FO, 4 Oct., McCarthy, FO minute, 19 Oct., R15193/58711;
BPPM, in, McCarthy minute,l9Nov.1946, R16572/58714. Some
authors incorrectly claim that it was devised by the
BMM(G), Eudes P.277; C. Chiclet 'The Greek civil war,
1946-9' in M. Sarafis/M. Eve Background to contemporary
Greece (London, 1990) P.208. Details of government 'camps'
in, J.V. Kofas Intervention and development (Penn., 1989)
P.94-6. Britain had tried population relocation most
recently in the South African War, and in a small scale
resettlement project instituted during the 1930s Burma
revolt, see Chapters 2,5.
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a more extensive and well-conceived population resettlement
programme and civic action policies were a feature of COIN in
Malaya from 1949.
A concurrent Greek innovation was a civilian 'Home Guard',
formed to involve the people actively on the side of the
government by enlisting them in counterterrorist population
protection and local pursuit of irregulars. From the winter of
1946, the BPPM and BMM(G) approved of newly formed civilian
'Country Self-Security Units', or 'MAY', although the British
army HQ was not enthusiastic about the formation of such
'militia'. 65
 Nonetheless, this Greek COIN policy became
accepted as standard, and a similar measure was introduced in
Malaya during the summer of 1948.
Advances in extra-military-security COIN policies up to
the end of 1947.
The British military in Greece began to assimilate new
military-security schemes by late 1946, but the Foreign Office
realised that physical confrontation with communist irregulars
and their supporting infrastructure could not alone relieve
insurgent pressures. It recognised that harsh socio-economic
conditions resulted in increased political support for the
insurgents, and its officials therefore sponsored national
economic reconstruction as a means to raise Greek prosperity,
65. Wickham/BPPM, in Norton, to FO, 2 Oct., R14782/58759;
Rawlins/BMM(G), 'Note on MAY', Nov., R9984/67005. Crawford
/LFG on militia, note, 4 Oct. 1946, W0261/771.
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and consequently, levels of popular support for the State.66
British political representatives emphasised the worth of
politically beneficial action by the government, and from
September 1946 it ran a systematic campaign of counter-
propaganda. However, the British Embassy in Athens condemned
Greek Emergency laws as 'draconian', and although Emergency
legislation was integral to the British response to rebellion,
London was warned that summary trial, execution and banishment
would exacerbate the situation by promoting KKE support. 67 In
the winter of 1946 to 1947, the ambassador came to realise that
military-security policies approved by the BMM(G) would not, in
isolation, defeat the communists. Hence, Norton wanted
'measures to eliminate the bandits, involv[ing] political
action to limit them to the hard core of irreconcilables .. and
military action to extirpate the latter.' He suggested that the
political aspect should include reconstruction, the creation of
a broad coalition government, and an amnesty to induce the
surrender of weak or enforced insurgent 'supporters'. Hence,
having recognised the Communist Party's revolutionary goal and
the policy instruments it used to try to achieve this, he
evidently had at least a rudimentary understanding of
insurgency. As a result, he proposed to counter this with a
politico-military programme, although he realised that it would
be regarded as 'a tall one' in Whitehall in view of Britain's
acute financial problems and its resultant inability to
underwrite major new Greek expenditure on COIN. Even so, his
66. FO views, such as, Under-Sec. M.S. Williams, minute, 26
Nov., R17544/; Parliamentary Under-Sec., Rt.-Hon. H.
McNeil, minute, 29 Nov. 1946, R17463/58716.
67. Athens Chancery Under-Sec.'s, Matthews and Payne, to FO,
Sept. 1946, R136519/58707. On government propaganda,
McNeill P.201.
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opinions were reinforced by the charg' d'affaires who also
called for political steps to be taken to divorce the KKE core
'from its accretions of sympathisers .. those under arms and
those not.' 68 By 1947, British emissaries and political staff
in London advocated government political action and counter!
propaganda; a crucial non-military element of COIN. Indeed,
with the onset of the Cold War in that year, the Foreign Office
formed an Information Research Department to develop psywar
techniques,which could have been applied tothel.S. sphere. In March,
the Foreign Office summarised the 'Red threat' in Greece as 'a
determined and well-organised effort to overthrow the State by
political and military action', and officials in both London
and Athens agreed that enemy casualties were insufficient to
raise the levels of government support necessary for it to win.
Likewise, General Crawford backed a combined political-military
course, 69 revealing a growing British concensus about the COIN
line required.
British COIN activities and Army counterguerilla warfare
policies and doctrine prior to autumn 1947.
68. Norton, telegrams to FO on COIN, 28 Dec. 1946, R143166994;
17 Jan., R517!66996; 14 Mar., R3429/'67001; 31 May, R7553!
67003; and on financial factors, 9 May 1947, R6314/ 67030.
Lascelles, to FO, in, Alexander P.239.
69. Norton's line, to FO, 14 Feb., R2359/'67000; 31 May,
R7533/67003. FO on Norton's views, D.J. McCarthy minutes,
14,24 Feb. 1947, R2359,667OO; M.S. Williams, minutes, 26
Nov. 1946, R17544/58716; 6 Mar., R2733,167000; Second
Secretary, John Colville, minute, 6 June, R7474/67003.
Crawford, to CINCMELF, Lt.-Gen. M. Dempsey, 19 Mar. 1947,
in Pyman, 6/1!3, LHC. On the FO IRD, West P.10.
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The BMM(G)'s increased COIN responsibilities from January
1947 should have given its members an opportunity to adapt the
British Army's I.S. line in the light of Greek COIN operations,
but circumstances conspired to prevent this. By 16 January,
Dalton argued in Cabinet that cuts in foreign aid expenditure
were imperative, and 'throughout January, Bevin [opposed him
and was] .. urging his government to aid Greece while seeking a
sharing agreement with the US.' On 30 January, despite the
current UK economic crisis, the Cabinet accepted the findings
of the CIGS's report on Greece, and backed him and Bevin by
agreeing to retain four battalions there and to increase the
BMM(G) from 1452 to 1700 personnel, as well as to seek more
American assistance. The Mission commented that this reflected
'the present [supportive] policy of H[is] Mjesty's] Government
as regards [the] training and administration of the Greek
Army.' 7° However, by 18 February, Bevin accepted that there
might be some value in terminating British finance for the GNA
on 1 April, not 'because of the [financial costs of the harsh
winter] weather, or .. Dalton's persistent complain[ts]', but
because of the Greek government's 'dalliance', and in order to
bring 'matters to a head' by pushing Truman into offering more
help. However, Dalton's diary records that six days later he
was 'constantly being pressed to provide more money for the
Greeks.' Frazier asserts that this entry 'is worthless', since
70. On Dalton's actions, H. Dalton High Tide and After
(London, 1962) P.188-9,193-6,198. On the UK financial
crisis, R.J. Donovan Conflict and Crisis (New York, 1977)
P.275. Bevin's actions, T.H. Anderson The United States,
Great Britain and the Cold War (Columbia, 1981) P.167-8.
Cabinet debate, 30 Jan., CM(47)14, CAB128/9; Montgomery,
30 Jan. notes, 178/1, IWM. On American aid, Bullock
P.316. Cabinet and the CIGS on increases for the BMM(G),
Brig. Steel, ibid; CM(47)30, 20 Mar. 1947, CAB128/9.
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it 'almost certainly' confused an earlier meeting with Bevin.
But in fact, it was not till 3 March that the Foreign
Secretary, who was tired and ill, agreed to abandon the
financing of the Greek forces, with Dalton commenting that
Bevin was 'not perhaps knowing what he was agreeing to.'
Following this decision, British-American talks started on the
allotment of 'Allied' tasks in Greece, and the new Secretary of
State from 18 February, General George C. Marshall, pressed
Britain to assume the leading role in military matters. On 20
March, the State Department implored Bevin to retain the BMM(G)
at least until an American aid programme could be organised,
and the Cabinet agreed that 'concurrent .. with US aid .. [it]
would continue assisting' through its missions, with the
proviso that the Americans met their costs from April 1947.
However, as bilateral talks opened, the unpublicised
operational advisory role of the British military missions was
ended, because the Cabinet was anxious to encourage a broader
American involvement in the emerging Cold War. Thus, the BMM(G)
was once more confined to advising the Higher Military Council-
formerly the SNDC- on army organisation and training matters,
BLUs were withdrawn from 'the Field', and the BMM(G) was
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reduced in size.71
During their short period of COIN operational advising,
British officers received a draft plan for a 'systematic
clearing up' of irregulars, circulated by the Joint Planning
Committee on 22 February. The need for army-air cooperation and
'holding' forces 'was stressed' by the British, because Greek
soldiery was said to be 'set and old-fashioned in their ideas.'
However, despite having accepted some valuable new COIN
concepts, high level British military figures felt that
clearance would be achieved in what was an unrealistic
timescale of a few months. Nonetheless, the Greek Minister of
Public Order, Napoleon Zervas, proposed to clear all regions of
Greece simultaneously, but he was opposed by General Rawlins,
who ensured that the blueprint for a progressive Clear-and-Hold
71. Bevin/Dalton debate, E. Barker The British between the
Superpowers (London, 1983) P.81. Bevin/Marshall, Bevin
minute, 18 Feb., F0800/468; Louis P.98-100; Anderson
P.168. British Government on the BMM(G), Xydis P.474.
Marshall on missions, Under-Sec. Christopher F.A. Warner,
FO, to PM, 29 Mar., F0800/468; Donovan P.267. On their
roles, Barker Superpowers P.81. Dalton on discussions, 24
Feb. entry, Diary #35, BLPES: on its dating, R. Frazier
British and American policy with regard to Greece, 1943-7
PHD, 1989, P.318-9. Bevin on discussions, 3 Mar., in
Dalton P.207; cf. Bullock P.368. British-American talks,
J.M. Jones The Fifteen Weeks (New York, 1955) P.164; JPS,
in COS(47)161, 22 Dec., DEFE4/9. Reimposition of
restrictions on the British, MoD directive, 4 Mar., R3192/
67029; GHQMELF QHR, 30 June, W0261/547. BMM(G) numbered




After March 1947, the level of aid for Greece from
Washington greatly increased, and a 40-man US Aid Group arrived
on 24 May, followed on 6 June by a 14-man Military Assistance
Group. The army mission's task was to advise the Greek General
Staff, although its precise responsibilities had not been
decided upon. By then, the BMM(G) had 'lost touch .. [and] its
influence on the conduct of operations .. [was] virtually
nonexistent.' 73 Between May and August, operations such as
'SWAN' were planned without a direct Allied input, and the
restrictions placed on the BMM(G) from March can only have
72. For the BMM(G)'s line, its Reports (on the GNA), 22 Jan.,
21 Feb., W0202/947; June, W0202/894; notes, 10 May, W0202/
948; LFGHQ, report, 22 Feb., W0261/637; Norton, to FO, 22
June, R8467/67030. Rawlins on operations, Notes of meeting
with CoS,MELF, Pyman, 24 Mar., 6/1/3, LHC; RAFDG HQ
report, 11 June, A1R46/62. On Zervas, BMM(G) note, 10
Feb., W0202/893. On British effect on plans, RAFDGHQ,
report, ibid; Campbell P.116. On the COS's optimism about
swift success, Gen. Alexander to FO, 21 Feb., R2629/67032;
JPS, JP(47)5, 25 Jan. 1947, DEFE4/1.
73. US action in, L.S. Wittner American intervention in
Greece, 1943-9 (New York, 1982) P.223-6; M.M. Amen
American foreign policy in Greece, 1944-9 PHD, 1978,
P.132; H. Jones P.53,67. On BMM(G) advising, Norton, to
FO, 18 Feb., R2567/72240; to FO, 22 June, R8467/; FO
minutes, Sir 0. Sargent, 30 Apr., M.S. Williams, 26 Mar.,
R5911/: BMM(G)'s lack of influence, in Brig. Steel, BMM(G)
note, 31 May, R8467/67O30; Col. A. Shortt report, 15 May,
R6706/72212; tlaj.-Gen. J.T. Crocker, draft tele. to CIGS,
18 Aug. 1947, in Pyman, 6/1/8, LI-IC.
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discouraged it from evolving its COIN thought. However, the War
Office allowed it to advise on the employment of a new 21,000-
man static National Defence Corps, designed to improve Clear-
and-Hold, 74
 and the DMO's approval of this scheme makes it
likely that it appreciated that British Army doctrine on
counterguerilla strategy required adjustment.
The BMM(G)'s broader military approach during the spring
of 1947 is further illustrated by the implementation of some
British ideas in Greek COIN operations. On 9 April 1947, a
British-Greek plan for Operation TERMINUS was put into effect,
featuring the arrest of 600 insurgent supporters, followed by
encirciements and drives that relied for success on 'blocks'
placed on roads and rivers 'reckoned .. uncrossable.' Mass
arrests dislocated the YIAFKA, but British-sponsored offensive
policies foundered because of guerilla dispersion. The GNA
inflicted losses on some insurgent units holding defensive
positions, the communist Democratic Army [DSE] having begun a
gradual 'conventionalisation' process in March 1947, although
the bulk of its manpower still fought as guerillas during 1947
and for most of 1948. Indeed, as the GNA encountered more
conventional insurgent 'brigades', Greek authorities were
reassured about their adherence to conventional war methods.
However, the RAFDG criticised the TERMINUS operation, and
asserted that the 'RHAF has a clearer grasp of the situation
74. Rawlins and static units, in Under-Sec. G. Wallinger, FO




In late April, the BMM(G) was eager to pinpoint the
reasons for continued operational misfortune, and distributed
questionnaires to BLUs to gauge their views on the validity of
operational planning, execution and methods. But although the
RAFDG acknowledged the shortcomings of encirclement, 76
 the army
mission doggedly stated that faulty execution was the cause of
the problem, and similarly, Sir Charles Wickham requested
'proper' implementation of operations in future. However,
following further setbacks during the spring of 1947, Wickham
came to realise 'the rottenness of methods applied.' 77 A new
Military Attach, Colonel Arthur C. Shortt, arrived on 3 March,
and established close contact with the British missions. He too
noted that though counterterrorist population protection could
lead to the provision of tactical intelligence, even if this
occurred, military success was not guaranteed. He criticised
the BMM(G) for supporting policies that failed to clear
targeted areas of guerillas, as well as poor holding that left
them prone 'to 40% .. reinfiltration.' Shortt reported that the
75. TERMINUS, and RAFDG/BMM(G) views, RAFDG report, 30 Apr.,
A1R24/760; Wg. Cdr. P. Broad, minutes, 5,14 Apr., 17,31
May, RAFDGHQ report, 11 June 1947, A1R46/62. On the DSE,
A.E. Laiou in Baerentzen P.75. Mass arrests, F. Smothers!
E.D. & W.H. McNeill Report on the Greeks (New York, 1948)
P.47.
76. On the BMM(G)'s efforts to learn, Lt.-Col. P. Flowers,
notes, 25 Apr., W0202/893. RAFDG, report, 11 June 1947,
A1R46/62.
77. Rawlins, on GNA, to WO, 22 July, W0202/893; Wickham, in
BPPM report, to FO, 26 June 1947, R8890/67031.
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GNA could only win using its present tactics if the DSE was
dernoralised and lost its cohesion, or if it shifted to
positional warfare. He foresaw neither course as likely for
committed communist irregulars, 78 and informed London about the
BMM(G)'s lack of insight.
The War and Foreign Offices also followed the course of
events in Palestine. BMM(G) officers met army intelligence
agents there in July 1947, and at least ten Palestine police
had been seconded to the BPPM by the Foreign Office. But
neither the Middle East GHQ nor the War Office attempted to
draw parallels between the two situations, not least because
the COIN effort in Palestine revealed no successful new
policies that could be applied to Greece. In addition, the
Military Mission's COIN operational planning and execution
advisory role was short-lived and covert, making the provision
of any extra assistance unlikely. However, the burgeoning
interest in guerilla warfare within the British military became
apparent during 1947, and in June, the War Office Directorate
of Military Training {DMT] received a report commissioned by
the Indian Army, entitled 'Mountain Warfare against a Guerilla
Enemy.' It investigated the effects of new technology on I.S.
duties and was designed for application in Asia, the Middle
East, and the Balkans, including Greece. Yet, it was either not
forwarded to Athens, or if it was, it made little impact
78. Shortt, 'Note on Antibandit Operations', spring 1947, to
FO; to FO, 21 May, R7338/67O75. Cf. in, Wickham to FO, 26
April, R6057/67031. Shortt arrives on 3 Mar., LFGHQ QHR,
31 Mar., W0261/637. [-us contacts, MacFetridge interview;
BMM(G) Monthly report on GNA, Sept. 1947, W0202/948. Poor
'holding' in 1947, COS(48)38(0), 17 Feb. 1948, DEFE5/1O.
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there. 79 Indeed, the Report noted that '[its authors'] final
recommendations [we]re not as revolutionary as the original
directive demand[ed]', probably resulting in it receiving less
than urgent attention from British military officials. Further,
the Report observed that, despite the recent proliferation of
guerillas, this would 'NOT in future' lead 'to specialis[ation]
or confine the interests of the Regular Army (viz. GHQ
Directive)', indicating that guerilla warfare continued to be
assigned secondary importance at a high level. Nonetheless, it
was written as a basis for future training and doctrine and was
retained by the War Office for reference purposes. Furthermore,
it contained some information of potential value to individuals
adjusting their COIN thinking in Greece.
The Report stated that 'the characteristics' of postwar
guerillas were not very different to those of the prewar era,
and that age-old principles were central to counter/guerilla
war. Its findings were drawn from simulative exercises, and 'a
century of practical experience' including conversations with
'senior officers with long experience in guerilla war.' The
treatise also referred to the Chindits' air support methods,
reflecting interest in them within the broader ranks of the
British military, but the main basis for analysis was
'opposition encountered on the N.W. Frontier', consisting of
both unsophisticated irregulars, and the less common 'modern'
guerilla bands that were active in Waziristan between 1933 and
1935 and in 1937. The Report advocated military principles and
policies contained in the Imperial-policing 'Manual' on
79. BLUs did not see the Report, MacFetridge interview. On
BMtI(G) visits, Col. Norman, letter, 18 July 1947, 87/57/2,
IWM. On PPF secondments, E. Home, BEM, letters, 21 Aug.
1990, 18 Feb. 1991. On British Army interests, see also
Chapter 3.
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'Frontier Warfare', the strategy being to 'provoke or entice
the enemy to battle', by familiar tactics such as sweeps,
columns, and patrols between picquets. It continued that the
outcome depended on the specific terrain, the nation-state's
physical infrastructure, and the availability of contact
information. However, the Report also advocated some reshaping
of traditional E.S. wisdom and the displacement of the
'conservative element in military thought [prominent in] .. the
1930s.' It stated that 'modern guerillas' were endowed with
superior tactical awareness and organisation, and therefore
encirclement or 'shepherding' was not 'realistic [as] there is
little hope of holding a ring', because guerillas 'always slip
out.' It tacitly recognised that the guerilla had undergone a
qualitative change, and to cope with this it argued that, 'by
increasing our mobility .. we can surprise, and with luck,
inflict casualties', [emphasis added]. It proposed large scale
offensives and 'protracted operations' by mobile columns to
'achieve decisive results.' Small patrols in the mountains were
also considered worthwhile, with the 'best [tactics] a
combination of both.' These demanded some army reorganisation,
coinciding to an extent with contemporary BMM(G) opinions: 'in
contrast with old methods of columns on a total infantry
marching basis', the Report suggested specially trained air-
supported light infantry to execute a strategic plan under the
direction of a joint military headquarters. However, it
denounced 'commandos' as a waste of resources, and in view of
the scarcity of intelligence, and an enduring belief in the
vulnerability of regulars to ambuscade, it dismissed any idea
of attempting the 'ambush of guerillas.' Ergo, the Report did
not seek to develop small unit tactics into a paraguerilla
policy, only to modify the 'familiar style.' Indeed, it
questioned War Office support for unorthodox forces at the time
of the Farran episode, which undoubtedly encouraged the
traditionalists. Nevertheless, the Greek commandos were
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sponsored by the War Office, and in September 1947, it took the
'unusually imaginative decision' of forming the 21 SAS
(Territorial) Regiment, explicitly for wartime unorthodox
operations.80
The BMM(G) and RAF Commands approved plans for relocation
and encirclement in Operation SWAN, executed from June to July
1947. Rawlins appreciated that removing the YIAFKA eased the
army's task, although he never believed it to be of crucial
importance, and both Wickham and the Foreign Office noted that
it was 'of itself no solution.' 81 But in criticising the
BMM(G), the Military Attache stated that 'the importance of the
self-defence organisation in the occupied villages has been
underestimated.' He added that, 'this organisation consists of
"cells" .. responsible for providing the bands with supplies,
information [and] recruits .. once this organisation has been
cleared up .. the exclusion of bands and [the] general control
of the area is very greatly simplified.' The RAF mission shared
his view that the YIAFKA could endure in 'cleared' areas
'occupied' by gendarmes and hence an effective clearance and
counterorganisation effort was required. Colonel Shortt
80. 'Mountain Warfare against a Guerilla Enemy', June 1947,
(Final Report on trials by 25 Experimental Infantry Bde.,
Oct. 1946-Jan. 1947, HQ Rawalpindi), to WO, WO231/34. On
the 'familiar style', Col. Shortt, to FO, 12 July 1947,
R19956/67135. The SAS, in Young, P.53; Strawson SAS P.151-
5; Calvert, interview.
81. Rawlins, to WO, 22 July, WO2O2/893; in First Secretary
D.R. Reilly, to FO, 17 July, R9984/67005. RAFDG OSUMs, 21
June, 17 July, A1R46/67. Wickham on counterorganisation,
in Norton, to FO, 19 June, R8375/67004; FO view, D.J.
McCarthy minutes, 9 June 1947, R7593/67O75.
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reported that 'the principal OBJECT of the GNA [by the middle
of 1947 was] .. the systematic eradication of this
organisation', and remarked that its removal would result in
improved 'popular morale.' During Operation SWAN, 2700 suspects
were arrested and target areas were depopulated prior to
military offensives. As a result the guerillas apparently
became less effective than hitherto. 82
 However, they were not
eliminated by encirciements, and the British army HQ- formerly
Land Forces Greece, now British Troops Greece [BTG]- blamed
insufficient information and manpower, and the mountain
topography for this. It consoled itself that the Nazis had also
failed to defeat Greek partisan guerillas, but while the BMM(G)
was then in no position to effect changes in Greek COIN
tactical policy, neither the current nor wartime failure of
large scale counterguerilla offensives convinced the HQ of the
need to propose alternatives. Nonetheless, the RAF group
applied experience gained during the War to suggest a revision
of COIN tactics, because 'from discussions with British
officers who have played a bandit role, SIS etc., in the last
war .. the bandit fears paratroops more than anything.' In
fact, paratroopers deployed as part of major COIN offensive
operations offered no panacea, but the Delegation condemned the
BMM(G)'s proposals for reorganisation of the GNA as 'half
measures', 83
 and urged its fellow mission to press the Greeks
for a further adaptation of tactical military policy.
82. Shortt's views, in IRs, 12 July, R19956/67135; 26 June,
R9984/67005. RAF agrees, RAFDG report, 31 Aug. 1947,
A1R24/760.
83. BTG views, QHR, 7 July, W0261/759. RAF proposals, Wg. Cdr.
P. Broad, RAFDG minutes, 21 June, A1R46/30; AOC, Air-Cdre.
A. Gray, to Rawlins, 6 Sept. 1947, A1R46162.
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In a report to Montgomery in August 1947, the CINCMELF,
General Cracker, reiterated the importance of the innovative
Clear-and-Hold strategy and paramilitary COIN forces, and
argued that 'possibly Rawlins has got a bit too close to the
problem .. [He is] a bit too optimistic as to [the GNA's]
condition and abilities.' Crocker admitted that the British
army mission might well have 'stifled' the Greek Army's
'material characteristics and fighting potentialities .. [and]
this wants watching both in regard to organisation, and
tactical methods/training.' He criticised current Greek tactics
and their failure to appreciate 'sufficiently in planning
counter-op[eration]s [against the DSE that] as the [communists]
become better equipped, they are bound to become less flexible
and mobile and, thus, more vulnerable.' Crocker appreciated the
differences between unconventional warfare and conventional
positional and mobile war, and hoped that in future the
insurgent military opposition would be a conventional rather
than a guerilla army, which would enable the Greeks to apply
their numerical and firepower advantages more profitably.
However, he declared that if this was to transpire, better
preparation of the GNA than hitherto was necessary, so that it
would be capable of defeating whatever form of military
opposition it encountered. This in turn demanded renewed
British freedom of movement and provision of advice on COIN
operational planning and execution to Greek Field Units,84
founded on greater tactical reflection and adaptability on the
part of British army officers.
Foreign Office officials frequently criticised the BMM(G)
84. Gen. J. Crocker, to CIGS, c.18 Aug., in Pyman, 6/1/8, LHC;
GHQMEF, to MoD, 9 Aug., WO32/11436. COS/FO/JPS agree with
Crocker, in VCIGS, Gen. Frank E.W. Simpson, note, in COS
(47)110, Annex I, 25 Aug. 1947, DEFE4/6.
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for its preparation of the GNA, because operations revealed
'examples of disadvantages of the existing organisation, which
cannot .. be put down solely to shortage of men and material.'
It derided current efforts 'designed to swat flies with a
sledge-hammer', and sought to end 'the complacency of General
Rawlins, whose optimism was shared by the War Office', and to
effect a change in 'training and operational methods [that]
have now become habitual.' There was a growing trend in the
British military to look to the experience of the War for COIN
inspiration, and similarly the Foreign Office proposed that the
GNA should be 'changed into a looser body of units after the
Chindit pattern, with .. greater freedom of action .. [for
officers trained] in the Wingate and Laycock school rather than
the armoured tradition.' 85
 Although Wingate's stronghold and
deep penetration strategies were not a solution to guerilla
warfare, the Chindit operations featured considerable small
patrolling from bases, and therefore gave a basic indication
of the type of junior level tactical initiative that was
required in counterguerilla war. Although the Foreign Office's
suggestion did not result in a new tactical policy, British
COIN agencies referred to wartime unorthodoxy more and more,
and the Army was encouraged to do the same after mid-1947.
Despite Tsoucalas' assertion, the responsibility for COIN
advising was not monopolised by the United States after 1947.
On 2 September, the chief of the American missions, Dwight
Griswold, proposed Allied advising on COIN operational planning
and execution, and twenty-five US officers began to give their
85. FO critique of BMM(G) in minutes by, D.J. McCarthy, 5
Sept., Under-Sec. David Balfour, 10 Sept., R12912/67031;
R.W. Selby, 25 July, R8478/67004; Balfour, 3 May, R6376/
67135. And also on comparative BMM(G) complacency, CoS,
MELF, Maj.-Gen. H. Pyman, notes, 11 Aug. 1947, 6/1/8, LHC.
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assistance within days. By 29 September, the American
ambassador, Lincoln MacVeagh, asked Norton whether the British
could 'provide direct operational advice' too, and by the
middle of October BLUs were again allowed to visit operational
areas, and to restructure army intelligence. 86 However, the
Cabinet was undecided about a wider, operational advisory role.
Norton asked London to ensure that if this was granted, BMM(G)
advisors would take account of new COIN ideas, but its
predisposition was to 'reject off hand any suggestion made to
them by mere civilians as to their professional task', hence
excluding 'interference' from non-military officials like
himself, despite his understanding of insurgency. Indeed,
during the time that the army mission made preparations to
resume operational advising, American officers advocated
encirclements, 87 and therefore created a climate in which fresh
COIN thinking was unlikely to burgeon. The Foreign Office
realised that in order to alter the BMM(G)'s military policies,
intervention at a high level was necessary.
By October 1947, the growing acceptance of fresh COIN
ideas such as the Clear-and-Hold strategy, population self-
protection forces, and political reforms, was demonstrated by
86. The widely-held view that the Americans took over COIN
operational advising is exemplified by, C. Tsoucalas The
Greek Tragedy (Middx., 1969) P.109. BMM(G)-AMAG talks in,
Wittner, P.232-6; H. Jones P.91-2,95-8. On BLUs, JP(47)95,
15 July, R9970/67031. On the BMM(G)'s role, Rawlins to WO,
23 July, W0202/948; 1 Sept., A1R46/62. COS/JO on the
British role, COS(47)121, 19 Sept. 1947, DEFE4/7.
87. On local counsel to BMM(G), Norton to Bevin/FO, 19 July
1947, R8478/67004. American thinking on operations, H.
Jones P.88.
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the Foreign Secretary's support for them in the Cabinet Defence
Committee. However, Bevin also aired his misgivings about the
BMM(G)'s record and recommended the transfer of Indian Army
officers to it, asserting that they possessed 'useful and
recent experience of the type of operation' required in Greece,
while most Mission officers had lately practiced conventional
warfare in France and Germany. Furthermore, he pressed for the
counterinsurgents in Athens to apply guerilla experience 'in
occupied territory during the war' to Greece. 88 Bevin did not
display a knowledge of all the requirements for COIN success,
and his power to influence its course in Greece was limited.
But he did argue for change based upon old I.S. procedures and
relatively new experience of unconventional warfare, and
encouraged non-military COIN action.
British support for extra-military-security policies in
the winter of 1947 to 1948.
The Foreign Office sponsored COIN political action by
pressing the Greek government to initiate steps towards
national political reconciliation, and to devise social welfare
schemes as a means to secure popular support. Additionally, it
proposed '"political warfare" .. [by] attempting to detach the
rank-and-file of guerillas from their .. leaders by offers of
amnesty and a more moderate administration of justice .. a
useful complement to armed warfare, which all wise governments
should adopt.' 89 British agencies recognised that many
88. Bevin's views in CDC, DO(47)78, DO(47)79, 11 Oct., CAB131/
4; and note, 11. Oct., PREM8/527; to MoD, 10 Nov. 1947,
FO800/468.
89. FO minutes, Balfour, 30 Sept. 1947, R757/72238; Second
Secretary John M. McCormick, 28 May 1948, R6326/72212.
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insurgent 'supporters' were actually forced into their ranks,
and the Foreign Office hoped that they would be prised away by
counterpropaganda and civic action. The use of the military
instrument for its positive psychological effect on the
population was no longer viewed as sufficient in the psywar
battle, and the Department was in the process of accepting
basic Hearts-and-Minds policies as the cornerstone of any COIN
campaign.
At the end of the year, Wickham elaborated that the KKE
thrived in the grim socio-economic and political climate in
Greece, and that the 670,000 displaced persons created by the
conflict by 1948 were a 'fertile ground for Communist
propaganda.' This made 'promises directed at the minorities
[for example, regarding religion,J economic conditions .. or
liberty and democracy.' Wickham recommended not only
counterpropaganda, but socio-economic measures to efface the
living conditions fostering pro-insurgent support, 9° thereby
reinforcing the growing trend towards British support for a
basic Hearts-and-Minds line by 1948.
British military tasks, and work on the Army's COIN line
in the autumn of 1947.
In October 1947, when Whitehall criticisms of the BMM(G)
reached their height, and Bevin called for the application of
wartime experience of guerilla warfare to adapt tactical
policy, General Rawlins initiated a study of GNA operations to
determine the 'essential needs for .. Army success.' He
concluded that it was 'problematic whether banditry can be
stamped out', but believed that 'the antibandit campaign in
90. 1ickham, in BPPM monthly reports, 31 Dec. 1947, 31 Mar.
1948, R/72317.
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Greece is similar to any other guerilla campaign', 91
 evidently
equating insurgency with other conflicts involving guerillas.
However, the military task in Greece differed to that of many
previous rebellions, in that the insurgent forces were
prosecuting a modern guerilla war, supplemented by conventional
'brigades' of 3-700 men by 1948.92 Nevertheless, after October,
the American army group chief, General S. Livesay, 'came into
repeated disagreement over .. training, operations and
administration' with the British Military Mission. The BMM(G)
Command's Review suggested a new military approach, commending
sustained
'deep patrols .. [by air-supplied] light infantry
operating like highly efficient bandits .. If bands feel
insecure in the hills .. continually hunted .. they will
be concerned chiefly with their own safety .. it follows
that to defeat bandits, the bulk of the Greek Army must be
in the hills operating like highly trained Andartes [or
guerillas]. It must be the object of every .. sub-unit to
obtain accurate information about the enemy, to gain
contact with a band .. to harass .. and finally to destroy
[it]', [emphasis added].
Senior BMM(G) officers favoured 'vigorous active patrolling'
because 'success in antibandit operations depends ultimately on
the junior commanders', and proposed the collection of
'intelligence from the population' by small army patrols, hence
abandoning the British Army's traditional opposition to I.S.
tactical intelligence-gathering by soldiers as well as police.
At last the Mission Command was coming to grips with previous
counterguerilla deficiencies, but it appreciated that getting
91. BMM(G) Command 'Review of the Antibandit Campaign', 22
Oct. 1947, W0202/893,A1R46/62.
92. DSE operations in, Woodhouse Struggle P.220.
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its proposals implemented would be difficult, as 'few [Greek]
commanders will order any form of deep patrolling because they
feel that a patrol of a section or platoon would be incapable
of looking after itself.' The Mission Command was itself still
guilty of seeking a swift victory through small unit forces
and its proposals fell short of paraguerilla action, but this
was a major advance in British counterguerilla military
thought. Additionally, the Review emphasised the Clear-and-Hold
strategy, because 'the importance of consolidating an area
[wa]s not always appreciated' by the Greek authorities.93
However, the BMM(G) had not regained its unrestricted COIN
operational advisory role, and when Rawlins was asked for his
views on future plans by the Greek authorities, he fell into
line with their thinking. The Greeks emphasised the employment
of more Commando Raiding Forces as a vanguard in large scale
offensives, rather than in widespread independent patrolling
operations. The conservatism of the Greek General Staff, along
with limited Greek financial resources, and pressing
operational commitments, conspired to prevent a very large
expansion and training of 'commando' forces, or a reorientation
of the GNA to small unit patrolling as the BMM(G) Review
recommended. In these circumstances, despite his Command's
report, General Rawlins adhered to the Greek and American
conviction that encirclements should be made to succeed, and
he approved plans incorporating them, thereby disavowing
proposals for a radical shift in operational policy.
By December 1947, the CNA implemented fewer sweeps and
drives in some districts and more 'commandos' and light
infantry with air support instituted 'continuous offensive
93. Regarding AMAG/BMM(G) disputes, and for the American view
on operations, H. Jones P.90,104. Details of British
proposals, BMM(G) Command Review, ibid.
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operations.' Their duration was less rigidly limited, involving
day and night attacks for over a month to 'systematically
expand .. control over well-defined areas.' But small unit
operations were regarded as being of secondary importance, and
additionally, holding forces were often unable to keep targeted
areas clear. The prevailing reactionary attitude to tactical
military policies was underlined by the Greek Army's plans for
conventional frontal assaults in response to the DSE's defence
of 'liberated' areas from September. Indeed, from 3 November,
American officers advised GNA units at division level, and by
18 November there was a Joint Greek-American Staff devising
plans which initially 'overshadowed the BMM.' Sir Charles
Wickham voiced his fears that American officers 'appear to have
failed to profit by our experience in Greece.' 94
 In the winter
of 1947 to 1948, Greek conventional assaults and large scale
counterguerilla operations continued to make meagre progress.
The BMM(G) Command Review outlined not only military-
security policy, but stressed that 'it must be appreciated that
the Greek Nation as a whole is engaged in war and not .. merely
the Fighting Services .. all the forces of the State must be
mobilised and Civil Authorities must realise that it is their
responsibility to take every measure for the protection of the
people.' The Mission did not contemplate the central direction
of all COIN efforts, and it asserted that 'military victory is
an essential prerequisite to political settlement, and economic
recovery', indicating that, unlike some other British COIN
94. GNA operations, Kousoulas P.255-7; C. Falls 'The Greek
Army and the guerillas', Military Review 28, Mar. 1948,
P.75. DSE action, and GNA changes in, O'Ballance Greek
P.155: on the American position and their views, P.156;
Wickham, in FO minute, J.A. Turpin, 1 Nov. 1947, R15323/
67053; Wittner P.236; H. Jones P.108.
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agencies, it had not developed an appreciation of the need for
a multifaceted COIN campaign. But it had expanded its vision
considerably, and the War Office was informed about its new
tactical thinking.95
The renewal of British operational advising, and COIN
progress, especially in regard to military-security and
control policies, from early 1948.
During much of 1947 the BMM(G) was criticised for its
stagnant I.S. thinking, and in the autumn Bevin contemplated
asking the Americans to shoulder the whole responsibility for
operational advising, while the British Mission would be
restricted to training the GNA. But in December, responding to
American requests for British help, and probably feeling that
their inexperienced partner should not be left to cope alone at
such a critical stage in Greece, the War Office and the Chiefs
of Staff pleaded for some British soldiers to be given the
'same responsibilities and freedom of movement' as members of
the new Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning
Group [JIJSMAPG] formed on 31 December. On that day, Bevin
agreed to their request.96
In January 1948, the CINCMELF drafted a new directive for
the BMM(G), requesting the 'closest possible collaboration'
with the Americans. Scholars mistakenly assert that
95. Regarding the importance of a politico-military campaign,
see Chapter 1. On BMM(G) ideas, its Review, ibid.
96. FO views on advising, COS(47)134, 31 Oct., DEFE4/8. COS/WO
views, COS(47)161, 22 Dec., DEFE4/9; COS(47)163, 30 Dec.
1947, DEFE4/8; MoD, to UK Joint Service Mission USA, 7
Jan., Sargent, FO memo, 5 Jan. 1948, PREM8/798.
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henceforward only the JUSMAPG advised on operational plans. In
actual fact, Crocker informed Montgomery, 'I feel (as does
LIVESAY), that we should take our full share of advising on
op{eration]s. The Americans fully recognise that our knowledge
and experience can add a useful contribution in this sphere.'
The Air Ministry informed the RAF Delegation that their ally
'stressed the point that there is no intention on their part to
usurp any of the functions now undertaken by the British', and
General Livesay helped Crocker to draw up a directive, the
CINCMELF noting that,
'very purposely we kept the directive as loose as possible
and avoided limiting the British Mission purely to
organisation and training .. [while] we were careful to
word it so that no impression could be given in American
circles that the British were concerned in policy
affecting the dispersal of American dollars.'
An Allied agreement delegated responsibility for advising on
army organisation and training to the BMM(G), and logistics and
operational planning to the JUSMAPG. But the British were
expected to, and did play a key operational role, and this was
successfully concealed by the Foreign Office. 97 The Foreign
Secretary had called for new expert advisors for the BMM(G) in
October, and by 20 January, the War Office agreed to send 46
new officers to Greece, all chosen for their 'battle
97. On draft dirve. to BMM(G), Crocker, to CIGS, 31 Jan.,
W0216/679; Air Mm. to RAFDG, 19 Feb. 1948, AIR8/1258; COS
(47)161, 22 Dec. 1947, DEFE4/9. On the assumed role of
JUSMAPG, for example, O'Ballance Civil P.156,166;
Kousoulas P.258; A. Nachmani 'Civil War and foreign
intervention in Greece, 1946-9' Journal of Contemporary
History 25, Oct. 1990, P.499. On the FO non-publicity
policy, CINCsME in, COS(48)127(0), 10 June, DEFE5/11;
Maj.-Gen. H. Pyman, to WO DM0, 27 Sept. 1948, 6/1/20, LHC.
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experience.' Another 50 more British army advisors were bound
for Greece by March, and all were ordered to make a 'continuing
study and appraisal of the developing situation' and to provide
'stimulating and aggressive advice' along with the JUSMAPG. The
175 BLOs assigned to Greek Field HQs were free to move and give
operational advice with 50 USLOs from 16 January, 98 a year
since Britons first assumed such a role.
New British army advisors outranked their JUSMAPG
counterparts, and Britons provided most operational advice from
spring to the summer of 1948, while the American 'involvement
dealt largely with the conventional aspects of military
activity.' Despite Tossizza's assertion, British-American
military relations by the middle of the year were strained,
with the BMM(G) Command frequently at odds with the American
army mission chief- from 24 February- Lieutenant-General J. Van
Fleet.99
98. WO despatches new advisors, 'History of BMM(G)', W0202/
908; Pyman, note, 3 Mar., 6/1/14, LHC; and on numbers,
GHQMEF QHR, 20 Mar., W0261/548; MacFetridge interview; H.
Jones P.158, records a total of 75- actually 96. On
operational advising, Gen. Livesay, to BMM(G), 15 Jan.,
W0202/895; WO Brief (draft), to BMM(G), 15 Jan., W0202/
894: BLU advice and numbers, COS(48)9, 19 Jan., R925/
72238; COS (48)20, 10 Feb., R2396/72239; WO Paramilitary
Establishments, 19 Jan., W033/2641; Brief, 14 Feb. 1948,
R2405/72240; H. Jones P.127.
99. Tossizza P.267, notes 'excellent' inter-Mission relations.
Cf. COS, in MOD minute, Maj.-Gen. Hollis, Feb. 1948,
R2637/72240. New BMM(G) officers' status, H. Jones P.158.
On the scope of American military advice, D. Blaufarb The
Counterinsurgency Era (New York, 1977) P.22-3.
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In early 1948, the BMM(G) drew up draft operational plans,
and by April BLUs were directed 'to advise the appropriate
GREEK authorities on the efficient development and employment
of their land forces.' Further, the Mission Command advised the
Greek General Staff to execute a strategic plan encompassing
all security forces under a single commander)°° Unified
command is an ancient military principle, but the BMM(G)
realised that a director of all security forces was essential
for COIN progress, and this was a significant departure from
usual British I.S. practice. Crocker and the army mission
pressed the Greeks to appoint a single commander, and a similar
step was taken by Britain in Malaya by 1950. Indeed, the
importance of central, unified operational planning and
execution was understood by the Vice-CIGS, Lieutenant-General
Gerald Templer, who studied reports on Greek COIN in 1948,101
and ensured that the requisite organisational arrangements were
in place when he was the High Commissioner in Malaya from 1952.
In January 1948, General Crocker informed Montgomery that,
'Rawlins is a bit bogged down', and that Major-General Ernest
E. Down should replace him in order 'to influence .. this
year's vital campaign.' The CIGS agreed that Rawlins was 'too
long mixed up with this difficult problem .. [and] a fresh
100. BMM(G) Directive, to BLU Commanders, Apr., A1R46/62. Brig.
C. Steel, CoS,BMM(G), on a single plan, QHR, 21 Feb.,
W0202/950; on a single commander, BMM(G) report, 18 Feb.
1948, R2495/72332.
101. Crocker presses for a C-in-C, 31 Jan., to CIGS, W0216/679.
Templer on operations and organisation, COS(48)24, 18
Feb., DEFE4/11. He kept up to date with Greek COIN, for
example in, COS(48)2O, 9 Feb., DEFE4/10; COS(48)38(0), 17
Feb., DEFE5/10; COS(48)91, 2 July 1948, DEFE4/14.
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brain [wajs wanted', recognising the need for a new impetus if
the GNA's fortunes were to change. Down was viewed as eminently
qualified for the task, having commanded a division in Greece
from 1946, followed by eighteen months as the GOC. Rawlins
officially stayed in command until April, but by 27 March 1948
Down controlled the BMM(G), and henceforth gave it a 'new lease
of life.'
General Down desired changes in the GNA's practices and
stressed that British advice should be impressed on the Greek
generals, because the conflict was 'an ideological and civil
war, of which many soldiers understand little.' Indeed, on 4
March, he convinced the War Office and Bevin to attach
initially another dozen new BLOs to Greek brigades, where they
advised without American counterparts. These British advisors
were chosen on the basis of their experience, particularly of
unconventional and mountain warfare. They supplemented their
own knowledge with guidance from time-honoured works such as
Passing it on by General A. Skeen, 'an expert' on mountain
warfare, and some of them 'agreed .. [that their experience]
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gave .. [them] an advantage' when devising COIN advice.' 02 The
War Office was making an unprecedented effort to provide its
policy executors with COIN expertise, clearly because it was
determined to ensure that the first communist revolt of the
Cold War would be defeated. Its procedure was now more like
that of the Foreign Office, combining a number of influences to
frame COIN action. But although it accepted the value of
providing expert COIN advisors, opponents of unorthodoxy in the
Army establishment evidently argued successfully against
Whitehall advocating any radical transformation of COIN
tactical policy, in contrast to the BMM(G) Command Review. For
while Kousoulas states that American advisors devised COIN
planning at this time, in mid-March BLUs received a draft
operational plan from the War Office, which the RAF group
noted was 'top secret .. [ V ]ery few Greeks know, or are
102. On Rawlins' replacement several months before the WO
originally planned, on General Down, and changes in the
BMM(G), Shortt, IR, 15 May, R6706/72212; CINCMELF, to
CIGS, 31 Jan., CIGS to CoAirStaff, 5 Feb., 1O216/679. On
the transition of the BMM(G)'s command, MacFetridge,
interview; Pyman, note, 3 Mar., 6/1/14, LHC. Down at the
WO, and on operational plans and the nature of the
rebellion, Lt.-Col. C.H.T. MacFetridge A Memoir of Greece
in 1948 (Ascot, Berks., 1987) P.26; interview; WO to
GHQMELF, 4 Mar., Pyman, ibid; Shortt IR, 1 Nov. 1948,
R12585/72241. Skeen's status, Bond P.105. On Bevin,
Shortt, IR, 1 Nov., R12585/72241; MacFetridge interview;
and on Down and the selection of BLOs; letter, 30 June
1989; Memoir P.7; 'History of BMM(G)', W0202/908. A BLO
was killed by a mortar, 10 Feb. 1948, GHQNIEF note, W0261/
548, one of three British fatalities during the conflict.
On JUSMAPG responsibilities, Wittner P.236-44.
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supposed to know, anything about it.' 103
 British army advisors
studied the War Office draft, and contributed to planning in an
Allied Advisory Planning Group [AAPG], along with Greek and
American officers, in March 1948. British thinking helped to
shape plans for Operation DAWN, and the status of prevailing
War Office counterguerilla thought prior to General Down taking
over command of the BMM(G) can be discerned from this.
Operation DAWN was executed from 15 April to 5 May, with
the aim of clearing a targeted region by mass arrests of the
YIAFKA, and by repeated encirclements to 'shepherd .. as many
bandits as possible into the killing area.' These inflicted
casualties on the communists and hence encouraged American and
Greek planners to support the continuation of such tactics. But
BMM(G) officers appreciated that security force gains were
essentially a result of the disruptive effect of counter-
organisation arrests and relocation, so that 'for the first
time an operation was mounted without the bandit knowing in
advance the plan, in time for counteraction' by evasion.
Moreover, the GNA's military victory was viewed as the result
of good fortune rather than judgement, because the DSE only
sustained major losses when some of its units defended their
ground, whereas when they scattered the GNA's achievements were
considered paltry. 104
 The British army mission therefore did
103. WO plan, COS(48)22, 13 Feb., DEFE4/1O. On plans, RAFDG, to
BLU, 19 Mar., A1R46/30. On the supposed American role,
Kousoulas P.258. Cf. the actual JUSMAPG and BMM(G) roles
in, COS(48)38(0), 17 Feb., COS(48)64(0), 24 Mar. 1948,
DEFE5/1O.
104. BMM(G) on operations, QHRs, 20 May, WO202/982; 20 Aug.,
W0202/893. Regarding DAWN, Shortt, to FO, Apr., and FO
minute, 13 May, R6329/; IR, 15 May 1948, R6706/72212.
-240-
not give encirclement the credit that others bestowed on it,
and its views contradicted those of the War Office
traditionalists, and the BMM(G)'s former commander.
In the spring of 1948, Colonel Arthur Shortt repeated his
criticism of the BMM(G) for its 'lack of imagination in the
study of the problem .. [and] lack of officers with the
particular type of experience required.' He was also unhappy
about GNA encirclements involving only a token 'commando'
element, and testified to the desirability of more of these
forces, as well as of light infantry and holding units.
Further, he warned his superiors against being blinded by
recent GNA successes in battles with conventional insurgent
formations, the result of a mistaken shift by the DSE that was
'so at variance with [its] hitherto successful guerilla
tactics.' American and Greek planners concentrated on fighting
conventional war, while Shortt stressed the counterguerilla
task. He also shared the growing British belief that 'political
pressure [as well] as military' was required for success, in
contrast to the JUSMAPG's clear-cut 'military objective.' The
Military Attache's strictures were accepted by both the Foreign
and War Offices.105
In March 1948, Down contemplated GNA organisational
improvements including a single operational commander, and an
increase in its ceiling from 147,000 to 250,000 to afford
Clear-and-Hold. Moreover, he set about answering the Mission's
critics and framing a counterguerilla policy that accounted for
'the complications of guerilla war', aware that, in spite of
105. Shortt's analyses, to WO/FO, 3 Feb., R/72322; 19 Jan.,
R1257/72207; in IRs, 15 May, 15 June, R6706/72212, R7618/
72213. FO view, Balfour, minute, 9 Feb. 1948, R1257/72207.
On the American military aim, Amen PHD,P.220.
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the War Office's plans, 'the scope for encirclement was very
limited.'' 06
 But while the guerilla menace remained unresolved
in 1948, the urgency of this task was diminished by gradual DSE
conventionaljsation and its creation of defended mountain
positions in northern Greece from the winter of 1947 to 1948.
Indeed, Down was 'profoundly grateful' that the GNA was
increasingly pitted against a conventional rather than a
guerilla opposition, because this was one that the GNA was in a
better position to fight.107
O'Ballance asserts that the JUSMAPG planned and directed
operations in the summer of 1948, instituting 'US methods and
doctrine.' And Van Fleet told the press that the JUSMAPG
'appears to be in charge of operations.' 108
 However, while the
Americans seemed to be directing the security forces during
Operation CROWN, the BMM(G) maintained a significant planning
capacity, while BLUs supervised its execution up to September
1948. The American army mission gave advice in the Allied joint
planning group where it retained four permanent members
compared to the BMM(G)'s two, probably reflecting the USA's
position as the provider of most Western political and
financial support to Greece. But Britons and Americans offered
COIN advice separately in the field, and while JUSMAPG was just
below 300 strong and maintained 20 officers at GNA units, the
106. Down's criticism of encirclement, MacFetridge interview;
and on necessary counterguerilla action, in, Under-Sec.
G.A. Wallinger, FO minute, 23 Mar., R4402/72241; Shortt
IR, 1 Nov. 1948,R12585/72241.
107. Down's views, RAFDG note,3OApr.1948,A1R46/1871; MacFetridge
interview.
108. O'Ballance Greek P.175. Van Fleet in, Wittner P.244.
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BMM(G) had over four times more men overall and seven times
their number in Liaison Units. Indeed, when trans-Atlantic
advisors disagreed with each other, the Britons tactfully
pressed the Greeks to adopt British advice, and Down, who
commanded the respect of the Greek Army Chief, General E.
Tsokalotos, pressed his generals to adopt British thinking and
therefore to place a greater emphasis on small unit patrolling.
The GHQ noted that during the summer operations General Down
'gained the confidence of the GREEK commanders by going among
them and quietly telling them how to win their battles
[acting as] Advisor-in-Chief on tactical matters.' Furthermore,
RAF officers on the ground cast a 'critical eye' on the RHAF,
and BLUs advised on the execution of operations down to brigade
level, while their JUSMAPG associates were only present at
higher echelons, and British advice was 'generally .. valued
and acted upon' by Greek Field Units. The BMM(G) reported that
British officers enioyed 'influence far greater than [the]
AMERICANS','°9
 a fact that was successfully concealed for
several decades.
Operation CROWN featured more small unit pursuit of
guerillas over many weeks than previous operations, but
although some Greek officials realised the need for sustained
"government guerilla warfare", there was 'a gap .. between
109. AAPG role, Norton, to FO, 15 Mar., R3848/72241; Reilly, to
FO, 23 July, R8688/72243. On the British role, Rawliris to
Pyman, 3 Mar. 1948, 6/1/14, LHC. BMM(G)/Down's influence
on operational planning, COS(48)92, 5 Jul y , DEFE4/14; AOC,
Air Cdre. J.A. Gray, note, 1 June, A1R2316395; Mac.Fetridge
P.2; interview; BGS,(Plans/Ops),BMM(G), to Pyman, 6 Sept.;
Pyman, to VCIGS, General Templer, Sept., 6/1/20, LHC. On
BLUs, BMM(G) OHR, 20 Au g . 1948, W0202/983. Mission sizes,
H. Jones P.121,127,158-9.
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intention and action [on their part ]'. The Greek authorities
insisted on further attempts at counterguerilla encirclement,
while concentrating military resources on conventional assaults
against DSE positions. During CROWN, engagements differed from
'those previously undertaken .. [in that] the army [ wa ]s up
against prepared defences', and insurgent bases were
substantially damaged by the GNA and RHAF. The BMM(G) commended
its planning for conventional offensives against DSE bastions
as 'well conceived tactically and administratively', but it
criticised the performance of Greek commanders, and the failure
of Greek counterguerilla operations to eradicate DSE guerilla
units. 1 '-° The CINCMELF also assessed Operation CROWN, in which
the RHAF supported large scale offensives and also 'commando'
operations, and he noted 'the value of the air arm .. [for]
recce .. [air] strikes and supply.' The Chiefs of Staff
supported an expansion of the RHAF and agreed that if Britain
'were faced with this problem, we should base op[eration]s on
the maximum use of airpower'; which was an advance on the
British Army's prewar indifference to air support in I.S.
operations. General Templer also emphasised air support,
together with the requirement for sufficient manpower to
institute effective Clear-and-Hold operations.' 11
 The British
operational involvement in Greece gave the VCIGS and the rest
of the British Army establishment an opportunity to study the
requirements of COIN, including counterguerilla warfare in
110. On Operation CROWN, (or CORONIS), BMM(G) QHR, 20 Aug.
1948, W0202/983. On Greek actions, H. Jones P.139,152-3.
111. Crocker, notes, and draft letter, to Van Fleet/COS, 23
June, Pyman, 6/1/17, LHC. COS on RHAF, COS(48)124(0), 2
June, COS(48)155, 19 July; and Templer's views, in, COS
(48)81, 14 June, AIR8/1258. CsINCME/COS on COIN operationi
requirements, COS(48)127(0), 10 June 1948, DEFE5/11.
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tortuous terrain and weather conditions, concurrent with the
start of the communist insurgency in Malaya.
The air aspect of counterguerilla action was elaborated on
by the RAF mission in the summer of 1948. It advocated more
RHAF fire support 'to give the bandits the least possible
respite', and wanted 'greater emphasis on destroying food and
equipment reserves [rather] than [on] inflicting casualties.'
Indeed, it realised that military attrition was no solution
because 'the problem in Greece though factually, is not
fundamentally and entirely a problem of bandits', revealing its
understanding of the politico-military nature of the conflict;
and it pressed for improved government propaganda. Moreover, as
the BMM(G) focussed its attention on the execution of major GNA
operations against DSE 'liberated areas' in mid-1948, and
neglected the problem of developing a successful counter-
guerilla tactical policy, renewed criticisms ushered forth from
the Mission's RAF colleagues. The Air Force Delegation argued
that, 'our past battle campaign has been at fault [and] .. we
as advisors must acknowledge that our experience in the type of
warfare being fought in Greece is negligible, therefore we must
learn as we progress.' The RAF proposed that the GNA should be
'beating the bandits at their own game' as a 'highly trained
mobile force of infantry, capable of operating for prolonged
periods without a "tail".' The Delegation stated that this
could be achieved if the GNA was 'free{d] .. from .. dependency
on road or animal transport' by using air supply, following the
Chindit example. 2 The RAF group evidently appreciated some of
112. RAFDG views, 'An independent Air aspect of the Revolution
in Greece', Wg. Cdr. W. Kemp, G(Ops&Trg.), 6 July, A1R46/
62; RAFDGHQ, 'Future Operational Requirements', (n.d., but
written after CROWN), A1R46/31; and especially on air
fire-support, report, 31 Dec. 1948, A1R46/760.
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the requirements of COIN and counterguerilla warfare, and
pressed the BMM(G) to pursue its proposals for developing
improved small unit tactics.
The main military threat in Greece after CROWN, however,
came from conventional rather than guerilla DSE forces, with
which the KKE aimed to gain rapid success through civil war.
Hence, General Van Fleet wanted the Greek military to undertake
conventional assaults and encirciemerits against them, and he
disparaged the BMM(G)'s proposal to retrain some GNA units
specifically	 for	 counterguerilla war
	
and	 others	 for
conventional combat. The American commander demanded
simultaneous offensives against guerillas in the south and in
the DSE's northern mountain strongholds, asserting that the
former should be 'a much easier problem' to resolve. 113 General
Down disagreed that a quick victory over insurgent forces was
possible, in contrast to the beliefs of his predecessor,
General Rawlins, and the Chiefs of Staff and the War Office
now agreed with the BMM(G) chief. After several weeks, Van
Fleet acceded to Down's wish for separate efforts against the
DSE's defended internal bases and those regions afflicted by
113. On the KKE's shift to conventional rather than guerilla
war, Woodhouse Struggle P.254. On the American COIN line,
O'Ballance Greek P.155; H. Jones, P.188: on GNA training,
P.184. Allied military mission relations, BGS,(Plans&Ops),
BMM(G), to Pyman, 6 Sept. 1948, 6/1/20, LE-IC. Gen. Down's
views in, First Sec. J.G. Tahourdin, to FO,26 Aug.1948 ,
R10077/72245; and on Van Fleet, Wittner P.247.
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guerillas, 114 but the GHQ feared that the rift in Allied
relations could spread beyond Greece. Indeed, as a consequence
of these difficulties, the JUSMAPG insisted that it alone
should advise on 'all operational matters .. tactical training
of combat units, supply, movement and evacuation in operational
areas.' Therefore, the UK army mission relinquished its
operational role in September 1948, restoring the Allied front
but leaving it devoid of responsibility for 'policy or higher
direction or advice to the Greek Government and high military
authorities', except on basic training. 'There would be one
mission [in future, the JUSMAPG] .. responsible for advice
on all major policy matters.'115
The BMM(G) played no part in COIN operations after October
1948, but General Down outlined the KKE's campaign and sought
'lessons' from the BMM(G)'s COIN involvement. He stated that if
Britain encountered a similar threat, it should aim to Clear-
and-Hold by employing very substantial manpower in constant
offensives from strategic bases with air support. His
'Appreciation' embodied an innovative counterguerilla approach,
and it was affirmed by the Chiefs of Staff. Indeed, with more
time to reflect, in early 1949 the Mission stressed the need
'to patrol constantly in order to obtain information and
114. Gen. Down in, J. Tahourdin, to WO/FO, 26 Aug., R10556/
72245; note, 15 Sept.; Brief for CINCMELF visit, 22 Sept.;
BGS, (Plans&Ops), BMM(G), to CoS, MELF, 6 Sept., Pyman, 6/
1/20, LHC: COS/WO view, COS(48)129, 22 Oct. 1948, DEFE5/8.
DSE external bases in, Appendix 7.
115. BMM(G) on their role in, BGS(Plans&Ops), to CoS, GHQMELF,
6 Sept.: JUSMAPG on COIN advising, notes, Pyman, 6/1/20,
LHC. CINCMELF on Allied Missions' status in, notes, 1 Oct.,
to WO, 16 Oct. 1948, W0202/899.
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security'' 16 and hence to defeat guerillas, although it was not
then in a position to pressure the Greek authorities to effect
a policy of protracted small unit patrolling. Nevertheless, the
BMM(G) substantially reshaped its counterguerilla military
approach after 1945, and it gained a greater understanding of
the nature of insurgency. Further, the CINCMELF commented in
June 1948 that, 'the rebel menace will continue and there will
be fresh infiltration by bandits .. unless some political
settlement can be achieved .. [and Greek forces] can hold and
keep clear areas won .. [to] cover the long process of economic
stabilisation.' Crocker's conception of COIN tasks was approved
by Foreign Office officials who shared the enhanced COIN vision
of local British agencies.7
Refinement of British thought on COIN psywar and political
action in 1948 and 1949.
Towards the end of 1948, Norton reported that many Greeks
refused to assist the State's forces because they foresaw 'no
concrete prospects of a better deal ahead for the ordinary
116. Gen. Down, 'Appreciation of the Antibandit war in Greece',
Oct., R12202/72248: on military-security strategy, H.
Jones P.184,ff.297. COS views, COS(48)129, 22 Oct. 1948,
R13118/72249: on the BMM(G)'s role, J. Crossthwaite, to
FO, 23 Feb., R2359/78481. The BMM(G) on operations,
'History of BMM(G)', W0202/908; to WO, 10 Jan. 1949, R90/
78357; 'KB' 'Greece at the crossroads' The World Today 5,
July 1949, P.293-4.
117. Crocker, and FO, in, G.A. Wallinger, FO memo, 26 June,
R7562/72243. On the multifaceted nature of the conflict,
Norton, to FO, 21 June, R7475/72242; First Sec. D.P.
Reilly, to FO, 23 July 1948, R8688/72243.
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citizen.' He proposed popular reforms as a means of securing
their support, and in December the Foreign Office described the
conflict as, 'equally political, military, and economic .. [and
suggested that government] effort[s] will require concerted
action in all three fields in greater measure than
hitherto.'' 18 The ambassador provided no detailed proposals for
civic action policies, but in January 1949, the Foreign Office
commented favourably on an analysis by A. Kellar of M15, who
had studied the Palestine COIN in 1946 and had fought with the
Greek guerillas during the War. Drawing on his varied
background in unconventional warfare, Kellar stated that, 'to
know what to do .. we must ascertain it is that .. the
partisans continue in rebellion' and retain their support. He
concluded that the population was 'either terrorised, or
frustrated, or both, [while the insurgents] offered something
which the .. Government cannot offer .. or .. 	 get them
[such as] agrarian reform .. village dispensaries, new
elections.' Therefore, Kellar suggested that the regime should
'realise some of the desired reforms .. and .. announce them
loudly as a New Deal' in its counterpropaganda. 119 This was an
exposition of the Hearts-and-Minds COIN line, and Whitehall and
Athens political staffs supported it.
The British Army on counterguerilla warfare in the spring
of 1949.
118. Norton, to FO, and minutes, 18 Nov. 1948, R13277/72250.
Wallinger FO tele. drafts, 11 Dec., R14135/72251; 15 Dec.;
approved by Under-Sec. C.H. Bateman, minutes, 15 Dec.
1948, R14000/72251.
119. Kellar's background in, CO notes, (1946), in CO537/1707,
1708,1728; and in Kellar Memo, 11 Jan.: FO view, J.O.
McCormick minutes, 13,22 Jan. 1949, R695/78393.
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From December 1948 to January 1949, the Greek army cleared
most guerillas from the south by mass arrests and then lengthy
small unit patrolling. The GNA's improved operational methods
contributed to rapid success, but this was achieved mainly
because of the widespread provision of intelligence by the
people, who were subjected to insurgent terrorism. Indeed, the
DSE 'could have gone on indefinitely if the .. [rebels] had
stayed with guerilla tactics and continued to receive'
assistance including safe-havens from neighbouring Balkan
communist states. But the Greek Communist Party concentrated on
conventional war in 1949, partly obviating the need for the GNA
to refine its counterguerilla tactics further.
The BMM(G) retained its interest in the COIN campaign
after 1948, and it endorsed Greek-American plans for Operation
ROCKET for a Clear-and-Hold from south to north, under the
direction of a single commander. This incorporated counter-
organisation arrests, frontal attacks on defended DSE
positions, and sustained small unit pursuit of the remaining
guerillas. In March 1949, the new CIGS, Field-Marshal William
Slim, believed that the civil war would continue until at least
1951, and concluded that victory would only stem from what Down
termed the DSE's 'ill-thought out tactics.' But the CIGS, who
was also concerned about the concurrent counterguerilla war in
Malaya, realised that Greek guerillas 'cause[d] the more
serious and widespread disruption of the economy', and he
advocated large forces of air-supported small unit patrols to
fight them, subscribing to the evolving British military
approach to counterguerilla warfare. During 1949, the Greek
security forces inflicted severe blows on the DSE, although
they still numbered 18,000 in October. However, in that month,
the KKE abandoned its civil war, not least because of major
cuts in international communist aid and the denial of




British political and military agencies involved in Greece
understood the fundamental character of insurgency by 1948, and
officials were formulating various COIN ideas and policies
addressing all of its aspects. Local and Foreign Office
political staffs began to comprehend its nature in the winter
of 1946 to 1947, and within two years they supported a Hearts-
and-Minds COIN line. British soldiers took considerably longer
to understand the conflict and work out a response, owing to
their innate military-centric viewpoint. But by the time the
British military missions' COIN role ended, the Army and RAF
groups and the Chiefs of Staff appreciated many of the demands
of COIN, and they had substantially reassessed their counter-
guerilla thinking. Those Britons developing COIN policies were
affected by various influences, and in the early stages of the
campaign individuals' thought was conditioned primarily by the
I.S. 'line' of the institution in which they worked. At first
this led to a degree of inertia in British COIN thinking, and
this tendency was underlined by the restraints placed on
120. Field-Marshal Slim, report, 18 Mar., W0216/702; as COS
report, 22 Mar., R2119/78348. Down on the DSE in, Norton,
to FO, 28 Apr.1949 , R4613/78349. British support for the
Papagos plan, Campbell P.305; 'History of BMM(G)', W0202/
908. Details of it in, O'Ballance Greek P.187; Woodhouse
Struggle P.259,270; Papagos in Osanka P.239-41. On DSE
activities, H. Jones P.223. On GNA operations, Tossizza
P.330; T. Papathanasiades 'The bandits last stand in
Greece' Military Review 31, Feb. 1951, P.23,31.
Counterguerilla operational flaws, 'Four Months Work by
the Army', GGS Press Dept., (Athens, 1949), P.12-5, MODL.
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personnel by high level directives from London. Nonetheless,
numerous officials, especially those with political as opposed
to military-security responsibilities, were able to shake off
the external influences that prevented others from advancing
COIN thought. Their perceptions were shaped by their own
experience of I.S. conditions in Greece, but also such factors
as their knowledge of innovative Greek counterterrorism and
counterorganisation policies, and other instances of
unconventional warfare and wartime unorthodoxy, all of which
were utilised to advance British COIN policies and apparatus.
Prior to the onset of the Malaya Emergency, British counter-
insurgents established the value of unusual and original
policies including population relocation, civilian self-
protection forces, extended small unit patrolling, and civic
action. Many recognised British I.S. practices were adhered to
by the UK military-security missions, but the traditional I.S.
wisdom that they advocated from 1945 to 1947 was transformed by
1948 through the secret British involvement with COIN in
Greece.
The employment of personnel with 'relevant' experience
also became an accepted premise upon which to frame British
COIN efforts in Greece, but BMM(G) and RAF officers continued
to work there between 1949 and 1952 and were not available for
reassignment to Malaya. Therefore, their COIN knowledge was not
directly transferred to the Far East, and there is no available
evidence that the War Office or Air Ministry, or indeed other
British agencies, forwarded relevant COIN information to the
Malayan authorities during 1948. Hence, as was the case in
postwar Palestine, the British institutional-bureaucratic
system ensured that COIN concepts developed in Greece were not
pooled and entrusted to a central repository ready for
distribution to British authorities, but remained in an
inconcise and unrefined form. In addition, contemporary
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insurgent treatises on the conflict are said to have made 'no
very serious impact on traditional Western thinking about the
nature and practice of guerilla war.' Yet, Campbell contends
that the British-backed Clear-and-Hold military-security
strategy of Operation ROCKET was adopted in Malaya in 1949.121
Identifying the extent to which the Greek experience was
applied there, and how this came about, will indicate whether
and how British agencies had learned any COIN lessons by
1948/9.
121. On the BMM(G) after 1948, MacFetridge interview. On the
impact of the insurgency, Bell Myth P.74. On similarities
between COIN action in Greece and Malaya in 1949, Campbell
P.305; Thompson World P.68.
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Chapter 5: The development of new COIN policies and
doctrine, and the 'Hearts-and-Minds' line, 1948-52, with
special regard to the Malaya 'Emergency'.
Insurgency began in Malaya in May 1948, and this was the
crucible in which 'Hearts-and-Minds' COIN policies and doctrine
were forged. The process of their development involved several
influences that have hitherto been ignored or neglected. The
structure of the Federation of Malaya, comprising nine Malay
'states' and two British 'settlements', afforded local autonomy
on many internal affairs, but resulted in a bureaucratic
framework that prevented swift, centralised COIN planning and
execution in practice. In these circumstances, advances in COIN
thought made by British officials were not immediately put into
practice, and hence their progress has not been appreciated by
historians. Some Cost-Benefit I.S. policies were unceasingly
applied in Malaya during the period under review, and
traditional British Army wisdom on counterguerilla war was not
wholly discarded by it, but there was a period of formative
change in COIN policies and doctrine in the years up to 1952. A
new COIN line was framed by then, and the foundations laid for
subsequent campaigns by Britain and many other nation-states
across the world.
The onset of insurgency, early British reorganisation, and
the State's military-security policies.
The Malayan Communist Party [MCP] practiced political
subversion to advance its goal of achieving national political
power during 1947, but by March 1948 the politbureau concluded
that an armed revolution may be required to attain this. It did
not choose between an orthodox communist urban coup or a Maoist
'revolutionary war' but on 10 May, under the pressure of
strengthened Federal Emergency regulations that allowed
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detention and banishment from April, the MCP approved political
subversion and terrorism by local communist cadres. The Party
visualised their continuation throughout 1948, both to pressure
the government, and it hoped, to inspire a mass uprising. In
the interim, the MCP organised its supporters for insurgency,
which they would pursue if an urban rebellion failed to
materialise.' By 18 June, the High Commissioner, Sir Edward
Gent, responded to mounting terrorist attacks by declaring a
State of Emergency. Communist irregulars were most active near
commercial estates that covered about 147. of the Federation, as
well as in the jungle that constituted over 807. of the
remaining land. The Malayan People's Anti-British Army [MPABAJ
was supported by an underground organisation designed to lead
the masses into revolt, the Mm Chong Yuen Tong, or 'Mm Yuen',
and these military and political bodies received broad guidance
from the MCP politbureau through a hierarchical committee
structure. By August, the MPABA fielded 2500 guerillas in
platoons that could combine to undertake attacks in large
1. MCP strategy and reasoning, R.L. Clutterbuck The long,
long war (London, 1966) P.45; Conflict and Violence in
Singapore and Malaysia, 1945-83 (Singapore, 1984) P.167;
K.K. Hoong Merdeka! (Selangor, 1984) P.137; R. Stubbs
Hearts and Minds in guerilla warfare (London, 1989) P.61;
M.R. Stenson The 1948 communist revolt in Malaya
(Singapore, 1971) P.8; P.E. Stanborough War by Committee
M.Litt., 1987, P.2,18-9, and decision-making, P.38; E.
O'Ballance Malaya: the Communist insurgency war, 1948-60
(London, 1966) P.85. Federal legislation, Colonial Annual
Report, 1948 (London, 1949) P.183; Communist Banditry in
Malaya (Kuala Lumpur, 1952) P.1-2; M.R. Stenson,
Repression and revolt (Athens, Ohio, 1969) P.3; A. Short
The Communist insurrection in Malaya, 1948-60 (London,
1975) P.71; Mockaitis, m/s, P.262.
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units, and 600 personnel in small terrorist cells. In addition,
'armed workers' assisted with the day-to-day maintenance of
this army.2
Gent and the British Commissioner-General for South-East
Asia, Malcolm MacDonald, assessed the situation on 20 June
1948. MacDonald chaired the theatre Defence Coordination
Committee comprising top civil and military authorities, and
also kept the Cabinet up to date with I.S. issues. However, the
High-Commissioner and Commissioner-General were reluctant to
take drastic I.S. action without the Colonial Office's
approval, owing both to their concern about upholding civil
liberties, and fear of provoking widespread civil dissension.
But of equal importance was the fact that they had no clear
idea about the nature of the 1.5. threat. Intelligence work was
carried out by the Malayan Security Service, the police and the
army, but their efforts were uncoordinated and none of these
agencies possessed adequate intelligence capabilities for COIN
purposes. Their warnings of impending rebellion in 1948 were
2. On the communist threat, R. Sunderland Army operations in
Malaya, 1947-60: Paper 4170 (Santa Monica, 1964) P.71-
2,79-80; Resettlement and food control in Malaya: Paper
4173 (Sa. Mon., 1964) P.16; RAF: the Malaya Emergency,
1948-60 (1970) P.3-4, AHB; Clutterbuck Conflict P.170.
Federal land use in, Under-Sec. John D. Higham, CO, note,
10 Oct. 1948, CO537/4402; Paget P.46. On the MCP committee
structure, see Appendix 8.
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hedged with doubts about its timing and scope, 3
 and an
insurgency as such was not foreseen by intelligence sources in
June 1948. The security forces were therefore handicapped from
the outset, as they were in Palestine, both by poor
intelligence resources and by broader weaknesses in the Ma].ayan
Police Force [MPF]. It maintained insufficient contacts with
the rural population, especially with the crucial Chinese
element which made up 38% of the populace and provided most of
the MCP's support. In addition, police ranks received
insufficient training, and the police relied on 'Strike Forces'
to quash unrest. 'By 1946, lessons from the European resistance
movements were .. available' to Malay state police chiefs, but
these evidently did not cause the Force to rethink its methods
or organisation, and it was not capable of undertaking
3. On the concerns of Gent/MacDonald, L.W. Pye Lessons from
the Malayan struggle against Communism (Cambridge, Mass.,
1957) P.10; Short P.71,80,85; M. Carver War since 1945
(London, 1980) P.14. On the intelligence scene, John D.
Dailey, (MSS chief), MSS report, 13 July 1948, Papers,
MslndianOceans.254, RHO; Stanborough M.Litt., P.2,39.
Warnings of rebellion, MSS IRs, 29 Feb., 15 June 1948, MSS
Political Intelligence Journals, (PIJ), 1946-8, MsIOs.
251, RHO; Dailey, letter, 3 July 1965, Association of
British Malaya (BAM) Papers, [sic.], 11/9, RCS.
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effective COIN action in mid-1948. 4
 The Police Commissioner,
J.D. Langworthy, ordered counterorganisation mass arrests from
17 June to 23 July, as well as familiar control measures like
spot-checks, searches of Left-wing premises and deterrent road
patrolling. 5
 In the meantime, the Government prepared
legislation for curfews, protected places and a re-formed
Special Constabulary. The Commissioner-General anticipated that
specials could protect economic targets from sabotage,
supplementing unofficial estate guards formed after
disturbances in 1946 and 1947. However, he appreciated the need
to replace this initially ad hoc State response with a planned
I.S. campaign, having studied the COIN effort in Palestine
between 1938 and 1939, when he was Colonial Secretary. On 22
June 1948, MacDonald contacted the Commander of the Far East
Land Forces {CINCFELF] Major-General Neil M. Ritchie, and
emphasised that military-security operations must be based on
information rather than mere speculation. Furthermore, he
proposed to set up committees and joint staffs to coordinate
4. For details of the Malayan Police Force, Short P.130-i;
Col. Sir Arthur E. Young, (KPF Commissioner, 1952),
'Appreciation of the Basic Situation', Mar. 1952, Papers,
3/1, MsBritish Empires.486, RHO; Annual Report of the
Federation of Malaya, 1949 (Kuala Lumpur, 1950) P.203;
Stanborough M.Litt., P.23; Sunderland 4170 P.59; Anti-
guerilla intelligence in Malaya, 1948-60: Paper 4172 (Sa.
Mon., 1964) P.18: especially on its role, P.46; Organising
COIN in Malaya, 1947-60: Paper 4171 (Sa. Mon., 1964) P.19.
On lessons of the War, H. Fairburn, (State cPo),
Supplementary Note to CO, 1950, Papers, MsIOs.262, RHO.
5. Police response, CAR, 1948 P.183,188; Communist Banditry
P.30; Col. A.E. Young, notes, 1953, 2/1, RHO; Short
P. 74 , 94.
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operational planning and execution. Sunderland states that this
idea came from British officials who knew about wartime and
Indian organisational arrangements, but MacDonald retained his
interest in the mandate, and the COIN committee system in place
there by 1946 could well have inspired his proposal. Whatever
the source of the scheme, Gent opposed it, and as a result, the
Commissioner-General convinced the Colonial Office to appoint a
new High-Commissioner.6
On 25 June, MacDonald announced the formation of a Local
Defence Committee [LDCJ as a tripartite planning forum to allot
I.S. tasks to Federal Government departments, and an Internal-
Security Committee to allocate resources. Within five days,
several Malay states set up their own civil-military-police
Security Committees, and a Federal Joint Operations Room
opened. Further, on 2 July MacDonald created a Combined
Intelligence Staff [CIS], consisting of representatives of all
intelligence agencies, with the task of developing background
6. British authorities discuss I.S. requirements, J.B.P.
Robinson Transformation in Malaya (London, 1956) P.126;
Short P.114-8: on guards, P.129; CAR 1948 P.183; R.W.
Komer The Malayan Emergency in retrospect (Sa. Mon., 1972)
P.40; The Kukri 1, May 1949, P.9; Stanborough M.Litt.
P.48; N. Barber The war of the running dogs (London, 1972)
P.86; R. Heussler Completing a stewardship (Westport,
Conn., 1983) P.168; MeCuen P.107. On MacDonald and his
involvement with prewar Palestine, R. Ovendale The origins
of the Arab-Israeli wars (London, 1985) P.68-9. His
interest in Palestine is exemplified by his request for
PPF personnel in June 1948, see ff.8. On the CGSEA and the
creation of a committee system, Sunderland 4171 P.v. On
Gent's removal, MacDonald, to SSC, Sir A. Creech-Jones, 29
June 1948, CO537/3686.
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information on MCP leaders, the Party's organisation, its
strategy and tactics, and then reporting its findings to the
Local Defence Committee. Numerous joint staffs at state police
HQs were also established to coordinate regional intelligence
efforts. In addition, the Colonial Office recommended an
'overhaul' of existing intelligence arrangements, thereby
encouraging states that were contemplating the formation of
their own committees to do so. However, there was no unified
national system of information collection and processing, and
although the Special Branch was assigned responsibility for
these tasks by the Federal Government in August, the Branch
lacked the skills to produce sufficient contact intelligence.
Furthermore, although the British security forces reorganised
for COIN far more promptly than they had in Palestine, and
despite the potential advantages of a committee system for
planning operations, it was hamstrung from the start by clashes
of personality and jurisdiction, bureaucracy, and complacency.7
Thus, in practice, COIN military-security operations, as in
Palestine, were initially short of both central direction and a
sound intelligence basis.
The British Defence Coordination Committee {BDCC] realised
that the Federal Police Force was not capable of coping with
7. On the role of the committee system, RAF notes, 26 June, 1
July, A1R24/1917; Sunderland 4170 P.24-5,28; Short P.122-
3; Stanborough M.Litt., P.47; R. Jackson The Malaya
Emergency (London, 1991) P.33,66; Komer P.26. Its actual
activities, 1/lOGurkha Rifles report, June, 2GR Papers,
133, GMW; Lt.-Col. J.K. Shepheard, FELF Trg. Lessons, 8
Mov. 1948, WO268/9. On the intelligence system, Sunderland
4171 P.28; 4172 P.2,18; Charters Armies P.219; Stanborough
M.Litt. P.47-8,199; Komer P.42; Short P.77,140; SSC
Report, 27 Feb. 1950, CO537/5439.
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the I.S. threat, and on 26 June MacDonald asked the Colonial
Office to transfer 200 ex-Palestine policemen to Malaya, and
also to receive the advice of their chief, Colonel W. Nicol
Gray. The Colonial Office approved this request, and the
Palestine Inspector-General was flown out to Kuala Lumpur on 4
July. The Department noted that his mission was to 'give the
benefit of his advice in the light of his experience of
terrorism in Palestine.' This was consistent with the Colonial
Office's previous practice of utilising I.S. expertise for COIN
purposes. Furthermore, Sir William Jenkin of Indian Central
Intelligence, an acknowledged expert on terrorism, concurrently
urged the Colonial Office to apply Indian I.S. experience to
Malaya, equating the I.S. situation in the Sub-Continent to
that in the Federation in a similar manner to Colonial Office
officials. He recommended the secondment of Indian officers to
reorganise the CID, and for the Malayan police to make mass
arrests like those carried out in India during 1947. Gray
subscribed to Jenkin's suggestions, and although the Colonel
had been recently selected for a posting to Accra, he was
'especially selected' by the Colonial Office to become the new
Malayan Police Commissioner on 20 August 1948. Furthermore, he
was accompanied by 551 'specially selected' former Palestine
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policemen. 8
 Additionally, M15 was interested in the Malaya
police reorganisation, and A. Kellar, who had worked in
Palestine in 1946, (and was to review the Greek internal
situation for the Foreign Office in 1949), agreed with
proposals for the CID to be restructured along Indian lines,9
reiterating the value of past I.S. experience for framing COIN
measures.
The BDCC concluded that until the Malayan police service
was revitalised through reorganisation and retraining, the
military must take the leading role in I.S. operations. The
British Army was subsequently criticised both for having little
idea about 'how guerilla warfare was conducted and hence what
countermeasures would be appropriate', and retaining 'no
lessons from which to draw [on]'. Indeed, Major-General Sir
Harold Briggs, who became the Federal Director of Operations in
1950, commented that the Government had 'very little
8. MacDonald and the BDCC's views, CP(48)171, 1 July; CGSEA
to SSC, 26 June, CAB129/28; Short P.121,130. The CO and
Col. Gray, CAR 1948 P.185. Jenkin's ideas, Sir W. Jenkin,
letter to J.P. Gibson, CR0, 6 July, (sent to CO); O.H.
Morris, CO, to Malaya Sec. of Defence & I.S., D.C.
Watherston, 28 July 1948, CO537/4250. On Gray's views,
OAG, Sir A.T. Newboult, in T.I.K. Lloyd, Permt. Sec., CO,
to A. Onraet, (State CPO), 12 Feb. 1949; Newboult, to C.
Hall, Acting MPF Commissioner, 5 Aug., in BAM, V/8,6, RCS.
On the PPF, CP(48)19O, 19 July 1948, CAB129/28; CAR 1948
P.123; Communist Terrorism in Malaya (Kuala Lurnpur, 1952)
P.26; Stanborough M.Litt.,P.50; Jeffries P.159-61.
9. On M15 activities, O.H.Morris, CO, to J.P.Gibson, CR0, 13
Sept.; HC, Sir H. Gurney, to J.D. Higham, CO, 28 Oct.
1948, CO537/4250.
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understanding [of] the size and scope of the measures required'
in the middle of 1948. But some British COIN agencies,
including the Army, sought guidance from other I.S. theatres
and applied this knowledge to devise their COIN policies. This
has not been properly appreciated until now,'° and assertions
about British ignorance of their tasks, and of the lessons of
the past, are misplaced.
British Army I.S. preparations and doctrine from the
beginning of 1948.
Army formations in Malaya received basic guidance on 1.5.
matters in 1948, and although much instruction was provided
'on-the-job' during operations against irregulars, units held
training exercises and received high level advice. This
supplemented 'general knowledge' about I.S. and non-
conventional warfare gained by individuals prior to the
Emergency. The most recent type of action seen by most army
officers and NCOs was that of conventional war, but a good many
were career soldiers who possessed 'ample experience of
"Imperial-Policing" .. in the main India and the Middle East',
although some of them referred to the counterguerilla campaign
during the South African War for guidance. Official army I.S.
10. Academic study regarding the use made of previous 1.5.
experience in Malaya has been neglected, and the Greek
insurgency disregarded, probably because the British COIN
role there was covert and was not perceived as a possible
factor in the Malayan campaign by other writers. Gen.
Briggs, Director of Operations Report, Nov. 1951, AIR2O/
7777. Critics of the British Army, such as, Stubbs P.247;
Stanborough M.Litt., P.7,52-3; H. Miller Jungle War in
Malaya (London, 1972) P.20; J.P. Cross In Gurkha Company
(London, 1986) P.29; Jungle Warfare (London, 1989) P.116.
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instruction in Malaya followed traditional lines too,
concentrating on exercises in cordon-and-search and control
measures, and short one to three day 'pl[atoon] patrolling in
jungle' from the start of 1948. This had become accepted by the
British Army establishment after the development of jungle
patrolling during the wartime campaigns in the Far East.11
According to Sunderland, over and above this groundwork in more
familiar I.S. policies, about half of the British officers and
six of the nine battalions in Malaya served in wartime Burma,
and two battalions fought against Burmese irregulars from 1946
to 1947. Hence, many infantrymen would have been exposed to
air-supplied small unit patrolling and ambushing. Furthermore,
the Air Officer Commanding, Air-Vice Marshal Sir A. Clifford
Sanderson, noted on 1 July 1948 that, the 'type of warfare'
confronting the security forces was comparable to 'that of the
Burma campaign', and he proposed the adoption of air supply, in
addition to air strikes that were 'used effectively in
operations in Palestine during 1938/9.' The local RAF
contingent favoured the 'Air Pin' technique after June and
staged exercises in it in September 1948, as well as carrying
out a study on the potential role for air supply in the
preceding month. Thus, the air force group readily referred to
previous I.S. and wartime experiences when designing COIN
operations in Malaya. However, few army units swiftly adapted
their knowledge of wartime Burma into new tactical plans in
11. On British officers' I.S. experience, Brig. A.E.C. Bredin
The Happy Warriors (Dorset, 1961) P.123-4; Lapping P.168;
Calvert, interview. Army training, Sunderland 4171 P.18; 1
KOYLI, TI-IS, Jan. 1948, W0268/624. On-the-job, 1/1OGR,
OD, June 1948, WO268/581. London's acceptance of 'jungle
warfare', and the WO.'s approval of Jungle warfare (London,
1944) by Maj.-Gen. H. Rowan-Robinson, in, Mockaitis, book,
P.160. (KOYLI- King's Own Yorks. Light Inf.).
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Malaya, 12
 and in the early stages of COIN, a more familiar I.S.
path was trodden.
In May 1948, the army performed road patrolling, large
unit 'recce in force' and multi-company sweeps reflecting
'normal training', as well as short duration small unit
patrols. The GOC, Major-General D. Ashton L. Wade, was
concerned about the escalation of irregular attacks, and he
ordered the training of 'subunits .. in jungle warfare',
including ambush and night operations. Indeed, some local
commanders set up a 'permanent pl[atoon] locality' and favoured
'special jungle patrol tr{ainin]g', incorporating short small
unit patrol and ambush that was considered 'special
operations.' 13
 But traditional I.S. wisdom was underlined by
the local army HQ, which later on that summer stated that, 'in
general the provisions of "Notes for Training in DIACP in the
12. British soldiers' experience, Sunderland 4170 P.vii,3,27,
31,99-103,166. On the lack of army use of Burma knowledge,
E.D. Smith East of Kathmandu (London, 1976) P.175. Early
COIN operations, for example, N.Mal. ISUM1, 5 July 1948,
1O268/774. AOC, AHQMa1. Report on Operations, 9 May 1949,
A1R23/8435. RAF, OSUMs, 15,24 Sept., 2 Dec. 1948, A1R24/
1925. RAF air supply study, CAR 1948 P.186.
13. GOC's views, to N.Mal., 19,24 May; and early sweeps,
N.Mal. QHR, 13 Oct., W0268/553; Short P.117,136. Army
training, N.Mal. QFTR, 31 Mar., W0268/584; and 'special
operations', 1/6GR QE-IR, 30 June, report, 16 Aug., ISUMs,
15,18,19 July, 7 Aug., tJO268/681; ISUM, 3 Aug., WO268/783;
Cross Company P.20; and 'special training', 1/6GR report,
15 July, W0268/681. On the formation of platoon areas,
Johore Sub-District HQ, 0014, 21 June, WO268/581; 1 KOYLI
QUR, 30 June 1948, WO268/624.
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Malayan Union" should be observed.' Although some authors
assert that Whitehall gave the army no guidance, there was
'much anxious deliberation at the War Office' over the Malayan
situation. Reinforcements were equipped not only with standard
British Army riot control and cordon-and-search training but
they also obtained the Malaya 'Notes', prepared prior to 1948
following War Office counsel, as well as its Military Training
Pamphlet 52, and 'Jungle Jottings, 1945.' These included
guidance on jungle patrolling in addition to more 'orthodox'
methods. 14 But the Service Department proposed no radical new
tactical ideas, reflecting wider current Army thinking about
I.S. affairs.
During 1948, the War Office deliberated over the revision
of its 'IS Duties 1947' document, and the Directorate of
Military Training enlisted 'specially selected' officers to
craft an 'I.S. Military Training Pamphlet', obviously in
recognition of the need for expert preparation of I.S.
doctrine. The Directorate also commissioned separate manuals on
'long-range penetration (including guerilla warfare)' and
'jungle warfare', but officials apparently made no reference to
these subjects when reviewing I.S. wisdom. The DMT did not
share the DMO's enthusiasm for small unit tactical
14. HQMa1. on Malaya Union 'Notes for Training', CoS, Brig.
R.N.M. Jones, 14 Aug., Dirve., 2GR Papers, 133, GMW. (The
Union ended and a Federation was created in Feb. 1948). On
the supposed lack of WO guidance, Sunderland 4170 P.44;
Smith Kathmandu P.175. On its actual action, Blaxland
P.83; and on the Union 'Notes', Gen. A. Wade, letter, 22
Feb. 1991; also WO L.S. guidance in, Lt.-Col. T.
Winnington, T13, 16 Oct.; 3 Gren. Gds. QHR, 31 Dec. 1948,
W0268/687. Also see, Cross Company P.18-20; A. Jones in
Howard P.318.
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experimentation, and it failed to appreciate the potential
value of applying wartime experience of unorthodox operations
to I.S. matters. It endorsed the traditional wisdom championed
by the CIGS, as did both lecturers at Camberley- where a one
week I.S. course included lessons from the Palestine campaign,
while reiterating customary policies- and British military
writers.15
The formulation and basis of counterguerilla strategy and
tactical military policies, from the summer of 1948.
At the start of the Emergency, army units still lacked
central operational direction, and local commanders devised
plans at their own discretion. The army undertook routine road
and settlement security patrol work, cordon-and-search and
15. 'IS Duties 1947' and new pamphlets, MA to the CIGS,
minutes, Mar.; CIGS draft notes, 19 Apr.; Maj.-Gen. J.
Cracker, 'Report by the Committee on Army Training
Pamphlets', 25 May 1948, W0216/257. The Director of the
DMT, t1aj.-Gen. C.H. Callender, thought in traditional I.S.
terms, having served on the Frontier during 1938 and 1939,
and then as GOC, 4 British Div., Greece, from 1945 to
1946. On tuition at the Staff College, Charters Armies
P.191,239; Maj.-Gen. Sir FL. Stockwell, 'Lecture on
(c.1948), 6/29/1, LHC. Published treatises, for example,
Anderson Army Q'ly 1948, regarding Palestine.
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'flying squad' reaction to attacks. 16 It also pursued offensive
operations including brief small unit jungle patrolling, based
on a prevalent belief in the British Army that infantry
sections would tire after ten days 'in country', and on 'the
myth of the Malaya jungle's impenetrability.' But in addition,
large columns were frequently active for periods of up to
several weeks for both reconnaissance and to confront and
defeat irregular forces, in line with long-standing Imperial-
policing procedure. Some writers argue that officers' knowledge
of conventional warfare and related exercises 'appeared to be
the basis of .. large scale' operations,' 7 but sweeps, drives
and encirclements were familiar to many soldiers, not least the
16. Security force operational routine, 1 KOYLI QHR, 30 Sept.,
W0268/624; Lt.-Col. J.K. Windeatt The Devonshire Regiment,
1945-58 (Aldershot, 1980) P.18; Maj. T. Phillips, (G2,
Trg., HQ Mal., 1948-9), Diaries, (1987), P.411; 112CR WD,
17 Aug. 1948, 2GR,133, GMW; Kukri 1, May 1949, P.14;
Sunderland 4171 P.29-30; 1/6CR QHR, 31 Dec., W0268/681;
Cross Company P.30; Short P.156. On reactive flying
columns or 'squads', 1 Mal. QHR, 30 Sept.; HQJohore, 001,
W0268/850;1/6GR,QHR, 30 Sept., W0268 /783; N.Mal. ISUM, 5
July 1948, WO268/774; Brig. R.W.L. McAlister Bugle and
Kukri, 2 (1984) P.32-6.
17. On small/large unit operations, Phillips Diary, P.415;
1/2GR QHR, 30 Sept., 2GR,133, GMW; HQMa1. QHR, 22 Oct.
1948, WO268/554; J.P. Cross The role of the brigade of
Gurkhas in the British Army m/s, 1982, P.B20, GMW; Kukri
1, May 1949, P.42; McAlister P.37: Their duration, C.
Messenger The Steadfast Gurkha (London, 1985) P.17; Cross
Company P.31. Assertions about conventional war in, Stubbs
P.70; Miller P.60; W. Jackson Withdrawal from Empire
(London, 1986) P.83.
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Gurkhas who had practiced them against postwar Burmese
irregulars. Mockaitis contends that large scale operations
were consistently adhered to, despite their meagre results, not
because of the 'inability of officers' to accept the need to
alter their tactics, but because they were valued for
accumulating tactical intelligence required for small unit
patrolling. But, although this type of reasoning was advanced
more often by army officers during 1949, these operations were
primarily instituted to tackle the growing number of MPABA
large units confronting the security forces. Moreover, in the
early days of COIN, sweeps and drives were initiated because
local commanders had faith in traditional I.S. tactics. Indeed,
small unit patrolling was often pursued at that stage 'due to
the lack of information upon which to base offensive
operations', and if contact intelligence became available it
was used by units 'for a thorough sweep of .. [a targeted]
area. '18
By the middle of June 1948, General Wade advocated jungle
'sweeps and drives' and patrolling, to forestall MPABA attacks,
dislocate their organisation and deprive them of resources. The
War Office passed no comment on his tactical proposals,
probably in view of the fact that by 22 June COIN plans were
being drawn up by General Ritchie and the GOC-elect, Major-
General Charles H. Boucher. He has been criticised for his
over-optimism during the summer of 1948 about the army's
chances of success, although Boucher based his assessment on
[8. All /ref's in W0268/. Mockaitis m/s, P.379,383. On the
threat from large unit MPABA forces, Sunderland 4171
P.126. Major operations and the rationale behind them,
N.Mal. ISUM, 12 July, /774; 1/6GR ISUMs,31 Oct., 12 Dec.,
/681; 18 Dec., /783; N.Mal QHR, 30 Sept. , ISUMs, 16,18
Oct. 1948, /774,775. 4QOH QHR, 31 Dec. 1949, /798.
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intelligence estimates which predicted that the MCP would not
be fully organised before November, and because he was 'told to
do this by his political masters' so as to boost the morale of
the Federation's population. 19
 As a consequence of their lack
of early tangible military success, senior army officers were
roundly condemned by historians for displaying little
comprehension of the I.S. problem facing them. But the
military-security strategy and tactics adopted in Malaya were
not devised without some knowledge of COIN requirements.
As CINCFELF, General Ritchie assessed all threats to the
Far East theatre, and he considered that these were 'primarily
one of I.S.'. In mid-1947, he attended a conference on
communism, where the Malayan Security Service chief, John
Dailey, warned that the MCP would act 'in precisely the same
manner as in other countries.' He reiterated this in May 1948,
and stressed the importance of relocating and controlling
Chinese squatters who might provide resources to irregulars,
notably food; a view most 'local commanders ridiculed' but
which Ritchie accepted. He had already witnessed large scale
counterguerilla operations and 'vigorous patrol' against
communist forces in Burma during 1947, and his study of postwar
rebellions incorporated an examination of the communist revolts
in China and Greece. He 'studied the{ir] lessons' to date and
19. Wade's views, Gen. A. Wade A Life on the Line (Kent, 1988)
P.147-50; letters, 29 Nov. 1990, 22 Feb.; and on the WO, 5
Feb. 1991. Also see, Short P.117,136; L. James P.149.
GOC/CINCFELF actions and views, F. Wallace, (State CPa),
Trengganu, 1947-50: a miscellany m/s, 1983, P.27-8, LisiOs.
275, RHO: especially on popular morale, Phillips Diary,
P.459, GMW; Ritchie, 'Report on operations in Malaya, June
1948-July 1949', 6 Sept. 1949, to CIGS, W0106/5884;
Windeatt P.10.
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drew 'useful conclusions', identifying a 'regular technique' of
communist insurgency. 20
 Indeed, although Ritchie never visited
Greece, his interest in it was reinforced by family connections
there. His sister was a personal assistant to Brigadier John
Kirkman at the BMM(G), and he became Ritchie's Chief of Staff
during the spring of 1948. As the MCP began to organise its
revolt, the theatre HQ 'believed .. [that it] would follow the
usual communist technique.'21
On 23 June, Ritchie sent Boucher his 'deductions', and
outlined a two-fold military-security plan. This featured
simultaneous police security patrolling and guarding to raise
popular confidence in the State and to attain 'battle
intelligence', and the military clearance of large MPABA units
and platoons. He agreed with Wade's premise that pressuring
them in the jungle could effect food-denial, and he proposed
'offensive operations' conducted 'from "firm bases"', including
'mobile patrolling' and 'sweeps'. General Ritchie emphasised
area-deployed patrolling, and he also suggested the formation
of 'small columns [to operate] in .. the jungle' with air
support, following Burma experience. He added that they must be
20. On CINCFELF tasks, Ritchie Report, W0106/5884. Ritchie and
Dailey views, J.D. Dailey, letter, 3 July 1965, BAM, II!
9, RCS; CGSEA Conf., notes, 26 June 1947, Dailey Papers,
MsIOs.254, RHO. Ritchie on China/Greece lessons, Report,
ibid; Sunderland 4170 P.30,83-4. On Burma operations,
McEnery P.97.
21. Kirkman was at the BMM(G) in 1945, HQMELF in 1946 and HQ
Pal. in 1947, Appendix 1; and on Ritchie's family, Maj.
A.N.B. Ritchie, (MA to CINCFELF to Mar. 1948), interview,
10 Apr. 1991. GHQ conclusions, Ritchie Report, ibid.
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better organised than 'in the past.' 22
 The RAF theatre command
similarly recommended air supply and fire-support missions,
techniques recently evolved for COIN operations in Greece, but
MacDonald and local army commanders were less enthusiastic
about air support, and most early RAF 'Firedog' flights were
for reconnaissance and transport purposes. 23
 Nonetheless,
although COIN policies applied against other communist
insurgents had yet to achieve success in practice, Ritchie
adjusted British COIN operational policies in the light of
experience. He was willing to learn from both past and present
COIN campaigning, and at the end of June planned future
military conferences 'to consider lessons .. [and] discuss
tactics, organisation' and methods.24
The CINCFELF's interest in the Greek conflict was shared
by the Malayan Combined Intelligence Staff, and in July 1948 it
warned against allowing the creation of 'liberated [areas]
on the lines of [the] Gen[eral] Markos "Gov[ernmen]t" in
Greece.' This view was reiterated by the Malayan Security
Service and within the GHQ. Further, in the following year, the
Greek army noted that 'many of those' soldiers currently in
Malaya, notably the Suffolk Regiment, had served in Greece.
Moreover, the RAF dropped napalm in the Federation during 1948,
22. Ritchie's proposals, Dirve., to GOC, 26 June 1948, W0268/
8; Cabinet Malaya Committee, Review, 14 Apr. 1950, CAB134/
497; Clutterbuck Long P.4.
23. On air support, AHQMa1., Report on RAF Operations, 9 May
1949, A1R23/8435; RAF P.40,53,60,80, AHB; P.A. Towle
Pilots and Rebels (London, 1989) P.82. MacDonald's view,
Short P.123.
24. Ritchie in, G(Ops)FELF QHR, 30 Sept. 1948, W0268/8.
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undoubtedly with Air Ministry approval. This followed its first
ever peacetime trials in Greece a few months before on the
recommendation of the RAF Delegation to Greece, and with the
consent of the Air Ministry. 25
 Furthermore, MacDonald urged
General Boucher to oversee 'the military show' until the police
could take over, and after consulting local civil and military
authorities, the new GOC presented a security forces plan on 5
July 1948. He said that it reflected Staff College principles,
and Boucher himself had fought on the North-West Frontier and
studied the Palestine COIN campaign of 1938 and 1939. But in
addition to this Imperial-policing background, the General had
commanded a division in Greece for a year from January 1945,
and although this period was 'almost certainly .. not' the
basis of his COIN ideas, because he encountered only a few weak
irregulars there, Boucher announced that his knowledge of
'terrorism' in India and Greece qualified him to act in Malaya.
He declared that the MCP was 'far weaker in technique' than the
Greek communists, evidently referring to KKE insurgents, and on
leaving Greece to take up the command of the Second Indian
Airborne Division in March 1946, he spent a month with the
Division and their commander, Major-General Ernest Down, who
25. On the CIS, Smith Kathmandu P.4. Its references to
Greece, ISUMs 15,22 July, to WO M12, W0208/3217. Also on
Greece, MSS report, 15 July, PIJs, RHO; Lt.-Col. J.K.
Shepheard, GHQFELF(Trg.), Lessons, 8 Nov., JO268/9; J.C.
Litton, (State Advisor's Office), Circular2, 2 Aug. 1948,
Papers, MsIOs.113, RHO. On service of British personnel,
Field-Marshal G. Papagos Order in, FELF Commentary 4/12,
Dec. 1949, W0268/20; Bredin P.164; Gen. Sir W. Walker,
letter, 18 Mar. 1991. Use of napalm in Malaya, Robinson
P.212. On the RAF and Air Mm., and napalm in Greece,
RAFDG, Wg.Cdr. P. Broad, to BLU, 19 Mar., A1R46/30; its
use there, RAF OSUMs, Mar.-Apr., July 1948, A1R46/44.
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became the BMM(G) chief in 1948. Thus, General Boucher was
keenly interested in the Army 's involvement in Greece, and he
'mentioned this from time to time' at the Malayan army HQ.26
Boucher followed Ritchie's planning outline, while emphasising
mobile columns, the 'Air Pin', and 'periodical sweeps', as well
as 'other well tried methods.' These included registration to
help control the population, which was being done at the time
by the Greek government. Moreover, the army HQ advocated not
only traditional wisdom, but also an unorthodox counterguerilla
force to 'ferret them out of their holes', and the control of
rice and squatters in order to deny the MPABA resources.27
In June 1948, General Boucher sanctioned the formation of
26. On MacDonald, and Boucher's role, Barber P.62,65; Carver
War P.16-7; E.D. Smith COIN Operations, 1: Malaya and
Borneo (London, 1985) P.10; Stubbs P.70; Komer P.26,48,
188; Short P.140: Boucher's experience, P.225; Appendix
1. On Greece and his reference to it in Malaya, Lt.-Col.
W.W. Stewart, (GSOI, 4 Indian Div., Greece, 1945-6),
letter, 13 Feb. 1991; Sir N. Short, (GSO2(Ops), HQMa1.,
1948-50), letter, 26 Feb. 1991. On Down and 2 md. Abne.
Div., K.C. Praval India's Paratroopers (Delhi, 1974)
P.106-7. Boucher on I.S., 5 July 1948, in Proceedings of
the Federal Legislative Council of Malaya, 1948-9 P.B212,
312-3,395-6.
27. GOC/HQMa1. on military-security operations including the
Air Pin, CP(48)190, 19 July, CAB128/8; PFLCM 5 July,
P.B212,312-3: especially control measures, CP(48)171, 19
July, CAB129/28; Communist Terrorism P.45; Short P.137-40;
M. Carver The Seven Ages of the British Army (London,
1984) P.2.62. On Greece, see Chapter 4. New forces and
controls, PFLCM 27 July 1948, P.B395-6.
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a Jungle Guerilla Force [JGF] code-named 'Ferret', derived from
'the lessons of various special forces.' Ritchie later noted
that the Chindits and SOE Force 136 endured 'somewhat similar
conditions', and ex-SOE men had already set up ad hoc counter-
guerilla patrols, undoubtedly encouraging the Kuala Lumpur army
HQ to develop its own force. Indeed, four former members of
Force 136 recommended three to four day small unit patrolling
at the jungle 'fringe'. The HQ deliberated until early July,
and considered excursions of up to three to four months
duration, but it concluded that two to three weeks was the
maximum time that jungle patrols could be sustained. Then, 'as
had been the case in Greece .. small elite units' were formed,
initially four groups of eighty men, half their intake being
civilians on three-month contracts. The creators of 'Ferret
Force' hoped that its example would 'raise the general standard
of "jungle worthiness" of the troops', but it was primarily
designed to fulfil a dual operational role: to 'locate and
destroy insurgent elements .. {and} .. to drive them .. into
more open country where they can be more easily destroyed', in
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conjunction with other security forces. 28
 This resembled the
pattern set by the Greek 'commandos', and Boucher and his staff
were probably inspired not only by wartime unorthodox units,
but also by a similar COIN force deployed against other
communist guerillas. The 'Ferrets' were trained under
Lieutenant-Colonel Walter Walker, and, impeded by a dearth of
contact intelligence, each group contained 32 Chinese-speakers
and, later on, Dyak trackers from Borneo. Walker adapted
wartime Burma experience to deploy groups in estates and the
nearby jungle for three-man 'recce' missions and ambushes laid
for a few hours, and also larger air-supplied patrols into
suspect areas for periods of up to several weeks. This was in
28. The JGF's codename, HQFELF to HQSingapore, 19 July 1948,
W0268/8. On its training role, and various sources of
inspiration for the JGF, Pocock P.86; Ritchie, (a strong
supporter of the SAS during the War, see Appendix 1),
Report, W0106/5884, especially regarding wartime units;
Barber P.36; Heussler P.171; C. Allen The savage wars of
peace (London, 1990) P.49; Short P.132, and on local
groups; J.C. Litton, Circular3, 27 Feb. 1949, RHO. Ferrets
were formed by Boucher/HQMa1., as in, 'Ferret Force', by
'Weasal', Malaya 1, Sept. 1952, and also on their role,
P.21-5; Sir R. Thompson Make for the hills (London, 1989)
P.88; letter, 21 Feb. 1991. On HQMa1.'s operational
studies, Short P.133; G(Ops)FELF QHR, 30 Sept., W0268/8;
2/2GR QUR, 30 June, W0268/674. The DM0 supported its
formation, and its Director, Maj.-Gen. A.D. Ward, had
supported trials with unorthodox forces in Palestine in
1947, see Chapter 3. On Greek units, Cable P.77, and see
Chapter 4. Details of Ferret operational roles in, HQFELF
to WO, 9,18 Aug. 1948, W0268/8; Ritchie ibid; and the
JCF's structure, Messenger P.13-6; Blaxiand P.82; J. Scurr
The Malayan Campaign (London, 1982) P.9-10.
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addition to their activities in large operations. 29 Indeed,
many army officers preferred to employ large columns, sweeps,
and drives towards ambushed 'stop lines' with ground or air
fire support, or scaled down versions of these tactics with a
few platoons. But large scale army operations accounted for
'only a small °h of all', and the Ferret example encouraged
local experimentation with platoon patrolling from one to five
days. 30
On 19 and 20 August, General Ritchie presided over an army
conference to review COIN lessons gained so far, and issued a
new directive three days later. This stated that MCP tactics
29. Ferret training and operations, ibid: 'Weasal', P.21,23;
Short P.132; Pocock P.86; Messenger P.13; Litton; Thompson
P.88. Also, Stanborough M.Litt.,P.53; Kukri 1, May 1949,
P.54. GOC presses for Dyaks, Victor Purcell, to Hugh
Pagden, (Federal minister), 9 Aug. 1948, CO537/3757.
30. Regarding inadequate central operational direction, 112CR,
reports, 30 Aug., 24 Sept., 2GR,155, GMW. All /ref.'s in
W0268/. On small unit patrolling, 1/2GR QHR, 30 Sept.,
212CR QHR, 9 Oct., 2GR,133, GMW; 1 Mal. QHR, 30 Sept.,
/650; 117CR, 1 Oct., /683; N.Mal. ISUM, 5 Oct., /775;
1/6GR ISUM, 20 Aug., /783; McAlister P.32,47. On sweeps,
Johore OD, 23 Aug., 2GR Ols, 7,12 Oct., 2GR,133, GHW;
1/6CR QHR, 30 June, reports, 24 Aug., 8 Sept., /681; ISUM,
28 Aug., /783; HQJohore QHR, 30 Sept., /703; 112CR
Operations Diary, 29 Aug., 2GR,155, GMW. On drives, 1/2CR
ibid; AHQ Operations Record Book, to 31 Dec., A1R24/1925;
1/6CR report, 16 Aug., /681; ISUM, 28 Aug., /783; 1/7CR,
19 Aug., /787; and on the % of each type of operation,
Brig. Robert C.O. Hedley, HQJohore, Conference notes, 24
Sept. 1948, 2GR,133, CMW.
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were 'similar to those employed in CHINA and GREECE', notably
terrorism and the graduation towards 'normal warfare', and he
advocated an 'overall south to north' clearance and civil
measures to control squatters and potential guerilia food
sources. Dailey had advocated such measures, and similar COIN
policies were also being applied in Greece during 1948. The
CINCFELF reiterated the importance of area-deployment for
police information-gathering from local posts, and Boucher and
Gray considered this a 'priority'. Furthermore, General Ritchie
pressed for 'a minimum "framework" of troops upon which to
build up additional .. reserves (Striking Forces).' Along with
the 'Ferret' groups, these were designed 'for offensive
operations.' He also emphasised that '"framework" troops should
NOT be shifted about .. so that they [can] get some knowledge
of the local country' and their fellow COIN agencies on the
ground. Ritchie proposed patrolling for two to three weeks by
'light forces' with air supply in suspect areas and on any
available intelligence. This reinforced the support given by
high level local army authorities to the development of small
unit tactics, and he added that each formation should form its
own 'Ferret element', and that Colonel Walker and the Far East
Training Centre [FTC] would train battalion commanders in
Ferret-style operations as a first step to their general
adoption by the army in Malaya. Indeed, Walker subsequently
told the CINCFELF that 'large scale cordon operations were a
complete waste of time', but local commanding officers held
the tactical initiative, and the GOC recommended that they
proceed with '"framework"' operations and major offensives.31
31. Ritchie's proposals and GOC's views, Agenda, 19 Aug.;
Conf. notes, and Dirve., 23 Aug. 1948, W0268/8. Walker's
views, letter, 2 Feb. 1991. Also regarding plans for
Ferret operations, HQJohore Conf. notes, 24 Sept. 1948,
2GR,133, GMW.
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General Ritchie combined recent Malayan operational experience
with that of other concurrent COIN, and developed British
counterguerilla thought substantially as a result.
The army implemented large scale operations throughout the
summer of 1948, but some formations were troubled by their
shortcomings and therefore 'cordoning off and then "sweeping"
[ofj fairly extensive areas was soon abandoned in favour of
small patrols operating offensively within very restricted
areas, i.e., "saturation patrolling".' This 'intensive
patrolling for a given period' was extended by many platoon
commanders from a few days to 'protracted periods' of up to
three weeks following "Ferret" principles.' 32
 This tactical
adaptation did not produce startling results because patrol
32. All /ref's in /W0268. Use of sweeps, 1/1OGR memo, 8 Dec.,
/677; 1/6GR QHR, 31 Dec., /681. Drives, 1/7GR, report, 1
Oct., /683; RAF OSUMs, 14 Oct., 4 Nov., 9 Dec., A1R24/
1925; 1/6 GR reports, 2 Nov., 2GR,133, GMW; 28 Nov., /783;
N.Mal ISUM, 20 Oct., /775. Short small unit patrol, 3
Gren. Gds. ISUMs, 5,12 Dec., /607; HQMa1. QHR, 31 Dec.,
/555; 1/6GR QHR, 31 Dec., /783; HQJohore QHR, 31 Dec.,
2GR,133, GMW. Extended patrolling, N.Mal. ISUM, 14 Sept.,
/774; HQJohore 0122, 5 Oct., 2GR,133, GMW; HQSing. QHR, 31
Dec., /696; Sunderland 4170 P.22; Pocock P.88; Messenger
P.13. For the reasoning behind small unit operations-
because of the failure of large scale operations, Brig. W.
Amoore, 1/2GR, report, 25 Aug.; QHR, 30 Sept.., 2GR,133,
GMW; 1/1OGR QHR, 30 Sept., Lt.-Col. C.C. Graham, memo, 8
Dec., /667,677; McAlister P.32,37,47- following the
Ferret example, 2/2GR, in N.Mal. ISUM, 2 Aug., /774; HQ
Johore, report, 4 Sept., 2GR,133, GMW; 2Mal. QHRs, 30
Sept., 31 Dec., /653; iMal. QHR, 31 Dec. 1948, /650; J.
Litton, Circular3, 27 Feb. 1949, RHO.
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activity was based mainly on speculation and on what little
contact intelligence was available. Inadequate police
cooperation with the military on intelligence matters
exacerbated operational difficulties and therefore army
intelligence officers tried to collect information themselves,
guided by the War Office Directorate of Military Intelligence.
But there were only twelve GSI officers in each brigade, and
they used outdated intelligence procedures. 33 However, at
another conference on 21 September, Ritchie reaffirmed that
despite its lack of success so far, a 'permanent "framework"
was 'right in principle', and Boucher supported the general
adoption of week-plus patrolling similar to that practiced in
recent War Office jungle warfare exercises. The GOC and
CINCFELF suspected that the MPABA would not be readily beaten
by 'orthodox methods', and 'compared recent events in MALAYA
with past history in CHINA and GREECE.' General Ritchie
assessed the relative value of 'large scale sweeps, small scale
"comb-outs"' involving small units, 'and "staying put"' for
area patrolling by companies. The GOC, Singapore, Major-General
Dermott Dunlop- who had fought in the Middle East throughout
the Second World War- favoured large scale offensive tactics.
But Ritchie and Boucher and their staffs were more perceptive,
arguing that while large scale operations could 'keep the enemy
on the move' and break up large MPABA forces, once enough
intelligence had accumulated, 'operations in general [should]
involve smaller numbers of troops and the big sweeps would
become rarer.' They preferred Ferret-style patrolling, and
following conference recommendations, the Second Malay Regiment
was trained specifically for this. However, General Boucher was
33. On the intelligence position, Sunderland 4172 P.10,13,18,
27-8; CAR 1948 P.123; Brig. R.C.O. Hedley, HQJohore OD1,
in QHR, 30 Sept., 2GR,133, GMW; CINCFELF Conf., 21 Sept.
1948, notes, J0268/581. On DM1, West P.43.
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anxious to prevent Ferret groups becoming the 'private armies'
of local CIDs, and hence, he and Ritchie agreed that once they
had proven their worth, Ferret members whose contracts expired
in November should be encouraged to provide widespread
'specialist training' to the army. 34
 A future major alteration
of tactical military policy was therefore accepted by key
senior local officers, but it was not generally effected by
the army in 1948, and consequently, their theoretical advance
has been ignored by scholars.
In late 1948, local tactical development by army
formations was encouraged by the Kuala Lumpur HQ, which itself
instigated a 'periodical review of lessons from operations',
and at least one of the army's four Malaya District commanding
officers recognised the importance of supplementing 'the
"trial-and-error" method' by analysing operations for lessons.
In September, Brigadier Robert C.O. Hedley recommended that
tactics should not be 'too stereotyped', and he stated that
although 'saturated patrol for 4-5 days' achieved few immediate
successes, trials in extended patrol and ambush were proper in
view of the failure of drives and encirclernents. 35 Furthermore,
the Far East Training Centre at Kota Tinggi provided unit
training cadres with up to six weeks 'intensive training in
34. CINCFELF Conf. notes, 28 Sept.; GOC Outline, 23 Sept.;
G(Ops)FELF QHR, 30 Sept. 1948, Lt.-Col. Shepheard,
W0268/8. Also on Ferret training, HQJohore Conf. notes, 24
Sept. 1948, 2GR,133, GMW; Kukri 1, 1949, P.9.
35. HQMa1. in, Phillips Diary, P.428, GMJ. Operational
lessons, for example in, 1/1OGR QHR, 30 Sept., W0268/677.
HQJohore, (one of four sub-District HQs), Brig. R. Hedley,
0D2, c.Oct., Conf. minutes, 24 Sept. 1948, 2GR,133, GMW.
On his background, see Appendix 1.
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jungle warfare' by officers who claimed they 'knew all about
it', having battled on the Frontier and in Burma from 1944 to
1945. This recurrent mix of past I.S. and wartime influences
was reflected in their instruction. Rather 'than reliance on
more orthodox' I.S. practices alone, they trained for night
operations, air supply, arid three-man 'recce' patrols from
bases to gather intelligence. 'Sen[io]r off[ice]rs were divided
in their opinion' about the viability of these patrols, but the
Training Centre adhered to the prevailing British Army belief
that small patrols ought to remain in the jungle only for a few
days. Moreover, the Centre taught that once patrols gained
contact with irregulars, they should call in reinforcements for
encirciements by ' Co [mpanie j s and even B[attaliojns',
reflecting familiar tactical policy. Instructors declared that
their guidance provided only a foundation upon which units
should make their own tactical investigation, and this
groundwork consisted of a blend of old I.S. policies and more
recent ideas. The Training Centre was criticised for poor air
supply procedures, and subsequently by Charters for its
inappropriate training in movement, orgarlisation and tactics.
But the application of its teachings depended upon the attitude
of individual cadre officers, and even if they accepted fresh
tactical concepts, heavy operational commitments often
prevented them disseminating new ideas within their units or
formations. This tendency was reinforced by a fairly common
reliance on 'on-the-job' learning, which was approved by the
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army HQ.36
By early November, the Jungle Guerilla Force was disbanded
having attained 'high standards and results', and Ritchie urged
its members to '"spread the doctrine" and 'raise the whole
standard of operational efficiency' of the army. The Force's
ranks possessed 'invaluable experience upon which the technique
was built up' after 1948, inspiring not only more widespread
small unit patrolling, but also a pseudoguerilla pilot scheme.
By 1949, security force Chinese Assault Teams were trained
under a civil official, John Litton, and they originated ruses
and undertook extended patrols based on information. They
proved to be a forerunner of similar forces formed in many
later COIN campaigns, as well as those in Malaya after 1950.
The contracts of Ferret Force personnel were not renewed for
1949, although this option was considered, because officials
raised questions about its administration and tactics.
36. All /ref's in W0268/. On the FTC's role, HQMa1. G(Trg.)
QHR, 2 Oct. 1948, /554. Training cadres, 2 Battalion, the
Scots Guards, Malaya 1948-51 m/s, 1951, P.22,57, GBHQ;
N.Mal. QHR, 30 Sept. 1948, /774; 2 Cold. Gds. QHR, 15 Nov.
1949, /608; D. Erskine The Scots Guards 1919-55 (London,
1956) P.473. Background of FTC officers, Allen P.6,11-2.
FTC training, Lt.-Col. W. Walker, FTC Interim Report, 21
Feb.; FTC QHR, 31 Mar. 1949, /116; T13, 16 Oct. 1948,
/607; letter, 25 Feb. 1991; CAR 1948 P.186; Pocock P.88;
Cross Company P.31; Messenger P.17; Sunderland 4170 P.42-
3; also, Col. C. Suther, 'Offensive Jungle Operations',
c.Sept., /8; HQMa1. G(Trg.), QHR, 31 Dec. 1948, /555.
Contemporary criticisms of FTC, Interim Report, ibid; R.
Fraser 'Report on Jungle Warfare Course', 12 Feb. 1949,
Papers, MsBEt.2, RHO. More recently, Charters Armies
P.204.
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Regarding the latter, objections were probably made over its
style of patrolling, which often ranged over large areas, in
contrast to the army's growing interest in 'saturation patrol'
of small areas. The Force's dismemberment also received 'the
complete support of the War [Office] traditionalists', at a
time when, with officer recruitment and basic training in mind,
they were discouraging unorthodox styles of leadership.37
However, its dissolution did not discourage further high level
discussion of tactical policy, and in October 1948 the army HQ
stated that 'the value of large and elaborate sweeps is
doubtful.' The new High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney,
remarked in November that, with fewer large unit MPABA forces
currently active 'our plans have been laid accordingly' for
more patrolling, as the GHQ advocated. Further, at another
conference on 13 December, the theatre Command argued that the
army should 'intensify and continue the present system',
approving its 'tactics of operating for prolonged periods in a
given area' in preference to large operations that 'seldom
37. Ritchie on the value and effect of the JGF, Report, W0106/
5884. CATs, J. Litton, 'Chuk Pa Operation', Feb. 1949; CAT
Diary, 1949, RHO; RAF OSUM, 7 July 1949, A1R24/1929; Short
P.133. JGF contracts were not extended, 'Weasal', Malaya
1, 1952, P.24. Reasons- administration, Walker, letter, 2
Feb. 1991; and methods, Miller P.47; Communist Terrorism
P.5. On contemporary JO attitudes, Cable P.77; Calvert,
interview: especially on officership, P. tlead Orde Wingate
and the historians (Devon, 1987) P.143-4.
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result .. in [substantial insurgent] casualties.' 38 This was a
significant development of tactical military thought, and one
that should have sparked the interest of the Army authorities
in London.
Growing Whitehall interest in COIN lessons during the
autumn of 1948.
Within the War Office, the DM0 and DM1 were traditionally
most interested in I.S. matters, and the DM0 was especially
progressive in regard to tactical developments in Greece and
Palestine. Despite the postwar military rundown, COIN in these
countries and in Malaya prevented any 'retreat into lethargy',
and M12, (a section of the DM1), handled both colonial
insurgencies, and during August 1948 it compared them. It noted
that fighting guerillas and terrorist cells in Malaya would
prove difficult, as men 'who took part in the Palestine
operations know.' Further, M12 cautioned that encirclement
relying on large manpower or 'to block escape .. by fire, is
usually impossible', 39 indicating its anxiety about this
traditional military policy. In September, General Boucher
38. HQNIa1. view, QHR, 22 Oct. 1948, W0268/554; Short P.138;
Sunderland 4170 P.127. Gurney in, PFLCM 1948-9 P.B618;
Maj. D. Challis 'COIN success in Malaya' Military Review
67, Feb. 1987, P.60-2. HQFELF view, notes, 15 Dec.; Lt.-
Col. J. Shepheard, G(Trg.), Lessons, 8 Nov., W0268/8;
Conf. notes, 13 Dec. 1948, W0268/607; Sunderland ibid
P.132.
39. On the DM0 and its COIN progress, see Chapters 3/4. On
DM0/I and I.S. affairs, P. Gudgin Military Intelligence:
the British story (London, 1989) P.52,68. M12, 'Some notes
on Malaya', 27 Aug. 1948, W0208/3218.
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suggested sending films illustrating tactical lessons to London
to help prepare reinforcements, and by December, the
Directorate of Military Training demonstrated a similar wish to
learn from operations. Following the example of the Cabinet's
Overseas Defence Committee, it requested monthly 'lessons' from
the army and a 'pamphlet on lessons' from the GHQ by the new
year, in a systematic attempt to benefit from COIN experience.
The Colonial Secretary, Creech-Jones, also decided that the
current state of imperial I.S. warranted a more coordinated
high level transfer of I.S. information. A Police College was
opened and attended by senior colonial police officers, and he
persuaded the War Office to provide 'duties in aid' courses for
them. Moreover, he produced a Circular for all colonial
governments in August 1948, sponsoring an interchange of I.S.
knowledge and offering expert advice from London. Further, he
encouraged the application of methods recently adopted in
'metropolitan countries' to any future outbreak of 'terrorism'
like that presently raging in Malaya. 4° With the onset of this
third postwar COIN campaign, British COIN authorities sponsored
greater inter-cooperation and transferral of I.S. wisdom
between those bodies dealing with it, as well as the study of
the Malayan operations for lessons.
Development of population-resource control policies, and
military strategy, up to the autumn of 1948.
40. GOC in, CINCFELF Conf. notes, 28 Sept., WO268/8. DMT
action, G(Ops)FELF QHR, 31 Dec., W0268/9; CINCFELF Conf.
notes, 13 Dec. 1948, W0268/6O9. CO lessons- 'Lessons
file', J.A. Gaved, note, 13 May 1949, CO537/4773. CO
action and views on I.S. issues, and WO, SSC Circulars, 24
June, 24 Aug., CO537/2717,2712; memo, 5 Aug. 1948, CO537/
4404; Jeffries P.176-7,210.
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Before the insurgency began, some army formations in
Malaya appreciated the value of food-control measures designed
to erode irregular capabilities. Jungle camp-burning during
April was called a 'waste of effort' by one battalion
commander, when 'the first essential [wa]s to remove ALL
squatters', and thereby deny resources to irregulars. The
importance of food controls was affirmed by the Malayan
Security Service, and General Wade's military strategy of
forcing the MPABA into the deep jungle rested on food denial.
In July, Boucher recommended this, as well as familiar controls
including cordon-and-search and a national registration scheme.
Senior army officers also recommended Frontier-style road
construction to make the control of remote areas easier, but
the Malay states refused to finance it. Nonetheless, despite
divided local opinion over population-resource control
policies, the GOC, CINCFELF and many army units supported
population relocation by August 1948. Such a project was
implemented in Greece in 1946, and was refined by the
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introduction of resettlement camps during 1947 and 1948,41
hence coinciding with studies of other communist rebellions by
high level army authorities in Malaya during the summer of
1948.
By September 1948, Far East Land Forces staff realised
that the age-old rapid clearance strategy was foundering,
because, when security forces moved away from an area, it
'almost invariably result[ed] in [the] recrudescence' of
irregular activity. Therefore, it 'emphasis[ed]' that the
'civil administration [had] to follow-up and take over cleared
areas', considering military and civil measures to be
'complementary'. The GHQ proposed a Clear-and-Hold strategy and
trials with both population relocation and police security
patrolling of squatter areas. A Malay 'Home Guard' for counter-
terrorist population protection, by then a broadly accepted
41. All /ref's in W0268/. Registration and other controls,
Communist terrorism P.47; Sunderland 4173 P.31; Miller
P.48; Stanborough M.Litt., P.55; Clutterbuck Long P.37-8.
Army support for food-denial, CAR 1948 P.210; PFLCM 1948-9
GOC, 5 July 1948, P.B395-6; Ritchie Report, W0106/5884; A.
Humphrey, (Sec. for I.S., 1953), m/s, 22 May 1979, Papers,
MsPacifics.115, RHO; Short P.179,182; Robinson P.80. Early
British support for relocation- 2KOYLI in, N.Mal. QHR, 30
June, /584; MSS report, 30 June, PIJs, RHO- and later from
the GOC/CINCFELF, Conf. notes, 23 Aug., /8- from military
units and formations, N.Mal ISUMs, 19 July, 2 Nov., /775;
1/6GR, 16,24 Aug., /681; 2 Cold. Gd. QHR, 31 Dec., /783;
FELF Sitrep, 23 Oct. 1948, /9; 2/2GR QHR, 11 Apr. 1949,
2GR,148, GMW; RAF OSUMs, 21,28 Oct., 4 Nov. 1948, A1R24/
1926; Paget P.50; Cross Company P.37,43; H. James/D.
Sheil-Small A pride of Gurkhas (London, 1975) P.23. On
Greece, see Chapter 4.
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British COIN principle, was authorised by Montgomery in August
1948. But the initiation of a similar measure for Chinese
illegal aliens, and any relocation of them, strictly speaking,
was the responsibility of the Malayan states. Therefore, in
deference to state autonomy, the Commissioner-General formed a
committee of state Premiers to study the squatter problem.
However, this resulted in a lengthy and damaging halt to COIN
progress. In September, only one state sanctioned relocations,
and then only if those moved were communist supporters. In the
meantime, army commanders pressed for rapid action, and
Operation KUKRI on 15 October was the first of several which
removed 10,000 squatters in 1948. They were instigated
initially for 'the clearance of a battle ground' and to disrupt
the activities of irregulars, and had 'at least the cognisance'
of General Boucher. But he also believed that relocation was
vital for a long term counterorganisation impact, and supported
it 'in order to clean up the areas entirely and
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successfully.' 42
 Indeed, Gurney noted that 'all my advisors
[the Local Defence Committee included, want] .. an immediate
and serious attempt to deal with alien Chinese squatters who
are providing bases from which bandits operate and are helping
them.' On 8 October, he ratified legislation for collective
detention and deportation of those assisting insurgents, and in
November set up a Federal Committee to study the squatter
question. It made only slow progress, but this was because of
the reluctance of Malay states to assist Chinese illegals, 'not
for [a] lack of appreciation of the problem.'43
42. Need for Clear-and-Hold and measures by the Civil Power,
FELF Sitreps, 28 Sept., 5,13 Nov. 1948, W0268/9; COS
report, 21 Apr. 1950, CA8134/497. COIN requirements, OAG,
Sir A.T. Newboult/Boucher/Gray, Report, 16 Sept., DEFE11/
33. Formation of Home Guards, DO(48)16, 13 Aug., DEFE11/
32. Regarding the Civil Power's task, CINCFELF Conf.
notes, 23,28 Sept., W0268/8. Army pressure for action,
HQMa1. QHR, 31 Dec., W0268/555; FELF G(Ops) QHRs, 30
Sept., 31 Dec. 1948, W0268/8,9; BGS,HQMa1. IR11, 13 Jan.,
W0208/4104; 2/2GR QE-IR, 11 Apr. 1949, 2GR,148, GMW; Short
P.110,181,188: GOC, P.86,183: details of relocations,
P.174-7; K.S. Sandhu 'Emergency resettlement in Malaya'
in, R. Nyce/S. Gordon (eds.) Chinese New Villages in
Malaya (Kuala Lumpur, 1973) P.xxxvii,lxi. On numbers
moved, Sunderland 4173 P.vii,27. On Federal Government
initiatives, Short P.86,179-86; Stubbs P.55; McAlister
P.38; Stanborough M.Litt.,P.55.
43. Gurney, his advisors, and their action, HC to CO, 29 Oct.,
F1504O/F0371/69698; to SSC, 2 Dec. 1948, F17892/F0371/
69630; CAR 1948 P.189; PFLCM 1948-9 P.B617-9; Short P.188;
and also on the situation, Sunderland 4173 P.24-7.
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Advancement of extra-military-security policies from 1948
up to the middle of 1949.
The Colonial Office learnt from the campaign in Palestine
that concentrating on a negative psywar approach was not viable
for COIN, and that positive incentives were required to
mobilise popular support. Gent followed its edicts on colonial
development during 1948, and he resisted political subversion
by sponsoring 'positive and negative steps .. to counter
communist influence', the positive measures including trades
union laws and constitutional reform plans. In June, the
Colonial Office emphasised the value of a long term 'programme
which commands not merely the acquiescence of the people .. but
their enthusiastic support', as 'past history shows.' Indeed,
MacDonald supposed that when considering a replacement for
Gent, the Department would 'no doubt' prefer a man 'sympathetic
[to] .. democratic, social and political reform[s]', such as
Sir Henry Gurney, who was the Palestine Chief Secretary. He was
chosen in preference to three other candidates, partly for his
experience, although not 'mainly as an expert in strong-arm
methods.' Until his arrival on 6 October 1948, no progress on
civic action was made in Malaya.
At first, the British COIN psywar effort focussed on the
negative approach and consisted of time-honoured policies.
Legislation passed on 5 July allowed the application of curfew,
detention, and searches of people and premises, which were not
44. CO on requirements in Malaya, memo, 28 Apr., CO537/4751;
T. Lloyd, notes, Aug., CO537/3758; Short P.121. On Gurney
and the CO, CGSEA to SSC, 29 June; CO to CGSEA, 10 July,
CO537/3686; HC to SSC, 18 June, in, A. Creech-Jones
Papers, MsIOs.128, RHO. Gent and the CO, J. Dailey, Conf.
notes, 26 June 1948, Papers, RHO.
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only designed for control, but also to 'cajole' the population
into opposing communism. Gurney reinforced this with powers
wielded in Palestine, as he felt that a 'show of force' and
'stern measures [we]re necessary' to indicate his determination
to prevail over the rebellion. By November, collective
punishments such as extended curfew and food sale restrictions
were introduced. But Gurney confined the negative approach to
measures that would affect those unprotected persons who were
most vulnerable to MCP pressure, and who at the time were said
to veer to the side that 'frightens them more.' 45 However,
General Boucher preferred the Cost-Benefit I.S. line,
supporting familiar aspects such as existing banishment laws,
and urging collective fines and property seizures like those
administered in Eritrea during 1948, where Britain faced
sectarian terrorism. 46 He accepted the army's use of punitive
searches, curfews, food removal, and the burning of suspected
communists' huts. But when Gray became Police Commissioner, in
August, he stopped these officially-backed punishments.
45. Aim and scope of Regulations, Robinson P.78; HC, Gurney to
Lloyd, 20 Nov.; to SSC, 19 Dec. 1948, CO537/3758; note, 3
Jan. 1949, CO537/4750. Basis, R.D. Renick 'The Malaya
Emergency' Journal of South East Asian History 6, Sept.
1965, P.28-9; Townshend Civil P.158; Short P.141; Stubbs
P.6,66,70-3.
46. Boucher's views in, CINCFELF Conf. notes, 28 Sept. 1948,
W0268/8. On Eritrea, R. Sherman Eritrea: the unfinished
revolution (New York, 1980) P.19; D. Pool Eritrea-
Africa's longest war (London, 1982) P.21,28-9; Sir G.K.N.
Trevaskis Eritrea: a colony in transition (London, 1960)
P.91,96, 102-8; L. Ellingson 'The emergence of political
parties in Eritrea, 1941-50' The Journal of African
History 18, summer 1977, P.268-73.
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However, reprisals continued and he issued a directive on 16
November ordering an end to torture and killings, 47
 which he
knew from his Palestine days would alienate the people.
The Army also applied its traditional positive psywar
approach, 'flag-showing' patrols and major operations being
carried out to boost popular confidence in the State.48
Palestine procedures for avoiding a 'bad press' were copied,
including press conferences and briefings, and allowing
reporters on operations and to interview senior officers. But
the army was also more aware of propaganda than hitherto,
facing a communist insurgency in a Cold War climate, when
peacetime propaganda was becoming more common-place and
politically acceptable in London. Indeed, the Federal Public
Relations Department believed that the army was well placed to
devise 'operational propaganda' from intelligence data, and
early on in the campaign some units spread their own simple
'propaganda .. calculated to belittle bandit leaders.' In
August, backed by the GOC, General Ritchie insisted that the
47. COC's attitude, Short P.154,166; HQJohore notes, 1,28
Sept. 1948, 2GR,133, GMW. He noted later that the shooting
of 28 Chinese by Scots Guards in Nov. 1948 at 'BATANG KALI
had had a good effect', in, 3 Jan. Conf., note, 11
Jan., in G(Ops)FELF QHR, 31 Mar. 1949, W0268/744. Gray's
action, A. Hayter The second step (London, 1962) P.208-15;
McAlister P.37-8; Phillips Diary, P.407-8, GMW.
48. Flag-showing operations, Gen. Wade, note, 24 May, HQMa1.
QHR, 30 June, W0268/553; HQJohore 0010, 17 June, W0268/
581; Cross Company P.32; Jarnes/Sheil-Small P.7; RAF OSUMs,
7 Oct., 4 Nov., A1R24/1925: especially sweeps, HQJohore,
report, 21 Nov. 1948, 2GR,133, GMW; PFLCM 1948-9 18 Nov.
1949, P.B617.
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army must make an effort to understand civilian psychology and
also suggested the production of anti-communist films. In
addition, Dunlop requested publicity for security force
successes, and the commanders noted that 'our counter-
propaganda needs to be stepped up.' Furthermore, they
acknowledged the worth of expert I.S. advice, requesting the
assistance of the War Office's Director of Publicity, while
stressing that counter/propaganda was a civil responsibility,49
thus displaying a considerable awareness of psywar
requirements.
In June 1948, the Public Relations Department was
responsible for 'supporting the actions of the Government and
security forces', and its chief, J. MacHugh, possessed wartime
psywar experience. The following month, the Colonial Office was
pressed by Sir William Jenkin to ensure that the Federal
authorities devised effective counterpropaganda, but no PR
Department officials received training for this, instead
concentrating on education information matters. Furthermore,
the security forces often failed to provide it with
intelligence for use in designing propaganda, and despite a
national 60% illiteracy rate, the Department was equipped with
only twelve public address systems and therefore relied on
leaflets and press conferences. The psywar effort concentrated
on demoralising MCP leaders, and although rewards for their
49. On the army and the press, CINCFELF Agenda, 19 Aug., Conf.
notes, 23 Aug., W0268/8; Communist Banditry P.7; HQSing.,
16 Aug., 2GR,133, GMW; PFLCN 1948-9 5 July, P.B314. Army
propaganda, CGSEA to FO, 28 Aug. 1948, DEFE11/33; N.Mal.
ISUM, 19 Apr. 1949, W0268/777. Views on propaganda,
OAG/GOC/Gray, 16 Sept., Report, DEFE11/33; N.Mal ISUM, 20
Sept., WO260/774; HQFELF,Agenda, 14 Sept., Conf. notes, 28
Sept.: on J0 expert, FELF Brief, 17 Aug. 1948, W0268/8.
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capture were introduced on 27 August, there was precious little
inventiveness. In September, the Federal Government asked for a
psywar expert from the UK, and formed an Emergency Publicity
Committee to coordinate various media with the security forces,
but its output was limited both in quantity and quality.50
The local army authorities agreed in September 1948 that
'civil measures were complementary' to military-security
operations, but no civic action programmes were implemented
prior to Gurney's arrival. He has been credited with announcing
the desirability of winning 'the Hearts and Minds of the
people', and acclaimed for his 'vision'. Yet, while it is true
that 'Gurney and his local advisors laid the foundations' of
the Hearts-and-Minds COIN line, certain influences on Gurney
have been overlooked. Various Federal departments were already
working on preparations for squatter administration, some
social services, and agricultural and educational improvements,
and in November Gurney outlined these publicly. He also visited
50. Dept.PR's role, Communist Terrorism P.111. MacHugh, his
views, and security force non-cooperation, CO memo, June,
SSC memo, 23 June 1950, DEFE11/37; CGSEA to CO, 28 Aug.,
DEFE11/32. Dept.PR action, PFLCM 1948-9 HC, 18 Nov.,
P.B527; AHQ 'Operations Record Book to 31 Dec.', Aug.
1948, AIR2A/1925; R. Jackson P.110; CAR 1948 P.111-3; and
on the press, P.188-90; and the new Committee. On Dept.PR
training and media, A. Nordin The Government's Hearts and
Minds campaign against Communist insurrection in Malaya,
1948-60 M.Sc., 1982, P.32-4. Jenkin, to CR0/Ca, 10 July
1948, CO537/4250. Police pressure for improvements, R.H.D.
Onraet, (State CPO), memo, 5 Nov. 1950, Papers, in BAM,
V/5, RCS: Army, BGS,FELF, note, 17 Aug.; CINCFELF Conf.,
28 Sept., O268/8; HQFELF notes, 15 Dec. 1948, W0268/9.
Rewards, Communist Banditry P.34.
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some of the first resettlement camps which were furnished with
welfare arrangements by local civil officials, and he lent his
support to such schemes in two Malay states. The army agreed
that 'the cure lies in removing those squatters on whom the
bandit organisations are based .. and then removing the
conditions in which Communism can flourish', representing a
basic local concensus on the requirement for counter-
organisation and civic action by late 1948.51 This progress was
founded not only on deductions from recent experience in Malaya
but also from previous cases of COIN.
Gurney knew from his service in Palestine that information
from the people was vital for COIN progress, and that its
availability ultimately depended on popular confidence in the
State. In August 1948, before arriving in Malaya, he proposed
to organise Chinese community leaders into a new advisory body
with links to the authorities, evidently deriving this idea
from the example set by the Jewish Agency in Palestine. By
December, he outlined a Malayan Chinese Association to improve
government contacts with the population and gain their 'active
help', as well as a Chinese Advisory Board and Secretary for
Chinese Affairs to improve relations and encourage Chinese
51. The army on relocation and civic action, G(Ops)FELF QHR,
30 Sept., W0268/8; HQMa1. BGS, 1R8, 23 Dec. 1948, W0208/
4104; Ritchie Report, W0106/5884. Gurney invents 'Hearts
and Minds' phrase notes Capt. R.S.N. Man 'Victory in
Malaya', in, Greene P.120. Regarding Gurney's vision,
Barber P.61; Miller P.47. On the HC and advisors, A.H.P.
Humphrey, m/s, RHO. On local COIN initiatives, C.E. Howe A
few memories m/s, 1965, in BAM, 111/14, RCS; Col. H.S.
Lee, memo, to CO, 28 Feb. 1950, CO537/609O; Communist
Banditry P.18; McAlister P.46; Barber P.65-7,82.
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enrolment into the police Auxiliaries, 52
 thereby committing
them to the COIN. Apart from his first-hand experience,
following the practice of army colleagues, Gurney also looked
to Greece for further guidance on COIN. He suggested the
construction of police posts and 'roads and schools', which he
termed 'familiar' measures in early 1949, and in May that year,
when writing 'lessons' for the Colonial Office, he quoted at
length from an article in a September 1948 issue of The
Spectator. This compared postwar conflicts such as those in
Burma, Palestine, and China; and various British counter-
insurgents in Malaya drew similar comparisons. The article's
author, Chris 'Monty' Woodhouse, focussed on the Greek revolt
and identified three phases from organisation and terrorism to
'full rebellion.' COIN was said to be mainly 'a civil and
political task', and Woodhouse assigned priority to policing
and 'the building of roads and schools to eliminate the
physical conditions and moral incentives' that led to communist
rebellion. Finally, on the military side, referring to the
Greek 'commandos', he recommended 'the technique of counter-
guerillas.
52. On the need for Chinese help, HC to T. Lloyd, CO, 28 Nov.;
to SSC, 19 Dec. 1948, CO537/3758; CGSEA to SSC, 20 Apr.
1949, CO537/4751. HC's ideas, Short P.264-5; to T. Lloyd,
8 Oct., CO53713758; and on the MCA, to J. Paskin, CO, 10
Dec. 1948; to J.D. Higham, CO, 10 Feb. 1949, CO537/4242;
Heussler P.173-4; Pye Lessons P.40. On the example of the
Jewish Agency, see Chapter 3.
53. HC on necessary action, O.H. Morris, CO note, 21 Apr.
1949, CO537/4751. He evidently drew on the article by
C.M. Woodhouse 'The Balkan War' The Spectator 6271, 3
Sept. 1948, N.B.- see P.305 for Gurney's full exposition
of COIN lessons in May 1949.
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Sir Elenry Gurney did not immediately adopt a Hearts-and-
Minds line, and the COIN authorities supported some 'ruthless
measures.' Indeed, Gurney imposed capital sentences on
communist activists, and sixteen collective detentions were
carried out from January 1949. They were designed 'to deprive
[the insurgents of] .. large bodies of .. supporters', but were
only 'conceived as a limited operation' by Gurney until
resettlement, (by then recommended by a Federal Committee), was
underway. Banishment orders were also imposed in the belief
that in the short term vulnerable squatters would side with the
camp inspiring 'the greater fear', 54
 at a time when counter-
terrorist population protection was not widely available. But
while negative psywar policies were applied by the State, there
was a general feeling locally that this should not become the
Government's long term approach. This view was shared in the
Colonial Office, where the performance of statutory martial law
in Palestine between 1936 and 1948 and in Aden during 1943 was
evaluated. Officials discounted its adoption in Malaya, and
Gurney and high level army sources considered that the
consequences of its introduction would be far 'worse' than
Emergency laws, 55 indicating the general acceptance in Malaya
54. BDCC ideas on COIN, notes, 28 Jan. 1949, CO537/4773; Short
P.147: HC's views, and COIN action, P.189; FLCMCP 1950-1
(Kuala Lumpur, 1952) Report 14, 19 Apr. 1950, P.B90;
Communist Terrorism P.15; Report, 5 Apr. 1949, in, Dr. R.
Clutterbuck, letter, 14 Nov. 1990; Paget P.54; Stanborough
M.Litt., P.66. Military support for measures, 1/2GR, 003,
17 Jan., 2GR,133, GMW; AHQMal., report, 7 Feb. 1949,
A1R23/8 443.
55. BDCC views, ibid. CO studies and conclusions, J.D. [-ligham,
note, 3 Mar.; J. Gaved, memo, 13 May; O.H. Morris note, 25
Aug. 1949, CO537/4773.
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that a stern Cost-Benefit line would fail.
The positive psywar approach was progressively emphasised,
another army conference in January 1949 agreeing that
'incidents [of misconduct by the security forces] are
tantamount to playing into Communist hands.' Moreover, that
spring, for the first time ever, British army units were
encouraged to develop their own civic action. This entailed
offering 'such goods as salt, tobacco, axeheads and cheap
sarongs' to Malay villages, as well as distributing propaganda
pamphlets. 56 The GOC and police Commissioner were patrons of a
mixed psywar strategy, proposing both pressure through
detentions and repatriations, and encouragement by
resettlement, population protection and MCA activities. But
they and many Whitehall COIN authorities agreed by April 1949
that 'drastic measures' which alienated the people were
impracticable.
rThile a new Federal land policy was worked out by Malayan
government departments, Gurney formulated COIN political
programmes, especially civic action policies, from the
beginning of 1949. He sought to give the people an 'object of
affiliation' other than communism and gain their 'wholehearted
56. CINCFELF Conf. views, minutes, 12 Jan., O268/582; G(Ops)
FELF QE-IR, 31 Mar., WO268/774; R. Onraet, memo, 5 Nov.
1950, BAM,V/5, RCS. Army civic action, HQJohore 0136, 18
May, WO268/582. Propaganda materials, 2 Gds. Bde. 003, 29
Sept. 1949, B1/25, SRM.
57. Gray/Boucher's attitudes, 'A paper on the security
situation', 5 Apr., DEFE11/32; CO memo, Apr., DEFE11/33;
HQMa1. IRs, 24 Feb., 13 Apr., WO208/41O4. CO views, as in
ff.55. Military in, COS(49)180, 17 May 1949, DEFE5/14.
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support', providing squatters with social amenities and
administration as a first step. The Colonial Office underlined
that the State must 'fire the [populace's] imagination' by
'publication of our political, economic and social etc.
policy.' It shared his appreciation that to defeat an
'underground war' required 'positive measures of resettlement',
in conjunction with 'civil and political measures [dealing
with, for instance,] .. squatters, national registration
[and] trade unions.' 58
 The positive psywar approach was further
augmented by an initiative of the Secretary for Chinese
Affairs, E.D. Fleming. Recently appointed by the High
Commissioner, 'early in 1949' Fleming suggested an 'experiment
along the lines' of British P1W re-education, and moreover, a
Greek COIN scheme devised by 1948 involving the psychological
reorientation of insurgents through training and education.
Details were available in a booklet designed by the Greeks for
universal COIN usage, and 'the principles upon which the
Macronissos experiment was run were modified to suit
Malaya.' Gurney sanctioned the project on 16 September 1949,
58. HC on popular support, O.H. Morris, CO notes, 2 Feb., 21
Apr., CO537/4750,1. On the means to gain it, HC to SSC, 8
Jan., DEFE11/32; PFLCM 1948-9: Report 3, of the Committee
appointed by His Excellency the H.C. to investigate the
squatter problem 10 Jan., P.C535-7; HC, 17 Feb.,
P.B770; to SSC, 14 Feb.; D.R. William, CO note, 9 Feb.,
CO537/4750; CP(49)52, 5 Mar., CAB128/33; HC to SSC, 11
Apr., minute, 31 May, CO537/4751; COS(49)180, 17 May 1949,
DEFE5/14; ARFM 1949 (London, 1950) P.212-3; Communist
Terrorism P.56; Short P.158; Stanborough M.Litt.,P.206.
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and three rehabilitation centres opened soon afterwards. 59 In
March, the Colonial Office had suggested that Government
'methods and achievements' should be publicised. But the
Emergency Publicity Committee's	 'basic plan'	 for 1949
concentrated on threatening communist supporters and
publicising insurgent losses, 60 and the chance to gain some
practical advantage by advertising civic action policies in
government propaganda was missed.
The Federal Government's plans for basic civic action were
retarded by 'complacency, red-tape, .. and opposition to
change' in 1949, only five Malay states supporting resettlement
by March. But Gurney's conviction that it afforded essential
'administration and protection' led, by 28 May, to his demand
that the states give it priority treatment. Further, in
October, he strongly urged the states to 'regroup' isolated
estate and mine workers. Moreover, by 1 June, the High
Commissioner 'virtually ended the mass evictions and
deportations of squatter{s]', dropping this policy altogether
in October. Gurney was adjusting 'the balance between the
59. On insurgent re-education, FLCMCP 1952-3 (Kuala Lumpur,
1953) Paper 24 9 Mar. 1953, in, C01022/32; K.J. Henderson,
'The experiment at the Taiping Rehabilitation Centre',
June 1950, FP1O15/F0371/92933; Communist Terrorism P.67;
Malaya under the Emergency (Kuala Lumpur, 1951) P.35.
60. CO on propaganda, SSC Circular, 29 Mar. 1949, CO537/6579.
EPC plans, ARFM 1949 P.124-7,208; Communist Banditry P.12;
Nordin, tl.Sc.,P.51-2.
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constructive remedies and the more unpleasant medicine', 61 and
there was concensus among COIN agencies on a gradual shift
towards positive psywar and political action.
The view from Whitehall, and new I.S. doctrine, in 1949.
The Cabinet Overseas Defence Committee sponsored the
production of 'I.S. Duties 1947' by the War and Colonial
Offices, and in view of the Emergency, it sought 'lessons' for
'general guidance' to the colonies by early 1949. The War
Office collated tactical lessons throughout the year for
inclusion in 'periodical training pamphlets', and by June 1949,
Colonel G.W. Turner had revised the 1947 document and completed
'Notes on Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil
Power, 1949.' It retained much traditional I.S. wisdom, but
also incorporated some COIN 'lessons' from Palestine, Greece,
and Malaya. These included counterorganisation against
underground movements, counterterrorist population protection,
and the prevention of 'liberation' zones. Indeed, the 'Notes'
identified a 'New Pattern' of graduated rebellion from
61. On the Squatter Committee, FLCMCP 1948-9: Report 3 ibid.
On the slow progress of resettlement, Col. W. Gray to Air-
Marsh. Hugh Lloyd, 21 Feb. 1950, W0216/333; HC to SSC, 20
Mar., CO537/475O; A.T. Newboult, letter, 3 June, CO537/
4751; G(Ops)FEL' QHR, 30 June, WO268/1O; Communist
Terrorism P.58; PFLCM 1949-50 31 Mar. 1949, P.383-7;
Stubbs P.79,101; Short P.196; Robinson P.81-4. HC
priority, FLCMCP 1950-1 P.B91. The military on civic
action, BGS,HQMa1., Maj. E. Scourfield, Review, 30 June,
JO2O8/41O4; Sqdn. Ldr. J. Dent, RAF OSUM, 2 June, A1R24/
1928. On policies, Short P.193-4,201. Shift to positive
psywar line, 1-IC to J. Paskin, CO, 2 June; O.H. Morris, CO
note, 4 June; SSC to HC, 30 June 1949, CO537/4751.
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subversion to liberated areas, founded on 'the relics of
[wartime] undergrounds.' To deduce this, its author must have
studied more than one communist insurgency, basing his findings
not on the Malaya insurgency alone, but also other examples of
the 'communist-inspired pattern', such as Greece. Furthermore,
the manual advocated offensive operations initiated in both
jungle and settled areas by junior officers commanding columns
and small patrols. The emphasis of the 1934 Notes on 'drives'
was absent, and the new pamphlet recommended that security
force units should not act at random but on information from a
civil police force rather than a paramilitary-styled force,
probably in the light of the weaknesses displayed by the police
in the Palestine campaign. It also advocated press arrangements
like those used in the mandate, although these were to be
reinforced by 'psychological warfare' and 'counter-propaganda',
and government punitive action was rejected. 62
 The 1949 Notes
did not alter COIN policies wholesale, but significant advances
are evident. However, the doctrine did not provide sufficiently
detailed outlines of new methods, and in any case it was not
generally disseminated until after January 1950, because it had
to be revised to take account of other new British COIN
doctrine. The Colonial Office commented that the War Office
Notes ' reflec t [ed] .. the "orthodox" or at least "traditional"
doctrine' regarding the role of police in counter-rebellion,
but Sir Henry Gurney's new '"heterodox" doctrine' argued that
police responsibilities extended beyond civil policing and
intelligence duties, to leading the planning and execution of
62. On the ODC, see, ODC(46)1, 25 Sept. 1946, CAB21/2444. On
its call for CO/WO 'lessons', SSC to HC, 4 Jan. 1949,
DEFE11/32. Their use, Ritchie Report, W0106/5884; and




The Overseas Defence Committee requested lessons from the
Malayan authorities, and in his 'Despatch 5' of May 1949,
Gurney concentrated on relating the features of the 'standard
Communist plan', from the organisation of an underground to
'liberation'. The High Commissioner stated that 'lessons' had
been forged not only from the Malayari experience, but also from
a study of 'the Maquis .. and similar movements elsewhere,
during and since the War.' Indeed, he clearly referred to the
Palestine example to recommend the formation of an I.S.
Committee under civil control to plan a COIN campaign,
including an effective propaganda effort, which he admitted had
been missing in the mandate. He recommended joint military-
security operations on information 'for the conduct of an
underground "war"', and also proposed civic action, quoting at
length from Woodhouse's article about Greece to emphasise that
COIN was mainly 'a civil and political task.' The Despatch
exploited wartime and especially postwar COIN experience to
suggest numerous improvements to COIN policies and procedures,
and it encapsulated	 the essence of a Hearts-and-Minds COIN
line. General Ritchie attested to Gurney's 'admirable
exposition of the lessons', and wanted it sent on to Camberley,
the Imperial Defence College, and all British Army Commands. By
August 1949 it was distributed to 22 colonies as the first step
to becoming universal British COIN doctrine by the spring of
63. On the use of the 1949 'Notes', WO note, 5 Jan. 1950,
CO537/5353. On its revision, SSC, J. Griffiths, Circular,
11 July 1952, DEFE11/48. On Gurney's view, J.C. Morgan, CO
note, 22 Jan. 1950, CO537/5353.
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i9so.64
The evolution of military-security policies and Army
doctrine up to the autumn of 1949.
The police Commissioner, Gray, was ostensibly 'in charge
of operational planning' by 1949, but was overworked and relied
on General Boucher. In January, they repeated that complete
army training in Ferret-style patrolling was required,
reflecting a 'growing feeling' that small unit tactics held
out a greater chance of success than large scale offensives.65
By April, they wrote a paper on the Clear-and-Hold strategy,
advocating 'intensive patrolling' in the jungle and at its
fringe, and ambushing in probable MRLA (formerly the MPABA)
food supply areas. In addition, they pressed for resettlement
and detentions, large scale operations and air strikes against
MRLA large units, and 'normal but intensified police work' in
'cleared' areas.
A month before the police-army report, the army HQ
64. Gurney, Despatch 5, to SSC, 30 May, CO537/4773. CINCFELF
view, to COS, 11 July, DEFE11/33. Use of the Despatch,
T.I.K. Lloyd, CO, note, 26 Aug. 1949, CO537/4407.
65. On COIN planning, HC to SSC, 28 Feb.; J. Paskin, CO, to
HC, 23 Mar., CO537/4750; CO memo, 28 Apr. 1949, CO537/
4751. And the GOC's role, Sunderland 4171 P.23-4; Robinson
P.149. Army on small unit operations, Commander's Conf.
minutes, 12 Jan., W0268/774; minutes, 4 Apr.; HQJohore
QHR, 31 Mar., W0268/582; HQMa1. IR1O, 6 Jan., W0208/4104;
FTC QHR,3lMar.1949,W0268/116; Sunderland 4170 P.127-8; and
on large scale operations, P.132; Messenger P.17; Komer
P.48-50.
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concluded that jungle patrols of two months duration were not
viable, but besides continuing short patrolling, many army
units were extending their jungle treks for several weeks. This
was made possible by the deployment of police specials who
could dominate army base areas while units were on patrol, and
because the army was relinquishing what the RAF called its
'complex' about self-reliance and was coming to accept the
merits of air supply for its patrols. Further, some units
attempted to ambush irregulars as they collected foodstuffs
from pick-up points, and SurrenderedEnemy Personnel [SEP] were
used for tracking to try to improve security force contact
rates with the insurgents. However, tactical progress occurred
mainly through 'on-the-job' learning and was therefore patchy.
Numerous units still preferred to move in large columns for
some weeks, while many small patrols relied on speculative two
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to three day 'recces'. 66
 Gurney and the local RAF HQ criticised
persistent deficiencies in the intelligence system, noting that
the importance of contact information was a 'lesson not
apparently yet .. generally learnt.' Boucher also criticised
the performance of the police, whose routine policing and
66. All /ref's in W0268/. QHRs unless otherwise stated. Gray!
Boucher's views, 'A paper on the security situation', 5
Apr., DEFE11/32. Short jungle patrols, 2/2GR, 11 Apr.,
2GR,148, GMW; 2 Cold., 15 Nov., 31 Dec., /608. HQMa1. on
prolonged patrolling, in Sunderland 4170 P.113: patrolling
on the fringe, P.139,182; Kukri 1, 1949, P.15-6; 2 Cold.,
30 June: extended jungle patrols, 31 Mar., /609; 1 Mal.,
30 June, /651; 1 Dew., 30 June, /614; Scots P.36-8, GBHQ;
1!1OGR, 31 Mar., /678; 1/2GR 00, 15 Jan., Ols, 18,31 Mar.,
2GR,133, GMW; 31 Mar., /673; 1/7GR, 1 Apr., /684; 30 June,
/614; 1 Dev., 27 Apr., /614; RAF OSUMs,26 May, A1R24/1928;
23,30 June, A1R24/1929; HQtlal. IR1O, 6 Jan., W0208/4104.
SEPs used, RAF OSUM, 12 May, A1R24/1928; RAF Progrep.
Nov., OSUM, 8 Dec.1949, A1R24/1934; 1 Suff. 0110, 5 July,
B1/23; Mal. WD- 25 May, 19 July 1950, 23 Jan., 9 June
1951, B1/24, SRM. On the need for Clear-and-Hold, 1/7GR, 1
Apr. 1949, /787; Kukri 2, July 1950, P.11. On-the-job
training, 1 Dew., 27 Apr., /614; HQSing. (Trg.), 31 Mar.,
/697; 1/2GR, 30 June, /687. Use of FTC 'recce' patrols,
FTC '4 Day exercise', 14 Mar., /116; 1 Mal., 31 Mar. to 30
Sept., /651. Police specials, HQJohore, 31 Mar., /582. On
the use of air supply, RAF, Apr. 'Ops', A1R24/1918; RAF
P.61, AHB. Large columns, N.Mal. ISUMs, 25 Jan., /776; 7
Feb., 1 Mar., 2GR,148, GMW; RAF OSUM, 27 Jan., A1R24/1926;
Kukri 2, 1950, P.11. On the lack of contact intelligence,
P.7; 2/2GR, 30 Apr., 2GR,148, GMW; RAF OSUM, 17 Feb.
A1R24/1918; BGS,HQMa1., 2 Feb., 30 June, JO2O8/4104; FTC,
26 May 1949, /116.
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cordon-and-search secured inadequate intelligence. Indeed, in
January 1949, the High Commissioner asked the Colonial Office
for experts to reorganise the Special Branch. But a Scotland
Yard officer, and W.C. Johnson, the Colonial Office's Police
Advisor, did not arrive in Malaya until June and were
subsequently given little help by Gray. He was too busy
restructuring the police force- which Gurney compared to that
of Palestine- with the objective of forming 235 'Jungle Squads'
to assist with counterguerilla operations. In the interim,
flaws in the intelligence organisation undermined the security
forces' efforts, and although Clear-and-Hold was promoted by
senior officers, it was not practiced effectively at the start
of 1949.67 A strong central command authority was essential to
ensure that improved counterguerilla strategy and tactics were
implemented, but in its absence, advances were unit-specific
and made a necessarily limited COIN impact.
The upper echelons of the army in the Far East supported
large scale operations to stem a reported resurgence of MRLA
large units in March 1949. In the following month, Ritchie
instigated 'Priority operations' in three states where the MRLA
threatened to establish liberated areas, and the GOC affirmed
67. Operations routine, 1/6GR QHR, 31 Mar., WO268/682; HQN.
Mal. ISUM, 23 May, WO268/777; 4QOH QHR, 30 June, WO268/
798. GOC on the police, S. Thomas, (ex-HC), to R.H.
Onraet, 13 Apr., BAM, V/6, RCS. Gurney requests experts
in, CGSEA to SSC, 20 Apr.: on slow intelligence progress,
HC to SSC, 11 Apr., CO537/4751; RAF, note, 24 Apr., A1R24/
1927; Stubbs P.71. On the MPF, HC to SSC, 8 Jan., 28
Feb., CO537/4996,4750; HC, note, 4 Apr., 2GR,133, GMW. On
Special Branch advice, O.H. Morris, CO memo, June
CO537/4996. On Johnson, Jeffries P.218. Clear-and-Hold
flaws, RAF OSUMs, 27 Jan., 3 Feb. 1949 A1R24/1926.
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that 'the flushing principle' of using air strikes to drive the
MRLA from targeted localities was sound. The Training Centre
offered guidance on this technique, and indeed, many unit
commanders clung to the idea that large scale operations would
'be [the] most effective' counterguerilla tactics, clearing
areas 'once and for all.' The CINCFELF from August 1949,
General A.F. John Harding, noted that 'almost without exception
the officers commanding units and formations' serving under him
had fought in the Second World War. Their predisposition to
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support large operations was underlined by their training n
conventional war in the UK, 68
 and individual officers would not
yet have been able to reassess their own E.S. knowledge in the
light of recent Malayan lessons received by the War Office.
Many British soldiers were dismayed by the poor results of
68. All /ref's in W0268/. QHRs unless otherwise stated.
Intelligence reports of large unit MRLA, FELF,G(Ops), 30
June, /10; and on Priority action, Ritchie Report, W0106/
5884; Stanborough M.Litt.,P.66; RAF P.66. On the use of
both large scale/small unit patrol operations, 1 Roy.
Innis.Fus., 30 June, /622; 2 Cold. report, 28 Jan., 00, 15
Mar., /609; 1/2GR 004, 3 Mar., 30 June, /673; HQN.Mal.
ISUM, 15 Feb., /776. Boucher on air strikes, RAF OSUM, 24
Feb. 1949, A1R24/1926; Kukri 2, 1950, P.18. FTC training,
QHR, 25 May, /116. Officers on large scale operations, RAF
OSUMs, 24,31 Mar., A1R24/1927; July 'Operations', A1R24/
1918; Maj. J.B. Oldfield The Green Howards in Malaya
(Aldershot, 1953) P.12. Their basis on intelligence, HQ
Johore, 2 Cold., 31 Mar., /582,609; RAF OSUMs, 19,26 May,
2 June 1949, A1R24/1928; RAF P.80, AHB. Their use against
MRLA large units, BGS,HQMa1., Review, 30 June, W0298/4104;
2 Cold., 30 June, /609. On sweeps, HQJohore 0133, 29 Jan.,
/582; FTC, 26 May, /116; 1 KOYLI, 30 June, /625;
Sunderland 4170 P.128-30; and encirclement,1/6GR, report,
16 May, /682; 1/2GR, 31 Mar., /673; Windeatt P.23. Drives,
RAF OSUM, 13 Jan., A1R24/1926; Scots P.17, GBHQ; 1/2CR,
004, 31 Mar., 0114, 18 July, 005, 5 Aug., 2GR,133, GMW;
l/6GR ISUM, 7 May, /682: air strikes, 2 Cold., ISUM, 2
Mar., /609; 31 Mar., /682; RAF OSUMs, 6 Apr., A1R24/ 1927;
12 May, 5 June; 1/7GR, 23 June 1949, A1R24/1928. Officers'
experience, Maj.-Gen. J. Harding, to WO, 16 Jan. 1950,
CO537/5974; Cross Role P.B24, GMW; Company P.35; Jungle
Warfare P.83,119; Clutterbuck Long P.51-2.
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sweeps and drives by the middle of 1949,69 but the majority of
senior officers attending a conference in July maintained that
these tactics should be implemented as long as there was a
threat posed by large MRLA bands. In view of this menace,
Ritchie also questioned the tactical efficacy of the three-man
'recce' patrols favoured by the Training Centre. Nonetheless,
the conference delegates reiterated that section patrolling
should be at the heart of army basic training in Malaya,7°
patently favouring the use of small unit tactics.
Many army units lost personnel through transfer
'turbulence' in 1949, and also as a result, their knowledge of
operations. But some units held learning periods and others
sought to update their techniques by sending cadres to the Far
East Training Centre. It also ran a touring 'demonstration
platoon', and distributed the War Office's Military Training
Pamphlets 51 and 52, its 'Jungle Jottings, 1945', and 'The
Jungle Book, 1943.' Two of these works, on wartime Burma, were
written by Field-Marshal Sir William Slim, the CIGS from 1
November 1948, and he was more amenable to changes in COIN than
his predecessor. But less than 240 men attended Jungle Warfare
Courses from April to October 1949, and 'officers and NCOs
[were] .. not .. given the opportunity to "spread the gospel"
due to operational commitments. Indeed, with an
69. Disappointment at operational failures, 1 Dev., report, 17
June, W0268/614; 1/6GR QHR, 31 Mar., W0268/682; FELF
Sitrep., 5 Aug., W0268/11; Capt. D. Ormerod notes, 26 Apr.
1949, 2GR,133, GMW; Oldfield P.7-8; Windeatt P.22-4; Kukri
2, 1950, P.7,10,51.
70. Views expressed at the Commander's Conf., Agenda, 5 Apr.;
HQFELF notes, 3 May, JO268/10; Maj.-Gen. D. Dunlop notes,
12 July 1949, .1O268/582.
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'intensification of operations' from September, Training Centre
tuition for the year came to a halt, 71 the tempo of operations
preventing a more widespread refinement of small unit tactics.
The expansion of army operational policies and thought, by
the autumn of 1949.
The DM0 had a consistent interest in unorthodox forces,
and in April 1949 it received the support of the Colonial
Office and the Prime Minister for an initiative which echoed a
COIN precedent set in Greece. The Directorate asked General
Ritchie if he required 'a special corps of Commando or guerilla
type [soldiers] .. including ex- •. Force 136' men. But the
CINCFELF stated that adequate resources for small unit
operations were already at his disposal. 72 However, progress in
a new direction was made as some units patrolled suspected
insurgent food-supply areas, and by May the HQ tried to create
71. Unit training and lessons, Scots P.22, GBHQ; 2 Gds. Bde.,
'Lessons and points from Operation RAMILLIES' 26 May;
'Account of the ambush of a patrol', Sept.; 018, 12 Dec.,
B1/25, SRM. Turbulence, HQSing., G(Trg.) QHR, 30 June,
W0268/697; BGS, HQMa1., Review, 30 June, W0208/4104;
Windeatt P.35. The FTC's platoon, CINCFELF tele., 5 Sept.,
WO268/11. Training cadres, R. Fraser 'Report', 2 Apr.,
RHO; HQFELF G(Trg.) QHR, 30 Sept., W0268/24; FTC QHR5, 5
Oct. (30 June): FTC doctrine, 30 Sept., and training, 31
Dec.1949, W0268/116;Hayter P.211.
72. Proposal for new force, J. Paskin, CO draft, to HC, Apr.;
CO Priv. Sec., W.F. Dawson, to W. Geraghty, WO (DM0), 4
Apr., CO537/4751. Reply, CGSEA to SSC, 20 Apr., DEFE11/32;
CO memo, Apr., DEFE11/33; Dunlop, notes, 12 July 1949,
W0268/582.
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intelligence by identifying insurgent food suppliers in
Operation SNOW-WHITE. It failed to achieve its goal because
food control measures were lifted too swiftly. 73
 Nonetheless,
by August the HQ stressed the importance of resettlement,
controls and policing to keep cleared areas 'permanently
denied.' The police were urged to 'smash or disrupt the "Mm
Yuen"' organisation and MCP committees, and counterorgariisation
was considered 'of equal if not greater importance than'
military offensives. 74
 Gurney and top local armed forces
commanders realised the importance of arrests and resettlement,
although the latter was not effectively carried out by most of
the Malay states until after 1950.
Debate over military-security policy, and reorganisation,
in the autumn of 1949.
On 2 August 1949, Major-General John Harding became the
CINCFELF, and he agreed to more operations in insurgent
'feeding and breeding grounds' near the jungle fringes. A
conference on 26 August commended 'fighting patrols' there, and
officers were encouraged to 'try anything that appears to be a
good idea .. we must UOT allow our tactics and methods to
73. HQMa1. ideas, IR, 4 Aug., WO208/4104. Operations, 1 Suff.
01, 13 Aug., W0268/713; 1 Dev., Report, 9 Aug. 1949, W0268
/614; Clutterbuck Conflict P.213-4; Sunderland 4170 P.139;
4171 P.29-30; 4173 P.31.




 But Harding realised that the current
COIN efforts of the police and civil authorities were
inadequate, and so he set the army the task of creating a
'breathing space' for them by stepping up the military pressure
on the MRLA. He wanted 'intensified routine patrol', especially
as Gurney was offering the MRLA surrender terms on 6 September,
and because of the boost given to the communists by Mao's
victory in China. 76
 From September, many units sustained
'saturation .. or platoon fighting patrols' on the "inside"
with base camps in the jungle on the lines of "Ferret Force"',
and used 'recce' groups 'until the Sakai, [or other jungle
aboriginals, could] .. be permanently won over' and
75. On Harding, M. Carver Harding of Petherton (London, 1978)
P.42; War P.18-9. Fringe patrols, Commander's Conf. notes,
26 Aug.; HQJohore notes, 30 Sept. 1949, W0268/582.
76. Harding's action, Aug. 1949 note; to WO, 16 Jan. 1950,
CO537/5974; HQMa1., 0147, 3 Sept., W0268/582; N.Mal. QHR,
30 Sept., WO268/585; Carver ibid: on the surrender policy,
Harding memo, 31 Aug., 2GR,133, GMW: on Mao, 1 KOYLI QHR,
30 Sept. 1949, WO268/625.
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intelligence procured from them. 77 But encirclement remained
'an attractive theory to some officers' who despatc.hed small
patrols simply to gather 'information for a future large
operation.' Others insisted that encirciements would succeed
given more manpower, though they usually met with a
77. All /ref's in W0268/. QHRs unless otherwise stated. On
operations, Conf. notes, 26 Aug., /582; RAF OSUM, 25 Aug.,
A1R24/1930. On the Sakai, 2/2GR, 30 June, 2GR,148, GMW;
RAF OSUM, 27 Oct., A1R24/1932. Lack of Federal action to
control them, ARFM 1950 (Kuala Lumpur, 1951) P.xiii; Short
P.442-3. Details of jungle patrols, RAF OSUM, 14 July,
A1R24/1929; Aug. 'Ops', A1R24/1918; 2Mal., 31 Dec., /554;
4 Queen's Own Hussars, 30 Sept., 31 Dec., /798; 2 Cold.,
15 Nov., /608; 2GR, 31 Dec., /675; 2 Gds. Bde. 018, 12
Dec. 1949, B1/25, SRM; McAlister P.40-3. On the
disbandment of Ferret elements in 1949, The fight against
Communist Terrorism in Malaya (London, 1953) P.16.
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'disappointing' outcome, 78
 and the army HQ stated that large
operations produced 'uncertain' results. The GOC sought to
increase the amount of sustained patrolling carried out, laying
plans for this in Operation SMOKE. But most companies failed
to gain successes because they neglected to 'operatle] as
three platoons' and moved in large columns. 79
 The army HQ
therefore 'decided to develop .. [the] tactical technique and
[urge commanders to] maintain patrols in the jungle' for two
78. Encirciements, Phillips Diary, P.459, GMW; HQJohore, Conf.
notes, 30 Sept., W0268/582. Sweeps/drives, RAF OSUMs, 16
July, 4 Aug., A1R24/1929; May, July, 'Ops', A1R24/1918; 18
Aug. report, A1R24/1930; HQJohore, 3 Aug., t'10268/582; RAF
OOs, 1,11 Sept., A1R24/1931; QHRs for 30 Sept.- 1/2GR,
2/2GR, 1 Dev., W0268/673,675,614; RAF OOs, 1,11 Oct.,
A1R24/1932; RAF OSUM, 3 Nov., A1R24/1933; OOs, 7,12,14
Dec., A1R24/1934; 1/2GR QHR, 31 Dec., 2GR,133, GMW; 2
Cold. QHR, 31 Dec., W0268/609; 2 Gds. Bde. 016, 10 Nov.;
003, 29 Sept., B1/25, SRM. Sunderland 4170 P.113.
Patrolling to gather information, HQMa1. Review, 31 Dec.,
W0208/4104. Officers' support for large scale operations
despite their flaws, Lt.-Col. J..7. Stephens, report, 22
Dec. 1949, 2GR,133, GMW; cf. Dirve., 10 Feb. 1950, W0268/
673; 1 Suff., in HQMa1. 1R50, 12 Oct. 1949, W0208/41O4;
McAlister P.43.
79. On the defects of large scale operations, HQMa1. 1R56, 24
Nov., Review, 31 Dec., WO208/4104; 1 Dev. QHR, 31 Dec.
1949, W0268/614. Boucher's plans, Phillips Diary, P.433,
438, GMW; Blaxiand P.86; Kukri 2, 1950, P.13-5: Operation
SMOKE, P.12; 1/2GR 009, 2 Oct., 2GR,148, GMW; QHR, 31 Dec.
1949, W0268/675. Most operations were small unit patrols:
Lt.-Gen.	 R.H.	 Bower,	 DOs	 Review,	 12	 Sept.	 1957,
WO 106 / 5990.
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months during Operation LEMON, which featured small unit
'intensive patrolling, ambush, and road-blocks.' It foundered
because of insufficient contact intelligence, but its planners
noted that this was bound to be the case until widespread
resettlement and population protection was completed, and they
accepted that no quick victory could be achieved unless the
MRLA offered a 'large and worthwhile .. target' like the DSE
did in Greece. 8° Thus, the HQ kept up-to-date with events
there, and pressed for improved counterguerilla tactics and
resettlement, appreciating that success against the Malayan
communists would not be achieved so readily as in the Balkans.
The army's Priority operations ended on 1 November, by
which time Boucher had overseen the establishment of tripartite
operations committees 'at all levels', as well as a Federal
Joint Operations Centre. The Colonial Office Police Advisor,
Johnson, informed London that Gray, who was swamped by the
amount of work required in reorganising the police force, was
unable to direct operations properly. But, as a consequence of
Boucher's effort to set up an extensive committee structure,
better machinery for invoking Gray's directives was now
available to him. On 12 November, the police Commissioner
recommended that the army concentrate its efforts on small unit
patrolling of the jungle, and the Malaya HQ encouraged patrol
work near squatter areas, realising that such military-security
operations would also enhance resource control, counter-
80. On LEMON, 2 Cold. QHR, 30 Sept., W0268/609; 1 Suff. 00, 13
Oct., JO268/713; 2 Gds. Bde. Ols, 24 Oct.,8 Nov.; 00
'Operation LEMON', 8 Oct., B1/25, SRM; Scots P.39,59,
GBE-IQ; RAF 'Operations', Sept., A1R24/1918; Progrep., Oct.,
A1R24/1932; AAE-LQ to AHQ, 11 Oct., A1R24/8443; its results,
and reference to Greece, EIQMa1. Review, 31 Dec. 1949,
W0208/4 104.
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organisat ion, and intelligence production. Intensified
patrolling was not immediately put into practice by all
officers, but despite continuing debate over tactics in
Malaya, 81
 this was an important local high level shift on
tactical policy.
The implementation of positive psywar policies during the
winter of 1949 to 1950.
Gurney and the security forces wanted an accelerated
resettlement programme to provide 'physical and moral'
protection for the people, but he also wished to 'broaden [the]
front' of extra-military action. By November 1949, he planned
an 'Anti-Bandit Month' for the following February, to 'rnobilise
the population' against the MCP. In January 1950, he underlined
that the key to success was 'the achievement of a political,
social, and administrative programmme capable of convincing the
vulnerable elements of [the people of] the advantages of
opposition to Communism', and to 'satisfy .. legitimate Chinese
aspirations.' A Federal Development Plan was therefore not only
an important step towards eventual self-government, but was
conceived by the High Commissioner as 'an important anti-
Communist weapon.' The Plan incorporated universal primary
education, and employment and welfare benefits. Other
'administrative, social and protective services' included
81. GOC's actions, Sir N. Short, letter; Scots P.50, GBEiQ; RAF
P.6,35,53, AHB; AAHQ, notes, Nov., A1R23/8443; RAF 0023,
27 Oct. 1949, AIR23/8446; AHQ, note, 8 Jan. 1951, A1R23/
8435. On HQMa1. and Gray, Communist Terrorism P.70-2;
Clutterbuck Conflict P.174; 1.C. Johnson to SSC, 18 Oct.
1949, CO537/5434. Tactical debate as in, Maj. W.N. Seymour
'Terrorism in Malaya' Army Q'ly 53, Apr., P.112; Lt.-Col.
L. Oatts 'Guerilla warfare' JRIJSI 94, Feb. 1949, P.192-6.
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Federal Home Guards, a Communities Liaison Committee to discuss
the extension of citizenship rights to more Chinese, local
elections, a government 'Member system' that would give
selected Malayans greater influence over socio-economic policy-
making, and economic help for Malays from a Rural and
Industrial Development Authority. 82
 Furthermore, Gurney and
MacDonald agreed that this programme required publicity, and
in January 1950 a Joint Information and Propaganda Committee
[JIPCJ was created, 'to coordinate all the information and
propaganda services' and 'organise effective counter-
propaganda.' 83
 Under MacHugh scant progress was made in this
sphere, but civil COIN authorities attempted to address the
need for positive psywar policies.
Military-security and control policies and doctrine in
early 1950.
By February 1950, Gray accepted that resettlement could
take 'a few years' to complete, and he believed that 'too much
faith should not be placed [un' it. He and Boucher pressed for
82. HC on 'Anti-Bandit Month' and requirements, CO note, May,
CO537/6018; Joint Information and Propaganda Committee,
notes, 28 Apr., CO537/6759; ARFM 1950 P.1; PFLCM 1949-50
P.605; Communist Banditry P.10; Short P.216-20: the Anti-
Bandit Month mobilised 400,000 people in government
security schemes. On resettlement and Home Guards, HC to
CGSEA, 15 Feb.: civic action, HC 'Despatch 3', to WO, 12
Jan., CO537/5974; to CGSEA, 7 Mar.; to Dato Onn Bin Jafar,
15 May, CO537/6018; to SSC, J. Griffiths, 9 Apr. 1950,
CO537/5 97 1.
83. JIPC, notes, 10 Feb. 1950, CO537/6759; H.C. Greene, psywar
report, 19 Sept. 1951, CO537/7255; Short P.416.
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an improved effort by the Malay states, involving the 'civil
authorities follow[ing]-up and establish{ing] Government
control' of cleared areas through more effective
administration. Furthermore, on 6 January, the GOC argued that
while army officers should orchestrate their own operations,
they also ought to follow the Kuala Lumpur HQ's 'tune.' Boucher
emphasised that 'in future operations will be .. on a system of
"saturation patrolling"' sustained for several weeks, based on
a "framework"' area-deployment intended to allow them to
dominate the ground 'between the enemy's jungle hideouts and
sources of food.' He and the police Commissioner also supported
the employment of '"Striking Forces"' in large scale
operations when they were considered necessary by army
officers. But in February, Boucher and Gray recommended police
domination of settled areas, the stationing of army platoons
and police Jungle Squads at the fringe, and sustained
patrolling in the deep jungle by the army. The strategy and
tactical policies encapsulated in their Report of February 1950
were approved by the Chiefs of Staff and by the War Office,
making them accepted Army COIN policy. 84
 On the ground, some
84. On discussions at the 6 Jan. Conf., GOC Conf. notes, 11
July, WO231/38; 48CR Inf. Bde., notes, OD1, 9 Jan., 7O268/
672. Emphasis on the fringe, Maj. D. Truss 'Malaya
Memories' mis, 2/2GR, GMW; N.Mal. ISUM, 17 Jan., WO268/
778; Commander's Conf. notes, 27 Jan., W0268/781; and on
Gray/Boucher's views, Gray, to GOC, 16 Feb.,
	 on
the Armed Communist situation', Feb.; HC to SSC, 24
Feb., CO537/5974; to CGSEA, 15 Feb., DEFE11/34; Carver
Petherton P.166-7; Short P.229-30. Approval for security
force plan, Harding to DM0, Lt.-Gen. H. Redman, 26 Jan.;
to JO, 16 Jan., CO537/5974; Lt.-Gen. .C.D. Brownjohn, 10
notes, 15 May, DEFE11/36; Commander's Conf. notes, 27 Feb.
1950, WO268/781.
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officers repudiated their previous practice of 'hopeful
sweeping' operations, and others concentrated on intelligence-
based patrolling rather than a mere speculative 'groping' by
patrols. Various army units held learning periods, as did the
Training Centre, but it accommodated only 26 officers on its
Jungle Warfare courses up to April 1950, and hence the Centre's
patrol training made no dramatic impact on the style of army
operations. Indeed, a 'constant change of units' in early
195085
 further hampered the widespread adoption of improved
tactical techniques.
General Boucher fell ill and was replaced by Major-General
Robert E. Urquhart, who became the temporary GOC on 3 March. He
was not disposed to encourage tactical evolution, and although
Mockaitis correctly notes that large scale operations were
often executed because of the continuing lack of contact
intelligence, most of Urquhart's staff preferred 'large scale
operations designed to disrupt, and then separate .. guerillas'
from their support. For instance, his close advisor Colonel
F.I.S. Tuker discouraged small unit experimentation and
disparaged the Training Centre's instruction on patrolling. His
attitude was undoubtedly conditioned by his previous experience
85. All /ref's in W0268/. Unit/FTC learning, Scots P.23,31,
41, GBHQ; FTC QHR, 14 Apr., /117; R.A. Ruegg The Wind of
Change in Malaya and North Borneo m/s, (1985), P.14, MsIO
s.290, RHO; and on small unit patrol, 1 Suff. 0113, 27
Jan., /612; 2/2GR QHR, 31 Mar., 2GR,146, GMW; report,
Mar., /676; 1 Dev., 1 Green Howards, N.Mal., QHRs, 31
Mar., /615,621, 778; 2 Cold., Clothed all in green-o
(Singapore, 1950) P.8; McAlister P.52,56,283; R. Crichton
The Coldstream Guards (London, 1972) P.39. Sweeps, Lt.-
Col. J. Stephens, 1/2GR report, Feb. 1950, 2GR,133, GMW.
Turbulence, Commander's Conf. notes, 29 Mar.1950,/781.
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of large scale E.S. operations in Mesopotamia from 1919 to 1920
and on the Frontier in 1937 and 1938, as well as conventional
war in North Africa and Europe. Encirciements with 'killing
areas' were sanctioned by the HQ, and some battalion commanders
incorporated small unit patrols into major offensive efforts
like Operation CARP, which was planned 'after Gen[eral] Boucher
[and] would .. not have appealed to him.' 86
 The War Office
considered that senior officers in the field were best placed
to devise tactical policy, but its newly revised 1949 'Notes'
were sent to Malaya at the start of 1950. By April they were
'issued down to platoon commands', and some units noted that
they were 'extremely sound .. and deserve .. close scrutiny by
all officers.' The doctrine advocated patrolling from bases but
did not explicitly encourage the development of small unit
tactics nor reject large scale operations. Hence, in 1950 the
rate of high level tactical progress slowed under General
Urquhart, a trend that was not reversed by new officers who
arrived in Malaya inadequately prepared for COIN. The Staff
College recommended the War Office manual, but its 240
graduates a year were still only instructed in riot control,
86. On Urquhart, Commander's Conf. notes, 27 Feb., WO268/781;
Communist Terrorism P.87; Communist Banditry P.72.
Mockaitis, m/s, P.383,390. On Tuker and other Colonels,
Calvert, interview; Paper. Also on commanders, Cross
Company P.43; Smith Kathmandu P.28; Pocock P.93. Large
scale operations, McAlister P.283; Scots P.32, GBHQ; 1
Suff., Operations Report, 23 Mar., B1/27, SRM; James!
Sheil-Small P.43; Oldfield P.12,15; RAF P.62,65, AHB; RAF
OOs, Jan.-Aug., passim A1R24/1935,1936,2275-9; 1 Suff.
016, 11 Mar., WO268/612; 1/7GR QHR, 31 Mar., W0268/685;
Truss Memories; 2GR, 'Operation CARP Report', Apr. 1950,
2GR,146: on Boucher's views, Phillips Diary, P.459, GMW.
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cordon-and-search, and 'lessons' from Palestine.87 The War
Office evidently continued to support the adoption of large
scale operations by local commanders, while the guidance
offered in its new I.S. doctrine was limited in its scope, and
thereby, in its usefulness for COIN.
Progress on military-security and organisational issues in
the spring of 1950.
General Harding was concerned that if patrolling was
concentrated on the fringes, the counterguerilla war in the
deep jungle might be neglected. By February, he rekindled the
DMO's interest in unorthodox forces and it set in motion
discussions about forming a 'long-range penetration squad'
under the former Chindit leader, Colonel Mike Calvert, who was
selected for his wartime experience. War Office officials
debated the force's size and functions, but after Calvert
reported on its requirements in August, the Malaya Scouts 22
SAS was formed. 88 Furthermore, in February the army received
films on air-supply techniques from London, and the CINCFELF
requested a War Office Operational Research Group to assist
with tactical investigation, which arrived in June. The
Department also made use of wartime experience, accepting an
87. On the WO 'Notes', 1 Suff., Lt.-Col. I.L. Wight, 'IP&
DIACP, 1949', 27 Apr. 1950, B1/27, SRM. On Camberley, M.J.
Dunnington, (Staff College Librarian), letter, 9 Oct.
1990, and College 'I.S.' pamphlet 'Contents' page, (RMAS);
lecture notes, Mar. 1950, Maj.-Gen. Stockwell, 6/29/2,
LHC.
88. CINCFELF/WO views, CO Note, 16 Feb., CO537/5974; DM0 note,
19 May 1950, DEFE11/36; Calvert Paper; Carver Petherton
P.169. WO debate, Calvert interview; Miller P.69,72.
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Australian offer to send a Military Mission comprising eight
'experts' who had served in New Guinea from 1943 to 1945, to
advise on counterguerilla warfare and the SAS's role. The
Mission visited Malaya during July and August 1950.89
Tactical improvements were not Harding's only concern, and
he and MacDonald were instrumental in organisational changes
that had far-reaching consequences for future COIN. Harding
believed that a 'supremo' was necessary to give orders
regarding military-security policy, in order to ensure that
all COIN agencies applied the correct measures in future.
Gurney was worried about the idea of a soldier planning all
COIN policies and 'thought this idea crazy.' But by January
1950, as Boucher stressed the need for more patrolling but
could-not ensure that it was prosecuted by all army units,
Gurney changed his mind. On 23 February, he requested the
appointment of a 'senior officer of military experience' who
could both centralise the planning and direct the execution of
operations. 9 ° British COIN authorities agreed that it would be
an advantage if the new man possessed appropriate I.S.-related
experience, and the CINCFELF suggested Major-General Richard
89. Films, ARFM 1950 P.144. On the ORG, Harding to WO, 11 May,
F1O16/FO371/84477. DM0, COS(50)76, 15 May, CO537/5975. On
Australian advisors, SSW note, 12 Oct. 1950, CAB134/497.
British officers also gave COIN advice in 1949 and 1950 to
visiting soldiers from, for instance, Burma, Thailand,
Ceylon, the Phillipines, the USA, France and all the
Dominions, see, for example, CO537/6005; DEFE11/34.
90. Harding, in VCIGS to CIGS, Feb. 1951, W0216/835; COS(5O)
20, 2 Feb., CO537/5974. And 1-IC, to J. Paskin, CO, 17 Jan.,
to Harding, 13 Feb.; Air-Marsh. Hugh Lloyd, to Air-Ch.
Marsh. John Slessor, 7 Mar. 1950, W0216/333.
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Gale, who had served in Palestine during the COIN of 1945 to
1947. The High Commissioner proposed four candidates, favouring
Sir Fitzroy MacLean, 'whose [wartime] experience of guerilla
warfare would certainly be' valued. But the CIGS consulted
General Ritchie, and he recommended either Major-General Sir
Harold Briggs, or Major-General Rob M.M. Lockhart, both
experienced in confronting irregulars. Briggs was well known to
Slim and the War Office for his successful campaign against the
postwar Burmese militants, and although he was their second
choice, he was the 'expert' finally chosen by Slim. 91 He
reached Malaya at the end of March 1950, and assumed the role
of a Director of Operations, charged with coordinating and
directing security force operations. But he was not armed with
executive powers of command, because Gray fought 'hard' to
retain control of the police, 92
 and therefore Briggs was
obliged to rely on the goodwill of others to institute any
changes that he desired.
'The Briggs Plan': 1) COIN organisation.
91. On Gale, Harding to HC, 16 Feb.; CO note, 16 Feb.; and HG
views, in, Harding to GIGS, 24 Feb., W0216/333. W. Jackson
notes that Briggs was 'Slim's inspiration', P.88. But cf.
Slim to Harding, 1 Mar., J0216/333, concerning Ritchie's
proposal. The WO and Burma in, McEnery P.97,123;
Sunderland 4171 P.vi, 33. Briggs was rated an 'expert', S.
Metz 'COIN campaign planning' Parameters 19, Sept. 1989,
P.69. But he was the second choice, GIGS to T. Lloyd, CO,
1 Mar., CO537/5994. The HC's request, and WO action,
COS(50),34,84, 2,3 Mar. 1950, G0537/5974, DEFE11/34.
92. DO's powers, MoD note, 17 Mar. 1950, CO537/5971+; Paget
P.56. On Gray, L.F. Knight, (State GPO), to R.H. Onraet,
26 May 1950, BAM, V/6, RCS.
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In the week following 3 April, the Director of Operations
devised what became known as 'the Briggs Plan', which has been
acclaimed as 'a remarkable feat.' However, it was written with
the help of civil staff and military and police officers, who
drew essentially on existing COIN strategy and policies. Briggs
then applied his own I.S. knowledge to assign priorities and
refine policies. It is probable that he had studied the Burma
rebellion of the 1930s in which his regiment had fought, and
the response there included an I.S. Committee structure,
drives, small unit area-deployed patrolling, and small scale
resettlement. Moreover, from 1945 to 1948 he was the GOC,
Burma, where irregulars were defeated in 1947 by multi-
battalion encirclements and drives, and air-supplied patrols.
He introduced a basic Committee structure to coordinate
operations in Burma, holding daily 'Morning Prayers' meetings
for this purpose, 93 and he applied this system to Malaya.
Briggs formed a tripartite Federal War Council to decide on
COIN operational policy, and an Operations Committee to draw up
military-security plans. To attain the coordinated execution of
policies, he sent directives to civil-military-police State
and District War Executive Committees [S/DWECs]. Further, a
Joint Intelligence Advisory Committee studying intelligence
matters was set up on 26 April, following the recommendation of
the Maxwell Police Mission, and Briggs also adopted its
93. On the 'feat' of the Briggs Plan, Carver Petherton P.169.
On Briggs and its writing, Communist Terrorism P.90;
Thompson Make P.92-3; 'Outline of future anti-bandit
policy in Malaya', 10 Apr. 1950, CO53715975; Maj.-Gen. H.
Briggs, Report, Nov. 1951, AIR2O/7777. On prewar Burma,
tiockaitis m/s, P.275; book, P.118. Postwar, Burma: the
struggle for independence 1944-48, Vol. 2 (London, 1984)
P.53,139,174-5,460,464,472, 497-8,850-1; McEnery P.31,46,
80,99-103, especially concerning the committees, P.59.
-327-
findings by requesting 30-40 Special Branch officers with
'experience in the Indian Police.' En addition, Sir William
Jenkin was appointed as an Advisor to the CID. He arrived on 15
May and was assisted by John Morton, the Head of the Combined
Intelligence Staff, who wanted a Director of Intelligence to
coordinate all agencies- Jenkin was appointed to this post in
November 1950. Furthermore, Special Branch officers were
trained by M15, and although they were not part of the State
and District Committees at first, Briggs gave intelligence
matters considerable and 'expert' attention. He did not seek to
embrace non-military-security planning in his reorganised COIN
framework, because it lay within the scope of Federal
departments. 94 But the new organisation made possible the
central assignment of all operational tasks, and brought about
a more unified security force effort.
'The Briggs Plan': 2) Military-security policies.
On 11 April 1950, General Harding reaffirmed the policy of
94. The committee system, DOD1, 26 Apr., DOD2, 15 May, CO537/
5975; Communist Terrorism P.94; Sunderland 4171 P.40-i;
Short P.240; Clutterbuck Long P.58; Paget P.57-8; McCuen
P.184, 188-9; Oldfield P.24; Renick Journal of S.E. Asian
History 1965, P.5; see Appendix 9. The Maxwell Mission was
a trio of police experts employed by the Colonial Office
to study the MPF at Gurney's request during Nov. 1949- A.
Maxwell Report of a Commission of Enquiry into the Malayan
Police Force 16 Mar., (Kuala Lumpur, 1950). Intelligence
advice, COS(50)216, 27 June, CO537/5975; MoD to GHQFELF,
16 May, CO537/5974; ARFM 1950 P.153; Miller P.91. On M15,
Bloch/Fitzgerald P.30. For the role of the Director of
Intelligence, W. Jenkin, to Ch.Sec., S. Sutton, 11 Oct.,
Sutton to HC, 21 Nov. 1950, CO537/5973; West P.43.
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small unit patrols following up intelligence rather than
engaging in 'prophylactic and will o' the wisp patrolling',
reiterating Boucher's tactical policy recommendations in his
final report as GOC. The Clear-and-Hold strategy and tactical
policies devised while Boucher held that position were likewise
adopted and refined by Briggs. He proposed a minimum
'Framework' of one company per regional district, and
patrolling for up to five hours trek from the fringe, in order
to lay ambushes at points known or suspected to be frequented
by guerillas, such as water or food sources or jungle tracks.
He believed that information would be attained from a
population fortified physically, and hence psychologically, in
resettlement camps with counterterrorist guards and police
posts. In addition, Briggs emphasised the importance of
resettlement for counterorganisation, which Slim was said by
War Office staff to have 'always been' in favour of, regarding
it as a prerequisite for COIN success. The CIGS had 'found in
similar operations' that this was so, having witnessed it
first-hand during a visit to Greece in 1949. Briggs also drew
on his past experience to emphasise that 'areas [must be]
dominated to such an extent that food, money, information and
propaganda are denied the enemy', as 'was proved in Burma.' He
also wished to see mounting pressure on the MRLA in the deep
jungle through air strikes and the deployment of 'Striking
Forces' for large scale operations as and when necessary, again
following 'past experience.' These methods were retained to
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accelerate the south to north clearance in Priority areas,95
although policing and army small unit patrols became the
foundation for tactical progress.
'The Briggs Plan': 3) Extra-military-security policies.
While General Briggs' responsibilities were officially
confined to the military sphere, he stressed the importance of
'Reward and Punishment' measures. He proposed negative psywar
action such as preventing uncooperative individuals from owning
land, and positive action to give the Chinese a stake in the
State, and thereby in assisting the counterinsurgents. Briggs
conceived the resettlement of initially 300,000 people as the
foundation for the positive approach, because they would
require socio-economic help, which could itself be publicised
in propaganda for wider effect. Further, he advocated the
formation of camp committees to cultivate popular support, to
organise Home Guards, and to gather information.
95. Harding's views, Report, 11 Apr., to BDCC, in, COS(50)132,
19 Apr., CO537/5974: Boucher report, Carver Petherton
P.167. Briggs' proposals, 'Outline', 10 Apr., DODs 1,2, 26
Apr., 15 May; COS(50)216, 27 June, CO537/5975; DO note, 24
May 1950, CAB134/497; Progrep., 15 Oct. 1951, DEFE11/46;
F.A. Godfrey The Malaya Emergency, 1948-60 m/s, 1978,
P.5-10, RMAS Papers, 7807-20, NAM; Short P.227,242-7;
Oldfield P.xxv; Communist Terrorism P.94,107; Sunderland
4171 P.51. On resettlement and food control, 4170 P.141-2;
Paget P.56-8. Cf. the terminology regarding operations
used by Briggs to previous. Slim's views, notes, 19 Apr.;
Lt.-Gen. N. Brownjohn, WO, notes, 26 June, CAB134/497;
CIGS to Emanuel Shinwell, MoD, 4 May 1951, CO537/7263. On
Greece, see Chapter 4.
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The Briggs Plan was accepted by all British COIN
authorities, 96 and was the basis of all subsequent military-
security action.
The Hearts-and-Minds line and new COIN doctrine, mid-1950.
The High Commissioner persistently used various negative
psywar measures, concentrating on punishing active pro-
insurgent supporters in order to deter others. But collective
punishments were infrequently applied, as Gurney stressed that
they were 'objectionable' and that he would not adopt 'ruthless
measures.' Briggs urged property forfeiture for offenders, and
Gurney and Harding considered collective fines, but concluded
that 'the whole trend of experience .. suggests [that they are]
not really an effective weapon.' 97 Previous I.S. experience
96. Briggs and psywar action, 'Outline', 10 Apr., DODs 1,2, 26
Apr., 15 May 1950, CO537/5975; DOD3, 26 Feb. 1951,
C01022/32; D.C. Watherston, (Federal Def. Sec.), note, 1
Dec. 1950, CO537/5969; Clutterbuck Long P.37; Sandhu in
Nyce/Gordon P.xxxviii; Short P.238-41: on resettlement,
P.230; Communist Terrorism P.91; PFLCM 1950-1 (Kuala
Lumpur, 1952) 19 Apr. 1950, P.128; FLCMCP 1952-3 Paper 33,
'Resettlement and the development of New Villages'. May
1952. Acceptance of his plan, Lt.-Gen. N. Brownjohn, WO,
note, 15 May, CAB134/497; SSW, John Strachey, CP(50)130,
16 June, CAB129/40; Air Mm. to FEAF, 26 Oct, AIR8/1629;
SSC, James Griffiths, CM(50)37, 19 June, CO537/6018; CP
(50)125, 13 June, CAB129/40; Cabinet Malaya Committee
minutes, 25 Sept. 1950, CAB134/497.
97. Military views in, Malaya Committee minutes, 24 Apr.; and
SSC, 14 July, CAB134/497. HC in, Attorney-General notes,
Nov. 1950, CO537/6007.
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encouraged Gurney to concentrate on the positive psywar
approach in the summer of 1950, to prevent 'social
disappointments' and provide the Chinese with 'good conditions,
in order to bring them over to our side.' Resettlement camps
received 'after-care' such as basic drainage and sanitation
systems, agricultural assistance, health, education and
community centres, and in some cases, village councils. The new
Colonial Secretary, James Griffiths, stated that, 'development
and expansion of the social services .. is one of our most
important weapons' in the struggle. Economic assistance was
also made available, and by June political reform included
twenty-two municipal elections, and the Legislative Council
discussed the extension of Chinese citizenship rights and a
'Member system' for tialays. This was 'not only as part of
progress towards self-government but also to satisfy public
demands for democratic as opposed to Communist methods' of
change. Legislation for local elections was drafted in
September, followed by approval for nine non-British Executive
'Members' of the Legislature from December 1950. Briggs and
some senior officers wanted to slow 'major political changes'
and focus attention on the military-security effort, butall
other COIN authorities agreed that building 'active and
enthusiastic' popular support by COIN political action demanded
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priority treatment.98
In May 1950, Gurney pressed not only for more civic action
and political reform, but also improved government propaganda,
which he considered to be reactive and negative 'as [it had
been] in Palestine.' The Director of Operations agreed that
COIN political initiatives required publicity, and that a
unified State propaganda effort was required. By June, the
former Controller of Broadcasting in Palestine, Alex Josey,
headed an Emergency Information Department, and MacHugh
planned to publicise government achievements and its impending
reforms. But Gurney wanted a fresh assessment of requirements
from someone who knew about 'propaganda in war conditions', and
by September, the Colonial Office secured from the BBC the
services of Hugh C. Greene. He worked in the BBC's Eastern
Europe Department and had a 'political warfare background',
having served as the Controller of Broadcasting in the British
zone of occupied Germany from 1946 to 1948. He set about
coordinating propaganda activities, and introducing new
measures like the manipulation of SEPs for anticommunist
98. HC on resettlement and social policy, PFLCM 1950-1 14
June, P.223-5; in Malaya Committee minutes, 17 Oct.,
CAB134/497; ARFM 1950 P.45-53. And on economic policy, HC,
in CGSEA note, 31 July, FZ1O114/F0371/88496; Hoong P.168;
Malaya Committee minutes, 17 July; SSC memo, 14 July,
CAB134/497; J. Griffiths Pages from Memory (London, 1969)
P.95. And political policy, HC, in CGSEA notes, 7 June,
CO537/5971; Communist Terrorism P.106. Briggs' views,
DOD6, 22 June, CO537/6003; to Ch.Sec. Sutton, 30 Oct.,
CO537/5975; Appreciation, 25 Oct., in COS(50)478, 18 Nov.,
DEFE11/42. Other officials' views- CGSEA to SSC, 24 Nov.,
CINCFELF to MoD, 13 Nov. 1950, CO537/5975.
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propaganda, and the publicising of civic action programmes.99
The Colonial Office noted in May 1950 that there had been
'lengthy consideration in Whitehall' about the state of
imperial I.S. and the danger of revolt, and as a result, the
Overseas Defence Committee had decided to distribute new
doctrine to all colonies and military Commands, as well as to
Cainberley and other military teaching institutions. The I.S.
authorities in London made an unprecedented effort to prepare
local I.S. agencies for confronting imperial rebels, and
numerous valuable new ideas were incorporated into the Colonial
Office's 'I.S. : Lessons of the Malaya Emergency.' It was
circulated together with Sir Henry Gurney's 'Despatch 5' by
September 1950. The 'Lessons' pamphlet repeated the revised War
Office 'Notes' in regard to military-security policy, while
adding more detail about counterorganisation and counter-
terrorist 'Guards'. It did not reject 'quasi-military' police
units, but gave priority to civil policing and intelligence
tasks. The manual also proposed a committee structure for COIt
organisation, and if necessary, a Director of Operations, which
was a major new doctrinal direction. Furthermore, it
99. All /ref's in CO537/. HC views and action in, Malaya
Committee minutes, 18 May, CAB134/497; J.D. Higham, CO,
note, 25 Apr., /6759. Briggs, DOD2, 15 May 1950, /5974. On
Josey, H.C. Greene, report, 14 Sept. 1951, /7255. New
propaganda ideas, J.N. MacHugh 'Policy Notes', 11 May,
/6759. HC/DO for expert advice, SSC memo, 23 June, /5999;
CGSEA, minutes, 7 June, /6011. And for a unified campaign,
ARFM 1950 P.140; Briggs to Malaya Committee, minutes, 26
June, DEFE11/37; RAF P.117, AHB. On Greene, SSC Brief, 17
Oct., CO537/5999; Clutterbuck Conflict P.190. His
proposals, H.C. Greene, report, ibid; Short P.416-8,420-i.
Their practice, P.417; DOD5, Sept. 1950, /5975.
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recommended the use of Gurney's Despatch, with its emphasis on
COIN political action. The Hearts-and-Minds line was accepted
by British COIN authorities, as it was by some contemporary
military writers, 100 and was a significant advance in British
COIN doctrine.
For a period of eighteen months after February 1950, the
British U.N. Trust Administration in Eritrea confronted
factional terrorism and sporadic guerilla attacks, involving
2000 irregulars. Early security force drives, air strikes and
large mobile columns failed to crush the opposition. But the
new I.S. doctrine went to all Army Commands in the autumn of
1950, and it was evidently adopted in Eritrea by 1951. The
Administration reformed intelligence procedures, set up a new
committee planning system, and a Home Guard for counter-
terrorist population protection, and large scale operations
were supplemented by army small unit area patrolling. Although
they were applied less frequently in Malaya, collective
punishments were widely used in Eritrea, but re-education,
social assistance programmes and a general amnesty were all
instituted in 1951, bringing the conflict to a close. 101 This
was not a COIN campaign, but the new doctrine formulated in the
100. WO/CO/ODC discussions, J.C. Morgan, CO notes, 18 May,
CO537/5434; J.M. Martin, CO, note, 22 Feb., CO537/5382.
'I.S. : Lessons' pamphlet, SSC Circular, 11 July, DEFE11/
48; its use, COS(50)144, 8 Sept. 1950, DEFE11/38. The 1949
WO 'Notes' were revised by Jan. 1950. Similar views in,
F.O. Miksche Secret Forces (London, 1950) P.67,157-9.
101. On Eritrea, Trevaskis P.108-12; U.N. Report, (1952), P.67-
9, Trevaskis Papers, 2/2, MsBEs.367, RHO; E.S./R.K.P.
Pankhurst Eritrea and Ethiopia (Essex, 1953) P.181-90: the
Trust Administration was responsible to the FO.
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light of Malayan events probably had a considerable impact on
concurrent British I.S. action.
The evolution of military-security policies,	 and
additional military doctrine devised in 1950.
Senior army commanders in Malaya exchanged tactical ideas
at periodic conferences, and at one on 11 July, they agreed
that large scale operations were still of considerable value
for pressuring and dispersing MRLA concentrations. The War
Office echoed some officers' fears that Malayan guerillas might
yet try to liberate targeted areas with large unit forces,
following the strategy recently seen in China and Greece. But
though Colonel Calvert's proposal for 'very small patrols'
caused 'considerable disagreement' among officers over whether
they could prevail if confronted by large insurgent forces,
fringe platoon patrolling was broadly supported. Indeed,
commanding officers asserted that 'FTC training covered the
requirements' for small unit patrolling, along with the War
Office's 'Warfare in the Far East' Military Training Pamphlet,
and local doctrine. A handful of commanders wanted the Training
Centre to distribute operational lessons, but the majority
argued that this was a unit responsibility, and their
conservative attitude prevented a uniform development of
tactics. 102 However, the Overseas Defence Committee's effort to
learn from Malaya was soon followed by the War Office DMT. Its
Director-General, Lieutenant-General Richard Gale, had
supported experimentation with small unit patrolling in
Palestine during 1947, and the Directorate requested a copy of
102. On China/Greece, SSW, J. Strachey, notes, 12 May, DEFE11/
36; 15 May, CAB134/497. GOC Conf. notes, 11 July, WO231/
38. Unit learning, 1 Suff., 'Operational technique and
training'; Notes for Conf., 14 Aug. 1950, B1/27, SRM.
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the Federal HQ's notes on this conference, for use in revising
its doctrine on 'antibandit tactics.' The resulting War Office
report, 'Tactics in Malaya', supplemented instruction given at
Camberley and six other military institutes, and subsequently,
officers from Malaya delivered lectures on communist insurgency
and unconventional war at the Staff College. New British Army
woodland training as a preparation for Malaya was also
introduced in the UK. 103 The Army establishment sought tactical
lessons and adapted doctrine and training accordingly, thereby
providing better COIN preparation for British soldiers after
1950.
By the summer of 1950, most army officers in Malaya were
said to have realised that 'a strong section [of infantry] was
a match for any' MRLA platoon, and although a lot of
patrolling was speculative, resettlement and improved policing
and intelligence procedures increased contact rates at the
fringe. 104 Calvert also wished to improve results, and he told
the War Office that the SAS could force irregulars out of the
jungle towards its fringes by paraguerilla patrol, tapping
intelligence sources such as the Sakai aboriginals who might
provide information in exchange for protection and the benefits
103. WO DMT notes, Lt.-Col. D.S. West, 25 Oct. 1950, W0231/38.
Lectures, Bredin P.149-52. Training, Allen, P.33.
104. Operational shift to fringes, Malaya Committee minutes, 17
July, 25 Sept., CAB134/497; FELF ISUM, 30 Oct. 1950,
DEFE11/40; 2CR note, n.d., 2GR,146A, GMW; Paget P.60. Army
views, Oldfield P.25,34; 2 Cold. Clothed P.7-8;
Clutterbuck Conflict P.214; and on intelligence, P.178-80,
184; Scots P.33, GBHQ. Concerning speculative operations,
Gen. Harding, Review of Operations, Sept. 1950, CO537/
5999.
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of civic action. Additionally, he tried to gain approval for an
enlarged SAS ready for COIN anywhere in the Empire, but the
War Office rejected his request- four companies started
training from August. Most of its intake came from the SAS of
1941-5, and the wartime experience of an Australian Advisory
Mission was also exploited. MacDonald noted that it advised on
"unorthodox" methods', and the Mission confirmed the merit of
SAS deep jungle operations. Furthermore, while the Chiefs of
Staff saw little scope for tactical deception when they
examined the subject in May 1950, and Gurney and Briggs were
wary of stirring up political disquiet by adopting these
techniques, the Australians encouraged the Federal Government
to utilise the expertise of former SOE men. In July, the
Special Branch welcomed an army advisor on deception, and in
late 1950, the theatre Command was assisted by Lieutenant-
Colonel S.D. Calvert and C. Cholmondeley, 'who had wide
experience of covert deception in the last war', with the
-33 8-
Chiefs of Staff's approval. 105
 Some units still retained their
faith in large scale operations, and debate over tactics
continued to be reflected in British military literature.'06
But the gradual shift towards lengthy small unit area
patrolling was supported by higher authorities by late 1950.
General Briggs advocated air strikes to harass the MRLA,
but the War Office and Air Ministry complained that RAF
105. All /ref's in /DEFE11. On the proposed SAS COIN force,
Calvert, interview; and on 22 SAS role and inception,
Paper; FELF to WO, 17 May; PM Australia, Robert Menzies,
to Attlee, 26 May 1950, /36; CINCFELF to WO, 2 Dec. 1951,
W0216/494; Capt. J.M. Woodhouse 'Some personal reflections
on the employment of special forces in Malaya' Army Q'ly
66, July 1953, P.68,72; Maj. C.L.D. Newell 'The SAS'
British Army Review 1, Sept. 1955, P.41-2; J. Ladd SAS
P.107-8; Geraghty P.23-41; J. Adams Secret Armies (London,
1987) P.32; Strawson SAS History P.158-9; Clutterbuck Long
P.150-5; Short P.366-7,449-55. Use of wartime SAS men, W.
Elliot, COSC minute, 13 June, /37; Shortt SAS P.19.
Australian Mission, SSW note, 12 Oct.; Malaya Committee
minutes, 17 Oct., CAB134/497; CGSEA to CO, 22 May, /36. On
SOE, R. Menzies to Attlee, 26 May; Brig. Price memo, 30
May, /36. HC/DO on deception, GHQFELF to MoD, 2 Aug., /38.
Use by Special Branch, COSC minute, W. Elliot, 13 July,
/37; GHQFELF to MoD, 25 July: COS on SOE, to Harding, 4
Aug., /38: by HQFELF, COS to BDCC, 30 Nov. 1950, /42.
106. Debate over tactics- small unit advantages, Maj. R.E.R.
Robinson 'Reflections of a Company commander in Malaya'
Army Q'ly 61, Oct. 1950, P.80-2,87; Miksche P.151,157. But
Miksche asserted that large scale action was the 'most
effective', P.169-70.
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resources could be better employed on other tasks, and that air
strikes were only being practiced because there was currently
'no other effective method' of harassment available. By the end
of 1950, the AOC, Sir Frank R.L. Mellersh, approved of small
scale air strikes, but rejected 'air drive' or 'flushing'
tactics. Along with numerous other British military officers,
he had studied current events in Indo-China, where the French
were trying to stem a developing civil war, and concluded that
'to close all escape routes from an area target in jungle is an
impossibility.' Therefore, he concentrated his attention on
other forms of air support, notably transport and supply.107
Moreover, by September Briggs was disturbed that the area-
deployment 'framework' was 'not being operated satisfactorily',
but was 'abandoned, sometimes for long periods to permit ..
large scale operations .. {which achieved] no tangible
results.' In October, he decided to drop sweeps by 'Striking
Forces' and instead employ them for intensified patrolling. The
BDCC noted that 'improvements in tactics and technique are
under constant examination', and Briggs drafted a directive on
15 November for six-week area patrolling by 'small controlled
units with a view to ambushing in the fringes.' Harding agreed
with this 'broad disposition and method of employment', and by
107. Briggs' proposal, COS(50)184, 23 Nov., CO537/5974; memo,
30 Dec., A1R23/8437; ARFM [950 P.5. SSJ views, note, 17
June, CA8134/497. Air Mm. view, to FEAF, 26 Oct., AIR8/
1629. AOC/GOC/Gray views, in Air V-Marsh. Sir F. t1ellersh,
to Briggs, 28 Dec.; to FEAF, 23 Dec.: opposition to
flushing, AOC memo, 8 Dec. 1950, A1R23/8437; RAF P.44-5,
53, AHB; Towle P.86-9; Sir F. Mellersh 'The campaign
against the Communist Terrorists in Malaya' JRUSI 96,
1951, P.407. Details of air strikes, for example, 1 Suff.
'Air strikes and supply drops', 13 June, B1/27; Malaya WD-
31 Aug., 1,19 Sept. 1950, 81/24, SRM.
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1951 two-thirds of the army was so deployed. 108
 Senior army
COIN authorities had eventually made prolonged small unit area
patrolling the basic military tactical policy, and hence
transformed British counterguerilla wisdom.
In view of the growing number of insurgent 'incidents',
albeit that most were minor in nature, such as the slashing of
rubber trees and sabotage of non-essential commercial premises,
the Director of Operations wanted the tempo of military
operations stepped up. Indeed, the theatre Defence Committee
argued that these should take priority over all other COIN
activities during the winter of 1950 to 1951. Gurney convinced
the Cabinet to provide substantial immediate extra financial
support for Malaya to allow an 'all-out effort' because 'as in
Ireland and Palestine, armed insurrection and terrorism can
quickly paralyse an administration.' But he wanted to
concentrate new resources on accelerating resettlement
rather than the military effort, as the basis of counter-
108. Briggs disturbed by the military situation, Report, Nov.
1951; RAF Review, 1 Oct., AIR2O/7777; Harding to CIGS, 24
Oct., W0216/835. Policy changes, DO Review, 25 Oct.,
CO537/5975; Dirve., 15 Nov. 1950, in Report, 1951, ibid;
Fight against P.13; Allen P.33; Short P.229-30,247. BDCC
view, to MoD, 13 Nov., DEFE11/42. Harding's view, to MoD,
13 Nov. 1950, CO537/5975. Operational details, Scots P.33,
GBHQ; DO Progrep., 15 Feb., CO537/7263; SSC Written Reply,
21 June 1951, CO537/7265; Oldfield p.xxv; Stanborough
M.Litt., P.88. Especially on sweeps, 13/18 Roy. Huss.,
'Operation PHEASANT', 14 Dec., B1/22; 1 Suff. Malaya WD,
June, 7 Dec., B1/24: area patrol and ambush on speculation
and information, 0011, 15 Aug.; 'Ambush report', 6 July,
B1/23; 'Policy- deployment', to 26 Gurk. Inf. Bde., 21
July, B1/27; WD, May-Sept., Dec. 1950, passim, B1/24, SRM.
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organisation, resource control, and protective and civic
action. And all COIN agencies in Whitehall agreed that extra-
military action warranted precedence at the end of 1950.109
Progress in COIN psywar and political policies up to the
summer of 1951.
In December 1950, the Cabinet approved new collective
punishments for those assisting insurgents, and local counter-
insurgents carried out military operations designed to have a
psychological effect on the MRLA. But Gurney realised that
these methods would not build up government levels of support
and were 'only justifiable so long as [they were] .. balanced
by constructive and progressive measures to assist the people',
in order to win 'the battle of ideas.' He again referred to the
Palestine COIN campaign, to illustrate the need to strike the
correct balance between 'severity and encouragement', and
stated that 'the best guarantee of I.S. is normally a good
administration pursuing policies acceptable to the people.' In
March 1951, the Federal Legislature ratified a proposal to
double the number of Chinese eligible for Federal citizenship,
109. Views of the BDCC, and FO/WO/CO/MoD, Cabinet Sec., J.A.V.
Heald, notes, 27 Feb. 1951, CAB13O/65; 27 Nov. 1950,
DEFE11/42; Shinwell to Attlee, 8 Aug. 1951, CO537/7263;
J.R.C. Denny, (State CPO), notes, n.d., in Sir W.C. Goode,
(Ch.Sec. Singapore, 1953), Papers, MsIOs.225, RHO.
Gurney's activities, SSC to OAG, M.V. Del Tufo, 9 Dec.,
CO537/5975; HC Statement, 15 Dec.; OAG, to Ch.Sec.,
Sutton, 2 Nov. 1950, CO537/6004; Briggs Report, Nov. 1951,
AIR2O/7777; RAF P.7, AHB; Hugh Fraser, CO Priv. Sec.,
Report, 16 Jan. 1952, C01022/22; Short P.248,250-2;
Stanborough M.Litt., P.81; Clutterbuck Long P.56. HC on
previous I.S., to SSC, 16 Jan. 1951, CO537/6593.
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and local elections in four Malay states were planned for
August. Briggs too supported the goal of 'contented
communities', and in February directed that all resettlement
camps must form Home Guards, 'to commit the Chinese to
combat[ting] Communism actively.' In addition, the Emergency
Information Service advertised government civic action through
an expanded array of media including 1700 community radios. In
April 1951, several colonial police chiefs, Army officers, M15
representatives and other Whitehall officials dealing with I.S.
issues, attended a Colonial Office conference convened to
formulate 'constructive answers' to insurgency. They agreed
with the COIN line being taken by the Malayan authorities.UO
110. Gurney on the correct psywar line, HC to CO, 25 Feb.,
CO537/7280. On I.S., to SSC, 16 Jan., CO537/6953. Military
psywar action, AOC minute, 13 Jan.; BDCC note, 13 Mar.,
A1R23/8437. COIN political action- civic action, PFLCM
1951-2 OAG, Del Tufo, 21 Nov., P.333-5; RIDA Progrep.
(Kuala Lumpur, 1952) 31 Dec., P.3-4,9,14,17,22-3; Short
P.394-5: political measures, PFLCM 1950-1 OAG, Del Tufo,
24 Jan., P.617; Communist Banditry P.103,109,120;
Communist Terrorism P.135; Fight against P.26-7; Stubbs
P.209. Briggs' support, DOD13,17, 26 Feb., 12 Oct. 1951,
CO537/7270. On the formation of Federal resettlement
guards in August 1950, Fight against P.15; Communist
Banditry P.88: Briggs for self-protection, P.118; DOD12,
17 Feb., note, 14 July, CO537/7279. EIS campaign, PFLCM
1951-2 HC, Jan., P.4-5; H.C. Greene, report, 14 Sept.,
CO537/7255; ARFM 1951 (Kuala Lumpur, 1952) P.12,180-2. CO
conference, 'Record of Conf.', 4 Sept., SSC Speech, Apr.,
CO537/6941; Jeffries P.210; and support for Malaya
policies, CGSEA to CO, 4 Jan., CO537/7263; SSC Reply, 21
June 1951, CO537/7265.
-343-
Advances in military-security and resource control policy
during 1951.
Despite General Briggs' intentions, in some Malay states
'the senior officers ha{d] a strong dislike' for patrolling and
preferred large scale operations, and the Director of
Operations was not empowered to compel them to alter their
tactical policy. Indeed, although the SAS undertook deep
jungle patrols, with the approval of the DM0- its Director from
1951, Brigadier R.W. McLeod, commanded the SAS from 1944 to
1945- they were also employed against large MRLA bands and as
part of major operations in some states. 1 Nevertheless, a
general 'intensification and improved methods' were evident by
summer 1951 and 'everywhere active patrolling .. [was] carried
out and ambushes laid.' Some units' prolonged small patrolling
of suspect areas was refined with the gradual accumulation of
intelligence, and this paraguerilla action met with increasing
111. On officers and large scale operations, J. Litton, (State
Sec., Chinese Affairs), notes, 31 Nov., RHO; 1 Suff. WD,
21 Feb., 21 Mar., B1/24, SRM; Maj. J.L. flillard 'Tactics
in Malaya' Army Q'ly 62, Apr. 1951, P.79,82-3; Short
P.248; use, ARFM 1951 P.5; Communist Terrorism P.36;
Sunderland 4170 P.128; Kukri 3, July 1951, P.45; Oldfield
P.61-5. On the SAS, DO Progrep., 1 May, AIR2O/7777;
GHQFELF, Report, to Wa, 22 Dec. 1951, W0216/494; Woodhouse
Army Q'ly 1953, P.71-3.
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success.' 12
 Hence, communist irregulars switched their
attention to vulnerable 'labour lines' such as estates and
mines. Local civil and army authorities foresaw this as a
likely consequence of better military-security policies like
resettlement, and indeed, food-denial was 'often' discussed by
them from 1950. But it was self-evident that effective food
control was not feasible until extensive resettlement was
completed. By 1951, over 125,000 people were resettled, and
Briggs felt able to develop the 'Food-restricted areas' scheme
that limited food availability. It was devised in August 1950
to give those under the greatest communist pressure an 'alibi'
for not providing them with resources. On 16 June 1951, DWECs
.were directed to extend food controls in order to undermine
MRLA elements attempting to contact the 'Mm Yuen'. In
addition, Operation STARVATION was 'a means of creating
intelligence' by forcing underground suppliers to 'surface',
thereby leaving the insurgents more vulnerable to security
112. On patrol and ambush, DO Progreps., 15 Feb., CAB13O/65; 1
May, AIR2O/7777; FELF Sitreps to WO, March-June 1951,
passim, DEFE11/44; 1 Suff. WD, Jan.-Dec. passim, B1/24,
SRM; SSC Reply, 26 June, CO537/7265; Kukri 3, 1951, P.27,
45; Oldfield P.43,68-70,90; Sunderland 4173 P.18-9; Allen
P.17; McAlister P.296-7. Success in suspect areas, DO
Progrep., 15 Oct., DEFE11/46: on information, DOD15, 7
Aug. 1951, CO537/7263; Short P.295.
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force operations. 113
 Subsequently, this proved to be a valuable
new operational direction.
Developments after Gurney, and the new COIN 'experts'.
In spite of increasing MRLA activity, by June 1951, Briggs
and Gurney sensed a 'turning point' in the campaign. Indeed,
the MCP realised that its terrorism was alienating the people,
and therefore ordered its curtailment from October. In that
month, the High Commissioner was murdered, and this sparked the
authorities in London and the Far East into introducing
orgariisational changes which assisted COIN progress. 114
 In July
1951, the CIGS chose Major-General Rob Lockhart to replace
Briggs as the Director of Operations from 12 November. His
selection was consistent with the now common British procedure
for appointing vital COIN personnel, Lockhart having been
113. Food control in 1950, FLCMCP 1952-3 Paper 33, P.B314;
Barber P.109; Komer P.59; Sunderland 4173 P.38. Insurgent
shift to attack labour, RAF P.19,81, AHB; Communist
Banditry P.22; Communist Terrorism P.36; ARFM 1951 P.8;
and discussion of controls, P.49; DOD1O, 15 Jan., CO537/
7262; DO Progreps., 15 Feb., CAB13O/65; 26 Apr., 31 May,
AIR2O/7777; Sandhu in Nyce/Gordon P.11; Stubbs P.123-4: on
STARVATION, P.105-7,111,166; DO Progrep., 31 Aug., AIR2O/
7777; DOD14, 11 June, CO537/7262; [iC/DO Appreciation, 4
June, DEFE11/45; ARFM 1951 P.2; Sunderland 4173 P.ix,7,65-
8; Paget P.61. On intelligence aspect and results of
STARVATION, Clutterbuck Conflict P.213.
114. [IC/DO in, Malaya Committee minutes, 4 June, DEFE11/44. On
the MCP, Maj.-Gen. R.tI.M. Lockhart, DO, 'The situation in
the Federation of Malaya', 26 Nov. 1951, CO537/7263;
Clutterbuck Long P.67,70; Conflict P.198; Short P.472.
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picked for his 'character, temperament and experience.' Senior
Army sources noted that he had been a Governor of the North-
West Frontier Province, 'a lively political-military job', and
displayed a 'knowledge of minor warfare'." 5
 In the interim,
clashes between Briggs and Gray over the role of the police and
their organisation led the Federal Government and General
Harding to press Whitehall to improve the direction of the
military-security campaign. Indeed, in March 1951, the Foreign
Office referred to General de Lattre de Tassigny's position as
the single COIN civil-military commander in Indo-China as a
possible exemplar for the Malayan authorities to follow. The
Colonial Office agreed that such 'a "supremo" .. might have a
tonic effect.' MacDonald rejected the idea, but after Gurney's
death in October, the Officer-Administering-the-Government,
M.V. Del Tufo, agreed to merge the Federal Executive and War
Councils, resulting in a body capable of dealing with all COIN
matters. He also tried to secure executive powers for the new
Director of Operations, who reported on the position to London
in November. Lockhart recommended the appointment of either a
'suprerno' or a single security forces chief, explicitly in
preference to customary 'Martial Law' or liaison arrangements
115. Slim's choice, minute, 25 July, to HC, 27 July, WO216/394;
to SSC, 24 July, CO537/7267; Lt.-Gen. K.G. MacLean, MoD,
notes, 10 Nov. 1951, DEFE11/46. Briggs had come out of
retirement to become the Director of Operations, and his
contract, (already extended), expired in November 1951.
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outlined in the War Office's recent 'Notes'. 116 In reaction to
reports from the anxious Malayan authorities, the Prime
Minister from November 1951, Winston Churchill, sent out Oliver
Lyttleton, the new Colonial Secretary, to report on the
situation. On 12 December, Lyttleton urged improvements in the
Home Guards, civil service, civic action and policing, and
recommended a 'supremo' who could execute a comprehensive COIN
plan. 7 Lyttleton and Churchill sought an appropriately
qualified man for the post of Director of Operations and High
Commissioner, the Prime Minister desiring someone of national
standing and insisting on personally interviewing all
candidates. Seven men were considered, including Montgomery,
Mountbatten and Scobie, who all possessed postwar I.S.
experience. But the War Office proposed Major-General Brian
Robertson, who had been Deputy-Governor of the UK zone in
occupied Germany, and was at present commanding British forces
engaged in fighting with irregulars in the Suez Canal Zone. He
wished to continue there and refused the offer, and therefore a
ninth name, that of Major-General Gerald Templer, was submitted
to Churchill, and approved by him in early January 1952.
116. Harding proposal, Carver War P.22. On Briggs/Gray, OAG Del
Tufo, to SSC, 1 Nov., CO1022/7; Barber P.109. FO/CO views
on supremo, CO note, Mar., CO537/7263. MacDonald, Short
P.323. Federal action, OAG, in CO note, 15 Nov., DEFE11/
46; OAG Statement, 17 Oct., C01022/24; Communist Terrorism
P.145; Stanborough M.Litt.,P.97. Gen. R. Lockhart, report,
26 Nov. 1951, CO537/7263.
117. PM's views and action, Sunderland 4171 P.61; Barber P.140;
Stanborough M.Litt., P.98. Lyttleton's views, draft Memo,
l5Nov.1951,CO1022/39; The Memoirs of Lord Chandos (London,
1962) P.358,364: Report, P.373,379-80; Short P.333; Paget
P.62; Stubbs P.139.
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Templer was proposed by the War Office on account of his
experience, 118
 and he used it to good effect to develop COIN
policies, to an extent that has been overlooked.
General Templer was an Irishman and would have been
interested in the COIN in Ireland, and he fought Arab
irregulars in the Palestine rebellion of 1936 to 1937. He later
worked on intelligence at the War Office, and in 1940 studied
past unconventional warfare with experts on the subject, such
as J.C.F. Holland and Sir Cohn Gubbins. During 1945 and 1946,
he grappled with civil and police issues as the Military
Governor of the British zone in Germany. He then became the
Director of Military Intelligence at the War Office from 1946
to 1948, and was charged with briefing the Chiefs of Staff on
external and I.S. threats. 9 He would therefore have been kept
informed about the activities of armed Burmese communists, and
on becoming the Vice-CIGS in February 1948, the insurgency in
Malaya became a preoccupation of his for two years. In
addition, although it has been previously ignored by
historians, Templer's ideas about the appropriate style of COIN
action were probably conditioned in part by the Greek
experience. He was kept up to date about the situation in
Greece as DM1, and then as VCIGS. Further, on becoming the
Federation's High Commissioner, he was briefed by the DM1,
Colonel Arthur C. Shortt, who took up that post in 1949
immediately after returning from Athens, where he had been the
Military Attach. Some army commanders in Malaya had served
118. On candidates, Sir A.E. Young, Narrative, m/s, RHO; PM to
SSC, 4 Jan. 1952, FZ1O18/F0371/101223. Choice, J. Cloake
Templer: Tiger of Malaya (London, 1985) P.204.
119. On Ireland, Palestine, Germany, and WO: Cloake P.59,61,
68,70,165,171; Stubbs P.144.
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there recently too, and DM0 staff compared the problems posed
by Greek and Malayan guerillas in the 'Official History' of the
BMM(G) written in 1952. Such connections with, and allusions to
Greece, might have encouraged COIN authorities in Malaya to
draw comparisons between the two communist revolts. This was
not the main source of Templer's COIN policies, but he said
that 'Germany and Whitehall enabled .. [him] to tackle' the
situation in the Federation, and some of his ideas were 'long
harboured in the back of his mind.' 120 Certainly, the conflict
in Greece cannot be discounted as an influence shaping his
adopted COIN line.
Templer arrived in Malaya in February 1952 and met local
officials, including the new Police Commissioner from 25
January, Sir Arthur E. Young. Colonel Gray was removed
unceremoniously after persistent disagreements over the role of
the police with other high level Malaya authorities. Young was
selected by Lyttleton for his 'wide police experience',
including a spell with the British Military Government in
occupied Germany during Templer's Governorship. The High
Commissioner soon secured the appointment of other former
colleagues, including the new GOC from 1 June, Major-General
120. Templer's knowledge of Malaya as VCIGS, Cloake P.181;
Clutterbuck Long P.80. Templer on his influences,
interview t/s, 30 Mar. 1977, P.5,11,13, in, D.L. Lloyd-
Owen Papers, 8011-132-2, NAN; Barber P.197. On Greece, see
Chapter 4; on Shortt, Appendix 1; MacFetridge, letter, 24
Jan. 1991. On officers, including Maj.-Gen. L.E.0.W.
Perowne, (BMM(G) Head, 1950-2), Brig. M.C.A. Henniker Red
shadow over Malaya (London, 1955) P.159; and DM0 reference
to Malaya, Maj. R.E. Austin, M03, in 'The History of the
BMM(G), 1945-52', W0202/908, written in 1952- MoD Booklist
312/6, MODL.
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Hugh Stockwell, though it was General Lockhart who was made
responsible for army tactical and training development, as
Templer's Deputy-Director of Operations. General Templer also
asked for specialist assistance with intelligence and psywar
matters, and all the major COIN authorities in Whitehall helped
to provide him with the experts he sought. Although R. White,
his first choice for the position of Director of Intelligence,
was unavailable because of his secondment by M15, the post was
filled by John Morton, who had worked at Indian Central
Intelligence between 1930 and 1947 and then with the CIS. He
was advised by the British Security and Secret Services, and
these agencies also assisted both the new chief of the Special
Branch, Guy Madoc, who came from the Singapore CID, and the new
Director-General of the Information Service, Alec Peterson, the
former Deputy-Director of Psywar in the wartime South-East Asia
Command. A specialist Foreign Office unit was additionally
secured to offer him guidance. Further, Templer acquired a War
Office Operational Research Section for research into tactical
and technical aspects of counterguerilla war.' 21 Additionally,
121. Templer meets locals, Cloake P.210-3. On Young, see
Appendix 1; Young, in Fyfe, (Home Sec.), letter, 16 Jan.,
Young, 4/4, RHO; Stanborough M.Litt., P.130; ARFM 1952
P.208: on the ORS, P.4-5; C.H. Everett, COSC Sec., note, 1
Feb., DEFE11/47; and new GOC/C0S, Communist Terrorism
P.155; WO to FELF, 12 Mar. 1952, WO216/630; Cloake P.211-
2. On Lockhart, HC Statement, 4 June 1952 , CO1022/7. On
intelligence and advisors, ARFM 1952 P.6; Andrew P.490-i;
Miller P.93; Short P.360; Cloake P.228; West P.44;
Communist Terrorism P.163: on psywar, P.152-3; Templer,
interview t/s, P.13, Lloyd-Owen, NAM. And advisors, Bloch/
Fitzgerald P.72: on the FO's advisor, T. [lodge, A.D.C.
Peterson 'Federation Information Services' Malaya 2, Feb.
1953, P.87.
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he established a central Intelligence Staff and restructured
the Director of Operations Committee in order to hasten
operational planning. Moreover, he proclaimed that COIN and all
other government activities were inextricably linked, and
injected new vigour into the COIN effort by his forthright
statements, extensive national tours and demands for swift
action. 122
Extra-military policies and the consolidation of the
Hearts-and-Minds line in 1952.
Templer approved some negative psywar measures to punish
those assisting insurgents, and authorised the razing of a
dozen houses of such people in August 1952, because he 'had to
do something.' He also accepted that controls like curfew could
have a punitive impact, but resorted to collective punishments
far less often than his predecessor.' 23
 Templer's most
celebrated use of such measures was his order for extended
curfew, food rationing and searches at Tanjong Malim in April,
following a nearby terrorist attack. But although this produced
a punitive effect, he was adamant that his aim was population-
resource control and information-collection in the innovative
122. On Templer's reorganisation, HC to SSC, 28
60; ARFM 1952 P.4-5; Communist Terrorism
P.241-2,251-2, 301; Templer interview t/s,






123. Templer on the need for him to act, interview t/s, P.18,
Lloyd-Owen, NAM. On the destruction of huts at Permatang
Tinggi, HC to SSC, 25 Apr., C01022/55; DO Staff notes, 9
Oct. 1952, C01022/56; Malaya under P.30-3; Sunderland 4174
P.39; Cloake P.273.
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Operation QUESTION, involving secret questionnaires about the
insurgents. He said his measures were 'in no way collective
punishments', and he opposed any broadening of the negative
psywar approach, having learned that 'in Palestine
collective fines d[id] not pay a dividend." 24 Thus, General
Templer drew on previous I.S. campaigns to shape his Hearts-
and-Minds COIN line.
Templer energetically implemented a Cabinet Directive
instructing him to prosecute COIN first and foremost, while
simultaneously making progress towards self-government and
instituting nation-building measures. In fact, there were local
elections in February 1952, and the State was already
introducing labour welfare schemes, building public housing and
setting up cooperatives. These projects were regarded by
General Templer as essential for COIN purposes, and on 19
March, he declared that the crux was to win over people's
'hearts and minds.' He proposed the extension of Chinese
citizenship, local elections, Home Guard units and private land
ownership, as well as the formation of youth groups and a
Federation Regiment, and other civic action which he considered
124. HC's action and ideas, to SSC, 2 Apr., 26 May, C01022/54,
56; HC Political report 4, 22 May 1952, FZ1O18/F0371/
101224; letter, to V. Purcell, 1954, in Templer Papers,
7410-29/5, NAN.
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to be 'an integral part of the fight."25
From May to November 1952, the High Commissioner steered
legislation through the Federal Councils that resulted in more
welfare assistance to workers, the Federation Regiment,
expanded education schemes, municipal elections, the doubling
of Chinese citizenship, and their first restricted opportunity
to enter the Malayan Civil Service. 126
 This programme was
publicised by the Information Service, and it devised new types
of SEP propaganda, such as instructional entertainment and
lecture tours. By October, 'voice aircraft' were also used to
disseminate propaganda. 127
 There was concensus among local COIN
authorities that 'civil measures' were at the fore of a
125. Civic action before Templer, Progress of the Development
Plan of the Federation of Malaya, 1950-2 (Kuala Lumpur,
1953) P.23,28,30,46,55. Templer's plans, PFLCM 1952-3 HC,
19 Mar., P.8-12; 19 Nov., P.459,463-4; Political report 3,
29 Apr., to SSC, FZ1O18/FO371/101224; to SSC, 13 Mar.,
C01022/100; Speech notes, 25 Apr. 1952, 7410-29/1, NAM;
Communist Terrorism P.155-7; Fight against P.10; Cloake
P.220,225,262,288.
126. COIN political action, CO Draft Brief, 25 Feb., C01022/29;
HC memo,Aug.1952,C01022/107; Fight against P.27,30; The
progress of the campaign in Malaya (London, 1952) P.2; V.
Purcell Malaya: Communist or free? (London, 1954) P.229;
R. Sunderland Winning the Hearts-and-Minds of the people:
Paper 4174 (Sa. Mon., 1964) P.14; Short P.342,346.
127. On propaganda developments, ARFM 1952 P.286; Barber P.160;
Komer P.71; Sunderland 4171 P.40-i. Aircraft, 'Op.
HAILER', ORS (Psywar), memo, 2 Oct. 1952, A1R23/8558; RAF
P.115-7, AHB.
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campaign comprising 'a combination of political advancement and
political-military action.' Indeed, at the end of 1952, when
the application of collective punishments against the Mau-Mau
rebels in Kenya was debated, the Colonial Office echoed Sir
Henry Gurney by insisting that if they were considered
necessary, punitive methods must be 'balanced by constructive
and progressive measures.'' 28
 It recommended the adoption of
positive psywar action by the Nairobi authorities, leaning
towards a Hearts-and-Minds rather than a Cost-Benefit COIN
line.
Military-security arid resource control policies, and
refinement of COIN doctrine in 1952.
By 1952 'big operations in the jungle' were 'most
unpopular [with the security forces] .. throughout Malaya.' The
Air Ministry accepted that 'air forces cannot adopt .. their
traditional [i.s. punitive bombing] role', and the AOC in
Malaya argued that 'with certain types of very successful
ground tactics, air action [meaning offensive fire-support
128. Views about the Malaya campaign, CO notes, Jan., CO1022/2;
1/2GR 014, 5 Apr., 2GR,133, GMW; AOC, Air-Marsh. Frank
Fogarty, to Air-Ch. Marsh. Alan Saunders, 8 Feb. 1952,
AIR2O/7610. On the Kenya situation, T.I.K. Lloyd, CO note,
Sept., in Mockaitis m/s, P.298; CO 'Notes for SSC for the
Kenya Debate', Dec. 1952, C01022/56; CO and WO views,
Cloake P.300. On the application of COIN experience to
Kenya, see P.360.
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missions] is .. unnecessary.' 129 The SAS was assigned to fight
the few major MRLA forces left in the jungle that 'normal
security force patrols' were unable to cope with, operating in
considerable strength and experimenting with deployment by
parachute. But the SAS mainly practiced small unit deep jungle
patrolling, and 'routine' army training and operations
increasingly consisted of 6 to 25-man paraguerilla action,
inherently featuring not only speculative movement in suspect
areas, but ever more intelligence-based prolonged patrolling
and ambush.' 3° Information accumulated as COIN policies began
to take effect and also because the security forces reformed
their intelligence training and practices. Further, M15 advised
the Special Branch on infiltrating the insurgent infrastructure
and the 'turning' of SEPs to the counterinsurgent side, and by
129. Large scale operations! with air-strikes, Brig. I.L Wight
'Malaya' Brassey's Annual 1952 (London, 1952) P.217-8;
Col. G.G. Elliot, 'Malaya 1952' notes, n.d., Papers, LHC;
[-IQFEAF OSUMs to Air Mi, Aug.-Dec., passim, A1R23/8553.
Flaws, and opposition, Smith Kathmandu P.49; Henniker
P.13,131; Cloake P.242. Air Mm., 'Comments', 4 Jan.;'AOC
to Air-Ch. Marsh. A. Saunders, 8 Feb., AIR2O/7610;
AHQMa1., to FEAF, 18 June 1952, AIR8/1629.
130. On the SAS, RAF OSUM, 14 Feb., A1R23/8564. Small unit
patrol training, 26 Inf. Bde., T13, 14 Feb., 2GR,133, GMW.
Operations, 1 Suff., WD, Apr.-Dec., passim, B1!28, SRM;
Hugh Fraser, CO Priv. Sec., Report, to SSC, 16 Jan.,
C01022/22; RAF OSUM, 13 LIar., A1R23!8564; GOC S.Mal., 22
Mar. letter, in, HQMa1./26GR Inf. Bde., report, 15 Apr.,
Stockwell, 7/4, U-IC; COS(52)275, 20 May, AIR2O/7418; 1!2GR
Ols, 5,18 Apr. 1952, 2GR,133, GMW; Henniker P.132;
Clutterbuck Long P.54; Scurr P.24; Oldfield P.191; Komer
P.49; Short P.368.
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1952 many assisted security force patrols. Tactical adaptation
also occurred in individual units that decided 'to adopt bandit
tactics' and consider 'the use of civilian clothes', in what
they termed 'Q' or 'Ranger' pseudogangs. 131
 In April, Templer
noted that rapid troop transportation by helicopters appeared
to be 'the only new technique in sight', but they were not
available in any quantity until 1953. Notwithstanding this, he
encouraged the process of tactical refinement at the Training
Centre, and furthermore, ordered junior officers to write
reports on all patrol operations, so that the Operational
Research Section could 'collate all the accumulated information
[and then] draw conclusions' from this material and propose
adjustments to methods and techniques. He was also accompanied
by a staff of four 'wise men' on his frequent nation-wide
tours, and they collected new ideas and ensured that lessons
were adopted by COIN agencies. Indeed, the staff contacted Far
East Land Forces officers who met their GHQ counterparts in
Indo-China, although apparently no significant COIN 'lessons'
were drawn from the civil war there. In addition, advice about
deception techniques from former SOE men was supplemented by a
scientific research team approved by the Chiefs of Staff. In
October 1952, its leader, Dr. Cockburn, recommended boobytraps
and electronic warfare to improve small unit contact rates.
131. Police retraining, ARFM 1952 P.14,208-il; Stubbs P.156-7.
Special Branch and M15, HC Political Report 2, 13 Mar.,
FZ1O18/F0371/101224; Miller P.94-7; Barber P.162-3; Cloake
P.229; Sunderland 4172 P.2,20-4,30-1,34. HQMa1. held 10-
day intelligence courses for all COIN agencies by 1952,
Sir A.E. Young, MPF Training Programme, spring 1952,
C01022/68. On 'Q' patrols, 26GR Inf. Bde. T13, 14 Feb.;
1/2GR Ols, 23 Feb., 5 Apr. 1952, 2GR,133, GMW; 1 Suff. WD,
30 Jan. 1951, B1/24, SRM. Cf. to CATs.
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These measures were implemented progressively after 1952.132
Taken together, this was an unprecedented effort to develop
British counterguerilla tactical policy, and considerable
progress was made by mid-1952.
During the summer of 1952, the Malaya HQ received a
proposal from an army intelligence officer, Captain H. Latimer,
for a three-month build-up of intelligence in a target area,
afforded by minimum military action and increased intelligence
collection and food control, followed by the 'turning' of
132. On helicopters, HQMa1. GSO1(Plans), note, 29 Apr., W0216/
542; COS(52)90,275,404, 24 June, 20 May, 29 July; MoD
message, 20 June, AIR2O/7418. On the FTC, Young, MPF Trg.
Pgmme., ibid. Patrol reports, Oldfield P.129,133. HC's new
staff, Clutterbuck Long P.84. GHQ contacts, Cloake P.296.
On the ORS, Memo 5/52, Dec., in Stockwell, 7/3, LHC. On
advice from SIS (former SOE) men, H. Fraser, CO Report, 16
Jan., C01O22/22. On Cockburn team, his report, to HC; C.H.
Everett, COSC Sec., memo, 9 Oct. 1952, DEFE11/49.
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identified insurgents, and then the relaxation of controls to
allow pro-insurgent supporters to contact and supply
irregulars, in conjunction with intensified military-security
operations. This 'target manipulation' was implemented during
Operation HAMMER from October 1952, and unlike previous
schemes, it incorporated 'really effective food control',
proficient intelligence work, and then 'a host of minor
operations' rather than large scale methods. It proved to be a
successful and subsequently much copied progression of
military-security policy.133
General Templer vigorously pursued better COIN practice
throughout 1952, by August instructing the seventy-one DWECs
to set up training courses for all security forces. The
curriculum covered all aspects of COIN, including the insurgent
threat, intelligence and organisational arrangements, outlines
of small unit tactics and military-security policies,
resettlement, guards, and controls, as well as the requirements
of extra-military COIN action.' 34
 Templer was especially
'disturbed' by the army's loss of knowledge about operations
133. Capt. Latimer's scheme in, Clutterbuck Conflict P.211-2,
215-9; Long P.96-7,117,121; Miller P.101; Henniker P.138-
9,144; HAMMER, Orders, 3 Oct., in W.B. Tucker Papers,
MslOs.125, RHO; 1 Suff. WD, HAMMER, 13 Dec. 1952, B1/28,
SRt1; Operation notes, n.d., Stockwell, 7/3, LHC; ARFM 1952
P.11-2; Stubbs P.167-8,177-9; Clutterbuck Long P.122,226;
Short P.376-7; and on previous trials, P.440.
134. Templer's views, to G(Ops)HQMa1., 'Notes for DWEC
courses', 26 Aug.; and on DWEC courses, DO Staff, notes, 1
Aug.; DWEC Directing Staff, Notes- 'The machinery of
command for planning', 'Joint plan with appreciation',
Aug. 1952, Stockwell, 7/4, LHC.
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through unit 'turbulence', and therefore, to ensure its
thorough preparation for COIN, he commissioned 'The Conduct of
Anti-Terrorist Operations, Malaya, (1952).' This new doctrine
was written by a team led by Major-General Walter Walker in
1952, as a basis for army training. It reiterated the guidance
provided by District authorities, and supplemented this with
more detail on Clear-and-Hold and small unit tactics. Air
strikes and large scale operations for harassment were also
advocated, but the shortcomings of these tactics were
mentioned. The emphasis was placed on sustained small unit area
patrolling based on intelligence or using 'recce' groups, and
the CATOM manual advocated a counterguerilla strategy and
paraguerilla tactics that were a major advance on prewar
British Army I.S. doctrine. Furthermore, it incorporated new
COIN principles, including a Committee system, resettlement and
food controls, and civic action as part of the positive psywar
approach.' 35
 It was designed for use in Malaya, but as a
rebellion gradually emerged in Kenya, the administration there
followed the example set during the 'Emergency', adopting such
measures as national registration, stringent controls and Home
Guards. There was not a swift systematic transfer of 'lessons'
from Malaya to Kenya during 1952 because of the comparatively
weak threat that the Mau-Mau posed at first, a resultant degree
of complacency in Nairobi, and also because of the nature of
the British bureaucratic-institutional structure. Nonetheless,
as a result of Britain's postwar COIN experience, by the time
that this fourth revolt broke out, Whitehall authorities were
better prepared to manage it than ever before. During the
spring of 1953, the CATOM book was 'used in Kenya almost word
for word, with only minor changes,' and the 'Malaya model' of
COIN was applied. The CATOM proved to be the prototype 'for
135. HQMa1., CATOM (Kuala Lumpur, 1952), passin, 6511-23, NAM.
Walker's role, letter, 25 Feb. 1991.
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subsequent COIN pamphlets and .. a source of doctrinal
principles and procedures.' 136
 But Malaya was only one chapter
of the British COIN story, and likewise, the Malaya manual was
only a single element of Britain's new COIN doctrine, the
others being Gurney's crucial 'Despatch 5' of 1949, and the
Colonial Office's comprehensive 'I.S. : Lessons of the Malaya
Emergency' of 1950. Together these works encapsulated the basic
Hearts-and-Minds COIN line and key policies used in later
campaigns. 137
 They represented a transformation in British COIN
wisdom after 1945, and were the culmination of eight years of
seminal COIN development.
136. Kenya uses registration following Malaya, SSC memo, 4 Apr.
1952, CO537/6959. And other measures, Clutterbuck Conflict
P.168; and on the threat in Kenya, A. Clayton Counter-
insurgency in Kenya (Nairobi, 1976) passim. On CATOM's use
in Kenya, D. Charters, letter, 9 May 1990; Intelligence
Paper, 30 Mar. 1989, P.2,49; Armies P.194-5, 198; C.N.M
Blair, [MoD], Guerilla Warfare (London, 1957) P.vii, NAM;
Darby P.55. On its later use by Britain, Mockaitis, m/s,
P.32,298,306-10,328-9; Carver Seven P.264; Lord Bourne
'The direction of anti-guerilla operations' Brassey's
Annual 1964 (London, 1964) P.207; Paget P.78.
137. The Hearts-and-Minds line was adopted across the globe
from the 1950s onwards, for instance, in Guinea-Bissau,
Angola, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Turkey, the Phillipines.
Selected policies were also widely used, for example,
resettlement, in the USSR, Algeria, Iraq, Spanish Sahara,
Zimbabwe.
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Chapter 6: Counterinsurgency developments in retrospect.
British COIN reflected traditional I.S. policies and
doctrine in 1945 and 1946, and the security forces also relied
on 'general knowledge'. When the familiar style of operations
failed to make progress against insurgency, high level
political and military officials in Palestine and Greece
conscientiously sought guidance from imperial I.S. history. But
in the main this featured conflicts other than insurgency, and
what little COIN experience there was offered few obvious
universal lessons to the early-postwar counterinsurgents. The
frequent success of traditional I.S. wisdom in practice between
the wars ensured that individuals and institutions initially
adhered to its tenets, 1 a tendency underscored by British
perceptions of minority rebellions with limited popular
participation that should be eradicated by the usual Cost-
Benefit I.S. line. The British authorities at first failed to
fully appreciate the potency of the insurgent threats they
confronted, and only after customary measures faltered in
practice did COIN agencies try to devise new methods.
The security forces in Palestine received normal I.S.
training and indoctrination throughout the campaign, but the
Cabinet's qualms about applying a ruthless Cost-Benefit line in
the light of political considerations about British public and
American government opinion prevented the repression desired by
many of the Army's most senior officers. Field-Marshals Brooke
and Montgomery supported time-honoured I.S. procedures like
those practiced between 1936 and 1939, but the Cabinet was
convinced by political arguments against the adoption of this
line until 1947, when the search for a separate political
1.	 Concerning the influence of individual Britons on the
process of COIN development, see Appendix 1.
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settlement ended. However,
Cunningham, was not only :
coercion, but also wanted
although its approval by th
of the prevailing condi
eventually accepted a
administered in the mandate
Office concluded that the
defective. Further,
	 the
devising programmes of grad
various re2ions of the
the High Commissioner, General
- at ease with the idea of State
integral COIN political action,
Cabinet was not feasible because
ions in Palestine. Cunningham
sort to the tough measures
before the War, but the Colonial
raditional British I.S. line was
)epartment's responsibility for
al socio-political development in
irnire 2 gave its officials the
opportunity to study nation-building measures that would become
the basis for an alternative to repressive I.S. methods.
However, the Army's sphere of responsibility was restricted,
and, as a consequence, so was its vision in assessing the
nature of the insurgent threat and the possible types of
counteraction to it. The Army was concerned about its failure
in Palestine and sought to ascertain why its policies had not
succeeded, in order to make them work in future. But it was an
innately conservative institution, and its upper echelons were
not psychologically ready to discard knowledge built up over
decades because of what could be perceived as an aberration.
The War Office's review of its I.S. doctrine in 1947 reflected
this predominant attitude within the military establishment.
Montgomery believed that the fault in Palestine lay not
with the Army's actions, but with those of the Cabinet, which
prevented the implementation of more forceful military-security
and control policies until 1947. In reality, these were not
best suited for COIN, and the War Office was uninterested in
2. For an account of CO duties and plans for imperial
development, see chapters on the postwar period in, J.
Cross The fall of the British Empire, 1918-68 (London,
1968).
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altering its doctrine during 1945 and 1946, not simply because
of its innate conservatism, but because it believed that its
existing I.S. practices were adequate for coping with the
insurgent threat. Further, in the circumstances of postwar
military cuts, unit turbulence, and the need for swift training
of conscripts in order to enable them to undertake their I.S.
duties promptly, following the traditional path was obviously
the least complicated way of preparing soldiers for COIN.
Furthermore, large scale operations were familiar to those who
fought in the War, and this style of I.S. tactics was therefore
easier to adopt than to develop new small unit patrol methods.
The War Office accepted some adjustment of existing policies by
soldiers on the ground through the accustomed practice of
learning on—the—job. But immediately following the War, the
British Army was not disposed to reappraise its I.S. wisdom,
and it could not have acted upon any other framework at the
start of its peacetime COIN commitments. However, as the
Palestine embroilment drew to a close, the War Office Military
Training branch attempted to learn from the two year conflict,
following a lead taken by the Cabinet's Overseas Defence
Committee. The War Office's researchers appreciated the
potential benefits of a tripartite committee system
coordinating COIN efforts, like that created in the mandate.
But they evidently concluded that the Army's inability to
defeat the insurgents stemmed from the mis- or non-application
of I.S. policies due to political constraints, echoing
Montgomery's feelings. The Department's traditionalists were
clearly in the ascendant 3 successfully opposing those in
Whitehall who were more ready to alter operational policies in
3.	 The WO's 1949 'Notes' emphasised the need for inter-agency
cooperation, but did not propose a committee organisation,
indicating that the concept was not universally accepted
within the Department.
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the light of experience.
The lack of COIN success in Palestine led at least one
local formation commander to contemplate tactical refinement in
the middle of 1946, and he referred to the Commandos as a model
for change. His initiative was not widely supported, but facing
similar flaws in familiar large scale operations in the autumn
of 1946, the BMM(G) embraced the idea of tactical adaptation
founded on the exploits of the wartime Commandos. In the
context of the desperate situation there, the War Office DM0
supported a trial with an unorthodox force of nearly three
thousand men. Montgomery also overcame his previous scepticism
and approved of the new force, which was designed to complement
large scale operations rather than to replace them, reflecting
the War Office's Report on guerilla warfare of late 1944, which
recommended air-supported small units assisting in major
offensives, (although the Greek 'commandos' were to patrol
independently too). The War Office therefore supported limited
tactical adaptation in Greece, possibly wishing to evaluate the
performance of the 'commandos' while bearing in mind a
potential future COIN role for the SAS, whose re-constitution
it had approved two months before. Moreover, although the Army
hierarchy advocated large scale offensives in Palestine and
Greece during 1947, early in that year the High Commissioner
proposed new COIN schemes founded on wartime example, and the
formation of another unorthodox force comprised of special
police units was supported by the SIS, the Colonial Office and
the DM0. A growing interest in unorthodox wartime activities
was reflected in contemporary British military literature, and
there was a small scale shift in security force tactics in
Palestine during the spring of 1947, the Army undertaking more
short duration small unit patrol and ambush. However, the
political uproar caused by the inept practices of new special
police squads enabled opponents of unorthodox tactics to
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emphasise traditional tactical policies for COIN purposes. A
report on guerillas sent to the War Office in the summer of
1947 also backed air-supported light infantry as a complement
to large scale operations. But it gave no fresh impetus for the
further development of small unit tactics, and at that time the
traditionalists were able to shape the War Office's I.S.
doctrinal review and ignore new tactical ideas.
Some progressive British COIN thinking resulted from the
UK's effort to assist the Greek government from 1945, which
included a brief spell of COIN operational advising in 1947.
Indeed, by the middle of that year, the DM0 approved of the
Clear-and-Hold military-security strategy, population self-
protection Home Guards and relocation. However, from March 1947
until 1948, Britons had no COIN operational role and British
COIN thought was not advanced, and the Foreign Office
criticised the War Office and the British army mission for
complacency over the Greek situation. The Foreign Office, like
other British COIN authorities, looked to the recent War for
tactical inspiration, referring to the Chindits as an example
of the type of flexible military thinking required in Greece.
Indeed, with the persistent poor showing of large scale
offensives, the British military missions in Athens reviewed
counterguerilla tactics between July and October 1947. The RAF
asked the SIS for new ideas, 4
 and it suggested parachuted COIN
4.	 RAF officers in Greece and Malaya displayed a considerable
degree of tactical awareness, often being more ready to
develop counterguerilla tactics than their army
compatriots. This fact probably stemmed from the
comparatively minor involvement of the RAF in I.S. duties
between the Wars, and the consequent absence of a long -
established body of traditional IS. 'general knowledge'
within it.
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forces. In addition, following wartime precedent, the Air Force
and Army groups sponsored greater use of air support. Moreover,
the Military Mission recommended the general adoption of army
extended small unit patrolling, which was a major advance in
counterguerilla tactical thinking. However, the Mission was not
empowered to demand that this was practiced, its Commander was
in any case non-committal about a radical change of direction,
and the Greek armed forces and American army advisors were
conservative-minded in terms of tactics and also opposed a
major shift because of the lack of available resources to
effect it. Furthermore, while the RAF Delegation pressed for
more prolonged patrolling in mid-1948, the Greek insurgents
gradually shifted towards outright civil war. British Service
personnel played a key role in COIN operational advising until
September 1948, but the two sides increasingly concentrated on
conventional rather than counter/guerilla war, and the
importance of devising new counterguerilla tactics decreased.
The campaign did not give the BMM(G) the opportunity to devise
and evaluate a paraguerilla policy, and indeed, War Office
planners produced orthodox tactical outlines for use in Greece
at the start of 1948. The traditionalists also dominated both
Staff College instruction and, apparently, the Department's
continuing review of I.S. doctrine, which omitted any study of
wartime unorthodox forces or Resistance movements. Nonetheless,
in early 1948 it made an unparalleled effort to assist local
army personnel undertaking COIN tasks, by providing nearly
one-hundred new advisors specifically selected for their
experience, a substantial amount of which was in unconventional
warfare. This followed the example set by the Colonial and
Foreign Offices which sought to employ specially qualified
individuals for COIN tasks, and applying I.S. expertise in this
manner became a principle adopted by all British agencies
before the start of the Malaya insurgency. Moreover, in October
1948, the highest levels of the British military establishment
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commended reports from the BMM(G) that recommended that were
Britain to encounter another communist insurgency like the one
in Greece, Clear-and-Hold should be carried out with the
maximum number of air-supported troops. Significantly, this
signalled a new willingness to adapt British COIN operational
policies, and this occurred in Malaya after 1948.
Field-Marshal Montgomery, the CIGS from mid-summer 1946,
never grasped the subtleties of the political-psychological
action required of counterinsurgents, and during the Palestine
and Greece campaigns he maintained his conviction that it was
not his business to consider such matters. However, these fell
within the purview of Colonial and Foreign Office staffs, and
by the autumn of 1946, Cunningham called for COIN political
action. Within a year, numerous British officials independently
concluded that political action was necessary in Greece, and
the Foreign Office advocated a politico-military course.
Further, although Whitehall was uneasy about the idea of
peacetime propaganda- and there had been a glaring deficiency
in this regard in Palestine- as the Cold War emerged, the
Foreign Office began to take considerable interest in this
instrument and itself formed an Information Research section.
Six months before the t4alayan revolt, the Foreign Office wanted
civic action policies developed in Greece, and M15 agreed with
it. Foreign and Colonial Office officials dealt with political
issues as a matter of course, and their exposure to insurgency
in Palestine and Greece convinced them that the familiar
coercive I.S. line would not defeat revolutionary underground
mass movements. Although there is no evidence that the Colonial
Office prepared COIN political action plans after 1947 in
readiness for a future campaign, when the second communist
insurgency began, it favoured a new COIN line. Hence, with this
in mind, Gurney was appointed as the new High Commissioner of
Malaya, and he subsequently drew on both the Palestine and the
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Greek experiences to begin constructing a new COIN path, in
preference to total reliance on familiar Cost-Benefit policies.
The War and Colonial Offices had yet to develop new COIN
procedures when, only a month after Britain's withdrawal from
the Levant, they were faced with another insurgency. Indeed,
the Army received familiar I.S. training and indoctrination
prior to the Emergency, and London once more relied on the
local authorities to produce viable COIN plans in the light of
prevailing conditions, rather than trying to transfer COIN
policies directly from other countries to Malaya. It was
fortuitous for the British Government that local political and
military personnel possessed an awareness not only of familiar
E.S. practices, but also of wartime unorthodox units and
undergrounds, and recent COIN campaigning. These factors in the
shaping of British COIN action have not been properly
appreciated, and British counterinsurgents' reference to COIN
in Greece has been completely overlooked by historians- yet
they clearly played a significant role.
	
At the start of COIN in Malaya, MacDonald,
	 the
Commissioner-General, requested Palestine veterans to
reinforce the police, and ensured that a basic committee
organisation was created. The Colonial Office supported his
efforts, and despite having been appointed as the Gold Coast
police chief, Colonel Gray was sent to Malaya to advise on
COIN, and soon after he became its new Police Commissioner. The
Colonial Office obviously drew comparisons between the two
rebellions, and moreover, it sought to learn from the Malaya
conflict and to transfer lessons to other colonies that it
perceived might also be threatened by such movements in the
future. It tried to organise better inter-agency cooperation
and coordination on I.S. matters by late 1948, pressed for
improvements in colonial intelligence arrangements, and
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together with the Overseas Defence Committee, undertook a
concerted effort to devise new COIN guidance by the spring of
1949.
The CINCFELF readily referred to previous I.S. experience
to devise COIN action, Major-General Ritchie having surveyed
the activities of armed communists in Burma, China and Greece.
The Army's initial reaction to the Malayan guerillas was to
implement large scale/unit operations and short jungle patrols,
and their lack of swift, tangible military success has
overshadowed progressive British COIN thinking and given rise
to blanket criticism of British soldiers by historians. But
within weeks high level Army authorities in the Far East not
only reaffirmed well-known tactical policies, but vouched for
the Clear-and-Hold military-security strategy, population
relocation, and an unorthodox counterguerilla force operating
both independently and in major security force offensives.
Senior commanders' knowledge of wartime unorthodox units and
Greek COIN featured in their calculations, and although at
first local officers in the field were slow to adopt air
support for jungle patrols, many units experimented with
extended small unit patrolling and later with air supply,
encouraged by recent operations in Burma and guidance from the
General and local army HQs. But, they did not give a strong
lead on tactical policy, resulting in erratic rather than
universal progress towards a new small unit area patrol policy.
They continued to support major operations, especially
against large communist forces, and numerous individual
commanders believed that these tactics were the key to counter-
guerilla success. Indeed, the War Office traditionalists
encouraged the demise of the Ferret Force, and large scale
operations were only slowly rejected as officers experienced
their shortcomings time and time again in practice. But small
unit patrolling was increasingly practiced from late 1948, and
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following his visit to Greece in March 1949, Field-Marshal Slim
recommended substantially enlarged Greek 'commando' forces,
and counterorganisation relocation. The CIGS's support for
counterguerilla tactical adaptation must have encouraged its
proponents in the British Army, and a fortnight later, backed
by the Colonial Office and the Cabinet, the DM0 asked Ritchie
whether he required a 'Commando'-type force. Indeed, the War
Office sought COIN lessons and approved of tactical refinement
based on operational experience, although without explicitly
rejecting old I.S. policies and doctrine. Its new I.S. manual
of June 1949, two and a half years in the making, incorporated
several important COIN lessons drawn from Palestine, Greece and
Malaya, including counterorganisation, population protection
guards, better intelligence organisation and processing, and
counterpropaganda. Furthermore, it advocated intelligence-based
patrolling, disparaged military action for the sake of it, and,
unlike prewar doctrine, did not emphasise 'Drives'. But the
Notes were not distributed for another six months because of
debate between Whitehall officials about British I.S. doctrine,
which resulted in the general acceptance of ideas enunciated by
Sir Henry Gurney.
By December 1948, there was concensus among high level
Malayan political and military authorities that a politico-
military campaign was required, and in 1949 the Army took the
original step of initiating military civic action programmes.
Moreover, Gurney set about gradually moving away from the Cost-
Benefit I.S. line and developing new COIN political action. He
combined his first-hand knowledge of I.S. with an analysis of
wartime partisan movements and recent British COIN campaigning
to derive COIN lessons and devise policies, and this was the
most sophisticated example so far of British actors utilising
historical experience for COIN purposes. He concluded that
civic action and counterpropaganda programmes were essential,
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and summarised his proposals in a Despatch to London in May
1949. This was praised by officials in both the Far East and in
Whitehall, and the pamphlet was distributed across the Empire
by the spring of 1950, laying the basis for the Hearts-and-
Minds COIN line.
The War Office continued to review Malayan events and to
receive tactical lessons during 1949. But its new Notes,
distributed in early 1950, neither provided details about small
unit patrolling, nor rejected large scale/unit tactics. Indeed,
most commanding officers who arrived in Malaya in 1949 were
World War Two veterans, and they naturally preferred large
scale operations, as did the staff of Major-General Urquhart,
the new GOC from March 1950. Nevertheless, many units refined
small unit tactics, and while the War Office DMT was not
inclined to officially adopt a new counterguerilla tactical
policy, the DM0 sponsored the formation of a small SAS counter-
guerilla force in 1950. It was not convinced of the need for a
larger SAS capable of responding to insurgency anywhere in the
Empire, but the Malaya Scouts nearly doubled in size in 1951.
Moreover, the War Office accepted the value of advice on small
unit tactics and techniques from former Australian guerillas
and British SOE men, in a similar manner to the DMO's
application of wartime experience to develop small unit tactics
in Palestine in 1947.
Colonial Office and War Office officials discussed COIN
organisational arrangements in early 1950, and supported the
appointment of a Director of Operations to oversee security
force activities. This was a major departure in British I.S.
5. The SAS expanded from 142 in 1950, to approx. 250, in, W.
Elliot, COSC note, 13 June, DEFE11/37; COS(5O)184, 23 Nov.
1950, DEFE11/42.
-372-
organisation and followed growing criticism of the ineffective
higher direction of operations. General Briggs applied his own
expertise to refine the Malayan committee structure, creating
central and local tripartite operational committees throughout
the Federation to improve inter-agency cooperation and
coordination, following the example set in Burma during the
1930s/40s. He also drew on his I.S. knowledge to support both
large scale operations and small unit patrolling, but following
the continuing failure of major operations in the summer of
1950, he considered the possible benefits of concentrating on
the latter. In November, he recommended more small unit
intelligence-based area patrolling, giving high level
encouragement to the army's gradual progress towards a
paraguerilla policy. However, he could not ensure that all
units adopted his proposals, and the continuing lack of contact
information and some commanders' firm conviction that large
scale offensive action was the best counterguerilla tactical
policy conspired to prevent a rapid and wholesale
reorientation of tactics. Nevertheless, the majority of
military operations during 1951 consisted of small unit patrol
and ambush, and in 1952 these tactics were refined by units
extending the duration of their patrols and improving their
manipulation of intelligence. Paraguerilla patrolling became
the main tactical policy, and the army 'CATOM' manual of 1952
relegated large scale operations and emphasised sustained small
unit action, hence altering the British Army's long-established
counterguerilla approach.
In 1953, a version of the Malaya army doctrine was
produced for use in Kenya, and although individual British
officers fighting in later campaigns often drew on the Army's
pervasive I.S. 'general knowledge', the assimilation of new
COIN ideas throughout such a bureaucratically inept and
conservative institution was bound to take a considerable time.
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The War Office did not reject familiar 1.5. tactical policies
at a stroke, but new counterguerilla strategy and tactics had
been formulated by 1952. Furthermore, although senior officers
in the Far East emphasised the military-security effort in late
1950, the importance of reorienting the State's campaign away
from the Cost-Benefit I.S. line was accepted within all COIN
agencies.
Gurney gradually introduced more COIN political action
after 1949, and the Overseas Defence Committee was anxious that
other colonial administrations should be made aware of Malayan
advances. This third postwar British COIN involvement, within
the wider context of the Cold War, clearly encouraged the
Committee to press British COIN authorities to improve their
I.S. preparations. The Colonial Office in particular tried to
sponsor the high level exchange of I.S.-related information
concerning police, propaganda and intelligence matters in 1949,
and recommended the adoption of Malayan lessons. The structure
of the imperial system allowed it to guide local civil COIN
authorities with ease, while the War Office was more
constrained by its traditional system of predelegating
responsibility for I.S. matters to the lower echelons of the
Army. In May 1950, the Colonial Office offered a new universal
Hearts-and-Minds COIN doctrine, embodied in the 'I.S.- Lessons'
pamphlet and the Gurney Despatch. These outlined counter-
organisation, counterpropaganda, relocation, counterterrorist
guards, civic action, military-security details, a committee
organisation and- if it was considered necessary- a Director of
Operations.
The Foreign and Colonial Offices also drew on French COIN
in Indo-China to suggest the appointment of a suprerno by early
1951. The idea of a soldier dictating civil affairs is alien to
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the British political tradition, 6
 but a combined civil-military
supremo was considered necessary to ensure that desired changes
in COIN policy were carried out. Major-General Ternpler was
selected for this post in 1952, based on his relevant
experience. The procedure of employing 'experts' for vital COIN
positions was firmly established among high level British
authorities, and was reinforced by Templer in Malaya, and
subsequently by other British officials in later COIN
campaigns. 7
 Templer encouraged the local refinement of policies
and ordered improved training and indoctrination of the State's
forces, including new lessons regarding food control,
resettlement, civic action and small unit methods, all of which
were incorporated into the 'CATOM' manual in 1952.
Despite the limitations of the British bureaucratic-
political system, which meant that no one central body was
responsible for collating, analysing and developing COIN
knowledge into a single universal doctrinal work, the various
British agencies involved in COIN had learnt a wealth of
lessons by 1952, and attempted to disseminate these throughout
the I.S. organs of the Empire. The metamorphosis of I.S. wisdom
built up over decades could not occur over-night, and lessons
were not always universally applied in COIN during the 1950s.
But, the creation of a new set of dedicated COIN policies and
doctrine in the few years immediately following the War was a
substantial achievement by those innovative and perceptive
British counterinsurgents who adapted and devised new COIN
ideas. Indeed, their work during this period has proven to be
the most crucial period of COIN development in history.
6. On British attitudes to military rule, Townshend Civil
P.15.
7. For example, Gen. Harding became the DO in Cyprus in 1955.
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Appendix 1:
Notes on fifty of the principal characters involved in
British COIN, 1.945-52.
Field-Marshal Harold R.L.G. 	 Alexander
As SAC Med., Alexander was interested in Greek I.S. in
1945, and proposed an innovative counterguerilla strategy.
He had served on the North-West Frontier, 1935, as GOC,
Burma, 1942, and he supported wartime unorthodox forces.
Lieutenant-General Sir Evelyn H. Barker
The GOC, Palestine, 1946-7. He had fought in the War, yet
was more supportive of COIN political action than his
superiors who wanted the old style of stern I.S. military
repression.
Ernest Bevin, M.P.
The Foreign Secretary, 1945-51, Bevin supported counter-
guerilla tactical development in Greece in late 1947, on
the basis of existing British I.S. practices and wartime
experience. He also urged that British 1.5. experts should
be employed to devise COIN schemes in Greece, and the War
Office sent new advisors there three months later.
Further, Bevin helped convince the Cabinet to allow
Britons to secretly undertake COIN operational advisory
tasks in Greece during 1947 and 1948.
Major-General Charles H. Bouc.her
The GOC, Malaya, 1948-50, he had served before the War on
the Frontier, and after it in Greece, 1945-6, and India,
1946-7. He initially advocated the Cost-Benefit I.S. line
for COIN, but accepted that small unit patrol and ambush
might be valuable for jungle counterguerilla war, and
proposed the formation of an unorthodox COIN force. Its
missions were similar to those of the Greek 'commandos'
formed in 1946. He supported the Clear-and-Hold strategy
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in 1949, and recommended that the Army concentrate its
efforts on small unit patrolling in 1950. Boucher also
established a basic structure of civil-military-police
committees in Malaya during 1949 and 1950.
Major-General Sir Harold Briggs
Appointed as the Malayan Director of Operations in 1950
for twelve months- his contract was extended for another
nine- Briggs was selected by Slim upon the basis of his
counterguerilla experience as GOC, Burma, 1945-8. He
adopted Burmese organisational arrangements in Malaya, but
became disillusioned with the large scale operations that
had succeeded in Burma and recommended more small unit
area patrolling. He also supported Gurney's gradual
reorientation of the government's I.S. line from coercive
measures to COIN political action.
Field-Marshal Alan F. Brooke
As the CIGS, 1941-6, he supported the traditional I.S.
line in both Greece and Palestine. His main interest was
in conventional warfare, having spent much of the interwar
years in the War Office and Staff Colleges.
Colonel J. Mike Calvert
During the Second World War, Calvert formed the regular
guerilla 'V Force', and referred to prewar guerilla
campaigns in a bid to devise effective tactics. He became
a Chindit commander and fought under Wingate in 1944.
During 1945-6, he pressed the War Office and senior army
officers to retain a SAS force, in order to fulfil unusual
military tasks, notably COIN, in the future. In 1950 he
was selected by the WO to organise a Malaya SAS force.
Winston S. Churchill, M.P.
Churchill served in the South African War, and maintained
his interest in guerillas: as the Prime Minister, 1940-5,
he supported the creation of various types of unorthodox
military units, (then called 'special forces'). During his
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second premiership, Churchill authorised the expansion of
22 SAS and appointed a suprerno in 1952.
Sir Arthur Creech-Jones
The Colonial Secretary, 1946-50, Creech-Jones backed the
formation of special police units in Palestine in 1947.
Furthermore, he encouraged the transfer of E.S. experts
between colonies in order for them to advise on COIN
policing matters, and this became a COIN principle by
1948. During that year and the next, he urged colonial
governments to adopt improved intelligence, policing and
propaganda techniques, and to exchange I.S. lessons.
General Sir John T. Crocker
The CINCMELF, 1947-50, he had fought in Europe during
1944-5. In 1947/8, he accepted that a politico-military
campaign was needed in Greece, and he supported fresh
ideas such as the Clear-and-Hold strategy and counter-
terrorist Home Guards.
General Sir Alan G. Cunningham
The High Commissioner of Palestine, 1945-8. He was GOC,
Northern Ireland, 1943-4, and served in the UK for the
rest of the War. He approved of a new tripartite committee
system, and tried to improve policing in the mandate by
requesting expert assistance from the Colonial Office in
1946. He also agreed to an experiment with unorthodox
forces in 1947. Furthermore, he frequently pressed London
to adopt COIN political action in preference to
repression.
Lieutenant-General John D'Arcy
The COG, Palestine, 1944-6, D'Arcy had fought irregulars
on the Frontier, 1930-1, and commanded an armoured
division, 1939-44. He referred to British I.S. history in
an attempt to glean COIN lessons, but found nothing of
value in interwar campaigns in Ireland and Palestine.
Thus, he advocated familiar tactical military-security
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policies.
Major-General Sir Miles C. Dempsey
The CINCMELF, 1946-7, Dempsey was one of the Army's most
ardent advocates of Cost-Benefit COIN. His most recent
active service was in Europe, but his enthusiasm for time-
honoured I.S. measures derived from his witnessing their
success against irregulars in Mesopotamia, 1919-20, and in
French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies, 1945-6.
Major-General Ernest E. Down
Commander of the BMM(G), 1948-50, Down was selected by
London for his knowledge of Greek conditions, having been
in command of the Fourth British Division and GOC, BTG,
since 1946. He pressed for Clear-and-Hold operations by
air-supported small units and rejected encirciements in
1948. The Chiefs of Staff agreed with his counterguerilla
proposals.
Captain Roy Farran
An ex-SAS officer, Farran was specially employed by the
Colonial Office to lead a police unit experimenting with
unusual tactics in Palestine. In 1947 he was accused of
killing an LZL propagandist. He fled to Syria, causing a
diplomatic incident and a political furore, which, despite
his trial and acquittal in December 1947, undoubtedly
harmed the cause of those hoping to develop COIN small
unit tactics.
Major Bernard E. Fergusson
Fergusson was an Assistant Inspector-General of the
Palestine Police, 1946-8, and in 1947 his superior,
Colonel Gray, asked him to develop new military-security
methods. He tried to apply his Chindit and SAS experience,
and assisted by the DM0, the SIS and the Colonial Office,
formed special police units that developed tactics based
on wartime unorthodox techniques, from March to May 1947.
Lieutenant-General Richard N. Gale
-380-
Gale commanded the First Infantry Division in Palestine,
1946-8, and from the spring of 1947 he sponsored increased
army small unit patrolling and ambushing, following a
proposal to adopt these tactics by the Police Inspector-.
General. These operations did not produce dramatic
successes, but when he was the Director-General of
Military Training, 1949-52, Gale ensured that it kept up
to date with Malayan tactical lessons, and that general
I.S. instruction in the UK was adjusted accordingly.
Lieutenant-Colonel W. Nicol Gray
The Inspector-General of the Palestine Police, 1946-8,
Gray was chosen by the Colonial Office because of his
background as a training specialist and Royal Marine
Commando, 1939-46. He was an exponent of unusual military
tactics and the driving force behind the formation of
unorthodox police groups in 1947, and the subsequent
development of small unit tactics. In 1948, the Colonial
Office chose him for another COIN task, this time as
Malayan Police Commissioner. He concentrated on reshaping
the police for jungle counterguerilla war, but his
persistent disagreements with army officers about the
correct COIN roles and methods of the police and army
eventually led to his forced resignation in early 1952.
Hugh C. Greene
Appointed Head of the Emergency Information Service in
Malaya in 1951, Greene was one of several specially
selected experts employed there. Prior to this, he worked
for the Broadcasting Department in the British zone of
occupied Germany, 1946-8, and then with the BBC East
European Service, 1949-50. In Malaya he devised new types
of propaganda, manipulating both human and media resources
in original ways.
Major-General Sir Cohn H. Gubbins
Gubbins studied previous guerilla campaigns at the 1O from
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1939, and wrote official pamphlets on it. He had served as
a major in Ireland, 1921-2, and then on the Frontier in
the late 1930s. He was a central figure behind the
development of SOE and wartime clandestine resistance.
Sir Henry Gurney
Gurney was Palestine Chief-Secretary, 1946-8, and had
worked in colonial government in interwar Kenya and
Jamaica, wartime East Africa, and the Gold Coast, 1944-6.
But it was mainly his experience of postwar COIN that held
him in good stead for his service as High Commissioner of
Malaya, 1948-51. Malcolm MacDonald noted that Colonial
Office officials considering candidates for this position
would undoubtedly bear in mind Gurney's commitment to
political development and nation-building. This must have
been reinforced by the failure of repression in Palestine
in 1947. Gurney also studied wartime undergrounds and
Greek COIN, concluding that COIN political action and
relocation were essential. He imposed some familiar
coercive I.S. policies but progressively sponsored more
civic action after 1949. His ideas were enshrined in a new
universal COIN doctrine in 1950, and he is the founding
father of the Hearts-and-Minds COIN line.
General A.F. John Harding
The CINCFELF, 1949-51, Harding had a conventional war
background but accepted the value of undertaking more
small unit operations in Malaya after 1950, and was
instrumental in achieving the formation of SAS jungle
units and the appointment of a Director of Operations.
Brigadier Robert C.0. Hedley
A formation commander in Malaya, 1948-51, he was one of
those officers who encouraged trials in small unit
patrolling after the failure of large scale operations in
1948, and in the following year fostered the refinement
of these tactics. He had fought traditional irregulars on
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the Frontier, 1923-4/1930, but also served in Burma, 1942-
5, and the Dutch East Indies, 1946, which evidently made
him well disposed to jungle small unit operations.
J.C.F. Holland
A veteran of Irish COIN, Holland chose to study previous
guerilla wars at General Staff(Research) in 1938, and
pursued his interest with the WO MI(Research) section in
1939. In 1940, he suggested 'Commando' forces, the SOE and
deception services, which inspired numerous COIN ideas.
Sir William Jenkin
Jenkin served with the Indian police from 1919 and became
Deputy-Director of Indian Central Intelligence. In 1948 he
suggested improvements to MPF practices, and was selected
by the Colonial Office as CID Advisor to the Federation in
1950, and soon afterwards as the CID chief.
A. Kellar
Kellar was one of M15's key advisors to the British
security forces on COIN police and intelligence matters.
He advised the authorities in Palestine, 1946, and in
Malaya, 1948, and then assessed the COIN situation in
Greece for the Foreign Office in 1949.
Brigadier John M. Kirkrnan
Kirkman served with the BMM(G), 1945, MEFHQ, 1946, as the
HQPa1. Chief of Staff, 1947, and in the same position at
the HQFELF, 1948. He distributed 'lessons' of the 1936-9
campaign to units in Palestine in 1947, and he almost
certainly encouraged FELF staff to compare communist
rebels in Greece and Malaya in 1948, concurrent with
General Ritchie's study of the Greek conflict.
Malor-General Rob M.M. Lockhart
Lockhart was selected by Slim as the new Malaya Director
of Operations in 1951, partly because of his experience of
irregulars as the Governor of the Frontier in 1947.
Lockhart recommended the appointment of a supremo in 1951,
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and he became Deputy-Director of Operations in 1952 when
General Templer assumed command.
Malcolm MacDonald
MacDonald was Governor-General of the Malayan Union, 1946-
8, and Commissioner-General for South-East Asia, 1948-53.
In 1948 he acted swiftly to try to ensure that COIN was
properly organised and conducted, requesting the Colonial
Office to send 200 Palestine policemen to bolster the MPF,
and proposing an I.S. committee organisation. This
probably stemmed from an awareness of the recent Palestine
COIN, not least because he had been centrally involved
with I.S. affairs in the mandate during his term as the
Colonial Secretary, 1938-40.
Major-General Gordon H.A. MacMillan
The GOC, Palestine, 1947-8. He had fought in Europe during
the War, and was not inclined to encourage major tactical
development, instead approving the use of typical large
scale I.S. operations.
Field-Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery
Montgomery was instilled with traditional I.S. wisdom
before the Second World War, fighting irregulars in
Ireland, 1920-1, and Palestine, 1936-9. He was a leading
sceptic of wartime unorthodox forces, although he accepted
their relatively small scale use. As CIGS, 1946-8, he
continued to display an ambivalent attitude to unorthodoxy
in COIN. He supported the formation of a Greek 'commando'
force in 1946, but it had only 3000 men. The following
year, the SAS was resurrected, but as a Territorial
Regiment and without any express COIN role. Montgomery
championed familiar coercive military methods in Greece
and Palestine in 1946 and 1947, thereby discouraging the
development of new COIN ideas. The I.S. traditionalists in
the military establishment retained their dominance while
he was CIGS, and more progressive thought only burgeoned
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when Slim took over in late 1948.
John Morton
The Director of Intelligence, Malaya, 1952-4, Morton was
specially chosen by Templer because of his experience,
including work with Indian Central Intelligence from 1930,
and intelligence duties in Iraq, 1947-9.
Sir Clifford Norton
The British ambassador to Greece, 1946-50. After the
spring of 1947, he persistently told the Foreign Office
that COIN political action was required in Greece. He also
pressed London to allow the BMM(G) to advise the Greeks on
counterguerilla warfare, and he supported British army
proposals for tactical changes in 1947.
A.D.C. Peterson
The Director-General of the Information Service, Malaya,
1952-4, and another expert picked by Templer. He had been
employed at the Ministry of Information, 1940, and was the
Deputy-Director of Psywar at SEAC, 1944-6.
tajor-General Stuart B. Rawlins
Commander of the BMM(G), 1945-8, Rawlins had served in the
artillery during the Second World War, and held various
positions at the War Office and Staff Colleges before
that. He had only a secondary interest in COIN, and
advocated the traditional British I.S. line in Greece from
1945 to 1948. He refused to abandon his belief in large
scale offensives and ignored tactical advancements by the
British army in Greece after 1947.
Ma lor-General Neil M. Ritchie
The CINCFELF, 1947-9, and architect of the military
strategy and tactics adopted in Malaya after 1948. Ritchie
had served in North India, 1933-7, and Palestine, 1938-9,
where he gained I.S. experience, and he backed Stirling in
the formation of the SAS in 1941. At FELFHQ he pursued his
interest in irregulars, witnessing I.S. operations in
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Burma, 1947, and studying the communist campaigns in China
and Greece in 1948. He proposed Clear-and-Hold by area-
deployed forces practising both large scale offensives and
small unit patrolling, and also supported the formation of
a Jungle Guerilla Force, and population relocation.
Ritchie was willing to adapt policies in the light of
experience gained from Malaya and other postwar COIN.
Major-General Sir Ronald S. Scobie
The GOC, Greece, 1944-6, Scobie fought in the War, and
crushed a Greek communist rebellion over Christmas 1944-5
with heavy firepower. He advocated traditional British
I.S. wisdom as a basis for the I.S. training of the GNA.
Colonel Arthur C. Shortt
The Military Attache in Athens, 1947-9, Shortt informed
London about the BMM(G)'s lack of progress in developing
effective counterguerilla tactics. He urged the employment
of expert military advisors in 1948, and emphasised the
importance of Clear-and-Hold, relocation, and a politico-
military campaign. As Director of Military Intelligence,
1949-53, it is likely that, when briefing senior officers
bound for Malaya on the subject of communist insurgency,
he alluded to the Greek example.
Field-Marshal Sir William Slim
The CIGS from November 1948, Slim was more willing to
accept changes in Army I.S. policies than Montgomery. Slim
had fought traditional irregulars on the Frontier in the
1930s, but he also backed Wingate's employment of unusual
tactics and techniques in the Chindit expeditions in
Burma, 1943-4. He approved of the 'V Force' in 1943, and
the use of other regular guerillas in New Guinea. During
the Emergency, he supported the development of small unit
tactics and new policies based on experience gained from
Malaya, and also from Greece, where he had visited in
1949. In 1950, he picked General Briggs as the Director of
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Operations, and, in 1951, his successor, General Lockhart,
partly because of their experience of irregular opponents.
Major-General Sir Hugh Stockwell
Commander of the Sixth Airborne Division and GOC,
Palestine, 1947-8, and then GOC, Malaya, 1952-4.
Stockwell had fought in Burma, 1942-5, and was selected as
GOC, Malaya, by Templer, whom he had served with in the UK
in 1951. The GOC organised the writing of the 'CATOM' in
1952.
Major-General Gerald Templer
The Malayan High Commissioner and Director of Operations,
1952-4. His selection as supremo was based on his
experience of politico-military problems,	 including
service in Palestine, 1936-7, periods studying
unconventional war and intelligence matters at the WO
during and after the War, and first-hand involvement with
civil and police issues as Governor of the British zone of
occupied Germany, 1945-6. He consolidated the committee
structure in Malaya, ensured that lessons were learnt
throughout the COIN forces, and ordered the production of
new training and doctrine reflecting the Hearts-and-Minds
COIN line.
Air Commodore Sir Geoffrey Tuttle
The AOC, Greece, 1946-9, Tuttle spent the War years
concentrating on France and proposed air supply for land
forces. In Greece during October 1946 he advocated
significant COIN tactical advances including air supply
for patrols and air fire-support missions.
Major-General Robert E. Urguhart
The GOC, Malaya, 1950-2, Urquhart was chosen as a
temporary replacement for Boucher. Urquhart served in
India, 1938-40, North Africa and Europe during the War,
and then in the UK, and his experience had not made him
inclined to favour counterguerilla tactical development.
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He adhered to familiar I.S. wisdom after 1950.
Major-General D. Ashton L. Wade
The GOC, Malaya, 1947-8, Wade was replaced in the opening
days of the Emergency by Boucher. From 1937 to 1947 Wade
served in India, including a spell on the Frontier. In
mid-1948 he advocated traditional large scale offensives,
but also short-duration jungle small unit patrolling. Both
types of tactics were practiced in Malaya from 1948.
Lieutenant-Colonel Walter Walker
Walker served in Waziristan, 1939-41, and Burma, 1942/
1944-6. He encountered traditional colonial irregulars,
but also endured jungle warfare, and he combined these
experiences into instruction at the FTC, where he was the
Commandant, 1948-50. He encouraged tactical adaptation
based on operational experience, and recommended the
adoption of both short small unit patrols and large scale
operations. But he emphasised patrolling after 1949, and
oversaw the writing of the CATOM manual in 1952.
Lieutenant R.P.P. Westerling
Westerling served in the Commandos, Chindits and SOE, and
was in the first Allied group parachuted into the Dutch
East Indies in 1945. He set up local irregular security
units, and continued to train for small unit patrolling in
1946, under the auspices of the British army HQ. However,
his senior officers disagreed with some of his more
distasteful methods. After the British left in November
1946, Westerling expanded his activities with the Royal
Dutch Army, carrying out mass summary executions of
suspected insurgents/supporters from 1947 to 1949.
Major-General Lashmer G. Whistler
Commander of the Third Infantry Division in Palestine,
1945-6, Whistler had served there before, 1936-7. Despite
his grounding in traditional I.S. practices, he proposed
the development of new tactics in 1946, taking inspiration
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from the Commandos.
Major-General Sir Charles E. Wickham
Head of the BPPM, Greece, 1945-50, Wickham was selected by
the Foreign Office because of his I.S. experience. He had
served in the South African War, with the RIC, 1920-1, and
then the RIJC, becoming its Chief-Constable just before the
War. The Colonial Office also utilised his expertise for
the restructuring of the PPF in 1946. He sponsored police
area-deployment in Greece after 1945, and emphasised COIN
civil policing and intelligence duties rather than
paramilitary activities. He also supported COIN political
action in Greece in 1947 and 1948.
Major-General Orde Wingate
Wingate grappled with Palestinian Arab rebels, 1937-9, and
set up the SNS to pre-empt attacks. In 1941, he organised
the guerilla 'Gideon Force' in Eritrea as an adjunct to
conventional offensives. He then applied his Middle East
experiences to Burma, where he planned the Chindit
expeditions of 1943-4, including guerilla operations and
air-supplied patrolling.
Sir Arthur E. Young
The Malayan Police Commissioner, 1952-4, Young was chosen
to replace Gray by the Colonial Secretary, in view of his
varied background. Young had been in constabularies in
Britain from the 1920s to 1941, in Allied Italy, 1943-5,
and in occupied Germany and the UK after the War. He was
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The main focus of the thesis is on postwar COIN in
Palestine, Greece, and Malaya, and analysis of these campaigns
is based on a comprehensive study of all relevant UK archives,
public and private, including previously neglected sources.
Those of greatest import in regard to Palestine were in the War
and Colonial Office files at the Public Record Office, Kew.
Foreign Office records on the mandate were not consulted for
COIN material, in the light of Foreign Office subject Indexes,
and the work on the Palestine insurgency of D. Charters. 1 All
the available files in the PRO regarding Greece were used,
including Foreign Office records, although many of those of the
War Office have been 'weeded' or remain closed. American
archives containing documents about British action in Greece
were examined by H. Jones, while Greek archives are closed
until 1997 and beyond. 2 All UK Malaya records were similarly
utilised, although War and Colonial Office files at the PRO
again proved to be the most useful. Malaysian collections were
examined by Short. 3 Finally, some reports previously in
regimental museums are no longer available, 4 while other
previously neglected sources have come to light.
1. Dr. D. Charters, letter, 9 May 1990: author of The British
Army and the Jewish insurgency in Palestine, 1945-47
2. El. Jones P.xi.
3. A. Short The communist insurrection in Malaya, 1948-60
4. For example, T. Mockaitis British counterinsurgency 1919-
60 M/s, (1989), Bibliography, notes a 1950 army report at
the Devonshire Regimental Museum. This is no longer
retained, L.J. Murphy, letter, 11 Dec. 1990.
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